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This dissertation analyses specific privacy problems arising from the surveillance of 
public spaces. It studies the scope and limitations of the human right to privacy and a 
right to personal data protection in light of advanced surveillance and security 
technologies. The main research question therefore asks how the existing European 
fundamental rights to privacy and data protection address increasing surveillance and 
the unprecedented surveillance capabilities of public spaces in Europe.  
This study is divided into two main parts. After introducing the research problem and 
a descriptive discussion of existing and future surveillance technologies, the first part 
discusses the theoretical conceptions behind this research, namely the concept of 
public space, privacy, data protection and security. Part two of this study then 
discusses four more specific issues in relation to public space surveillance: 
Individually targeted surveillance, mass surveillance, surveillance done by private 
actors, automation of surveillance, and incident prediction.  
In order to address the research question, this study analyses existing legislation, 
jurisprudence and specific cases. The overall framework for analyses is derived from 
a fictional urban surveillance scenario, representing a large European city. This 
surveillance scenario serves as an anchor point to identify central problems and issues 
for further fundamental rights based analyses. In that sense, this study uses legal and 
critical analyses of a specific scenario in order to identify existing, but also potential 
future legal problems arising from sophisticated public space surveillance.  
This study consequently identifies several ways to address public space surveillance 
from a European fundamental rights perspective. The analyses of a right to privacy 
and a right to personal data protection show that the European system of fundamental 
rights protection is very well capable of addressing legal problems arising from public 
surveillance. However, there is a lack of available case law dealing with complex 
technological surveillance in Europe. This study therefore distils two main approaches 
for addressing public surveillance: The first approach is based on individual freedom, 
relying on the legitimate expectations of legal subjects, the second, which is derived 
from human dignity and personality rights, challenges the communal effects of 
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surveillance. Each approach comes with a fundamentally opposite take on public 
surveillance. Furthermore, this study shows, how data protection functions as a gap-
filler between the two approaches. In its conclusion, this study therefore illustrates 
several ways to address public space surveillance, and it shows that there is a series of 
legal problems arising from sophisticated technological surveillance, which require a 








This dissertation is the result of several years of research at the Faculty of Law at the 
University of Helsinki. I am grateful to the many people whose help, both direct and 
indirect, contributed to this work. I am lucky to have benefited from wonderful 
colleagues, research communities, friends and family who, in one or the other way, 
through their support, comments, encouragement, or excellent belay skills, made this 
dissertation possible. 
I would like to especially thank my doctoral supervisor, Kaarlo Tuori, for his 
mentorship and the many forms of support and encouragement. I am grateful to 
Professor Iain Cameron for doing me the honour of acting as the opponent and as one 
of the pre-examiners for this dissertation. Many thanks go to Juha Lavapuro for his 
contribution as pre-examiner. I also owe a debt of thanks to Tuomas Ojanen and 
Susanna Lindroos-Hovinheimo for their extremely valuable comments and 
constructive critique of this work.  
I am thankful to Kimmo Nuotio, the Dean of the Faculty of Law, for his continuous 
support and encouragement. Warm thank you is due to Pia Letto-Vanamo for being a 
fair, caring and encouraging superior during my employment at the Faculty of Law. I 
also want to thank Jarna Petman for her role as the coordinator of the discipline of 
international law, as well as her support and encouragement.   
This dissertation could not have been completed without the variety of stimulating 
research environments and communities that I have had the honour of being a part of 
during the years.  
Particularly the Centre of Excellence in Foundations of European Law and Polity 
Research and its members provided a welcoming research environment and an 
excellent platform to discuss the first ideas for this work. 
I additionally want to thank Sakari Melander and the members of the project Criminal 
Law Under Pressure in Helsinki, Professor Martin Scheinin and the members of the 
SURVEILLE-Project at the European University Institute, the Members of the 
Research Consortium Laws of Surveillance and Security (LOSS) in Helsinki and 
Turku, the Young Nordic Police Research Network in Oslo, the IACL Research Group 
	 vi	
Constitutional Responses to Terrorism, and the Research Project Digital Health 
Revolution II at Aalto University. They all provided platforms for presentations and 
discussions, and fostered the creation of many friendships.  
I would like to particularly acknowledge the growing information law community at 
the University of Helsinki, and here the Fundamental Rights, Privacy and Security 
(FUPS) research group, spearheaded by Tobias Bräutigam, Samuli Miettinen, Niklas 
Vainio, Olli Pitkänen, Anette Alén-Savikko, and Päivi Korpisaari.  
I am very grateful to the Academy of Finland funded Graduate School Law in a 
Changing World (LCW) at the University of Helsinki, both for funding the majority 
of this research, as well as for generating a creative research environment for Doctoral 
Candidates at the Faculty of Law. This work received further financial support from 
the Research Foundation of the University of Helsinki and the Scandinavian Research 
Council for Criminology.  
A special thanks goes to the colleagues and friends and their invaluable contributions 
throughout the years, especially Silke Trommer, Søren Berg-Rasmussen, Heikki 
Marjosola, Suvi Sankari, Fernando Losada, Klaus Tuori, and Eliška Pírková.  
Finally, the deepest thanks go to my family and friends for their love and support. To 
my parents, who have always been supporting me in all possible ways. And to my 
wife, who brings meaning, motivation, and balance into my life, throughout good and 
bad times.  
 







1.1 Background .................................................................................................. 3
1.2 Research objectives and main research question ......................................... 7
1.3 Methodology ................................................................................................ 9
1.4 Structure ..................................................................................................... 16
1.5 Technology and Surveillance Scenario ...................................................... 18
1.5.1 Video Surveillance ................................................................................. 20
1.5.1.1 Purposes and Promises of Video Surveillance ............................. 22
1.5.1.2 Smart Surveillance and Video Content Analytics (VCA) ............ 24
1.5.1.3 Mobile Cameras and Aerial Surveillance ..................................... 28
1.5.2 Ubiquitous Sensors and Networks ......................................................... 31
1.5.3 Biometrics .............................................................................................. 32
1.6 The Urban Surveillance Scenario .............................................................. 35 
 
2.1 ‘Private’ and ‘Public’ Physical Space ........................................................ 39
2.2 Privacy as a Legal Concept ........................................................................ 46
2.2.1 Privacy as the Right to Be Let Alone ..................................................... 46
2.2.2 Privacy and Torts ................................................................................... 49
2.2.3 Privacy as Control of Information ......................................................... 52
2.2.4 Privacy as Limited Access to the Self .................................................... 57
2.2.5 Intimacy and Secrecy ............................................................................. 60
2.2.6 Privacy, Dignity, and the Right to Personality ...................................... 65
2.2.7 Privacy in Public .................................................................................... 71
2.3 Data Protection and Information Law ........................................................ 85
2.3.1 The Emergence of Data Protection in Europe ....................................... 85
2.3.1.1 Data Protection in the International Sphere. ................................. 91
2.3.1.2 The Sources of Data Protection in Europe ................................... 92
2.3.1.3 Data Protection in the EU ............................................................. 94
2.3.2 Data Protection as a Fundamental Right? .............................................. 96
2.3.3 Conclusion ........................................................................................... 102
2.4 Security .................................................................................................... 104
2.4.1 Security and the Law ........................................................................... 107
2.4.2 Public Surveillance and Security ......................................................... 109
2.4.3 The Right to Security ........................................................................... 109
2.4.3.1 The ECHR and a Right to Security ............................................ 110
2.4.3.2 The EU and a Right to Security .................................................. 114
2.4.4 Conclusion ........................................................................................... 116
2.5 Limiting Mechanisms to Fundamental Rights ......................................... 118
2.5.1 Limitations of the International Human Right to Privacy and Data 
Protection ............................................................................................. 118
2.5.2 Permissible Limitations in the ECHR .................................................. 126
2.5.3 Permissible Limitations in the EUCFR................................................ 133 
 
3.1 Targeted Public Surveillance ................................................................... 145
3.1.1 The Scope of a Right to Privacy in Public ........................................... 146
3.1.1.1 Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in Public and the ECHR ... 153
3.1.1.2 Covert and Overt Public Surveillance ........................................ 162
3.1.2 Personal Information and Surveillance ................................................ 166
3.1.2.1 The Definition of Personal Data ................................................. 169
3.1.2.2 The General Principles of Data Protection ................................. 174
3.1.2.3 Data Protection in the Scope of the ECHR ................................. 179
3.1.2.4 Data Protection Issues in the Scenario ....................................... 190
3.1.2.4.1 Systematic Collection ............................................................. 191
3.1.2.4.2 Data Quality ........................................................................... 193
3.1.2.4.3 Data Retention ........................................................................ 195
3.1.3 Conclusion ........................................................................................... 197
3.2 Mass Surveillance .................................................................................... 200
3.2.1 Distinguishing Mass Surveillance from Targeted Surveillance ........... 202
3.2.2 Mass Surveillance and Privacy ............................................................ 204
3.2.2.1 Admissibility and Victim Status in ECHR Mass Surveillance 
Cases ................................................................................................ 205
3.2.2.1.1 Challenging Mass Surveillance in abstracto .......................... 210
3.2.2.1.2 The Victim-Status Test ........................................................... 212
3.2.2.2 Fundamental Rights Arguments against Mass Surveillance ...... 215
3.2.2.2.1 Mass Surveillance and the Scope of Privacy ......................... 215
3.2.2.2.2 Mass Surveillance as a ‘Menace to Society’ .......................... 219
3.2.2.2.3 The Right to Establish Relationships with the Outside 
World. ..................................................................................... 221
3.2.3 Mass Surveillance and Data Protection ............................................... 223
3.2.3.1 The Scope of Data Protection ..................................................... 225
3.2.3.2 Big Data ...................................................................................... 226
3.2.3.3 Big Data, Societal data and Data Protection Principles .............. 232
3.2.3.4 Applicability of EU Data Protection to Mass Surveillance ........ 234
3.2.4 Mass Surveillance and Dignity ............................................................ 239
3.2.4.1 Personal Autonomy and Self-Determination .............................. 240
3.2.4.2 Dignity and State Surveillance ................................................... 243
3.2.4.3 EU, Dignity and Surveillance ..................................................... 246
3.2.5 Conclusion ........................................................................................... 247
3.3 Private Actor Surveillance Operations ..................................................... 249
3.3.1 Private Actors and Fundamental Rights .............................................. 249
3.3.2 Private Surveillance Operations in Public Areas ................................. 250
3.3.3 Conclusion ........................................................................................... 260
3.4 Automation and Prediction ...................................................................... 262
3.4.1 Automation .......................................................................................... 262










ACLU  American Civil Liberties Union 
ACM  Association for Computing Machinery 
ADAPTS  Automatic Detection of Abnormal Behaviour and Threats 
in crowded Spaces 
ANPR  Automatic number plate recognition 
App Application 
ARGUS-IS Autonomous Real-Time Ground Ubiquitous Surveillance 
Imaging System 
Art  Article 
Az  Aktenzeichen  
BayRS Bayerische Rechtssammlung 




BSIA British Security Industry Association 
BVerfG  Bundesverfassungsgericht 
BVerfGE  Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 
CoE  Council of Europe  
CUP  Cambridge University Press 
D Deliverable 
DARPA  Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
DHS Department of Homeland Security 
DNA Deoxyribonucleic Acid 
DPA  Data Protection Authority 
ECHR  European Convention of Human Rights 
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights  
ed  Editor 
edn Edition 
eds  Editors 
	 xi	
esp especially 
ETS European Treaty Series 
EU FP7 European Union Framework Program 7  
EUCFR  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
FCC German Federal Constitutional Court 
fn footnote 
FRA European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 
GCHQ  Government Communications Headquarters 
GDPR  General Data Protection Regulation  
HRC  UN Human Rights Committee  
IA Intelligent Analytics 
ICCPR  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICJ International Court of Justice 
ICT Information and Communications Technology 
INDECT  Intelligent information system supporting observation, 
searching and detection for security of citizens in urban 
environment 
IPS Intelligent Pedestrian Surveillance System 
ISTAG Information Society Technologies Advisory Group 
IVA  Intelligent Video Analytics  
MAD Militärischer Abschirmdienst  
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
NGO Non-governmental organization 
no Number 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 
OUP Oxford University Press  
PerSEAS  Persistent Stare Exploitation and Analysis System 
SIS Schengen Information System 
StVO  Straßenverkehrsordnung 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
UAV  Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
	 xii	
UDHR  Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
UK United Kingdom 
UN United Nations 
UNGA United Nations General Assembly 
UNTS United Nations Treaty Series 
US United States 
VCA  Video Content Analyses  
VCLT Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
Vol  Volume 
WAMI wide area motion imagery 
WP  Working Party 
WWW World Wide Web 
  
Prelude		
Imagine a sunny Saturday morning in early September. The sun is shining and a light 
warm breeze is coming from the seaside, a forerunner of a nice warm late summer day 
in a city somewhere in Northern Europe. You take a short glimpse at the clock on the 
kitchen wall, place the empty coffee mug in the dishwasher and prepare to leave your 
apartment in order to visit the nearest supermarket to get some groceries for the 
weekend. It is 09:53 am and the supermarkets should be open by the time you get 
there. You grab your keys, your mobile phone and the small thin leather wallet you 
got as a birthday present and you leave the house. The door locks behind you, making 
that familiar short squeaking sound as the small electronic motor locks the safety bolts 
of the door.  
As you walk down the stairs your phone suddenly sounds an alarm. You look at it and 
read on the screen: ‘Attention, you are leaving your home. I have switched off the 
coffee machine and the light in the bathroom for you.’ ‘Thanks’, you think, and at the 
same time you open your Application for your car on your phone. Yesterday, when 
you came home from work, the next available parking spot was over 800 meters away 
from your door and as you don’t feel like walking, you press the ‘pick me up’-button 
to order the car to come by itself.  
After a couple of minutes, it arrives, fully charged and ready to take you to the 
supermarket. ‘Good morning, your trip will be 7km, 13min driving time with barely 
any traffic’ sounds from the speakers of the car hi fi system while you enter and shortly 
after that: ‘do you want me to get you there?’ You think, ‘why not’, respond ‘yes’, and 
while the car noiselessly accelerates down the road, you open your favourite news 
application on the main dashboard screen. ‘I sense that you are in a good mood, shall 
I select some music from a relevant playlist for you?’ sounds from the car hi fi system. 
‘Yes’, you respond and your favourite music makes you feel even better than before.  
As you get closer to the supermarket, some advertising in the news-application catches 
your eye. ‘Fresh mussels from French Bretagne, today only 7.95 per kg’. You always 
love to prepare fresh mussels, especially when you have a good mood and it is a nice 
summer day. You start speaking: ‘Hey, can you get me those mussels, as well as some 
fresh celery, carrots, parsley and… is there still some white wine in the fridge?’. The 
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computer system responds immediately: ‘Yes, there is a bottle of white wine in the 
fridge and I will order your groceries.’ A couple of seconds later, the system gets back 
to you: ‘The supermarket confirms your orders, they can be picked up at the drive-by 
station at exit B of the supermarket parking hall. Thank you for your shopping. Please 
let me know if you need anything else. Have a wonderful day!’. You lean back and 
think, what a nice start of a day.  
This is science fiction. It is far from clear whether such a scenario will ever be reality. 
Today, in 2017, and at least this morning, my door lock was still mechanical, my car 
drives on dirty gasoline and my phone barely understands me when I want ‘Siri’ to 
text my wife that I’ll be home an hour later this evening. My fridge is still not 
connected to the internet although it’s been forecast since the 90s and I still have to 
actually physically walk into a supermarket to check if they sell mussels (which one 
shouldn’t buy if one is concerned with environmental and health issues). Yet, on the 
other hand, although my lock is still mechanic, the key carries a digital code which 
allows the lock to be physically opened. My car knows when its emissions are tested 
and cheats, and there are actually some electric cars out there which can drive on their 
own in certain situations – none of which are (yet) affordable for individuals from 
average income households. Also, my phone and all the installed applications collect 
large volume of data and although my fridge is not connected to the internet there are 
about 20 devices connected to my home router including phones, tablets, computers, 
TV, some receivers and lately even a LED lightbulb that can change colour, controlled 
bt my mobile phone. It seems, we are getting there. 
  
This thesis is about surveillance in public spaces. One might rightly ask what the 
scenario in above has to do with surveillance and furthermore why it is the prelude to 
this study on surveillance and law. The answer to this question is relatively simple: 
All those new services described above produce data. Data which essentially contains 
information of many sorts. This is not necessarily intended but it is just how it works. 
Computers create data as a ‘by-product’ in every operation they process. Bruce 
Schneier describes this phenomenon in his recent book Data and Goliath.1  
If technology, innovation and entrepreneurship strive for a scenario as the one above, 
a lot more sensors and devices will need to produce, collect, retain and process data. 
This data also needs to be shared more efficiently. Simply imagine the computer 
processes that need to happen when one wants to build a functional and safe system 
that warns one that the coffee machine is on when leaving home. There needs to be a 
network that enables those devices to somehow communicate. Some sensor needs to 
identify that the coffee machine is on, some others need to detect that a person is 
leaving, requiring location information. Then, there needs to be a system that 
processes those sensor data and makes the right conclusions. Also, the system should 
be secure, foremost against malfunction but also against external manipulation. In 
order to technically achieve such an operation, a lot of data needs to be collected and 
analysed, all automatically and in the background. Similarly, for vehicle automation, 
but much more complex and a broader scale. Automatic vehicles need to process a 
large quantity of sensor data and they will probably be networked. Many more 
examples of data processing in everyday contexts can be found in smart city designs 
and the digitalization of infrastructure.  
Scenarios as the one mentioned above require vast networking and communications 
between things, devices and people in society. In fact, everyday life will increasingly 
be accompanied by a vast and invisible web of communications and data flows. Those 
data flows, have been described as the Internet of Things, ubiquitous computing, and 
                                                
1 See Schneier B, Data and Goliath: the hidden battles to collect your data and control your world (W.W. 
Norton 2015), especially Chapter 1.  
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smart cities amongst other terms.2 All of those come with one issue: The data which 
is produced can be used to gather, retain and process information about individuals. 
Such information can literally tell everything about a person, including profiling and 
the prediction of likely future behaviour. In short, all data, even if collected as a by-
product, is extremely useful for surveillance purposes.  
Surveillance, as a buzzword, has become a major issue for democracies and law not 
at least with the public debates sparked by the revelations of excessive global 
surveillance practices through US military and intelligence agencies.3 David Lyon 
described such surveillance already in 2001 as ‘…any collection and processing of 
personal data, whether identifiable or not, for the purposes of influencing or managing 
those whose data has been garnered.’4 Surveillance therefore comes with the core 
purpose of controlling and coercing, or in order to gain advantages over an alleged 
opponent or competitor in the future.  
One of the reason why surveillance appears to have become omnipresent is, however, 
not only due to the ever-expanding capabilities of technologies and data processing, 
but also because of many alleged and perceived increased security concerns. The 
increasing fears of terror attacks in crowded public places, for example, have therefore 
paved the ways for more public surveillance. Both, the variations of attacks and the 
sophistication of the attackers appear to necessitate a wide array of security counter 
measures that reach from architectural alterations to the installation of highly 
sophisticated surveillance systems enabling control over vast public spaces. In fact, 
today’s tools for public surveillance have reached an unprecedented level of 
sophistication and surveillance capabilities, which promise to improve security 
perceptions. During recent years, surveillance capabilities have evolved dramatically.  
                                                
2  See e.g. De Hert P and others, ‘Legal Safeguards for Privacy and Data Protection in Ambient 
Intelligence’ (2008) 13 Personal and Ubiquitous Computing 435; Rouvroy A, ‘Privacy, Data 
Protection, and the Unprecedented Challenges of Ambient Intelligence’ (2008) 2 Studies in Ethics, Law 
and Technology 1; Edwards L, ‘Privacy, Security and Data Protection in Smart Cities: A Critical EU 
Law Perspective’ (2016) European Data Protection Law Review 28. 
3 See Greenwald G, No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the U.S. Surveillance State 
(Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt 2014); Georgieva I, ‘The Right to Privacy under Fire – Foreign 
Surveillance under the NSA and the GCHQ and Its Compatibility with Art. 17 ICCPR and Art. 8 
ECHR.’ (2015) Utrecht Journal of International and European Law 104. 
4 Lyon D, Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life (Open University Press 2001), 2. 
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Today, modern public surveillance systems include a variety of sensors such as video 
cameras, hyper sensitive microphones or radiation detectors and their 
interconnectedness allows for highly sophisticated processing of data. This enables 
the use of surveillance systems that can automatically detect incidents, recognize 
gunshots or explosions or track objects in real time. Additionally, they are integrated 
into modern centrally administered ‘smart’ cities. Soon, scenarios of such ‘smart’ 
surveillance systems could enable total control over public spaces, may that be a 
parking lot, a railway station or a whole city including its roads, public transport 
systems, shopping, leisure and commercial areas.  
Public places are of special concern for security authorities. With their general 
accessibility, openness and the inherent freedom in addition to the symbolisms they 
carry, public places are a focal point for both the bright and dark sides of societal life. 
Liberations and revolutions, but also atrocities and massacres are often associated with 
particular public spaces. Breaking highly organized, regulated and functional public 
spaces can be a tool to question existing or ruling powers in all its forms and shapes.5 
With this, the public space is an area of freedom, the expression of opinion, political 
protest, but also a space for state violence, massacres or target for terror attacks such 
as the recent attacks in Paris.   
Fifteen years ago, after the 9/11 attacks put terrorism up high on political agendas, a 
variety of legal exceptions and emergency measures were introduced, inter alia in the 
form of anti-terrorism laws. A whole new regime of security measures was introduced 
on a global scale, legally enabling unprecedented surveillance of individuals in ever 
expanding states of exceptions and emergencies.6 Debates and responses to the recent 
attacks in Paris indicate that the expansion of surveillance in European spaces has not 
yet reached its peak.7 
                                                
5 See Burgmer C, ‘Warum einen öffentlichen Platz besetzen?’ (Deutschlandfunk, Essay und Diskurs, 
03.10.2014) http://www.deutschlandfunk.de/protestbewegung-warum-einen-oeffentlichen-platz-
besetzen.1184.de.html?dram:article_id=299327 accessed 8 October 2016.  
6 See e.g. Scheppele KL, ‘Global Security Law and the Challenge to Constitutionalism after 9/11’ 
(2011) Public Law 352. 
7 The New York Times Editorial Board, ‘Mass Surveillance Isn’t the Answer to Fighting Terrorism’ 
The New York Times Online, (17.11.2015) http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/18/opinion/mass-
surveillance-isnt-the-answer-to-fighting-terrorism.html accessed 17.11.2015, also in print: The New 
York Times, New York Edition, 18.11.2015, p A26.  
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As the amounts of data have increased, so has the capabilities for analysing them. 
Technological advancements also led to continuous progress in the capabilities of 
surveillance technologies up to a point that was unimaginable just a few years ago. 
The ability to trace individuals with commonly used devices such as mobile phones 
or RFID-tags is only one example8, CCTV systems are now part of everyday life and 
Massively Integrated Multiple Sensor Installations (MIMSI) 9  as well as video 
analytics and facial recognition systems are available, functional and are being used 
by security services. While in 2008, for example, automated face recognition 
technology was only capable of recognizing faces regardless of environmental 
conditions with an accuracy of 90-95%,10 in 2015 Google researchers published a 
paper claiming nearly 100% accuracy for a popular facial recognition dataset.11  
Modern surveillance systems in public places have come a long way since the first 
analogue closed-circuit surveillance cameras emerged.12 Today, smart surveillance 
systems are digital, networked, retain and analyse surveillance data they obtain from 
a variety of sensors and sources, and they are deeply integrated into the public 
environments they control. Video analytics enables the searching of image data in real 
time, facial recognition can pick out suspects from a vast data pool, behavioural 
analytics can identify any incident in real time, and the integration of ubiquitous data 
                                                
8 Radio Frequency Identification tags are small microchips which store unique information about a 
single item and which can be read and traced via radio waves.  
9 MIMSIs are surveillance systems that combine different sensors into one connected surveillance 
system: e.g. when intelligent visual surveillance (that can identify suspicious behavior through e.g. 
motion analyses) is connected with other types of surveillance technology such as audio analyses (that 
can automatically identify unusual sounds, such as explosions, shooting or screams). See e.g.: 
Cannataci, JA, ‘Squaring the Circle of Smart Surveillance and Privacy, 2010 Fourth International 
Conference on Digital Society’ in Council of Europe Recommendation R(87)15 & ETS Convention 
108, Data Protection Vision 2020: Options for improving European policy and legislation during 2010-
2020; Appendix 3, 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/dataprotection/J%20A%20Cannataci%20Report%20to%20
Council%20of%20Europe%20complete%20with%20Appendices%2031%20Oct%202010.pdf 
accessed 17.November 2015. 
10 See: e.g.: Gardiner B, ‘Engineers Test Highly Accurate Face Recognition’ Wired (24.03.2008), 
http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2008/03/new_face_recognition accessed 17 
November 2015. 
11 Florian Schroff, Dmitry Kalenichenko, James Philbin, ‘FaceNet: A Unified Embedding for Face 
Recognition and Clustering.’ (v3, 17 June 2015, Cornell University Library, arXiv.org) 
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1503.03832.pdf accessed 17 November 2015. 
12 See e.g. Webster CWR and others (eds), Video surveillance: Practices and Policies in Europe (IOS 
Press 2012). 
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streams from the internet of things, the internet, and social media allows profiling, 
highly targeted surveillance and even theoretically incident prediction.13  
1.2 Research	Objectives	and	Main	Research	Question		
Today’s massive data streams, paired with the constantly improving capabilities of 
surveillance and security technologies will theoretically enable highly sophisticated 
surveillance and the control of public spaces. With this, the public space is 
transforming. It is becoming more surveilled and controlled, and the control 
mechanisms are becoming more efficient, more responsive and even predictive. In this 
connection, two legal questions emerge - and both questions address regulations 
concerning public spaces.  
The first, and probably most intuitive legal question concerns the ‘regulability’ of 
public space per se.14 How is individual or collective behaviour regulated in a public 
space? What governs it and how can new issues such as technological developments 
be addressed? Surveillance and control mechanism in this context are an essential part 
of enforcement and analyses of the functioning of such regulations.  
The second legal question rising from the increased surveillance and control is about 
governing and regulation of power. What are the counter mechanisms that protect 
individuals from excessive control of public spaces?  
Public spaces in democratic societies are essentially places symbolizing freedom and 
any state measures restricting that freedom needs to have, at least to some extent, 
certain recourse mechanisms. In that sense, the second question is about fundamental 
and human rights in public spaces. What are the rights of individuals in public places? 
How can surveillance and control be limited? Is there a need to rethink the existing 
fundamental rights frameworks? Are advancing surveillance and control technologies 
a concern for fundamental rights?  
                                                
13 TrapWire is an early example of an attempt to build such a system. See Botsch RD and Maness MT 
‘Trapwire. Preventing Terrorism.’ (2006) 22 Crime and Justice International 95, November/December 
2006, 39-41.  
14 The term ‘regulability’ derives from Lawrence Lessig’s work on cyberspace and describes ‘…the 
capacity of a government to regulate behavior within its proper reach.’ See Lessig L, Code: and other 
laws of cyberspace (Basic Books 1999) p 19.  
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On the one hand, human rights have developed mechanisms to address the above-
mentioned questions, for example, employing a human right to privacy. On the other 
hand, international human rights conventions and their protection systems seem to be 
overstrained with increased risks in public places, and the improved surveillance and 
control capabilities. It can clearly be said that the right to privacy is at stake through 
increasing state surveillance and anti-terrorism measures 15  and the massive 
improvements in security technology are adding to yet unprecedented interferences 
with human and fundamental rights. Furthermore, advanced technologies such as, for 
example, incident prediction and algorithmic analytics pose new challenges to existing 
fundamental rights mechanisms.  
This study primarily addresses the latter set of questions. It asks how the existing 
European fundamental rights to privacy and data protection address the increasing and 
unprecedented surveillance capabilities of public spaces in Europe. For this reason, it 
primarily focusses on the scope of privacy and data protection in a public sphere 
increasingly controlled by highly sophisticated surveillance.  
In order to answer these questions, this study approaches the topic from the various 
theoretical perceptions of privacy as a fundamental right. The core thesis of this study 
lies in a presumed separation between two fundamentally different approaches to 
privacy as a right: a conception of privacy based on individual liberty and a conception 
of privacy based on dignity, a right to personality, and a communal element deriving 
thereof. This distinction is important, because each of the approaches has different 
answers to the question of the applicability of fundamental rights to public space 
surveillance and the dramatic improvements of surveillance capabilities. This study 
will show that both approaches are present in current European jurisprudence on 
privacy and data protection and will therewith contribute to a better understanding of 
the ‘problem of privacy in public’,16 by discussing a different perspective on privacy 
                                                
15 See UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Martin Scheinin, 
A/HRC/13/37, 28.12.2009; Privacy International (2007), 'National Privacy Ranking 2007, Leading 
Surveillance Societies around the World', 
 http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd[347]=x-347-559597&als[theme]=Data 
Protection and Privacy Laws accessed 17.11.2015. 
16 See e.g. Nissenbaum HF, ‘Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of Privacy in 
Public’ (1998) 17 Law and Philosophy 559. 
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This study is based in theoretical analyses of existing legislation, jurisprudence and 
case analyses. For the latter, the framework for analyses is derived from an urban 
surveillance scenario. With references to real functional surveillance technology as 
well as connecting jurisprudence, the surveillance scenario serves as an anchor point 
to deduct central problems and issues for further analyses. This method is used to 
cover the uncertainty of future surveillance scenarios and in this way, future legal 
questions can be identified – as one essential element of this research is the ability to 
identify emerging legal problems.  
There certainly are a variety of methods in law and so are there discussions of that 
topic.17 One can, for example, borrow methodologies from the social sciences such as 
empirical research or socio-legal analyses, but probably the most common method in 
law is doctrinal legal research as ‘…the research process used to identify, analyse and 
synthesize the content of law.’ 18  This, of course, presupposes that there is an 
identifiable content of law. However, assuming that law is an objective concept in 
reality enables to leave aside fundamental theoretical problems when researching it.  
The debates around law and its methods in the social- and natural- sciences have of 
course always been subject to debates within the respective fields and one of the 
reasons for these debates is law’s very distinct nature from the social sciences and 
natural sciences. In natural sciences, scientific knowledge is derived from a 
combination of description and causality. A phenomenon is observed and explained 
in accordance with the commonly agreed rules of explanations in the specific area of 
the scientific community. In social science, a variety of theoretical approaches such 
as, for example, an empirical-analytical or a critical-dialectical approach can construct 
and deliver scientific knowledge. Legal science, although it can be approached and 
                                                
17 See e.g. Watkins D and M Burton M (eds), Research Methods in Law (Oxon: Routledge 2013). 
18 Hutchinson T ‘Doctrinal Research – Researching the Jury’ in D Watkins, M Burton (eds) Research 
Methods in Law (Oxon: Routledge 2013) 9. 
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combined with methodologies of classical social sciences, has an added component: 
legal problems are heavily ‘event’-based problems. Legal scholars, as Rubin describes 
it, ‘…are not trying to describe the causes of observed phenomena, but to evaluate a 
series of events, to express values, and to prescribe alternatives.’19 This means that a 
method in law will have difficulties employing natural science methodologies, and 
requires turning towards the production of knowledge in social science, on the one 
hand, but it also means that it should be clear that a purely legally-dogmatic approach 
concerning the sole interpretation of existing rules has its clear limits.  
One possibility to overcome this problem could be to employ a discursive perspective, 
in which communications in their many different forms play the decisive role. After 
all, law is communicated through language which allows us to look at law through the 
lens of discursive theories. Law can then be conceptualized as a self-referential and 
operatively closed system in Luhmannian terms, 20  for example when certain 
specialized fields of law are understood ‘as a language’ comprising of its own 
‘grammar’.21 From this perspective, legal discourses need to adapt and comply with 
the code and rules of the relevant communicative system. For Koskenniemi, for 
example, international lawyers need to speak the language and know the grammar of 
international law in order to build a legal argument that can be successful within the 
system of reference and therefore, conduct and apply doctrinal research on the surface 
level, while not losing the bigger picture of legal theoretical problems in the 
background. One problem with such allegedly critical methodologies, however, is that 
they barely leave room for theoretical inventions on a doctrinal level within the 
particularly closed specialized field of law.  
Another theoretical strand is to understand law in connection with its embedded social 
presuppositions. Here, Kaarlo Tuori’s take on a ‘hidden social theory’ behind legal 
concepts offers an interesting approach. According to this idea, ‘legal concepts and 
doctrines include at least an implicit or “hidden social theory”: a conception of the 
                                                
19 Rubin EL, ‘Law and Society & Law and Economics: Common Ground, Irreconcilable Differences, 
New Directions’ (1997) Wisconsin Law Review 521, 527.  
20 See Luhmann N, Das Recht der Gesellschaft (Suhrkamp 1995), 38-41 
21 See Koskenniemi M, From Apology to Utopia. The Structure of International Legal Argument. 
(Reissue with new Epilogue, Cambridge University Press 2005), 568 (emphasis original).  
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social field under regulation.’22 With this hidden social theory also comes a certain 
‘legal culture’ as an integral element to the basis of application of law.23 This means 
especially, that a specific legal system comes with certain core assumptions of social 
reality. 
This is extremely important for analysing legal issues in connection with surveillance. 
Assuming that the developments and employment of surveillance technologies are 
driven by actors and certain systems of security, it is required that the legal regulation 
of such systems are understood in connection with the presuppositions of the system 
in place. This phenomenon could be understood in terms of security mindsets, a 
specific and institutionalized way of approaching security problems.24 Approaching 
and solving security problems therewith would depend on the institutionalized 
understanding of how security problems emerge and how they should be solved. 
This particular study choses fundamental rights analyses as a coherent point of 
approaching security problems in relation to surveillance systems. This naturally 
presupposes a critical stand towards surveillance as such, however, there are of course 
other, more systematic, and more critical ways of approach surveillance. In that sense, 
this study employs a thematic, rather than a systematic way of conducting a problem-
based analyses of specific issues deriving from current and future surveillance 
technologies.  
One additional reason for such an approach is that many of the technologies in the 
security sector have capabilities that have not been subjected to jurisprudence and 
legal disputes. In addition, many of the technologies do create new legal problems. 
The question of liability for damages caused by automatically flying Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAVs) or of legality of wide-scale surveillance practices of mobile-phone 
meta-data and location analysis by police forces during political demonstrations could 
                                                
22 Tuori K, ‘A European Security Constitution?’ In Fichera M and J Kremer (eds), Law and Security in 
Europe: Reconsidering the Security Constitution. (Intersentia 2013), 43. See also Tuori K, Ratio and 
Voluntas: The Tension between Reason and Will in Law (Ashgate, Aldershot 2011), 197.  
23 See Tuori’s approach to legal culture and ‘Vorverständnis’ in Tuori K, Ratio and Voluntas: The 
Tension between Reason and Will in Law (Ashgate, Aldershot 2011), 197. 
24 The idea of security mindsets has been discussed elsewhere: See Kremer J, ‘Exception, Protection 
and Securitization: Security Mindsets in Law.’ in Fichera M and Kremer J (eds), Law and Security in 
Europe: Reconsidering the Security Constitution (Intersentia 2013) and Kremer J, ‘Policing cybercrime 
or militarizing cybersecurity? Security mindsets and the regulation of threats from cyberspace’ (2014) 
23 Information & Communications Technology Law 220.  
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be two examples. Some of those issues may reach new levels of intrusion with 
fundamental rights, or even necessitate rethinking whole legal structures such as the 
recent reform of the EU data protection framework. Consequently, the effects on law 
and the arising legal questions may be rather broad.   
In order to delimit the scope of research, this study takes a scenario-based approach. 
This means that it will use an exemplary surveillance scenario and test it towards 
possible legal responses. From this point of view, it will then be possible to identify 
certain problems and new questions requiring legal responses. From a methodologist 
point of view, this thesis will hence have a more critical-dialectical background than 
a normative one. This is probably because underlying this study is the belief that 
approaches towards surveillance technologies today, due to many factors which will 
be discussed throughout this text, need to be analysed from a critical perspective, 
ultimately due to the fact that they run the danger of becoming tools for establishing 
power imbalances. However, the connecting point between the theoretical discussion 
and doctrinal approach shall be the use of human rights law as the main reference.  
On the one hand, this study takes a theoretical stance in order to analyse the legal 
theoretical underpinnings behind technology and surveillance. On the other hand, this 
study attempts to reason doctrinally with the help of the rules and principles for global 
standards given by international (and European) human and fundamental rights law. 
It therefore attempts to avoid the many theoretical discussions around the societal and 
social science aspects of surveillance and control e.g. in its Foucauldian sense,25 while 
at the same time giving some room for theoretical discussions about legal arguments 
on surveillance and control as the subject of this study. Surveillance, technology and 
control are thereby approached from a critical perspective: in a similar way as human 
and fundamental rights can be conceptualized as a tool of criticism of control, power 
and suppression.26 The social presuppositions underlying societal surveillance and 
control, paired with their critical-dialectical approach towards the effects of 
                                                
25  Much research has been done in the social sciences on the theory, implication and effects of 
surveillance, up to the point that some may argue for the existence of its own sub-disciplinary field of 
research labelled ‘surveillance studies’. See e.g. Lyon D (ed), Theorizing Surveillance: The Panopticon 
and Beyond (Willan Publishing 2006), Lyon D, Surveillance Studies: An Overview (Polity 2007), and 
Lyon D, Haggerty KD and Ball K (eds), Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies (Routledge 2012). 
26 See e.g. Douzinas C, The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century 
(Hart 2000). 
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surveillance and control on individual and collective freedoms therefore serve as 
underlying elements in the search for legal arguments capable of challenging new 
phenomena, or ‘events’, deriving from a sophistication of surveillance technologies 
paired with an increased political will to employ such tools.27  
In fact, the capabilities and use of technology play a central role in the analysis this 
study attempts to conduct. And it is here where it chooses to depart from analyses of 
discourses on surveillance, power and control: technological capabilities play a 
decisive role for the creation of ‘events’ which need to be addressed in terms of legal 
arguments. While those ‘events’ can very well be understood in terms of power 
relations and their challenges, it appears that technologies of information collection 
come with more subtle underpinnings. Particularly holistic surveillance practices often 
use data sources that are not primarily intended to be panoptical, but have from the 
outset other purposes in societies. While the Foucauldian panopticon can serve as a 
method and a model for analyses, a lot of personal data processing does not come with 
the intention of surveillance of control, but with the purpose to provide a service, 
conduct business, make profit, or even liberate persons. As often data are essentially 
by-products of computing, and computing is an essential element of societies, 
surveillance and control possibilities come as by-products of electronic 
administration, technological progress and new forms of business and services in 
modern societies. Consequently, regulation and governance of data processing 
requires keeping in mind possible responses to disturbances and interferences caused 
by technologies with surveillance and control capabilities. In order to address the 
question of compatibility but also suitability for law as a mediating mechanism 
addressing such effects, this study uses human and fundamental rights as the point of 
intersection between law and technology, simply because it is interferences with 
fundamental rights which lie at the centre of the critique of a critique, but also of 
acceptance of surveillance technologies in European societies.  
An additional element of importance in this study is therefore a clear understanding 
of the function and capabilities of surveillance technologies. In order to analyse legal 
                                                
27 Some work has also been done particularly on legal and governance responses to surveillance and 
control: see e.g. Bennett CJ and Raab CD, The Governance of Privacy: Policy Instruments in Global 
Perspective (Ashgate, 2003), Bennett CJ, The Privacy Advocates: Resisting the Spread of Surveillance 
(MIT Press 2008).  
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‘events’ that may appear as a result of using new technologies, this work employs a 
fictional surveillance scenario, which is based on a brief analysis of technological 
capabilities and potential future developments. While the fundamental rights analysis 
is based on case analyses, the technological part uses a variety of sources both from 
technical research fields, but also from media and journalism. The surveillance 
scenario is therefore hypothetical, however, based on existing current technology as 
well as on prognoses on where developments may lead. In that sense, potential future 
legal ‘events’ deriving from surveillance are distilled from an urban surveillance 
scenario outlined in Section 1.6. Before, however, presenting the scenario, the 
following sections will briefly discuss terminologies, structure, as well as give an 
overview that will enable a better understanding of the function, but foremost, the 
capabilities of surveillance technologies.  
*** 
Terminology and language are essential in law. The mere substance of the subject as 
such depends on commonly agreed meanings of language and communications. 
Consequently, it is important to discuss and clarify the meaning of the terms employed 
in this study, especially because the conceptualizations, notions and meanings of terms 
in technology and surveillance can be rather broad. Additionally, this study brings 
together a variety of scientific fields such as the social sciences, technology and law, 
which may lead to confusion of the terms that are employed in different ways 
throughout the fields.  
The first confusion that may arise in light of this study, is the distinction between 
public and private. As will be discussed in Section 2.1, this theoretical distinction is 
highly complex and heavily disputed as well as conceptually problematic. An 
extensive theoretical discussion of the public/private distinction, however, would 
exceed the limits of this study. It is therefore important to keep in mind that the term 
‘public’ is mostly used in connection with ‘physical’ public space. The same applies 
for all combinations of words containing the term ‘public’: public sphere, public space 
or public area relate to physical spaces and zones, if not otherwise described in the 
context of the discussion. Public surveillance therefore relates to surveillance of public 
spheres, mostly in its concrete physical, rather than its abstract political sense.  
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Another issue requires to be mentioned in this context, and that is the use of legal 
sources. Sources lie, of course, at the core of legal analyses and the particular choice 
of sources depends on disciplinary considerations. This study employs a variety of 
legal sources from international law, European law, human rights law and information 
law. Such as international treaties, sources of EU law, case law and even national law. 
In some parts, however, this study relies on general legal arguments deriving from the 
national jurisprudence of EU Member States. Those are employed in order to illustrate 
different approaches to the problem of privacy in public spaces and naturally do not 
unfold the same authoritative force on international levels. What matters for the 
argument in this study, however, is more the theoretical strands of lines of 
interpretation of surveillance issues in European public spaces. National and 
constitutional legal arguments are therewith used as a supportive theoretical argument, 
which function on a different level than international and European legal arguments. 
It is therefore the focus of possible regulation of European public spaces, rather than 
the strict focus on a specific field of law which underlies the choice of sources and 
methodology throughout this study. Additionally, the relationship between legal 
sources on an international level as such is naturally problematic. The complex 
relationship between the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR) and the 
European Convention on Fundamental Right (ECHR) is only one example of 
essentially different regimes addressing similar issues with similar material and 
territorial scopes. Those debates, however, would exceed the limits of this study.28 
The combination of focussing on the physical public space (rather than an abstract 
public sphere) with narrowing the scope of this study (mostly) to a European context, 
produces the concept of a ‘European public space’ contained in the title. While it is 
clear that such a conceptualisation may be challenged, it shall serve as an anchor point 
for a legal analysis in a globalised world, in which the traditional legal boundaries 
between jurisdictions and legal systems are more difficult to uphold, particularly when 
law encounters technologies that operated beyond national and conceptual boundaries.  
                                                
28 For further discussions on that issue see e.g. Fischer-Lescano A and Teubner G, Regime- Kollisionen. 
Zur Fragmentierung des globalen Rechts (Suhrkamp 2006); Maduro M, Sankari S and Tuori K (eds), 
Transnational Law: Rethinking European Law and Legal Thinking (Routledge, 2014), Gragl P, The 





This study analyses the role and function of the fundamental rights to privacy and the 
protection of personal data in the context of increasing public surveillance. For this 
purpose, there are essentially three elements of crucial importance for answering this 
question.  
Firstly, in order to connect the legal analysis to the existing sophistication of 
surveillance technologies, this study requires an assessment of surveillance 
technologies and their capabilities and therewith a short description of existing and 
future surveillance technologies. Secondly, this study discusses questions surrounding 
the underlying conceptions of privacy (and data protection) as fundamental rights. 
Thirdly, in order to assess the legal implications of surveillance technologies on the 
European public space, this study requires a fundamental rights analyses of specific 
issues that are derived from public surveillance.  
Consequently, the structure of this study follows this outline. It is structured into two 
main parts, where Part One discusses the underlying theoretical frameworks and legal 
concepts, and part two analyses specific issues in light of fundamental rights 
protection in the European public space.  
This introduction contains an overview of specific surveillance technologies and their 
capabilities and gives a glimpse into potential near-future application of such 
surveillance technologies. This includes a description of the development from classic 
video surveillance systems to sophisticated and highly integrated surveillance 
networks which analyse vast quantities of data and might even have certain predictive 
capabilities. It additionally outlines a fictional urban surveillance scenario in order to 
distil four distinct issues related to the question of fundamental rights applicability in 
public places and the consequences of different conceptualization: targeted individual 
surveillance, mass surveillance of public spaces, surveillance through private actors 
and predictive and automated surveillance.  
The first part then starts off by analysing the foundational concept of a European 
public space and the problem of privacy in public areas in this study. It then turns to 
the theoretical background of the research question, providing an insight into the legal 
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theoretical conceptualization of privacy, data protection and security. Within the 
analyses of a right to privacy, privacy is analysed as a legal concept, outlining the 
foundation for the distinction between privacy as a concept of liberty and privacy as a 
concept of dignity and community. It furthermore discussed data protection as a 
regulatory instrument on the one hand, and as a fundamental right on the other hand. 
Thirdly, part one of this study analyses security in light of its theoretical complexity, 
function in surveillance contexts, and in light of the construction of a right to security 
in Europe. Of particular interest here is the concept of security, including the 
relationship between security and law as well as the construct of security as a right. 
Finally, as a fourth issue, part one turns to the more general practical problems of 
human rights and surveillance, and that is a discussion on permissible limitations to a 
right to privacy in a global and a European context.  
Overall, part one of this study shows that privacy, while originally conceptualized as 
a liberal individualistic concept, has tendencies in Europe to be understood in terms 
of dignity and personality and therewith has become a right that forms an essential 
building block in the ideal of a freedon and dignity based European democratic 
society.  
The Second major part of this study analyses the current European fundamental rights 
framework in light of the fictional urban surveillance scenario which is based on the 
technological analyses in the introduction.  
The first section in the Second part analyses targeted public surveillance in the sense 
that surveillance operations here are focused on a particular individual. This is the 
most classic public surveillance scenario and the analyses draws from the vast body 
of case law, especially from the perspective of the ECHR.  
The second section in part two then turns towards a more detailed analyses of mass 
surveillance in public places. Here, fundamental rights jurisprudence is analysed 
towards its capabilities to address and resolve legal disputes arising from the 
surveillance of large groups or abstract entities.  
The third issue addressed in part two focuses on actors, and here particularly on private 
actors. The public-private divide, the increasing privatization of public spaces as well 
as increasing possibilities for individuals to acquire and operate surveillance 
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technologies call for a closer look at the relationship between private surveillance 
actors and fundamental rights protection.  
The fourth and final focus issue in part three then looks at future perspectives: the 
increased availability of data flows and networks paired with the development of 
surveillance technologies might have and the consequences of automation as well as 
the predictive capabilities of future surveillance systems.  
Each of the issues therefore addresses separate legal questions in connection to certain 
fundamental rights aspects. Additionally, beyond mere legal analyses of existing 
regulations, this part identifies areas of legal uncertainty as well as those that lack 
regulations and suggests possible solutions. This thesis concludes with a detailed 
response to the research question outlined in this introduction.  
***	
The following section will now briefly introduce surveillance technologies. Of 
particular importance here, is the technological development from classical video 
surveillance to sophisticated multi-sensor surveillance systems. In that sense, this 
section will describe different security and surveillance technologies, culminating in 
a fictional, yet technologically more or less realistic urban surveillance scenario.  
 
1.5 Technology	and	Surveillance	Scenario	
Surveillance technology plays a crucial role in this study. One of the core assumptions 
of this work is that there is a mutual influence between technology and law. New 
technology requires new regulation, and new regulation influences new technologies. 
The reason for regulation of technology often derives from the societal effects of 
technologies, and their potential for changing social life, either for better or for worse. 
Furthermore, in relation to security, regulation is employed for mediating risks, threats 
and worst case scenarios.29 Technology can be very dangerous when seen from this 
perspective.  
For this work, the focal point lies on surveillance and respective technologies enabling 
surveillance. It explores, how surveillance technology is shaping legal regulation and 
                                                
29 See e.g. Sunstein CR, Worst-case scenarios (Harvard University Press 2009). 
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how legal regulation shapes technologies. Foremost, however, the underlying legal 
sources of this work derive from human and fundamental rights norms, as the 
overarching norms and principles guiding the regulation of technologies. While this 
work refrains from a detailed engagement with the relationship between technology 
and law as such, as well as from a detailed engagement with the philosophical 
discussions of rights as a concept, it remains important to understand the functionality 
of security and surveillance technology to assess their impacts on law. Consequently, 
after outlining the theoretical basis of the affected rights in question, namely the 
fundamentals of privacy and data protection, this section turns to a more descriptive 
analysis of the functionality of surveillance technologies. This is important for two 
reasons: Firstly, to give an overview of the available technologies and their future 
developments, and secondly, in order to lay the ground for a fictional, but technically 
realistic surveillance scenario. The surveillance scenario will then enable a legal 
analysis of specific issues based on the theoretical conceptions of privacy and data 
protection as rights in the first part.  
Surveillance technologies have a long-standing history, and include targeted and non-
targeted technologies, but also tactics of espionage and deception.30 In that sense, 
classical surveillance technologies were concerned with the gathering of information 
about specific individuals. Technologies of surveillance have therefore always played 
a big role in societies, and were especially prominent in repressive regimes in which 
they were used by the states’ security and police authorities. Security and surveillance 
technologies became more and more sophisticated and efficient, and with the 
emergence of computers, public registers and bureaucratic administration of public 
authorities, came the need for technology which could make processing easier and 
more efficient. While data protection emerged as a tool for regulating states’ access to 
personal information, public surveillance technologies followed different logics than 
the administrative collection of personal data in registries. Public surveillance is 
different because it is more offensive surveillance. Unlike the administrative 
collection of citizens’ data, public surveillance is per se of a repressive nature. Its very 
nature is control, not administration.  
                                                
30 See e.g. Dandeker C, Surveillance, Power and Modernity: Bureaucracy and Discipline from 1700 to 
the Present Day (Polity 1990).  
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That said, naturally, security technologies used in public places underwent similar 
technological improvements as computers and information technologies. In the last 30 
years, they became cheap, powerful, efficient and ubiquitous. The driving forces 
behind those tendencies were digitization31, miniaturization, the ‘sensor revolution’ 
and data processing. As a result, the gathering, storage and analyses of information on 
persons became easier and more efficient than ever before, a phenomenon which was 
labelled ‘dataveillance’ by Clarke already in 1988. 32  In fact, technological 
advancements have had an enormous impact on public surveillance technologies, and 
have blurred the borders between the surveillance of public spaces and the surveillance 
of individuals via data collection, retention and processing. For example, social media 
data as well as mobile phone communication data can add to the surveillance of a 
public space equipped with a camera surveillance system. The following Section 
therefore discusses some of the most prominent technologies and trends in public 
surveillance.  
1.5.1 Video	Surveillance		
Video surveillance is the first and most obvious surveillance technology in public 
places and there is probably very few central places in a modern city which are not 
equipped with video surveillance technology, and today it can be seen as an integrated 
part of public urban life.33 Video surveillance first was seen in the 1960s when video 
cassette recorders enabled the storing of video images and has experienced nothing 
less but a technological revolution ever since.34 The simplest technological version of 
such Closed-circuit Television (CCTV) systems essentially consisted of a monitor 
which was directly wired to a camera. The monitor then showed an image of an area 
in real time, much in the same way than if a security person would stand at a corner 
                                                
31 For an excellent explanation of the term and its effects see Murray A, Information Technology Law: 
The Law and Society (2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2013), 4-7.  
32 Clarke R, ‘Information Technology and Dataveillance’ (1988) 31 Communications of the ACM 498. 
33 See Norris C and Armstrong G, The Maximum Surveillance Society: The Rise of CCTV (Berg, 1999), 
18; Welsh BC and Farrington DP, ‘Public Area CCTV and Crime Prevention: An Updated Systematic 
Review and Meta-Analysis’ (2009) 26 Justice Quarterly 716, 717.  
34 Webster CWR, ‘CCTV Policy in the UK: Reconsidering the Evidence Base’ (2009) 6 Surveillance 
& Society 10, 11-12. 
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and watch an area with her own eyes.35 Taking electronic images from public places, 
however, allowed for the integration of additional elements into the CCTV system: 
Video recorders in order to retain images and for manual review enabled a view back 
in time, and additional cameras which could be controlled and viewed from a single 
location enabled the surveillance of larger spaces.  
Contemporary video surveillance, however, functions very differently. Three essential 
elements have changed the core technologies: digitization, integration and the sensor 
revolution. Digitization essentially means the shift form analogue technology to 
digital technology which became the technological standard for visual security 
applications.36 Digital technology37 enables more complex surveillance systems as it 
improves the quality of images as well as the easier and wider distribution of images 
without quality loss.38 Furthermore, images can be stored easier and most importantly, 
enable computers to process visual data, giving rise to an array of new capabilities for 
visual surveillance systems, for example analysing images.39 With digitization comes 
also the capability of integration and networking of surveillance technologies. A 
surveillance camera which is connected to the internet installed in a home in Finland 
can be accessed from a mobile phone in Australia. This means also that a variety of 
controllers in different places can have access to a surveillance system at the same 
time, and surveillance data of the same surveillance system can be shared and analysed 
simultaneously in many places.40 At the same time, an indefinite number of sensors 
such as video cameras or microphones can be added to the surveillance network, 
enabling the steady growth and the modifications as well as adding new capabilities 
and technologies.  
                                                
35 The argument that being watched by video surveillance in public places is not different than being 
watched by another person is essentially based on the assumption of a very basic CCTV system.  
36 See Harwood E, Digital CCTV: A Security Professional's Guide (Elsevier/Butterworth-Heinemann, 
2008), ix- x.  
37 For an excellent detailed explanation of the differences between analog and digital technology, see 
ibid, 19-37 and Murray A, Information Technology Law: The Law and Society (2nd ed, Oxford 
University Press 2013), 2-14. 
38  Harwood E, ‘Digital CCTV: a security professional's guide’ (Elsevier/Butterworth-Heinemann, 
2008), 95, 96.  
39 Ibid, 221-223.  
40 Ibid, 99; See also Von Silva-Tarouca Larsen B, Setting the Watch: Privacy and the Ethics of CCTV 
Surveillance (Hart Publishing 2011), 46. 
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The third element fostering radical change in visual surveillance technologies is the 
revolution in sensor technologies. Digital image technology is of high quality and the 
sensors as such became cheaper and more efficient. Many of the digital cameras today 
are so called dome-or PTZ-cameras (pan-tilt-zoom) which means that they can rotate, 
tilt and zoon in and out. 41 Actual zoom ranges of such cameras are impressive, when, 
for example, a camera controller can read a newspaper article on the surveillance 
monitor over distances of 150m and more.42  
Consequently, most of contemporary video surveillance systems have developed 
significantly from the analogue input-output model. Furthermore, video surveillance 
not only advanced technologically, but also spread at a fast pace: it became a 
ubiquitous technology in urban public, semi-public and also private spaces.43 For 
example in the UK, they have become an ‘entrenched’ urban feature since the mid-
2000s: partnerships between public and private sectors, enormous technical 
advancements, centrally managed systems as well as a focus from community security 
to the prevention of terrorism led to a quantitative but also qualitative expansion of 
security systems.44 Video surveillance today should be understood more in terms of 
sophisticated and multi-purpose surveillance networks which embody a wide variety 
of capabilities, rather than cameras wired to a control room where images are watched 
by controllers.45  
1.5.1.1 Purposes	and	Promises	of	Video	Surveillance	
The proliferation of visual surveillance systems often follows an alleged assumption: 
video surveillance systems somehow would have a positive effect on the environments 
they observe. The promises of increased video surveillance are manifold and reach 
from increased public security, over to more efficient security governance to 
deterrence and the prevention of crime, however, the real and measurable effects of 
                                                
41 Ibid, 43.  
42 Ibid. 
43 See Norris C, ‘Accounting for the global growth of CCTV’ in Lyon D, Haggerty KD and Ball K 
(eds), Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies (Routledge 2012) 251-258, 252 
44 See e.g. Webster CWR, ‘CCTV Policy in the UK: Reconsidering the Evidence Base’ (2009) 6 
Surveillance & Society 10, 11-12. 
45 For a technological description of networked cameras see Nilsson F and Axis Communications, 
Intelligent Network Video: Understanding Modern Video Surveillance Systems (CRC Press 2008), 21-
46.  
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video surveillance are subject to debate.46 Studies on the functionality and effects of 
video surveillance have produced contradicting results. In 2009, for example, a meta-
study by Welsh and Farrington found that video surveillance ‘…is most effective in 
reducing crime in car parks, is most effective in reducing vehicle crimes, and is more 
effective in reducing crime in the UK than in other countries.’47 Beyond the positive 
effects in car thefts, the study could not find significant impact on other crimes.48 Also, 
a 2011 U.S. Department of Justice-funded evaluation of video surveillance systems in 
Baltimore, Chicago, and Washington D.C. found inconsistent results: while there were 
measureable reductions of some crimes in some areas, not all the areas showed the 
same effects:  
Analysis results indicate that cameras, when actively monitored, have a cost-
beneficial impact on crime with no statistically significant evidence of 
displacement to neighboring areas. However, in some contexts and locations 
these crime reduction benefits are not realized.49 
Considering the general complexity of crimes as a social phenomenon in public areas, 
this does not come as a surprise. It should however, be made clear that the assumption 
of a large positive effect of video surveillance on safety in public spaces is 
scientifically problematic.  
While the studies above primarily focused on the measureable effectiveness of video 
surveillance in the context of crime, much further research on the impact, perception 
or function of video surveillance has been conducted in the social sciences. The most 
recent works address for example the specific analyses on the steady growth and path 
of success of video surveillance,50  perceptions and policies of video surveillance 
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across several European countries,51 how video surveillance embeds into the core of 
societies, 52  from a normative and ethical perspective, 53  how video surveillance 
changes public spaces54 or video surveillance as a tool for power in surveillance 
societies.55 In that sense, video surveillance is often theorized and criticized as a tool 
of power and suppression and as a tool that has a strong effect in cities, as a tool 
fostering cities as ‘panopticon’.  
 
1.5.1.2 Smart	Surveillance	and	Video	Content	Analytics	(VCA)	
The digitization of image technology added another important aspect to the 
capabilities of surveillance systems: digital images can be processed by computers. 
This laid the bases for so-called ‘smart’ security systems in the meaning of ‘…security 
augmented by computer-mediated processing.’ 56  Computer processing enables 
detailed and automated analyses of video images in many forms, for example as 
recognition of patterns or facial recognition. Such video processing technologies are 
also called ‘Video Content Analytics’ (VCA), ‘Intelligent Video Analytics’ (IVA) or 
just ‘Intelligent Analytics’ (IA). 57  Digital analytics therefore add capabilities to 
surveillance systems which previously required time consuming manual analytics. 
Facial recognition, for example, allows for automatic identification of individuals in 
public areas, or the search for a certain person in a vast pool of video data. Automated 
                                                
51 See Webster CWR and others (eds), Video surveillance: Practices and Policies in Europe (IOS Press 
2012). 
52 See Kroener I, CCTV: A technology under the radar? (Burlington: Ashgate 2014). 
53 See Von Silva-Tarouca Larsen B, Setting the Watch: Privacy and the Ethics of CCTV Surveillance 
(Hart Publishing 2011). 
54 See Koskela H, ‘“The gaze without eyes” Video surveillance and the changing nature of urban space’ 
in Holmes D (ed), Virtual Globalization: Virtual Spaces/Tourist Spaces (Routledge 2001).  
55 See e.g. Lyon D, Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life (Open University Press 2001), 60-
68 where the author discusses video surveillance and its relationship to urban consumer spaces.  
56 Ferenbok J and Clement A ‘Hidden Changes: From CCTV to ‘smart’ Video Surveillance’ in Doyle 
A, Lippert R and Lyon D (eds), Eyes Everywhere: The Global Growth of Camera Surveillance 
(Routledge 2012), 220.  
57 Video Content Analytics is also sometimes described with the term Intelligent Video Analytics 
(IVA), see BSIA, ‘An Introduction to Video Content Analysis - Industry Guide (BSIA, August 2016), 
3 http://www.bsia.co.uk/Portals/4/Publications/262-introduction-video-content-analysis-industry-
guide-02.pdf  , accessed 15 October 2016; and Ferenbok J and Clement A ‘Hidden Changes: From 
CCTV to ‘smart’ Video Surveillance’ in Doyle A, Lippert R and Lyon D (eds), Eyes Everywhere: The 
Global Growth of Camera Surveillance (Routledge 2012), 222-223. 
	 25	
detection of incidents could use movement patterns in order to alert the operators of a 
surveillance system to certain citations and detect intrusions, hazards, explosions, or 
unusual behaviour amongst many others. Already shortly after the turn of the century, 
media reported the employment of behavioural analytics software in the London 
Underground: Software named ‘Intelligent Pedestrian Surveillance System (IPS)’ 
allegedly analysed video data of metro stations and picked out ‘unusual’ behaviour 
such as loitering or repeatedly missing trains. 58  The idea behind the software 
‘Cromatica’ developed at London’s Kingston University was to identify potential 
suicidal persons, enabling real-time response and even prevention.59  
Ever since then, an array of technologies and research projects worked on the 
sophistication and integration of algorithms for complex video analytics. Other 
examples of heavily integrated video surveillance analytics are the two EU FP7 funded 
research projects ADAPTS and INDECT. ADAPTS (Automatic Detection of 
Abnormal Behaviour and Threats in crowded Spaces) was an FP7 consortium research 
project from 2009 until 2013 which attempted to develop systems for the detection of 
‘abnormal’ behaviour via video analytics as well as audio analytics.60 Specifically, the 
project developed ‘…visual and acoustical sensor processing and inference 
mechanisms to automatically detect potentially threatening behaviour of individuals 
in a group or crowd in large public spaces, e.g., those in relation to public transport or 
large scale events.’61 To achieve this, ADAPTS developed a methodology of defining 
‘abnormal behaviour’ on the basis of the academic literature, the analyses of former 
incidents, the behaviour of video surveillance operators as well as the opinions of 
experts in the field62 and distinguished a list of detectable types of behaviour and 
sound. 63  This was then used in order to develop detection systems in specific 
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scenarios, such as terrorism at an airport, crowd behaviour in a stadium and individual 
behaviour in a city centre.64  
Following ADAPTS, another FP7 funded research project attempted to achieve 
similar goals. INDECT, spelled out ‘Intelligent Information System Supporting 
Observation, Searching and Detection for Security of Citizens in Urban Environment’ 
used a nearly 15 Million EUR research budget in order ‘…to develop advanced and 
innovative algorithms for human decision support in combating terrorism and other 
criminal activities, such as human trafficking, child pornography, detection of 
dangerous situations (e.g. robberies) and the use of dangerous objects (e.g. knives or 
guns) in public spaces.’65 In a similar way as ADAPTS, INDECT attempted to develop 
the recognition of specific individual behaviours but also added audio analytics to the 
system and therewith used audio recorded via microphones from public places for the 
detection of not only ‘unusual’ behaviours but also ‘abnormal sounds.’66 INDECT, 
however, went a step further than ADAPTS: it also included a variety of data analytics 
for criminal forensics and detection in computer networks, which means that INDECT 
actually attempted to combine real world audio and video surveillance with virtual 
world data analytics.67 The project claims that it actually developed a variety of 
software for police use, for example amongst many others ‘high precision crawler 
technologies navigating the Internet World Wide Web (WWW)’, ‘software for 
learning relationships between people and organizations through websites and social 
networks’ and a ‘…KASS Social Network Analysis system with the functionality 
dedicated to the analysis of data coming from Internet blogs.’ 68  INDECT even 
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included a research group on UAVs and their integration into surveillance systems.69 
While the presentation of the project’s results appear rather dubious and the project in 
general has received widespread criticism for its surveillance approaches in the 
public,70 the ideas behind such research show a trend towards the integration of a 
multitude of sensors as well as a rather holistic approach of using real world data as 
well as data from computer networks for the detection of potential threats.  
Returning to visual surveillance, the list of available VCA functions and capabilities 
is long, however, implementation, practical use and security value vary in quality and 
usefulness. Nevertheless, a compilation of available algorithms available in 2011 give 
a glimpse into the surveillance technologies of the future: There exist algorithms for 
crowd behaviour analyses such as detection of assembly, congestion, dispersion, 
counting, queuing (waiting time), individual behaviour such as tailgating, loitering, 
falling/slipping, for creating virtual fences, alarm zones, restricted areas, detecting the 
direction of a person’s movement and dwell time as well as detection of objects i.e. 
object tracking, abandoned objects, classification, speed, size, vehicle counting, etc.71 
Furthermore, systems can include more complex functionalities such as facial 
recognition, complex location tracking and automated number plate recognition 
(ANPR).72 The usefulness of such a technology for surveillance is obvious: automated 
analytics of video material and the detection of specific security relevant incidents can 
make complex visual surveillance systems extremely efficient. Furthermore, such 
systems can extract information from video and audio material which would either 
require a large quantity of resources or even be impossible to compile manually. 
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Clearly, such systems have surpassed classical video surveillance, in which the camera 
was seen merely as an extension of the eye of the observing security guard.  
Another important element of VCA in surveillance systems is the ability to search for 
incidents, persons and object in the retained video material. Theoretically, 
technologies such as facial recognition or ANPR enable not only the tracking of 
vehicle in real time but also in the past: with ANPR, for example the location and 
movement of a suspect prior to an event could be established by programs searching 
through stored video material.  
1.5.1.3 Mobile	Cameras	and	Aerial	Surveillance	
Projects like ADAPTS and INDECT show that there is an increased interest in 
developing and employing automated surveillance and detection technologies. 
However, there are additional factors which could revolutionize surveillance systems 
further.  
Firstly, sensors, including surveillance cameras have become smaller, cheaper and 
better in terms of quality. Additionally, cameras acquired, as did so many other things, 
the capability of wireless networking. This means that small and barely recognizable 
cameras are also much more mobile and connected easily connected to computer 
networks. Secondly, recent years have also seen a technical revolution regarding 
robotics: Autonomous vehicles have entered mass markets in all forms and shapes, 
most prominently as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), so called ‘drones’. Drones, 
furthering the reach of the technology, are ideal carriers of surveillance sensors. F 
Regarding the first technological advancement, digital video cameras and the general 
miniaturization of computer technology led to the appearance of relatively cheap 
cameras which can be connected to the internet. So-called ‘IP cameras’, connect either 
via cable or wirelessly, transmit a video stream without the need to build up separate 
closed wired or wireless networks.73 There are now pocket-sized, battery powered 
cameras with wireless connections to mobile data networks that are highly mobile and 
difficult to spot. Furthermore, they are widely available on the market and can 
therefore easily be employed also by private persons. Even a smart phone with the 
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appropriate piece of software or application can stream video via the internet and can 
be turned into a surveillance device. This means that it has become very easy to build 
up relatively cheap surveillance systems both for private as well as public use. 
Furthermore, mobile cameras allow the ad hoc installation of surveillance networks, 
for example for a targeted surveillance operation. Networked cameras can also be 
installed on police cars or worn as body cameras for police officers. Especially body 
worn cameras have sparked intense discussion about surveillance, police violence and 
the protection of officers on duty.74 Mobility, wireless video streaming, and global 
video access made visual surveillance available to any private individual, any 
organization, and any government. Sophisticated wide-area surveillance employing 
analytics should, at least for a couple of years remain a tool for entities with greater 
resources.  
The second technological aspect adding novelty to surveillance systems are UAVs and 
the possibility to use wide-area aerial perspectives in surveillance systems. While it is 
still rare that UAV’s are elements in static surveillance systems, the possibilities for 
their use are manifold. Drones equipped with video cameras operating video content 
analytics technologies could automatically follow targets, or identify suspects and 
track them, eliminating problems in response times to incident alerts. Furthermore, 
high resolution cameras could become an all-seeing eye hovering above public spaces.  
ARGUS-IS is an example of how such a vision could become reality. In 2009, 
DARPA issued funding calls for the development of systems for wide area aerial 
visual surveillance.75 In the call, DARPA was looking for the development of what 
they called a ‘Persistent Stare Exploitation and Analysis System (PerSEAS)’, a system 
capable of ‘…automatically and interactively discovering actionable intelligence from 
wide area motion imagery (WAMI) of complex urban, suburban, and rural 
environments.’76 In October 2013, BAE Systems published information about a newly 
                                                
74 See e.g Elizabeth J, ‘Beyond Surveillance: Data Control and Body Cameras’ (2016) 14 Surveillance 
and Society 133; Moser R, ‘As If All The World Were Watching: Why Today’s Law Enforcement 
Needs To Be Wearing Body Cameras’ (2015) 7 Northern Illinois University Law Review 1. 
75  See DARPA, Persistent Stare Exploitation and Analysis System (PerSEAS), Broad Agency 
Announcement (BAA) for Information Processing Techniques Office (IPTO) Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), DARPA-BAA-09-55, 18 September 2009, 
https://www.fbo.gov/utils/view?id=1d32b1d49cdf59a1e5f8790260c7a350 accessed 17 October 2016. 
76 Ibid, 4.  
	 30	
developed product named ‘Autonomous Real-Time Ground Ubiquitous Surveillance 
Imaging System’ (ARGUS-IS), a 1.8 Giga pixel colour camera surveillance system 
which can be mounted in manned or unmanned aerial vehicle in order to enable 
persistent detailed surveillance over a 15 square mile area at 20,000 feet (about 6km) 
hovering height.77 The produced visual image, clear enough to see moving objects 
such as cars but also persons, is streamed to the controller, who can zoom into more 
detailed perspectives both in real time as well as in the recorded data.78 The usefulness 
of such systems for urban surveillance are obvious: especially paired with data- and 
video content analytics, systems such as ARGUS IS and others would be capable of 
creating persistent real-time visual surveillance from the sky, including the detection 
of ‘anomalies’ and the tracking of pre-defined targets.79 In the US at least, it seems 
that aerial surveillance has become a standard practice in policing, albeit exact 
information on the details of the surveillance systems employed are not publicly 
available.80  
Persistent surveillance from the sky using sophisticated image technology and data 
processing adds a new dimension to urban surveillance. Integrating UAVs into 
complex surveillance systems gives operators another layer of unprecedented public 
surveillance capabilities.  
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1.5.2 Ubiquitous	Sensors	and	Networks	
Surveillance possibilities have improved dramatically. Naturally, this is due to the 
development of electronic devices and technological inventions that have been 
permeating everyday life during the last decades. Smart phones and computer 
networks are only examples of a row of technologies which have changed ways of 
work and life in modern societies. Today we are surrounded by an array of devices, 
microcomputers and sensors that collect, transmit and retain data in many forms and 
shapes. The European Commission’s Information and Communication Technologies 
Advisory Group (ISTAG) has described this phenomenon as ‘Ambient Intelligent 
Environment’, in which ‘humans will, (…), be surrounded by intelligent interfaces 
supported by computing and networking technology that is embedded in everyday 
objects such as furniture, clothes, vehicles, roads and smart materials - even particles 
of decorative substances like paint.’81  
In addition, Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) are ‘…an integral 
part of almost anything we do (…) – We have moved from society of human 
communication only, into a world of Internet of Things – where machine-to-machine 
communication will be a large part of future communication.’82  
Apart from this ‘internet of things’ and ubiquitous digital communication between 
people and devices, another trend has become visible: One prerequisite of such 
scenarios and visions is the fact that an increasing number of electronic devices can 
‘interface’ with the real environment. This means that there is an increasing number 
of sensors of all forms and shapes embedded in people’s environments. For example, 
sensors in mobile phones today include sound and touch sensors and future 
developments are moving towards the expansion of interface options enabling 
‘cognitive computing’ as devices will be able to learn and adapt to their 
environments.83 Other examples show the increasing possibilities to use networked 
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sensors for environmental monitoring84, or the development and improvement of 
various sensor types, such as, e.g., the integration of chemical sensors in sensor 
networks.85  Hence, today there are more types of sensors, sensors are becoming 
smaller, cheaper, ubiquitous and networked and this trend is likely to increase in the 
recent year. This sensor revolution has consequently huge implications for 
surveillance technologies. Not only are the technical capabilities of sensors 
specifically built for surveillance technologies, such as, e.g., video cameras, 
microphones or movement sensors, but more and more networked ‘everyday’ sensors 
can be used for surveillance and integrated in complex surveillance systems. Many of 
the NSA surveillance practices that were revealed by the Snowden-Files in summer 
2013, 86  for example, were based on data-stream analytics. Such data streams, 
however, become more and more available through the proliferation of sensor 
networks recording information, amongst them sensitive information about 
individuals such as heart rate, movement profiles, body temperature, mood etc. Body 
sensors in so-called ‘wearables’ –electronic devices that embody a variety of sensors, 
for example smart-watches are complemented with technological developments in 
smart homes or home automation. Furthermore, wide sensor networks can be installed 
in wide areas of public space – and they can be integrated into surveillance systems as 
well. Improved sensors, their networks and proliferation hence dramatically improve 
surveillance capabilities in many ways.  
1.5.3 Biometrics		
The term ‘biometrics’ contains a variety of different technologies, some more relevant 
for public surveillance than others. In general one way of defining the term 
‘biometrics’ can be as ‘(…) the science of establishing the identity of an individual 
based on the physical, chemical or behavioral attributes of the person.’87 The general 
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idea is that ‘measureable physical properties’88 are used to uniquely and securely 
identify individuals as those attributes –such as for example fingerprints or DNA 
profiles – do not change during a person’s lifetime.89 As such, biometrics can have 
many forms and shapes, but they all serve the purpose of enabling reliable 
identification of persons in various environments. Those forms can roughly be 
separated between physical biometrics and behavioural biometrics. Physical 
biometrics include features such as finger- palm- or hand prints, face, iris, retina, 
signature, gait, voice, ear, hand vein, odour or DNA.90 Behavioural biometrics can for 
example include certain special patterns such as a person’s signature or specific 
personal typing pattern on a keyboard.91  
Biometric systems come with certain technological pre-requisites. First, a sensor 
needs to take a person’s biometric data. This can be for example a fingerprint reader, 
an iris scanner or a video camera filming a face. Secondly, the data needs to be 
processed. In more detail, the data quality is assessed, the data is translated into a 
biometric template and the data is compared to adequate reference data.92 Thirdly, the 
data or template is stored in a database, possibly in connection with information on 
the identifiable individual.93 It goes without saying that biometric systems are often 
highly complex and require many different technical blocks and stages in order to 
function in a reliable and efficient way and it is not the intention of this chapter to 
provide an exhaustive definition of systems, compounds and their efficiencies.94  
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Today, biometric technologies appear in all kinds of systems and devices and they can 
play an important role in modern surveillance systems. Biometrics or biometric 
authentication 95  are applied, for example, in access control, passports, criminal 
investigations, border control, video surveillance, employees time tracking, identity 
management and unlocking mobile phones, amongst many others. As such the use of 
biometric technologies can be classified in different usage groups: Commercial, 
government, forensics, 96  and personalization. 97  In forensics, biometrics such as 
fingerprints or DNA samples are used to identify perpetrators or corpses. 
Governmental application includes identity management for ID documents, border 
controls, healthcare, public administration, etc. Commercial application encompasses 
many commercially distributes application of biometric technologies such as access 
control, employee tracking, personal identification and authentication in banking and 
consumption, including a strong need to reliably identify individuals in online 
commercial activities. Today, biometrics are also used in private security applications 
where they are already a standard, such as for example many smart-phones and 
computers can use finger prints to identify users. In addition to the forensic, 
governmental and commercial use of biometrics, Shimon Modi adds what he calls 
future ‘Personalization/context-aware applications’.98 Those are systems that connect 
certain personal biometric features to personal adjustable systems, such as, for 
example, a car seats automatically adjusting to a specific driver, a car security system 
recognizing tiredness, or a smart home activating a preferred light setting by an 
inhabitant connected to a finger print. Many of those, however, would also fall into 
the category of commercial applications.  
Today, one can envision an endless amount of possible uses for biometrics for a 
myriad of purposes. Biometric technologies have advanced dramatically in recent 
years in their distribution, application and efficiency and they will continue to 
advance. Together with the sensor revolution, biometrics will continue to improve and 
will proliferate. In addition, biometrics will increasingly be found in large-scale 
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applications such as national ID systems, e-commerce and an array of security 
applications.99  
Generally, biometrics can play a crucial role in large-scale surveillance systems. 
Naturally, some of the systems and traits are more suitable for surveillance then others. 
So are fingerprint or DNA samples less relevant for surveillance systems than facial 
recognition or certain personal pattern recognition. Biometrics have always played an 
important role in surveillance and forensics for example when it is necessary to 
identify a perpetrator on a video tape. The improvements of biometric technologies, 
however, have made it possible to integrate certain biometric recognition technologies 
into surveillance systems to enable real-time recognition of persons. 100  Facial 
recognition is the most prominent example of how surveillance capabilities have 
improved in the recent years, but also pattern recognition such as keystrokes or gait 
could be used to identify individuals in a surveillance context.  
	
1.6 The	Urban	Surveillance	Scenario	
In order to illustrate the theoretical capabilities of such modern smart surveillance 
systems, this study will use an urban surveillance scenario. Although the scenario as 
such is fiction, many of the technologies exist, function, and are part of many smart-
cities projects all over the globe.  
The scenario takes place in the city of Helberg somewhere in Northern Europe. 
Helberg is a capital of country X with a little over 1.5 million citizens, the seat of the 
government including many ministries, the legislative including a parliament. Helberg 
is situated on the coast and has a large passenger and industrial harbour as well as a 
large airport. Due to this, Helberg is the political, cultural, industrial and commercial 
centre of the country. Helberg ranks average in terms of crime statistics as well as 
social stratification. Helberg has a touristic town centre including many culturally and 
historically valuable sites. Helberg runs a centralized video surveillance system.  
                                                
99 Jain AK and Ajay Kumar ‘Biometric Recognition: An Overview.’ in Mordini E and Tzovaras D 
(eds), Second Generation Biometrics: The Ethical, Legal and Social Context (Springer 2012), 65. 
100 See Tistarelli M, Barrett SE and O’Toole AJ, ‘Facial Recognition, Facial Expression and Intention 
Detection’ in Mordini E and Tzovaras D (eds), Second Generation Biometrics: The Ethical, Legal and 
Social Context (Springer 2012), 229, 230.  
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The system is installed in the city centre; the boundaries are the inner ring road of the 
city. The city centre is equipped with 10000 state-of-the-art PTZ cameras, enabling 
coverage of almost 95% of public spaces within the inner surveillance zone. 
Furthermore, those cameras are equipped with microphones that can access sounds 
close to the cameras. Third, the centre is equipped with 500 radiation sensors. In 
addition to the fixed cameras, all police vehicles are equipped with permanently 
recording mobile video cameras.  
Furthermore, the police authorities operate several unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) 
which fly above the city in 12 hour shifts. Those UAVs are equipped with an 
Autonomous Real-Time Ground Ubiquitous Surveillance Imaging System (ARGUS-
IS), a surveillance system capable of tracking moving objects such as cars and persons 
by filming and recording around 100 square km of city area form the air. The ARGUS 
Imaging System is controlled from the police surveillance centre and is used for real-
time tactical police operations such as in mass events or for investigations and 
forensics, for example in cases of major traffic accidents or crimes.  
All the surveillance sensors are connected via fibre-optic cables to a central control 
centre operated by the police. The control centre retains all collected data for 30 days 
and is equipped with powerful computers running various types of video analytic 
software. The surveillance system is therefore capable of automated number plate 
recognition (ANPR), facial recognition, person and object tracking as well as motion 
analytics and a wide array of Video Content Analytics (VCA) technologies. The 
system can also be configured to set different surveillance intensities to specific areas.  
For example, the system operates behavioural analytics software in all central car-
parks which can automatically identify behaviour typically related to car theft such as 
the loitering of a group of people and subsequently alert the security centre staff. 
Furthermore, the system also monitors drivers’ compliance with parking regulations 
in the inner city. Generally, the system operates on an alert-on detect basis. This means 
that it constantly analyses the incoming sensor data stream and alerts security 
personnel when a pre-programmed event appears. The levels of sensitivity and the 
‘anomalies’ and ‘incidents’ which the system detects can be adjusted and set by the 
operator.  
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In order to achieve a high level of coverage within the city, public authorities have 
entered into a variety of public private partnerships in the security field: as a 
consequence, much of the surveillance data comes from sensors operated by private 
stakeholders, for example cameras in car parks and shopping malls. Furthermore, a 
majority of data is collected by private security companies that operate surveillance 
systems in large areas such as the stations, metro trains, trams, and busses of the city’s 
public transport system. 
The system is therefore capable of aiding the execution of a high level of control over 
vast public areas in the city. The scenario illustrates surveillance and control 
capabilities, which if implemented, come with a variety of concerns, particularly for 
the right to privacy of citizens.  
This surveillance scenario is hypothetical. The following Sections will identify 
elements of the scenario with core relevance for a legal analysis. The technological 
descriptive analyses above have shown that modern urban surveillance no longer is 
merely about one technology, but about an accumulation of several technologies 
combining sensors, hardware and software and about complex data analytics and data 
processing operations. In that sense, modern urban surveillance is not somebody 
watching a screen and others being watched, but about complex algorithms that 
automatically and independently control and regulate spaces.  
With this, urban surveillance systems have the potential to shift from being rather 
independent and autonomous ‘closed circuit’- systems towards meta-systems that 
access the treasure troves of big data, social media, smart-city data and the wide 
variety of available sensor data in order to surveil areas and individuals, control spaces 
and even forecast events. Recursively, such surveillance systems can feed back data 
into the variety of other smart city systems that control for example traffic flows, 
public transport systems or the electronic grid.  
Consequently, modern public surveillance will not merely conduct surveillance for 
reasons of security, but will be a highly complex combination and networks of 
technologies and sensors that simultaneously administer, regulate, control and surveil 
large urban spaces.  
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With this, the borders between classical security surveillance systems and smart 
administrative and regulative systems become blurred and distorted. In fact, access to 
data, data mining and methods of data processing are playing an increasingly 
important role in our capabilities to control public spaces.  
The consequences of this are manifold, but there are certain issues that need to be re-
thought when approaching this from a legal perspective. The following sections will 
analyse certain aspects and tendencies of such overarching surveillance that appear in 
this urban scenario from a fundamental rights perspective, particularly a right to 
privacy and data protection and their conceptualizations between human 
dignity/personality and individual liberty. A special focus will be directed towards the 
gaps and missing connections in the current jurisprudence of European Courts on the 
issue.  
The analysis is structured along the lines of legal issues arising in the scenario and 
does not necessarily follow classical schemes of testing fundamental rights intrusions. 
As many problems in the scenario dealing with uncertain legal grounds and a lack of 
jurisprudence, much focus will be on the applicability and scope of current European 
fundamental rights. The following analyses is structured in a thematic rather than a 
schematic way.  
 
This section addresses the theoretical conceptualizations of privacy and the 
fundamental conceptual antagonisms one must face when engaging with privacy in 
public places. The question what does privacy in a public context mean, necessitates 
a deeper theoretical engagement with privacy as a concept on the one hand, and the 
public private distinction on the other. Yet, certainly a lot of those stories have already 
been told and will not be told again here. Nevertheless, some of the theoretical 
foundations do need mentioning because they play a fundamental role in the questions 
that appear when dealing with privacy and control in public spaces in light of an 
analyses of the scenario above.  
One of the core underlying issues in his study derives from the distinction between 
public and private spaces. In that sense, referring to the scenario above, much of the 
surveillance happens in physical public spaces in the city of Helberg, and in that sense 
in areas that can be somehow distinguished from ‘private’ spaces. One of the first 
questions deriving from the surveillance scenario requires a distinction between 
physical ‘public’ and physical ‘private’ spaces. 
In many ways, much of the theoretical work on privacy draws on the distinction 
between spaces: it appears intuitive that the privacy framework is different depending 
on the physical space in which an issue is located. In a private bathroom, privacy 
appears to work differently than in the centre square of a town. In a similar way, the 
distinction between public and private does play a role in the legal assessments of 
surveillance technologies. The applicable legal frameworks vary, depending on the 
physical space: Surveillance systems operated on a public space appear less intrusive 
than in a private space, consequently they might be regulated differently.  
This section will look at conceptualization of public spaces and its legal ramifications. 
Furthermore, the distinction between public and private have consequences for the 
underlying conceptions of privacy. The right to be let alone comes with a distinct 
interpretation of space than the concept of control of information. Yet, most of the 
privacy approaches distinguish between a public or a private, an inner and an outer 
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sphere. Controlling one’s personal information, for example, means controlling the 
zones through which information shifts from a personal into a public sphere. Those 
concepts will be discussed in Section 2.2 below. 
While the relationship between privacy and publicity is naturally not easy to delineate, 
the question arises to what extend a distinction between physical public and private 
space can be approached from a legal perspective. In fact, there are many ways of 
legally defining public space, and all come with their own problems and weaknesses.  
The Venice Commission, for example, defines public areas as  
…a place which can be in principle accessed by anyone freely, indiscriminately, 
at any time and under any circumstances. Public areas are open to the public. In 
principle anyone at any time can have the benefit of this area. A person benefits 
freely from public areas. Public areas are governed by public authorities whose 
power to enforce the law and intervene are wider than within private property.101 
At first sight, this definition makes sense. Public areas are spaces, which are publicly 
accessible as well as publicly controlled, governed and administered. However, it is 
also obvious that there are public places today that are somehow public and yet come 
with restricted access. Train stations and airports are such examples of a public space, 
which could be owned and administered by a public entity but yet where access is 
restricted to those holding a travel ticket. In addition to this, there are also spaces that 
are publicly accessible, however, only during certain times (e.g. city libraries) or that 
are even privately owned (such as shopping malls, supermarkets or restaurants. In fact, 
modern urban spaces today are composed of a variety of publicly or privately owned 
or administered physical spaces that are only accessible upon the fulfilment of certain 
conditions. In that sense, strictly speaking, the above-mentioned Venice Commission 
definition does not cover areas that are not indiscriminately open to the public, or that 
are not open at all times. If indiscriminate and unrestricted openness is problematic as 
a criterion, how else could ‘public areas’ be distinguished from ‘private’ areas? 
Gary Marx gave a nuanced private and public space distinction: he emphasized the 
need to understand the distinction rather as multi-dimensional and fluid than as fixed 
and rigid and laid out a list of dimensions of the public-private distinction, such as 
                                                
101  European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on Video 
Surveillance In Public Places by Public Authorities and the Protection of Human Rights, 23 March 
2007, Study No. 404/2006, CDL-AD(2007)014, para 8.  
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geographical locations, information, communication, expectation and social role and 
status.102 
One of Marx’s elements for a legal definition of physical public space, however, was 
that public spaces were ‘geographical places as determined by law’. 103  Marx 
emphasized that the distinction here depended on the accessibility of space from a 
formal legal perspective and that while public space could be entered or left without 
constraints, the accessibility of a private space could legally be regulated by the private 
owner.104 It is interesting that this definition relies on the formal legal status of a 
physical space in order to define its ‘private’ or ‘public’ nature. This definition, 
however rests on the legal right to access. However, even here, the distinction is 
legally tricky. Access to public spaces can be legally restricted, for example when 
there is a curfew. Public parks can have very strict rules for access and behaviour and 
public bathrooms do have a very strict element of accessibility restrictions, if they are 
occupied. Marx therefore rightly noted that many public areas still could be very 
difficult to access, for example, a jungle or the peak of a mountain.105  
Hence, besides the accessibility criteria, the legal status appears to be an important 
element when distinguishing ‘public’ from ‘private’ physical areas. In that regards, 
also the Venice Commission definition contains an element of legal scope: ‘Public 
areas are governed by public authorities whose power to enforce the law and intervene 
are wider than within private property.’106 In that sense, scope and applicability of law 
play an important, if not a decisive part in defining what is a physical ‘public’ area.  
It is striking, though, that legal definitions of what constitutes a physical public space 
are in practice either avoided or defined in relation to its opposites. In the CJEU Ryneš 
case, for example, the Court conceptualized public space as the space which is not 
private: The fact that camera surveillance was directed to the space outside of the 
private area was decisive in the decision concerning the ‘household exemption’ of 
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article 3(2) of the European Data Protection Directive.107 In the CJEU Judgement, 
public space was therefore defined through its explicit distinction from the private 
space.  
Examples of legal definitions in relation to public spaces can also be found in many 
national jurisdictions. In the UK, for example, a ‘public place’ pursuant to the 1936 
Public Order Act, includes, ‘…any highway (…) and any other premises or place to 
which at the material time the public have or are permitted to have access, whether on 
payment or otherwise.’ 108  Here, public places are defined through accessibility, 
although the fact that entrance fees or other restricting mechanisms can prevent entry 
are not decisive for separating a public place from a private one.  
In France, ‘public places’ required definition for a law prohibiting the concealment of 
one’s face in public.109 In article 2, the law states that ‘…l'espace public est constitué 
des voies publiques ainsi que des lieux ouverts au public ou affectés à un service 
public.’110 This means that, besides accessible roads and places, the law also bans the 
concealment of one’s face in areas assigned to a public service. In a Prime Minister’s 
Circular of 2nd of March 2011 on the law, places open to the public include both 
unrestricted and conditional access areas, in so far as ‘as any person who so wishes 
may meet the requirement (for example, by paying for a ticket to enter a cinema or 
theatre).’ 111  Here, the comment explicitly includes privately owned areas of 
commercial use into the scope of public places, as well as ‘banks, stations, airports 
and the various means of public transport’.112 Furthermore, places assigned to a public 
service in the meaning of the law  
…are the premises of any public institutions, courts and tribunals and 
administrative bodies, together with any other bodies responsible for providing 
                                                
107 See Case C‑212/13 František Ryneš v Úřad pro ochranu osobních údajů, Judgement, Court (Fourth 
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public services. They include, in particular, the premises of various public 
authorities and establishments, local government bodies and their public 
establishments, town halls, courts, prefectures, hospitals, post offices, 
educational institutions (primary and secondary schools, universities), family 
benefit offices, health insurance offices, job centers, museums and libraries.113  
Consequently, in France, and regarding concealment of one’s face, public places are 
defined as vast areas of life and daily activities, excluding only the mere sphere of an 
individual’s own apartment or private residence. In such conceptions, it appears that 
everything comprises public space, except physical spaces that are walled in, shielded 
and locked off.  
Another example of how to address the complex nature of public space for legal 
purposes, can be found in German jurisdiction: Here, a public road becomes a public 
space through official labelling, following an administrative procedure.114 Once a 
street is constructed and officially labelled, it becomes a public area on which general 
public traffic regulations apply as regulated in the ‘road traffic order’ 
(Strassenverkehrsordnung, StVO).115 According to the administrative act on the ‘road 
traffic order’, however, public traffic regulations also apply in areas which are not 
labelled by a public authority but on which the holder of the right to disposal has 
accepted or tacitly tolerated public traffic.116 This means that public traffic regulation 
only does not apply in an area, if that area is clearly and effectively blocked from all 
sorts of public traffic.  
In this example, public areas are delineated from private areas by de facto accessibility 
and an administrative designation. In that sense, the law distinguishes between public 
areas, semi-public areas and private areas. Public and semi-public space then share the 
same rules, only strictly private areas might be subject to exemption from such 
regulation. What matters here, is the intended or unintended openness and 
accessibility, hence the character of the space.  
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These example show some formulations of definitions of public spaces in law. While 
many of the definitions are limited, it is clear that the relationship between concepts 
of privacy and legal definitions of space are important for legal arguments addressing 
the surveillance of public spaces. Especially crucial here is the application of the legal 
scopes: territorial, personal and material scopes of laws are crucial particularly for 
fundamental rights arguments.  
Regarding public surveillance, the legal distinction between physical public and 
private space is important for two reasons. Firstly, the categorization of physical space 
is important for the scope and applicability of laws. Secondly, the definition of public 
and private spaces has a significant effect on the applicable legal arguments regarding 
surveillance practices. This will be discussed in more detail in relation to the legal 
conceptions of privacy below.  
For now, it is important to conclude that there are many legal definitions of physical 
public and private space, containing different elements, such as accessibility, 
openness, legal designation, or ownership and governance. In connection with the 
urban surveillance scenario of Helberg above, this raises a variety of issues. Firstly, 
much of the sophisticated surveillance technologies are directed at physical public 
spaces that fall under at least one of the public space definitions above. This means 
that persons that place themselves outside of their own secluded and locked spaces 
will necessarily expose themselves to some of the described surveillance technologies. 
Some of the described surveillance technologies additionally might even reach into 
the physically secluded spaces of a locked off and principally inaccessible ‘private’ 
physical spaces. Mobile phone tracking, or holistic aerial surveillance, for example, 
potentially produces location data of persons also once they are inside allegedly 
secluded private physical spaces. The potential different treatment of surveillance 
practices in relation to the location of its target is problematic, as individuals in 
Helberg might be subject to surveillance regardless where they roam, may that be 
inside a privately-owned shopping mall, a public library during opening hours, a metro 
station or even inside their private vehicles on a motorway.  
This study therefore employs a rather wide conception of physical public spaces, a 
conception based on accessibility of space and corresponding effects of surveillance. 
The conception of ‘public space’ for the purpose of this study therefore contains all 
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areas and spheres in which individuals can be subject to surveillance and affected by 
the surveillance technologies described above. As already indicated above, however, 
for the detailed legal analyses, the territorial scope of this study shall be limited to 
Europe, and therefore European public spaces. Although it is limited, for the purposes 
of this study, public space shall therefore be understood as an open and accessible 
physical space in which individuals are de facto subject to the surveillance 
technologies describes in the scenario. 
The following section turns to the legal conceptualization of privacy, before this study 




The second important concept underlying this study on surveillance of public places, 
is the legal concept of privacy. This section therefore requires a discussion of the 
concept of privacy and its application and function as concerns public spaces. This 
discussion is important, particularly because it lies at the core of questions associated 
with the relationship between surveillance of a public space and surveillance of private 
spaces. In fact, the legal reasoning on interferences through and justification of 
surveillance of public spaces depend on the underlying understanding and 
conceptualization of privacy. This section therefore discusses several concepts of 
privacy and analyses their relationship and applicability to public space surveillance, 
leading to a discussion of privacy in public.  
Of course, presenting a unique and holistic classification would quickly stress the 
frame of this study. Many attempts have been made to grasp privacy in all its forms 
and classify its many components from a variety of disciplinary perspectives. It is 
important to stress that a legal conception of privacy may vary significantly from 
philosophical concepts of privacy, and that legal typologies tend to be specific to a 
particular legal system or legal culture. 117  This section nevertheless focusses on 
privacy as a legal concepts, namely privacy as a right in order to address the conceptual 
issues of privacy in public spaces, in an attempt to understand privacy in public from 
a perspective of international – or transnational law and therewith through the lenses 
of privacy as a human right.118  
2.2.1 Privacy	as	the	Right	to	Be	Let	Alone	
A legal conceptions of privacy following the lines of the common narratives, starts off 
with Warren and Brandeis’ 1890 conception of a right to privacy as a ‘right to be let 
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alone’.119 There is not much academic writing on the right to privacy that does not 
refer to Warren and Brandeis’ article. Published in 1890 in the Harvard Law Review, 
the article today often counts as the historical starting point of a legal right to privacy. 
The storylines behind the article vary, but the authors’ main motives appear to be 
rooted in the emergence of aggressive and invasive practices of journalism in the US 
from the midst-19th century onwards. Technological advancements such as mass print 
media and photographs contributed to the proliferation of newspapers, especially 
between 1850 and 1890, when the number of readers in the US increased from 800.000 
to 8 Million.120 In their article, Warren and Brandeis argued for a new right to privacy 
and conceptualized it as the right ‘to be let alone’, deriving from Thomas Cooley’s 
definition of personal immunity.121 In 1880, Cooley conducted a classification of legal 
rights, in which he conceptualized amongst others the right to immunity from attacks 
and injuries and the right to life as ‘personal rights’.122  He understood personal 
immunity as ‘[t]he right to one’s person may be said to be a right of complete 
immunity: to be let alone.’123  
In their 1890 article, Warren and Brandeis took up the concept of inviolate personality 
and argued in favour of the introduction of a new right – the right to privacy. They 
argued that especially due to the spread of print media and photography, individuals 
were in need for better protection against harms.124 According to them, the protection 
of the individual necessitated the formulation of a new right, simply because existing 
mechanisms of protection such as against slander or libel, copyright violations or the 
protection of property were not sufficiently developed in that regard. While the right 
to life protected from physical assault and the threat of death, while slander and libel 
protected individuals from direct assaults, and while the right to property protected 
tangible and intangible forms of possessions, there was consequently also a need to 
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expand those concepts and form a right that would protect individuals from being 
exposed to a public audience, from having letters opened and read125 and from their 
portraits being published.126 As a consequence, Warren and Brandeis grasped the right 
to privacy as personal injuries done to individuals by another party, on the same level 
with ‘…the right not to be assaulted or beaten, the right not to be maliciously 
prosecuted, the right not to be defamed.’127 In addition, the authors added that this did 
not derive from legal principles surrounding private property, but from the ‘inviolate 
personality’ of the affected person.128 
Warren and Brandeis hence argued, that Common Law Courts in the US had already 
been applying certain realms of protection that fell into the scope of a right to privacy, 
however, by subsuming them under expanded versions of other rights, such as the 
right to life or copyright. Consequently, a new formulation of a right to privacy would 
enable better protection against individual harm. What is interesting is that the right 
to privacy was conceptualized from a private law perspective. Warren and Brandeis 
did not primarily see the state and its agents as causing interferences with an 
individual’s right to privacy, but rather other individuals or the press. Privacy was 
therefore conceptualized as a right to be let alone, not exclusively by the state, but also 
by other individuals.  
Additionally, Warren and Brandeis relied strongly on the concept of a personality 
right, when they defined the right to privacy as a ‘…more general right of the 
individual to be let alone’129 which was in fact very similar to Cooley’s conception of 
personal immunity as the ‘right to one’s person’.130  
Generally, Warren and Brandeis’ article has been discussed in countless publications 
on the issue, and is not only seen as the starting point of the story of privacy but 
probably one of the most cited legal publication in the history of legal privacy 
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research. Hence, it would not serve any purpose for this work to overly engage with 
the early conceptions of privacy, as this has been done elsewhere.131 However, it is 
interesting to realize how much technological and social developments have 
influenced already early legal works on privacy. Parallels can be drawn between the 
role of technologies such as photography and print-media at the turn of the 19th century 
and today’s debates on social media, data protection, information law and the 
necessity for new interpretations of ‘old’ civil and fundamental rights. In fact, one of 
the core assumptions of this work is that modern surveillance practices and 
technologies in public places come with an enormous potential for societal and legal 
changes. Interestingly, while social and legal changes have always been part of 
history, modern surveillance technologies have the potential to control and hamper 
changes and developments. The legal protection of liberty and change might very well 
lie at the core of the debate. The right to privacy conceptualized as the right to be let 
alone, however, did not remain the sole conception of privacy.  
2.2.2 Privacy	and	Torts		
In 1960, the dean of the University of California Berkley, William Prosser published 
an article in the California Law Review, in which he further developed Warren and 
Brandeis’ privacy tort. While Warren and Brandeis’ right to be let alone was the 
starting point for the conceptualization of privacy, Prosser was ‘…the law’s chief 
architect.’132 Prosser, after reviewing the extensive body of jurisprudence since the 
Warren/Brandeis 1890 article, described privacy as consisting of four tort categories:  
The first category included cases where somebody gathers information, trespasses, 
hounds, pries, and hence somehow intrudes either in the private affairs or the chosen 
seclusion or solitude of others.133 Important to mention in this context is that this does 
require the existence and delineation of a clear zone or area of seclusion. Prosser 
stressed that ‘[o]n the public street, or in any other public space, the plaintiff has no 
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right to be alone, and it is no invasion of his privacy to do no more than follow him 
about.’ 134  Further categories of Prosser’s four privacy torts were the ‘[p]ublic 
disclosure of embarrassing private facts…’, ‘[p]ublicity which places the plaintiff in 
a false light in the public eye’ and the ‘[a]ppropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, 
of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.’135  
According to Prosser’s first category, being in a public place contradicts actively 
searching for solitude. Therewith, an individual enjoys less, if even any, privacy when 
in a public space. At the same time, however, liabilities could also occur in a public 
scenario. For example, taking a picture of an embracing couple in public isn’t as such 
an invasion into privacy for Prosser, even if that image may be published. However, 
if the image would be published with a negative connotation and with an intention to 
slander or insult the couple, the invasion could fall into the third ‘false light in the 
public eye’ –category by which a plaintiff would have a case.136 With his article, 
Prosser hence clarified and categorized the right to privacy conveniently for many US 
lawyers at the time. At the same time, Prosser’s conceptions have been subject to many 
debates and criticism and there are indeed several problems with them: One is, for 
example, that the Prosser’s torts appear to be only a swansong for existing remedies 
against specific pre-existing torts, or, as Bloustein, argues:  
…the right to privacy is reduced to a mere shell of what it has pretended to be. 
Instead of a relatively new, basic and independent legal right protecting a 
unique, fundamental and relatively neglected interest, we find a mere 
application in novel circumstances of traditional legal rights designed to protect 
well-identified and established social values.137  
Indeed, looking at the four tort categories ‘intrusion’, ‘disclosure’, ‘false light in the 
public eye’ and ‘appropriation’, this criticism makes sense. There are barely any 
unique or new forms of invasions in those torts, rather an accumulation of categories 
that are based on existing torts. This essentially disregards Warren’s and Brandeis’ 
idea that privacy should rely on the concept of an inviolate personality as an essential 
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building block.138 Bloustein used this argument to state that privacy should in fact be 
based on ‘…the individual’s independence, dignity and integrity’ as the essence of 
human self-determination. 139  This illustrates the existence of two fundamentally 
opposed understandings of privacy which will be essential for the analyses of modern 
public area surveillance in this work: an understanding of privacy based on dignity 
and an understanding of privacy based on a liberal conception of the individual, on 
harms and on individual expectations.140  
Additionally, in Richards’ and Solove’s reading, Prosser’s privacy torts face yet 
another criticism:  
Like a deer caught in the headlights, the privacy torts froze after Prosser's beam 
focused upon them. Prosser codified the torts in the Second Restatement of Torts, 
effectively locking them into their current form. The result is that the privacy 
torts are woefully inadequate to address the privacy problems we face today.141  
It is crucial to note here that Warren and Brandeis, but especially Prosser, understood 
and discussed privacy with a strong connection to tort law – which as such is a very 
limited perspective. In fact, such criticism is deeply rooted in the debates around 
privacy as a general personality right: it can be regarded as problematic to 
conceptualize privacy merely as a tort law issue because tort law only activates a 
mechanism of sanction in case of interferences with a general personality right, but 
does not contribute to a definition and a legal conceptualization of privacy as a part of 
personality.142 In other words, if privacy is reduced to a sanctioning mechanism, it is 
difficult to argue its essential contribution to forming and sustaining personality. The 
importance of privacy as a personality right will be discussed further below in this 
study.  
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2.2.3 Privacy	as	Control	of	Information		
While Warren and Brandeis as well as Prosser derived their conceptualizations of 
privacy at least more or less through tort law, and therewith as civil wrongs occurring 
to individuals, Alan Westin developed a radically different approach to privacy. In his 
book from 1967 Privacy and Freedom, Westin conceptualized privacy as an intrinsic 
necessity for human beings, opposing the perception that it was a relatively new legal 
concept.143 He defined privacy as ‘…the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions 
to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extend information about them 
is communicated to others.’144  
Consequently, for Westin, privacy related firstly to individual self-determination, and 
secondly, to control over the sharing of personal information. This perspective 
constituted a new and major aspect of a legal understanding of privacy with immense 
relevance for modern information law: privacy could now be grasped as informational 
self-determination and therewith as people’s control of information about 
themselves.145  
Westin, however, based his ideas on privacy on an anthropological argument and 
hence derived privacy from a certain nature of human beings which he categorized 
into the ‘animal world’, in the ‘primitive world’ and in ‘modern societies’.146 While 
such cultural anthropological simplifications are problematic, Westin’s ‘states’ of 
individual privacy in Western Democracies are worth mentioning in this context. 
Westin defined what he calls ‘four basic states of individual privacy’ as ‘solitude, 
intimacy, anonymity and reserve’.147 Employing those states, he described the basic 
relationship between an individual and society, and set out a distinction between the 
privacy and public sphere.  
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In the state of solitude, individuals are separated from others and completely free from 
observation through other persons.148 In the state of intimacy, individuals are placed 
in small, close and intimate units, such as a circle of friends, a marriage or a family. 
Such units consist of secluded individuals forming close relationships without which, 
‘…a basic need for human contact would not be met.’149 On the one hand Westin 
hence described the individual need for solitude as a fundamental part of human 
existence, while, on the other hand, he recognized the need for social interactions and 
community.  
In describing the third state of individual privacy, Westin moved more and more 
towards the individual in the public sphere.  
The third state of privacy, anonymity, occurs when the individual is in public 
places or performing public acts but still seeks, and finds, freedom from 
identification and surveillance.150  
While in a public place, one does not necessarily expect to be identified, although, of 
course, everybody could gather certain information about other individuals. Westin 
further noted that ‘[k]nowledge or fear that one is under systematic observation in 
public places destroys the sense of relaxation and freedom that men seek in open 
spaces and public arenas.’151  
Such an argumentation is crucial for emphasizing the importance of privacy in public 
spaces. In backing up his argument, Westin was certainly right when he referred to the 
special personal openness of individuals in public and towards strangers, as a result of 
having to fear less recourse than if that openness was given to closely related persons, 
a phenomenon described in and deriving from Simmel’s excursus on the stranger.152 
In that sense, while humans in public spaces can be observed, they at the same time 
enjoy a clear sense that their behaviour and expressions do not have the same 
consequences as if they would be conducted among a group of people of close 
relationship. Strangers, indeed, as Westin put it, were ‘…able to exert no authority or 
                                                
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid, (emphasis added).  
151 Ibid.  
152 Ibid. 31, 32; Georg Simmel, Soziologie (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1908), esp. Kapitel IX: Der 
Raum und die räumlichen Ordnungen der Gesellschaft, Exkurs über den Fremden, 509-512.  
	 54	
restraint over the individual.’ 153  This is certainly an important contribution to a 
different understanding of privacy and will be followed up later in the discussion on 
privacy in public space.  
The fourth state of privacy as defined by Westin is called ‘reserve’. With this, he 
described a certain ‘…psychological barrier against unwanted intrusion;’ which 
occurs ‘…when the individual’s need to limit communication about himself is 
protected by the willing discretion of those surrounding him.’154 This means that 
information shared between individuals in close relationships generally are not 
carelessly made public or spread in order to safeguard an individual’s personality. This 
self-restraint ‘…expresses the individual’s choice to withhold or disclose information 
– the choice that is the dynamic aspect of privacy in daily interpersonal relations.’155 
Once again, Westin drew the idea from Simmel and his identification of constant 
tension between self-exposure and self-constraint.156  
Westin additionally took a rather functionalist approach to privacy as a concept in 
society: for him, the distinction between different privacy states and the distinction 
between the functions of individuals in society serve as tools to further develop law in 
a modern democratic state.157  
In addition, another important contribution of Westin’s work were the analyses of new 
technologies and their effect on individual privacy through surveillance. He 
thoroughly examined, for example, location tracking, listening devices, physical 
surveillance and psychological surveillance through public and private actors. 158 
Already in 1967, Westin excessively speculated about the future capabilities of 
privacy invasive technologies; and his predictions concerning small vibration or 
acceleration sensors carried on the body, miniature microphones or miniaturization of 
cameras come surprisingly close to the modern mobile phone.159 He noted that while 
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most of the mechanism of surveillance, control and manipulation go a long back in 
history, ‘…[w]hat is new today is the marriage of advanced scientific technology to 
these classic surveillance methods.’160 It appears that this certainly still applies today, 
probably even more than ever before.  
While engaging with Westin’s work, it does not come as a surprise that he has been 
hugely influential in creating a distinct categorization of privacy, which does not 
primarily derive from private law and tort law, but from the social sciences, 
anthropology and sociology. Subsequently, one of the many conceptualizations of 
privacy today revolves around Westin’s idea of privacy as control over personal 
information. Many other scholars have since then analysed or developed the idea of 
privacy as control over personal information,161 and the idea built the foundation of 
many current understanding of privacy and data protection rights, from the German 
‘right to informational self-determination’ to the right to request access to one’s data 
held by others in the new European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).162 
Furthermore, Westin’s concept of information control by individuals has played a very 
important role in the development of privacy management in information law, e.g., in 
the concept of implied and explicit consent as well as ‘notice and choice’ for consumer 
data processing.163 With this, Westin’s privacy as control of personal information 
strongly depends on an individual’s will and choice to share information or not. 
Hoofnagle and Urban have therefore rightly described Westin’s conceptions as deeply 
dependent on the sovereignty of individuals and their choices, hence as ‘privacy homo 
economicus’.164 Westin’s assumptions are problematic, firstly because it appears that 
his conception of individual rational choice does not hold up to thorough testing165 - 
                                                
160 Ibid, 68.  
161 See e.g. Solove DJ, ‘Conceptualizing Privacy’ (2002) 90 California Law Review 1087, 1109, 1110 
fn 112; For detailed analyses of Westin’s contribution, see Margulis ST, ‘On the Status and 
Contribution of Westin's and Altman's Theories of Privacy’ (2003) 59 Journal of Social Issues 411; 
Fried C, ‘Privacy’ (1968) 77 Yale Law Journal 475, 482.  
162 For a further discussion on the right to informational self-determination see Rouvroy A and Poullet 
Y, ‘The Right to Informational Self-Determination and the Value of Self-Development: Reassessing 
the Importance of Privacy for Democracy’ in Gutwirth S and others, (eds), Reinventing Data 
Protection? (Springer 2009), 45-76. See Regulation (EU) 2016/679, (GDPR), (n 303), Art 15.  
163 See Hoofnagle CJ and Urban JM, ‘Alan Westin's Privacy Homo Economicus’ (2014) 49 Wake 
Forest Law Review 261, 261, 262.  
164 Ibid, 268-270.  
165 Ibid, 270.  
	 56	
understandable when one thinks of how careless consumers often accept e.g. the 
privacy policies of a mobile phone application – and secondly, because 
conceptualizing privacy on the bases of individual choice is too reductive. Solove, for 
example, rightly remarks that privacy ‘…is not simply a matter of individual 
prerogative; it is also an issue of what society deems appropriate to protect.’166 
Westin’s privacy conception appears to be centred on individuals rather than 
communities, and privacy might often need to be contextualized differently, especially 
when the individual choice theory, for one or the other reason, does not keep its 
promises.  
Problems with conceptualizing privacy as control over information arise especially 
when the definition of personal information as such is problematic: What actually falls 
into the realm of personal information and what does it actually mean to ‘control’ such 
information?167 When privacy is understood as control over personal information and 
dependent on an alleged rational choice, information easily becomes proprietary. The 
connection between privacy and property, however, is deeply problematic. Solove 
puts this nicely:  
[W]hen theorists attempt to define what "control" entails, they often define it as 
a form of ownership, making the conception falter in a number of respects. 
Finally, conceptions of information control are too narrow because they reduce 
privacy to informational concerns, omit decisional freedom from the realm of 
privacy, and focus too exclusively on individual choice.’168  
This critique is especially directed towards understanding privacy under the auspices 
of a liberal common law society, such as in the US, where most of the legal privacy 
debates unfold around interferences with privileges held by intellectual and financial 
elites. The connection between early conceptions of privacy with high social status, 
possessions and property in a liberal capitalist society becomes certainly visible in 
Warren’s and Brandeis’ right to be let alone by the press and the State. Also, Prosser’s 
four torts of intrusion into chosen solitude, libel and slander and disclosure or 
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appropriation of information on individuals, carry a strong scent of a liberal 
individualist understanding of privacy, and Westin has repeatedly, as discussed above, 
been criticized for his liberal conception of a ‘privacy homo economicus’.169  
So far conceptions of privacy discussed here included the right to be let alone, privacy 
as a legal tort and privacy as control over personal data, but there are, of course, further 
nuanced understandings in legal and theoretical writings worth discussing in this 
context.  
2.2.4 Privacy	as	Limited	Access	to	the	Self	
Daniel Solove has repeatedly analysed another category of privacy theories, namely 
privacy as ‘limited access to the self’.170 Ruth Gavison, in this context, argued that 
privacy boils down to the accessibility of individuals by other individuals or entities. 
In her understanding, ‘accessibility’ means ‘…the extent to which we are known to 
others, the extent to which others have physical access to us, and the extent to which 
we are the subject of others' attention.’171 ‘…[I]n perfect privacy no one has any 
information about X, no one pays any attention to X, and no one has physical access 
to X. Perfect privacy is, of course, impossible in any society.172 Similarly, Gross 
argued that ‘…privacy is the condition of human life in which acquaintance with a 
person or with affairs of his life which are personal to him is limited’173 and Solove 
summarized limited access theories as ‘…the individual’s desire for concealment and 
for being apart from others.’174 He furthermore interpreted those views as a further 
sophistication of the right to be let alone, and in that sense as a right reaching beyond 
mere solitude:  
Solitude is a component of limited-access conceptions, as well as the right-to-
be-let-alone conceptions, but these theories extend far more broadly than 
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solitude, embracing freedom from government interference, as well as from 
intrusions by the press and others.175  
Indeed, Gavison’s understanding of accessibility goes beyond individual solitude or 
to be left alone: for her, privacy comes with an inherent value:  
…the reasons for which we claim privacy in different situations are similar. 
They are related to the functions privacy has in our lives: the promotion of 
liberty, autonomy, selfhood, and human relations, and furthering the existence 
of a free society.176  
Privacy, in this understanding, becomes ‘…a complex of three independent and 
irreducible elements: secrecy, anonymity, and solitude’ as a short form of ‘…the 
extent to which an individual is known, the extent to which an individual is the subject 
of attention, and the extent to which others have physical access to an individual.’177 
Gavison criticized the idea of privacy as control over information on the basis of the 
difficult notion of ‘control’. On the one hand, control is a difficult concept, because 
‘…a voluntary, knowing disclosure does not involve loss of privacy because it is an 
exercise of control, not a loss of it.’178 Yet, on the other hand, ‘…voluntary disclosure 
is a loss of control because the person who discloses loses the power to prevent others 
from further disseminating the information.’179  
Gavison is right in her analyses. ‘Control’ indeed contains an element of choice and 
hence runs the danger of a reductionist and choice-centric perception of privacy. 
Choice is in fact a very weak element of privacy protection, when understanding 
privacy as access to one’s self: there are countless ways available that one can think 
of scenarios where information is voluntarily disclosed, but then still used in order to 
gain access to the person. Furthermore, the element of individual choice, inherent in 
the Westin’s conception of privacy as control over information, would require rational 
and informed individual decision making capabilities which leads back to Hoofnagle 
and Urban’s critique of a ‘privacy homo economicus’.180 Making those choices would 
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require a level of individual rationality, technical skills, knowledge and wisdom that 
not many people in today’s networked world have the means to acquire.  
Gavison further rightly pointed out that privacy choices as such cannot be evaluated 
if a conception of privacy solely depends on individual choice.181 An individual might 
for example be criticized for uploading exercise and health data to a server through a 
fitness or health application on a phone on the basis of not choosing the ‘right’ kind 
of privacy behaviour. Through this, privacy becomes a value that reaches beyond 
individual choice. And this value does not depend on individual choice. Consequently, 
privacy conceptualized as limited access to the self carries an overarching value of 
privacy while it is able to point out concrete losses of privacy for individuals. Solove, 
however, criticised Gavison’s conception as it seems to exclude what is often called 
‘informational privacy’, meaning the importance of privacy in connection to the 
collection, retention and processing of data in computerized databases.182  
Defining privacy as control over information and conceptualizing privacy access to 
the self does, however, not seem to be as far separated as some suggest. While the 
element of choice in the control-conceptualization can be criticized as an illusionary 
liberal concept, so can the idea of inaccessibility. In fact, defining privacy as 
something that an individual controls, possesses and even might lose, is one of the 
core elements of liberal rights theories.183 Allen stated that liberal conceptions relied 
on three basic ‘privacies’, namely ‘physical privacy’ – containing chosen solitude and 
seclusion, ‘informational privacy’ – concerning control, access, processing and 
retention of personal information, and ‘proprietary privacy’ – as the ‘control over 
names, likenesses, and repositories of personal identity’.184  
Each of those distinct ‘privacies’ therefore has rather individualistic underpinnings 
and at its centre is the individual with her desires for seclusion and capacities to make 
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rational decisions. ‘Access to the self’ can therefore be seen as an understanding of 
privacy which is based on choice on the one hand, and control on the other.  
Returning to Gavison’s definition of privacy as access to the self (as ‘…the extent to 
which we are known to others, the extent to which others have physical access to us, 
and the extent to which we are the subject of others' attention’),185 it should be noted 
that it contains an element beyond individual control and choice: after all, being 
known, physically accessed and being subject to others attention generally is 
determined and regulated not only by the individual, but also and maybe even 
foremost by the community or the society.186 And in that sense regulating access to 
oneself is at least on a similar scale a matter of societal and communal regulation and 
therewith an essential part of the substance of societal organization.  
2.2.5 Intimacy	and	Secrecy	
A fifth approach or conceptualization of privacy discussed in this context evolves 
around the notions of secrecy or intimacy.187 At first sight, ‘secrecy’ appears as a self-
evident concept: it assumes that individuals want to keep some things secret, including 
personal information or some kinds of knowledge about themselves. The concept of 
intimacy consequently is based on the assumption that privacy related issues derive 
from the need and feelings for personal intimacy.  
Richard Posner, a strong critic of many other understandings of privacy, contended 
that privacy would de facto be mostly about keeping secret and withholding 
information about oneself in order to avoid disadvantages in capitalist economies. 
Posner expressed this in as following:  
Much of the demand for privacy, however, concerns discreditable information, 
often information concerning past or present criminal activity or moral conduct 
at variance with a person's professed moral standards. And often the motive for 
concealment is, as suggested earlier, to mislead those with whom he transacts.188 
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With this, privacy is turned into a mere tool for rational individuals operating in a 
liberal competitive market society in which people, according to Posner, ‘…want to 
manipulate the world around them by selective disclosure of facts about 
themselves.’189 In that sense, Posner’s basic understanding of privacy is embedded 
into his theory of law and economics and appears to be rather reductionist compared 
to other privacy conceptions. In his ‘The Economics of Justice’, Posner recognized 
three distinct meanings of privacy: namely, privacy as secrecy, as seclusion and as 
autonomy, however, he strongly emphasized privacy as secrecy.190  While Posner 
understood the claim for personal privacy as a tool to conceal things in order to defy 
others about certain facts related to a person, he recognized the importance of personal 
information in social economic relationships. Gathering information about another 
person ‘…enables one to form a more accurate picture of a friend or colleague, and 
the knowledge gained is useful in social or professional dealings with him.’ 191 
Furthermore, the disclosure of seemingly private information about individuals 
beyond one’s own social realm serves, according to Posner, as a model for success or 
a deterrent for failure for careers and personal life choices. The rise of gossip and 
rumour and its media distribution which lead to Warren and Brandeis developing a 
right to be let alone, was, in Posner’s view, not a result of the press turned rogue, but 
a result of market demands:  
Gossip columns provide valuable information …[on] the personal lives of 
wealthy and successful people whose tastes and habits offer models to the 
ordinary person in making consumption, career and other decisions.192  
In fact, according to Posner, the lives of the poor were simply not that interesting and 
therefore there would be less demand for privacy in most poor societies.193 Hence, the 
reason for the rise of privacy as a legal concept had more to do with the increase of 
personal income than with the increasing invasion into a sphere in need of better 
protection.194  
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With this Posner presented a strong and slightly polemic criticism of privacy as a right 
and concept. A focus purely on controlling information about oneself is, however, 
reducing the complexity of privacy to a large extend. Furthermore, Posner’s critique 
is fundamentally based on assumptions and ideologies of economics and liberal 
market societies which are exclusively concerned with the regulation of human life 
through market forces and rational economic actors. Privacy as a concept and as a 
right has served more complex functions than regulating the dissemination of market-
valuable information about individuals. What is somewhat remarkable is that while 
Posner seems to regard privacy as a regulatory tool hampering market societies, others 
have discussed understandings of privacy as property: especially a perspective on 
privacy as intellectual property can result in interesting discussions about the 
concept. 195  Nevertheless, Posner offers a strong critique of common 
conceptualizations of privacy. 
On a more meta-critical level, it could also be argued that all attempts at synthesizing 
varieties of privacy concepts fail due to their legal and theoretical complexity. Indeed, 
the conceptualizations remain fragmented and often specialized. As a result, Daniel 
Solove attempted to develop an alternative approach to privacy after criticizing a 
variety of this pre-existing understandings.196 With this, he developed a conclusive 
privacy-taxonomy in order to enable legal professionals and policy makers to 
understand and process privacy in a better way. 197  This taxonomy basically 
categorized privacy issues into four different groups: Firstly, ‘information collection’, 
secondly, ‘information processing’, thirdly, ‘information dissemination’ and fourthly, 
‘invasion’.198  
Solove criticised the fact that most of the existing privacy conceptions follow a very 
traditional model of methodology: They undergo attempts to define privacy through 
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distinguishing it from other concepts.199  Solove argued that many theorists were 
attempting to define a specific core or essence of privacy as something that delimits 
privacy from other concepts, but that those concepts would come with serious 
shortcomings.  
Ultimately, the problem emerges from the fact that theorists are attempting to 
conceptualize privacy with the traditional method. They are seeking to isolate 
its core characteristics. Privacy, however, does not lend itself very well to this 
form of conceptualization.200  
Furthermore, Solove stressed that the core problems of the theoretical debates in 
privacy are related to the employed method of research: the search for a clearly defined 
and delineated scope of privacy. He contended that  
…the problem with current theories of privacy is the method of conceptualizing. 
The theories fail on their own terms - they never achieve the goal of finding the 
common denominator, and thus commentators remain unsatisfied. But perhaps 
the quest for a common denominator is a search for the holy grail. What if there 
is no essence or core dimension of privacy? Can privacy be conceptualized?201 	
Indeed, one of the problems deriving from the attempt to define privacy through the 
search for a clear core lies deep inside a theoretical debate on the indeterminacy of 
law and especially of rights as such. Solove criticised the fact that attempts to define 
privacy using what he calls a ‘traditional method’ of identifying a clear common 
definition of privacy are bound to fail because those definitions will either not include 
enough important privacy aspects, or include too many.202  If privacy were to be 
defined too narrowly, many legal issues of everyday life would simply not be 
addressable through legal frameworks and privacy might not be able to serve well as 
a mechanism of protection. If, on the other hand, privacy was to be defined too 
broadly, it would run the dangers of rendering itself legally meaningless.  
Those aspects, however, are not surprising and they are not unique to privacy. 
Excessive debates on rights indeterminacy have attempted to point out the dual nature 
of law and particularly rights.203 Koskenniemi, for example, argued that rules -and 
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particularly rules that come with a claimed universalism component- are always over-
inclusive and under-inclusive at the same time.204  
The rules will include future cases we would not like to include and exclude 
cases that we would have wanted to include had we known of them when the 
rules were drafted. This fundamentally – and not just marginally – undermines 
their force.205  
Koskenniemi therefore argued that indeterminacy was not only a problem of the 
semantic un-clarity of the legal language, but a fundamental problem due to the 
inherent political nature of international law and human rights and that therefore 
questions – also related to making decisions about privacy – could not be solved 
through abstract legal reasoning.206  
While this work does not want to deeply engage in such theoretical debates on 
international law and human rights, it should be pointed out that Solove’s critique 
stems therefore from a broader and deeper criticism on the nature of international law. 
Nevertheless, while it is indeed questionable if there can be one right and functional 
conceptualization of privacy, is should not be forgotten that privacy as a concept did 
not emerge as an attempt to ultimately regulate future legal problems, but as a legal 
argument responding to existing problems. In many ways, a right to privacy is a right 
with an inherent emancipatory function: it addresses severe political and societal 
problems or ‘wrongs’ as a tool of critique. Warren’s and Brandeis’ right to be let alone 
was in many ways a legal emancipatory move against certain intrusions in a similar 
way as the development of a right to control information can be understood as a legal 
response to problems emerging from the massive automated collection of personal 
information by states and the private sector. As a consequence, while it is important 
to understand the fallacies as well as the alternatives of different privacy conceptions, 
this study approaches privacy as a critical legal argument that functions within existing 
regulatory systems. Privacy and its definition as a right therefore play a very important 
role for approaching surveillance in public places, also because it is particularly the 
application of privacy in public places that may be able to break the rather limited 
understandings of an individualistic and proprietary focus of a legal right to privacy. 
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The following section therefore now turns towards the analysis of privacy as a 
personality right and its connection with the public-private dichotomies.  
2.2.6 Privacy,	Dignity,	and	the	Right	to	Personality	
As discussed above, privacy has been conceptualized in various forms, for example as 
tort, as control over information, as access to persons, or along the lines of intimacy 
and secrecy. Privacy, however, can also be understood in terms of individual rights, 
including autonomy, self-determination, and dignity, especially in in a European 
context.207 It is therefore interesting to identify a further reading (or conceptualization) 
of privacy, namely as a personality right primarily relying on self-determination and 
human dignity.  
Post, as a starting point, distinguished three concepts of privacy in a review essay on 
Rosen’s The Unwanted Gaze by separating privacy as protecting reputation, privacy 
as dignity and privacy as freedom. Particularly the last two conceptions were taken up 
later by Whitman to separate what he calls ‘two western cultures of privacy’. In Post’s 
understanding, a privacy conception based on freedom is founded on the cores of 
individuality, imagining ‘…persons as autonomous and self-defining, rather than as 
socially embedded and tied together through common socialization into shared 
norms.’208 In that sense, a privacy conception based on freedom is based on the very 
core of a classical liberal understanding of autonomous individuals. Therefore, it 
depends strongly on a very specific organizational model of society in which selfish 
autonomous individuals attempt to maximize their gains. For some, Warren and 
Brandeis’ construction of a right to privacy as a right to be let alone exemplifies the 
idea of liberal privacy, ‘[representing] a wealthy, smug, exclusive, and self-centered 
upper-crust life which abhors publicity and public space.’209  
In that sense, privacy could be understood as a concept based on individual freedoms 
opposing community and social relations. In many ways, the ‘private’ is a sphere in 
which the autonomous individual exists in a completely self-referential state, in a state 
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of complete absence of community, communication and other individuals. What could 
be understood as ‘public’ would then be a sphere in which this isolated individual 
starts communicating and interacting with other individuals. A right to be let alone in 
private therefore embodies absolute freedom as no restraints whatsoever would be 
exercised on such autonomous individuals.  
Post, then placed privacy as freedom as opposing a concept based on dignity:  
From a theoretical point of view, (…) privacy as freedom is an almost exact 
inversion of the concept of privacy as dignity. Privacy as freedom presupposes 
difference, rather than mutuality. It contemplates a space in which social norms 
are suspended, rather than enforced. It imagines persons as autonomous and self-
defining, rather than as socially embedded and tied together through common 
socialization into shared norms.210  
In many ways, privacy conceptualized as individual and liberal freedom can function 
as a defence mechanism against interferences of any kind against that personal 
freedom. The freedom to act is equalled with the freedom to act against others and to 
act against the community, for example the freedom to enjoy one’s property, the 
freedom to not pay any taxes or the freedom to beat one’s own children in one’s own 
house.  
Basing a conception of privacy on dignity, on the other hand, means something 
different. Post connected the concept of dignity with the communality and social 
interaction. In fact, privacy derived from dignity  
…presupposes a particular kind of social structure in which persons are joined 
by common norms that govern the forms of their social interactions. These 
norms constitute the decencies of civilization.211  
Furthermore,  
[p]rivacy as dignity locates privacy in precisely the aspects of social life that are 
shared and mutual. Invading privacy causes injury because we are socialized to 
experience common norms as essential prerequisites of our own identity and 
self-respect.212  
Apart from presenting privacy as a rather high valued normative concept, Post 
therewith conceptualized privacy not as an individualistic defence mechanism against 
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intrusion, interference or wrongs, but as an essential component of the self, one’s own 
identity and personality. In many ways, such a conception can be compared to Julie 
Cohen’s understanding of privacy as an important factor for the development of a 
society build by autonomous and self-determinant individuals.213 
For Cohen, privacy presents itself as a fundamental element of autonomous 
individuals and civil societies: Western political philosophy and the strong emphasis 
of, and commitment to, human dignity requires a restrictive approach, for example 
banning  
…data processing practices that treat individuals as mere conglomeration of 
transactional data, or that rank people as prospective customers, tenant, 
neighbors, employees, or insured based on their financial or genetic 
desirability.214  
Privacy therewith becomes an intrinsic value in societies, a prerequisite for 
communication, choice and freedom, the creation of identity, and the autonomy of 
individuals as a core of communities. Similarly, Floridi remarked that ‘[a]ny society 
in which no informational privacy is possible is one in which no personal identity can 
be maintained (…)’.215 
The necessity of privacy for the autonomy of individuals leads to another argument: 
In fact, when privacy is an essential element of a community because it guarantees 
individual autonomy, it also becomes important for democracy as a whole.  
Paul Schwartz argued that privacy was important for individual self-determination and 
the creation of identity and therewith a requirement for deliberative democracy.216  
The need is to insulate an individual’s reflective facilities from certain forms of 
manipulation and coercion. Privacy rules for cyberspace must set aside areas of 
limited access to personal data in order to allow individuals, alone and in 
association with others, to deliberate about how to live their lives.217  
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The underlying assumption here is that privacy is more than just the control of 
information or an element of choice: it is essential for self-development and therewith 
essential in democratic communities. With this, privacy is more than just an individual 
value: it becomes a communal and social good that lies at the essence of a particular 
democratic form of society.  
Cohen’s and Schwartz’s ideas on privacy as an essential part of autonomous 
individuals in democratic societies goes very much in line with a dignity-based 
approach on privacy deriving from a right to personality. Luciano Floridi similarly 
argued, that  
[l]ooking at the nature of a person as being constituted by that person’s 
information allows one to understand the right to informational privacy as a right 
to personal immunity from unknown, undesired or unintentional changes in 
one’s own identity as an informational entity, both actively and passively.218 
In that sense, privacy is a right protecting important, if not essential societal values 
such as human dignity and the creation and maintenance of human identity and 
personality and therewith it brings essential building blocks of Western democratic 
societies.219  
One of the first and highly influential legal arguments of privacy as a personality right 
in case law can be found in the jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court (FCC).220 The arguments put forward by the FCC shall here serve as an example 
of the conceptualisation of privacy as a derivate of dignity and personality and 
therewith as the construction of privacy as an essential element in the political and 
legal design of societal communities.  
Already early on, in 1969 the FCC employed concepts of free individuals and 
emphasized the importance of a constitutional protection of self-determination as a 
right. The collection of information about individuals therewith fell into the scope of 
protection given by human dignity. In fact, individuals’ self-determination capabilities 
were seen as being seriously hampered merely by potential psychological pressure 
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created through public authorities systematically collecting personal information.221 
Natural persons, so the argument went, were free to develop their personality and 
therewith would have a principal right to self-determination of which privacy formed 
an essential element. Then, in 1983, as a response to public census and governmental 
data collection, the FCC developed a ‘right to informational self-determination’ by 
combining the right to freely develop one’s own personality (art 2(1)), and the general 
inviolability of human dignity in article 1(1) of the German Basic Law.222 According 
to the FCC, the general personality right in the Constitution explicitly protected the 
dignity of persons as free members of a free society.223 In this regard, every individual 
had the ability and competence to decide for herself in what way personal information 
was distributed and shared, but new technological means of data processing would 
threatened the ability to control such information, and the FCC emphasised especially 
the potential constraining or coercing effects of information collection, including a 
‘chilling-effect’ for the exercise of fundamental rights.224 
Privacy as a personality right based on inherent dignity therewith opposes an 
understanding of privacy as freedom. Post, and later Whitman, analysed those 
fundamentally different distinctions as ‘…privacy as and aspect of dignity and privacy 
as an aspect of liberty.’225 While privacy in the latter concept works as a liberal 
defence mechanisms against intrusion into individual lives, it can also function as an 
overall critique of control in social structures. Privacy as dignity functions as an 
element of critique against social coercion and control and as such is a necessity for 
the ideal of a democratic society. The argument of the FCC essential combines a 
liberal conception of privacy as freedom of control with the construction of privacy as 
an inherent building block of community and communal interaction.  
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Privacy as an aspect of democratic societies gained even more importance when vast 
scale of data processing was considered. With this, privacy theory experienced a shift 
from an individual problem to a collective problem as a result of modern technological 
data collection capabilities. Spiros Simitis argued already in 1987 that surveillance 
had ‘…lost its exceptional character…’ and would manifestly impact individual 
behaviour: ‘Information processing is developing (…) into an essential element of 
long-term strategies of manipulation intended to mold and adjust individual 
conduct.’ 226  As a consequence, such information processing should be strictly 
regulated as participation and communication in democratic societies would depend 
on high levels of privacy protection.227  
Privacy as dignity and the right to personality therefore is essentially conceptualized 
from two perspectives. Firstly, privacy can be derived from human dignity because 
massive data and information collection means treating individuals as mere objects 
and mere means towards an end. Such collection, retention, and dissemination of 
information comes with high risks of manipulation, coercion and self-alterations. The 
exercise of this powerful but tacit control therefore requires strict legal limitations.  
Secondly, basing privacy on dignity is important because the mere volume, 
technological sophistication and capabilities as such come with a high risk of control 
which hampers democracy as the preferred model of societal organization. If 
democracy and therewith the ideal of autonomous and self-determinant individuals 
lies at the core of a society, privacy based on dignity is not only an essential right, but 
also a core value of a society. While societies are naturally not free from control, 
privacy is the language which articulates and addresses control, coercion and 
manipulation as a legal remedy.  
This leads to the other important issue related to public space surveillance, namely the 
application of the legal conceptions of privacy to public space surveillance. As 
discussed above, there is not one single conception of privacy, but it can be 
conceptualized in many distinct ways. The question deriving from the discussion 
therefore concern the application of privacy to surveillance of public places. 
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Intuitively, of course, it appears odd that the concept of the protection of individuals’ 
private issues would apply to public places. The discussions above, however, showed 
that especially the strong connections between individual, communal or societal 
conceptions, and the conceptualisation of privacy as an inherent element in human 
dignity and personality, can form a connection between privacy and public spaces. 
This, of course, additionally requires reference to the classical dichotomy between the 
public and the private. Can privacy function as a legal argument in public places, and 
if so, under what conditions? Is a right to privacy therefore suitable for addressing the 
complexities of modern public surveillance technologies? The following section will 
now turn to the problem of privacy in public and its possible theoretical approaches 
and legal arguments.  
 
2.2.7 Privacy	in	Public	
Privacy can be conceptualized in a variety of ways and the concept appears to defy a 
universal definition. The Section above discussed several approaches to privacy, from 
privacy as a tort to privacy as deriving from the right to personality and dignity and 
therewith as right that protects central values of societies.  
This section consequently turns to the core issue of this study: the conceptions of 
privacy in relation to public spaces. Most importantly, this section lays the grounds 
for a right to privacy in public spaces based on a dichotomy of privacy conceptions: 
privacy as individual freedom on the one hand and privacy as a derivate of dignity, on 
the other. When it is understood in terms of individual freedom, privacy can be 
conceptualized as a tool to address harm and demand freedom from it, e.g. as a right 
to be let alone or as a tort leading to liabilities for others. When privacy on the contrary 
is seen as a derivate of dignity, it becomes an essential element of societal organization 
and community. Privacy then functions not only as articulating demands for individual 
freedoms, but it addresses interferences with the mere foundations of communal and 
societal organization, the balances of power, and the exercise of violence.  
This distinction can also be formulated through the identifications of harms. Daniel 
Solove described the nature of privacy problems through the concept of harms and 
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therefore distinguished between individual and societal harms.228 Individual harms are 
injuries or damages that occur to an individual person and include ‘physical injury’, 
‘financial losses and property harms’, ‘reputational harms’ and ‘emotional and 
psychological harms’.229 All such harms can be understood as harms to the individual 
and her abstract liberty.  
Beyond this, however, Solove also articulated other harms that can be said to have a 
more societal or communal nature. ‘Relationship harms’, for example, are damages 
done to the relationships between people. 230  A lack of privacy protection can 
undermine trust in communications between people and interferes with the 
establishment and maintenance of trusted relationships between individuals and 
groups. ‘Vulnerability harms’, are described by Solove as the creation of risk and 
insecurity through a steady ‘pollution’ with privacy problems occurring ‘…through 
the combined activities of a multitude of institutions, each with differing motives and 
aims.’231 In fact, this describes the creation of collective insecurities of a systematic 
nature.  
Additionally, Solove described two harms which are fundamental to the discussion of 
privacy in public space: the interference and tampering with people’s behaviours, the 
so called ‘chilling effect’ and ‘power imbalances’ deriving from privacy problems that 
affect societal and communal structures.232 This line of argument follows a distinction 
between harms to the liberty of individuals and harms to communal and societal 
structures.  
In a similar way, this section distinguishes between privacy as focused on individual 
freedom and privacy as a derivate of dignity forming the base of societal and 
communal structures, without resorting to the harm-principle. That is because 
fundamental rights and principles as underlying foundations for societal and legal 
systems go beyond the understanding of protecting individual and communities from 
harm: they actual establish positive foundational principles and values which lay the 
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foundation for the social systems as such. Privacy as a derivate of dignity is therefore 
not based on preventing harm to individuals, communities or societies, but as the mere 
pillar on which the functioning of a respective system relies on. An entire lack of 
dignity would, in a similar way as an entire lack of privacy, therefore change the very 
nature and structure of a society.  
In the context of rights to privacy in public spaces, the distinction between individual 
liberty and dignity is important because it leads to two fundamentally different 
perceptions of a concept of privacy in public.  
On the one hand, privacy in public is determined by individual liberties. This 
paradoxically means that individuals in public spaces are less ‘free’ than individuals 
in private spaces. That is because, if the harm principle -based argument is accepted, 
individuals in public, for some reason, can harm other individuals in public easier than 
in private simply because there is per se more interaction between individuals in public 
spaces. Individuals therefore enjoy a lesser degree of privacy than in private secluded 
spaces. 
On the other hand, privacy in public can also be conceptualized as a dignity-based 
approach. If so, the public space as such forms the ultimate area of societal interaction 
and therewith the core of communal and societal existence. People in public spaces 
therefore can be subjected to insecurities, altered behaviour, self-censorship, the 
chilling effect, and control as the exercise of power. All those therefore touch upon 
the very core of the current structure and organization of social systems, namely the 
balance of power, rule of law and democratic governance through which privacy 
protection becomes an essential element in public as well as in private spaces.  
Those perspectives have substantial effects on legal jurisprudence and case law on 
privacy in public spaces. This distinction between privacy as deriving from individual 
freedoms and privacy as a derivate of dignity gains additional relevance when 
analysing privacy problems in connection with advanced and sophisticated public 
surveillance systems and their legal regulations.  
*** 
Privacy as a concept lies naturally at the crossroads between public and private space. 
Public and private spaces, however, are not that easy to delineate, as the discussion in 
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the section above showed. The final theoretical question to be discussed in this chapter 
is therefore a theoretical synthesis between the conceptions of privacy and the 
European public space. In how far do conceptions of privacy along the line of the 
dichotomies between privacy as freedom and privacy as a derivate of dignity and 
personality extend into public spaces?  
A preliminary answer to this question is already evident from the discussions above 
and strictly depends on the theoretical conceptualizations. In that sense, privacy 
deriving from individual liberty is less likely to extend its protection into the public 
sphere than dignity based approaches. Basing privacy considerations on an 
individual’s legitimate expectation is after all very different from understanding 
privacy as a tool to address chilling-effects and the exercise of control.  
The distinction between a public realm and the private realm is naturally subject to 
broad theoretical debates.233 In many ways, the theoretical underpinnings of the public 
and private dichotomy reflect the ancient question about the relationship between the 
individual and society and can be seen as ‘…a central tenet of liberalism.’ 234 
Particularly in liberal thought, the private sphere often describes a zone in which the 
community (or the state) as a bearer of power has limited influence.235  
The abstract private and public distinction therefore plays an essential role specifically 
for the conceptualization of privacy, but reaches broader into discussions on social 
organization and the essential structure of law and even societies. In fact, the 
private/public distinction lies not only at the core of the philosophical thought of 19th 
century liberal market societies, but is at the same time foundational to law per se:  
Although, as we have seen, there were earlier anticipations of a distinction 
between public law and private law, only the nineteenth century produced a 
fundamental conceptual and architectural division in the way we understand the 
law.236  
                                                
233 See e.g. Horwitz MJ, ‘The History of the Public/Private Distinction’ (1982) 130 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1423. 
234 Wacks R, Personal Information: Privacy and the Law (Clarendon Press 1989), 9.  
235 See Mnookin RH, ‘Public/Private Dichotomy: Political Disagreement and Academic Repudiation’ 
(1982) 130 University of Pennsylvania law review 1429, 1429.  
236 Horwitz MJ, ‘The History of the Public/Private Distinction’ (1982) 130 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 1423, 1424.  
	 75	
With this came the need for a clear distinction between public law as a foundational, 
regulatory or sanctioning mechanism and private law as the ‘law of private 
transactions’ necessary for the functioning of a market society.237  
While this understanding appears to make sense, on closer examination the 
public/private distinction comes with a variety of serious problems. In fact, many 
argue that the public/private distinction is nothing more but a tool for simplification, 
a construct which is reproduced in legal thought and training, even as a pedagogical 
tool in order to train undergraduate students.238 In that sense, some argue that the 
public private divide has vanished,239 and some favour a theoretical understanding 
beyond such dogmatic differentiations.240 Kaarlo Tuori, for example, argues that the 
global legal structure is in fact ‘…an epitome of legal hybridization’.241 Tuori contends 
that  
[w]hat we call today legal hybridity is a sign of our conceptual confusion: new 
conceptual and systemizing grids are needed, but our legal mind-set is still in 
many respects attached to the state-sovereigntism of the black-box model and 
the distinctions of traditional systematization.242  
While the deeper discussions on the nature of a public/private distinction and its 
decline are done elsewhere, it is important to keep in mind the problematic nature of 
such conceptualizations. Particularly because a conceptualization of individual 
privacy often rests on clear distinctions between public and private realms, leading to 
massive conceptual problems of the legal understanding of privacy. What makes 
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privacy additionally complex in this regard, is the understanding of privacy as a right 
because it adds another layer of complexity to the alleged distinction between realms: 
some understandings of privacy, especially the connection between privacy and 
freedom led to the paradox situation that a realm of private law is protected by a public 
legal system from a mere intrusion through the very same public legal system. 
Additionally, the same right to privacy, as well as the right to data protection, are 
nowadays permeating into the private sphere horizontally: private individuals also 
have a right to be protected from violations of their rights through other private actors 
(such as data collecting companies) not only through the state’s Schutzpflicht 
(obligation to protect) but also by direct fundamental rights obligations imposed on 
companies by heavy regulation of data processing and the emergence of data 
protection as a fundamental right. Understanding privacy in public in a more multi-
dimensional way or in terms of legal hybrids is therefore more useful than relying on 
the clear distinctions of concepts.  
Theoretically, the clear distinction between private and public realms is therefore 
problematic. What follows from this is that the theoretical conceptualization of 
privacy in public space becomes equally ambiguous. If privacy protection is extended 
into the public sphere, does this mean that it is in fact an expansion of the private realm 
into the public space? Additionally, when the clear demarcation of private from public 
is understood as a concept of liberal market societies, does it mean that privacy 
fundamentally opposes other rights, such as political participation, public speech, the 
freedom of assembly, let alone communal or other societal interest?  
The answer to those questions depends, once again, on the respective conception of 
privacy and the argument made above: privacy in public can rest on the 
conceptualization as liberty or as dignity. While the former is focused on the liberal 
individual and her freedom from state or public interference, privacy as dignity in fact 
allows for a recognition of communal and societal interests. Here, it is not the 
individual and her free will which determines a rather narrow scope of privacy 
protection in public, but the dignity and the right to personality of the individual 
including the protection of communal and societal goods, if necessary even against 
the interests of a single individual.  
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Expanding a right to privacy into the public sphere means essentially to protect the 
capabilities of the individual to enter into a relationship with a society. It protects the 
right to personality and the development of such and therewith essentially the social 
realm: the ability of an individual to communicate, form relationships with other 
members in society, and participate in social and political life. Together, those three 
factors can be seen as an essential compound of private as well as public realms and 
all of those are protected by the concept of privacy relying on dignity and the right of 
personality. Understanding privacy as individual liberty opposes this concept because 
it puts individuals in a secluded space and labels them as free beings.  
This is also where hybridity becomes an important tool: In a conception of privacy 
based on individual liberty the public/private distinction is essential to the demand of 
liberty. Here, the private realm is constructed as protection against interference from 
state and public and therewith it is conceptualized as being mutually exclusive. 
Privacy based on dignity and personality opposes such understandings: privacy here 
protects the individual in her social settings and in her abilities to participate and 
communicate, and at the same time the structures of a community as such. This 
requires an understanding of the legal realms in an alternative way, for example as a 
legal hybrid.  
Understanding privacy in public more as a tool of community protection than the mere 
protection of individual freedom from public interference rests on the assumption that 
societies are formed through communities which require the forming of relationships 
between individuals, the ability to socially and politically contribute and participate, 
and the recognition of the importance of communication between individuals. 243 
While political and social participation as well as the forming of relationship have a 
physical relationship with public spaces, communication has gained an essential 
virtual component.  
This is where technological development becomes crucial for privacy in public places, 
simply because much of societal communication today takes place through digital 
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channels in virtual spheres. In that sense, it is crucial to note that the digitization of 
communications has added a layer of virtual space to the public realm as much of 
private and public communications happen in a virtual public space. Additionally, 
digitization enables the collection of information in the form of data and the creation 
of virtual networks spanning through spheres that could be characterized as public as 
well as private. This leads to an ever more hybridization of the legal spaces through 
which those processed can be addressed. Particularly data protection, which is 
discussed below, can therefore be seen as connecting public and private spheres.  
Privacy in public can of course also be discussed in terms of individual liberty. 
Particularly in the US legal theory – and probably in other common law systems, 
privacy in public is a matter of individual defence against state and public intrusions, 
as the discussion on the conceptualization of privacy above indicated. Especially in 
US jurisprudence, privacy in public appears to have a close connection with individual 
liberty and property. The doctrine of ‘reasonable expectation’ of privacy in public is 
an outcome of a liberal perspective on privacy in public. The jurisprudential 
understanding of privacy in the US remained very much limited to trespassing and 
interference with privately owned land and property up until the 1967 US Supreme 
Court Judgment in Katz v US, establishing the famous doctrine of ‘reasonable 
expectation.’244 The doctrine describes that persons have a subjective ‘expectation’ of 
privacy also in public areas, provided that this expectation is somehow ‘reasonable’.245 
US Constitutional Jurisprudence contains an enormous body of discussion and case 
law on privacy in public place and more detailed discussions would exceed the limits 
of this study. It is however important to note that the idea of a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in public areas found its way into European legal jurisprudence.246 Such 
expectation-centred perspectives rely on a very particular construction of the 
individual within the public sphere as an autonomous liberal individual in a market 
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society, which leads to a very different conceptualization of privacy than if the 
community – or even some sort of communitarianism – would form the centre of the 
respective understanding of privacy.247 
Particularly a liberal perception, however, is vulnerable to the classic critique of 
privacy as a right merely important for the rich and wealthy. If there was no or only a 
very limited privacy in public spaces, the right to privacy would become an issue of 
access to private spaces, and access to private spaces is reserved for those that can 
materially afford them. Serge Gutwirth articulated such a critique as:  
What does the inviolability of the home mean to the homeless? No one can put 
into question that residents in luxury apartments and fancy neighborhoods and 
that owners of estates guarded by security systems and pit bulls have far better 
opportunities to protect their privacy than people living in decrepit 
neighborhoods, housing projects, or in one of the endless rows of apartment 
blocks.248  
On the one hand, privacy appears therefore as an essential element of possessive 
individualism and can therefore be criticized as a right only for the privileged, and, 
probably even worse, as a right cementing the relations of power in liberal market 
societies. 249  On the other hand, Gutwirth pointed to an antagonism in such a 
perspective: in fact, for totally free markets, privacy functions as a tool to shield and 
distort information about individuals.250 Posner’s critique251 of privacy as a market- 
and trade- distorting element therefore adds to an antagonism in understanding privacy 
merely as a protection mechanism for enjoying wealth in a capitalist market society. 
The question of privacy in public appears crucial to the understandings and 
conceptualizations of privacy. When basing privacy on liberty, the public space lies 
(mostly) outside the realm of privacy protection because privacy is essentially 
understood as related to private space, property, seclusion and secrecy. When privacy 
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is understood in terms of a right to personality deriving from dignity, however, privacy 
is more than just an individualistic concept. Privacy in public then includes a variety 
of societal and communitarian ideals in which the individual is seen in her relations 
and communications with others, and as a part of a community or society. Privacy 
then regulates and allows emancipatory arguments against restraint, coercion and 
control.  
In many ways, data processing has added another layer to the public/private space 
dichotomy. Nissenbaum, for example argued, that many of the classic privacy 
conceptions were problematic because merely applying privacy to intimate, private 
and personal spheres would fail to acknowledge threats to privacy from sophisticated 
(public) data processing: This is  
…problematic not because they develop normative accounts of privacy that 
protect the personal and intimate realms from interference, but because they 
neglect the relevance to privacy of realms other than the intimate and 
sensitive.252  
In fact, the processing of vast amounts of information with digital means adds an 
additional dimension to privacy in public: Firstly, privacy as controlling one’s 
personal information becomes an essential component of a conceptualization of 
privacy and secondly, virtual spaces additionally blur the boundaries between public 
and private spaces.  
In fact, modern surveillance often does not mean that a specific person is targeted and 
her intimate secrets are collected, but that all members of society are somehow subject 
to tacit surveillance practices as information and data is collected as a by-product of 
daily life.253 Once privacy derives its essential value from freedom, the conclusion is 
that there is a certain ‘legitimate interest’ of the individual also in a public sphere.254 
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On the other hand, when the essence of privacy is derived from dignity and 
personhood, the controlling of personal information as well as being in a way free 
from surveillance and control are essential to privacy in public spaces. Once again, 
the scope and application of privacy in public depends on the conceptualization of the 
many different ‘privacies’.  
*** 
This section discussed various theoretical aspects relating to privacy. Privacy self-
evidently is a complex concept and indeed defies one single definition and 
conceptualization, and the perspective on privacy often determines its practical legal 
relevance. Privacy as a concept, however, has come a long way from its first legal 
expression as a right to be let alone to the complex conceptualization deriving from 
dignity, self-determination and personality rights. Consequently, some theories of 
privacy have long moved beyond their original conceptualizations, but also beyond 
their critique.  
It is clear that a right to privacy exists and that there are many valid legal arguments 
which show that privacy does not only play a role for individual seclusion, solitude 
and expectation, but that privacy as a rights matter in most areas of daily life, also 
within a public context. Relying on a synthesis between privacy as freedom and 
privacy as self-determination and dignity shows that privacy works not only in the 
bathrooms in the villas of the wealthy and powerful, but also in public areas and in 
realms in which coercion and control are exercised on individuals and groups. Privacy 
in public places exists as a legal argument questioning semi-visible layers of control 
and manipulation, such as for example, when an overall societal chill influences 
individual and political life in public spheres.  
It remains to be mentioned, that privacy, despite the apparent ambiguity of its 
theoretical underpinnings has been cemented as a global human and fundamental 
rights both in international as well as European contexts. Privacy was enshrined in 
relevant international human rights sources after the Second World War: Article 12 of 
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) prohibits arbitrary 
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interferences with ‘privacy, family, home or correspondence’ as well as attacks on 
‘honour and reputation’.255 The legally binding 1966 International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights contains a similar provision for a right to privacy256 and there are 
a variety of other international sources as well as regional human rights protection 
regimes that come with one or another version of a legal formulation of privacy.257 
What is common to the right to privacy, though, is that it is not an absolute right, 
which means that privacy can be legitimately interfered with, provided that such 
limitations can be adequately justified.  
The scope of such privacy provisions has been subject to much debate, firstly because 
naturally the scope of a fundamental right to privacy depends on the respective 
understanding of privacy as a legal concept as discussed above, and secondly, because 
the scope of the content of a right to privacy is articulated rather widely. Article 8 of 
the ECHR, for example, protects ‘private life’, ‘family life’, ‘home’ and 
‘correspondence’, four concepts which each require detailed analyses in order to grasp 
all the possible cases falling into their realms. The ECtHR, for example, repeatedly 
held that the term private life was ‘broad’ and ‘not susceptible to exhaustive 
definition’.258 In that regard it may cover physical or psychological integrity, physical 
and social identity, gender identity, sexuality, personal development as well as a 
variety of cases relating to surveillance, wiretapping, identification, criminal 
procedure, non-discrimination and inclusion as well as freedom of communication.  
The UN HRC CCPR General Comment No 16 specifies regarding the scope of ICCPR 
article 17 that it covers information relating to an individual’s private life, the integrity 
and confidentiality of correspondence, various forms of surveillance, intrusions into a 
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person’s home, body searches, medical examinations as well as gathering and holding 
personal information on computers, data banks and other devices.259 
Of particular relevance to EU law is of course the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union (EUCFR) 260 , which became a binding document for EU 
Institutions and the Member States when implementing EU Law with the 2009 Treaty 
of Lisbon. The EUCFR therewith stands next to the ECHR within the realm of privacy 
protection in Europe and contains a separate article on the right to personal data 
protection (art 8) next to the ‘right to respect for his or her private and family life, 
home and communications’ in article 7. As mentioned, privacy is not an absolute right 
and there are a variety of mechanism in each relevant international source allowing 
for derogations and limitations of the enshrined rights. How public surveillance 
through sophisticated technologies as described in the scenario falls into the realms of 
protection of the existing rights will be discussed in connections with some of the 
specific surveillance issues below. The respective mechanisms for permissible 
limitations is discussed separately in Section 2.5.2 below.  
For now, this discussion moves away from the legal theoretical foundations of privacy 
towards what appears as a separate theme next to privacy and its implications: namely 
personal data protection. Data protection is discussed separately because it has a 
special relevance in legal arguments addressing surveillance. Data protection is part 
of the scope of protection of a right to privacy, both within the ECHR as well as the 
ICCPR, as the HRC’s General Comment No 16 showed. 
Data protection is additionally of special relevance as it directly addresses and 
regulates the means and methods of information collection. Information processing, 
however, appears to be essential for our modern digital world and therewith comes 
with an enormous rise in the possibilities for surveillance. Furthermore, the regulation 
of data collection and processing has been subject to regulation through countless 
documents, ever since States and private entities started to process information with 
the help of computer and digital technologies. The following section discusses some 
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of those issues in relation to privacy and outlines the importance of the concept of data 




Both the right to privacy as well as the concept of security261 play important roles in 
the debates on the surveillance of public places in Europe. Recently, however, another 
field of law has come to the fore, particularly on the stages of EU fundamental rights 
jurisprudence: the right to data protection and certain other, more particular rights and 
principles deriving from it. Data protection is essentially connected to surveillance as 
it regulates the collection and processing of all sorts of information about individuals. 
With the gathering of information about groups and individuals in public places, data 
protection, its principles, and legal systematics are crucial for legal analyses of public 
surveillance practices. This section therefore outlines data protection and its key 
elements.  
2.3.1 The	Emergence	of	Data	Protection	in	Europe		
Data protection and its legal regulation is not anything particularly new. It has started 
to play a role in modern regulation and legislation since the first processing systems 
and electronic databases began to emerge. In many ways, data protection is about the 
law regulating information including its collection, retention and processing. In the 
early advents of information and law, the legal literature in the field focused on the 
regulation of new technological aspects of processing information.262 In fact, also 
Warren’s and Brandeis’ famous article on privacy partly derived from the emergence 
of small and portable handheld photographic cameras and resulting advancements in 
print media.263  
The first data protection legislation in Europe emerged through regional and national 
laws starting with the 1970 Data Protection Law of the German state of Hesse as the 
first of such laws worldwide.264 Sweden followed in 1973 with the first national data 
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protection law (Swedish: Datalag)265 which has been described as a result of debates 
around the means and methods of a public census in Sweden in 1969.266 Soon after, 
many other European States, including Germany in 1977267, France268, Denmark, and 
Norway in 1978,269 Luxembourg in 1979, as well as later the United Kingdom in 1984 
and Switzerland in 1992270 There are also some examples of early constitutional 
recognition of data protection such as in Portugal, Austria and Spain.271 While some 
national data protection instruments were drafted and implemented smoothly in some 
countries such as in Sweden272, in some others they were subject to intense debate. In 
Finland, for example, the committee which attempted to draft data protection 
legislation was dissolved in 1974 due to fundamentally opposing political views on 
data regulation and did not resume its work until the 1980s, leading to the 
parliamentary approval of the Finnish Personal Data Files Act only in 1986.273  
Data protection hence became a core issue in law making and jurisprudence in the 60s 
and 70s, as a result of increased technological capabilities by states to collect, store 
and process citizens’ data through technological means. Computers gained influence 
in public and social administrations and personal data processing and population 
registration entered into the picture just at a moment where many states were 
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conducting significant social reforms, requiring the retention and processing of large 
amounts of population data, without which the governance and administration of 
modern welfare states would have become very difficult.274 In fact, the discussions 
about privacy in the 60s and 70s were significantly determined by the emergence of 
new data protection capabilities through computers as well as the willingness and 
necessity for states, public administration and security authorities to employ them.275 
Large data banks and population registries were often seen as threats to people’s 
rights,276 especially when those means were used – often in secrecy - by security 
authorities.277  
Victor Mayer-Schönberger divided early stage legal data protection instruments into 
first-, second-, and third generation data protection norms. The first generation data 
protection laws derived from the need to respond to large data processing in databases 
by states and large entities and while focusing on the functionalities of large data 
collection and processing, they were also seen as a tool to ‘tame’ the use of new 
technologies and data processing in government activities.278 The second generation 
data protection included drafts and regulations, such as the Austrian, Spanish and 
Portuguese constitutional inclusion of informational privacy rights or the French, 
Norwegian and Danish data protection laws, which were characterized by a strong 
focus on individuals and their rights.279 With this, data protection expanded from a 
purely functional approach to regulating big data processors to the inclusion of micro 
level personal data processing. In that sense, those changes can be seen as a reflection 
of expanding technologies, the emergence of networks and the ‘World Wide Web’ 
and the fact that the processing of personal information became a general practice. 
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Understanding informational privacy as a classic privacy right came with certain 
problems: Mayer-Schönberger pointed out that  
[c]itizens and society are so intensely and subliminally intertwined that a 
deliberate attempt by an individual to resist such information requests, if 
possible at all, carries with it an extraordinary social cost. Similarly, from bank 
and money matters to travel and voting, disclosure of personal information more 
often than not is a precondition to individual participation.280  
This raised the question, if data protection as a defence against information processing 
per se can be a functional and efficient mechanism in societies increasingly dependent 
on data.  
As a response to those new challenges, Mayer-Schönberger regarded a Court decision 
of particularly important for a European understanding of data protection: the early 
construction of an explicit ‘right to informational self-determination’ by the German 
FCC. He saw the German Constitutional Court’s decision as a prime example for the 
emergence of the third generation of data protection regulation; one that grants more 
options for participation in decisions about the processing of an individual’s personal 
data and one that quickly gained influence in the debates around data protection as a 
right throughout Europe.  
On the 15th of December 1983, the German Federal Constitutional Court delivered its 
landmark judgement in the Census-Decision (Volkszählungsurteil) already briefly 
discussed above.281 In this decision, the Federal Constitutional Court developed the 
individual right to informational self-determination, deriving from a person’s 
inviolable dignity in art 1 (1) in connection with a general personality right in art 2 (1) 
of the German Constitution.282 The Court argued that because modern data processing 
enables the infinite collection, retention and processing of data about individuals as 
well as the creation of profiles, individuals would lose the ability to determine what 
information is collected, retained and shared about themselves which could lead to a 
behavioural chilling effect.283 In the words of the FCC: 
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A right to informational self-determination is not combinable with a social 
order, and a legal order enabling it, in which citizens cannot know who knows 
what, when and in which occasion about them. A person who is insecure if 
deferring behaviour is noted, shared and indefinitely retained will try to avoid 
raising attention through behaviour.284 
Hence, essentially, a right to informational self-determination meant that individuals 
have to be enabled to have some kind of control over their personal data. Control over 
one’s personal data would liberate the individual from constraints and fear, and 
therewith countering a 'chilling effect’ of personal behaviour, through which personal 
autonomy to act and communicate would be impaired and consequently can have a 
severe impact on democratic societies.285 
On further examination, it can be seen that this encompasses several data protection 
aspects, such as control, access or rectification of information as well as the limitation 
of disclosure, minimalistic collection or the specification of a processing purpose.286 
Mayer-Schönberger is right in his analyses that this argument can lead to a more 
participatory understanding of data protection:  
Individual liberty, the right to ward off invasions into personal data, was 
transformed into a much more participatory right to informational self-
determination. The individual now was to be able to determine how he or she 
would participate in society. The question was not whether one wanted to 
participate in societal processes, but how.287  
With the articulation of the right to informational self-determination, Mayer-
Schönberger identified a third generation of data protection regulation and he regards 
the German census judgment as a development towards a more participatory approach 
for individuals in data protection.288 On the other hand, he argued that the concept of 
informational self-determination also gave an individual a wide element of choice as 
to what data about her can be collected and processed by whom and when. In that 
sense, informational self-determination could be seen as giving a wide contractual 
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freedom to individuals to tolerate and consent on issues concerning waiving their data 
protection standards.289  
As a consequence, to this allegedly unlimited freedom to individual consent the next 
(fourth) generation data protection standards attempted to ‘…equalize bargaining 
positions by strengthening the individual’s position vis-à-vis the generally more 
powerful information-gathering institutions’ and, at the same time, ‘…take away parts 
of the participatory freedom given to the individual in second- and third-generation 
data-protection norms and subject it to mandatory legal protection.’ 290  Mayer-
Schönberger sees for example the general ban on data processing of sensitive data in 
the 1995 EU Data Protection Directive as a sign for such legal protection.291  
The understanding of data protection therefore has changed since it first emerged. It 
is not a coincidence that the collection of information faces similar problems in 
specification and definition than the more general concept of privacy. Data protection, 
however logically has its roots in an understanding of privacy which advocates control 
and power over personal information. This understanding, however, produces similar 
antagonisms as the distinction between individual centred privacy protection and 
privacy as a societal value. Interestingly, though, particularly the argument that 
individuals need complete control over the sharing of information (and therewith the 
right to informational self-determination) derives from a legal argument based on 
dignity and personality. Complete realization of informational self-determination for 
individuals, however, embodies the core idea of free individuals and therewith comes 
with its own problems. While privacy as a derivate of dignity includes a societal 
component, data protection appears as a more choice-and consent- centred issue, and 
therefore takes a more liberal approach. An individually centred right to informational 
self-determination, without a societal or communitarian component therefore appears 
to contradict a dignity- and right to personality-based approach to data protection as a 
communal value per se. In that sense, data protection based on control and choice has 
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a different conceptual basis than privacy as a derivate of human dignity with its 
importance as a societal value.  
2.3.1.1 Data	Protection	in	the	International	Sphere.	
Apart from the developments in national jurisdictions, data protection has also 
developed as an issue on the international sphere. Data protection is not enshrined as 
a separate right in classical international human rights instruments, 292  and 
consequently, the protection of personal data is considered to be part of a general right 
to privacy. Privacy has been a fundamental right in Europe ever since the first human 
rights treaties were drafted after the Second World War. Privacy is enshrined in the 
first non-binding international document on human rights: article 12 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states that  
[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, 
home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honor and reputation. Everyone 
has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. 
Article 17 of the legally binding 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights states the same, with the exception that it adds the word ‘or unlawful’ before 
‘interference’ in the first sentence. In its 1988 ICCPR General Comment No 16 on the 
right to privacy, the UN Human Rights Committee stated that all collection and 
retention of personal information must be regulated by law and therewith included 
data protection into the scope of the right to privacy of art 17 ICCPR.293 It furthermore 
requires state parties to the ICCPR to respect fundamental standards such as fair and 
lawful processing and use, data accessibility, and control as well as rectification or 
deletion.294  
Data protection has also played a significant role in the international plane mostly due 
to the fact that data and data-exchanging networks became increasingly important to 
the cross-border operations of states and businesses.295 Consequently, international 
organizations such as the UN, the OECD and the Council of Europe drew up early 
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Honour and Reputation, 8 April 1988, para 10.  
294 Ibid, para 10. 
295 See Siemen B, Datenschutz als europäisches Grundrecht (Duncker & Humblot 2006), 39-41 
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documents addressing data issues. For example, in autumn 1990, when the UN 
General Assembly adopted a document titled ‘Guidelines Concerning Computerized 
Personal Data Files’ in which it laid out several minimum data protection principles 
such as for example purpose-specification, lawfulness, accuracy or data security.296  
2.3.1.2 The	Sources	of	Data	Protection	in	Europe		
Also, the Council of Europe European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), of 
which the drafting history began in 1950, enshrines privacy as a ‘right to respect for 
(…) private and family life, (…) home and (…) correspondence’. Consequently, 
privacy including data protection is far from being a new right in Europe and its 
substance and scope have been developed in many different directions within the 
European legal order.  
There have, of course, been extensive debates on the many different aspects of privacy 
and data protection and there is an extensive body of case law developed by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). What is relatively new within the 
European framework of fundamental rights protection is another fundamental rights 
document which derives from the European Union: The Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (EUCFR) entered into force with the Treaty of Lisbon 
on 1st of December 2009 and is meant to close a gap between Community Law and 
existing fundamental rights protection in Europe. The EUCFR particularly aims to 
tackle fundamental right issues that are related to technological development in 
societies, and it wants to ‘…strengthen the protection of fundamental rights in the light 
of changes in society, social progress and scientific and technological developments 
by making those rights more visible in a Charter.’297 As a matter of fact, the EUCFR 
enshrines not only privacy as a right in article 7, but also establishes a fundamental 
right to personal data protection in article 8. Previously, data protection has been 
recognized as being part of the scope of privacy, for example when the ECtHR 
recognized the mere retention of personal information as interference with private life 
in article 8, which will be discussed in more detailed below.   
                                                
296 See UN GA Guidelines for the regulation of computerized personal data files, Adopted by General 
Assembly resolution 45/95 of 14 December 1990, A/RES/45/95.  
297 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EUCFR), 18.12.2000, OJ 2000/C 364/1, 
Preamble.  
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International regulation of data protection consequentially has played an important 
role already at the dawn of the information society, when computers and information 
processing became a necessary part in society and in all kinds of state administrations. 
The Council of Europe ever since has played an important role in laying out core 
principles for data protection and its shift towards a fundamental right. In 1973 and 
1974 the CoE Committee of Ministers adopted Resolutions on individual privacy and 
data collection in the private and public sector, both outlining core principles of 
collection and storage of information in databanks, including for example fair means 
of collection, purpose specification, right to access and rectify personal information 
as well as the requirement of legal bases for public area data collection and 
retention.298 Then, in 1981, the Council of Europe adopted the first legally binding 
international data protection instrument, the Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data.299 This Convention 
is essentially an international treaty signed and ratified by the Member States of the 
Council of Europe and Uruguay as the only non-CoE member300 and applies to the 
automatic processing of personal data in both the public and private sectors.301 It 
enshrines several basic principles of data protection including protection against 
abuse, fair and lawful collection and processing as well as purpose specification and 
proportionality. Additionally, article 12 addresses trans-border data flows, in 
combinations with a 2001 additional protocol to the Convention containing also 
provisions on third-country data flows and supervisory authorities in the member 
                                                
298 See Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Resolution (73) 22 on the protection of privacy of 
individuals vis-à-vis electronic data banks in the private sector (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers 
on 26 September 1973 at the 224th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies); and Resolution (74) 29 on the 
protection of individuals vis-à-vis electronic data banks in the public sector (Adopted by the Committee 
of Ministers on 20 September 1974 at the 236th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies).  
299 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, 
(CoE Data Protection Convention), Council of Europe, 28 January 1981, entry into force 1 October 
1985 ETS No. 108. 
300 The CoE Data Protection Convention is signed by all 47 member states, however, not ratified by 
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301 See Art 3 CoE Data Protection Convention.  
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states.302 With this, the Council of Europe data protection framework is the most 
encompassing system predating the complex EU data protection regulations.  
2.3.1.3 Data	Protection	in	the	EU	
Data Protection in the EU consists of a variety of complex regulatory instruments and 
recent developments both in jurisprudence and legislative procedure. The current EU 
data protection reforms established the directly applicable General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) and the Directive on the protection of personal data processed for 
law enforcement purposes303 and the resulting upcoming changes in public and private 
data protection regulation make this field one of the most interesting in current EU 
law discussions.304  
In order to give a brief overview of the relevant data protection instruments available 
in the EU at this point, the most important is currently still the Data Protection 
Directive 95/46/EC adopted in 1995.305 The essential purpose of the Directive is to 
harmonize certain data protection standards and therewith make easy common market 
activities in an area which became extremely important for public and private sector 
in the EU and EEA area. Its scope includes therefore the to ‘…processing of personal 
data wholly or partly by automatic means, and to the processing otherwise than by 
automatic means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended 
to form part of a filing system.’306 Excluded, however, are activities which fall outside 
                                                
302 See Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data, regarding supervisory authorities and transborder data flows, Council of 
Europe, 8 November 2001, ETS No.181.  
303 See Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on 
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation, 
GDPR), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, 1–88 and Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal 
data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution 
of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, 89–131. 
304 It should be stressed that the European Union has a special mandate for ensuring data protection 
throughout its territory in Art 16 TFEU. For an extensive discussion on this article see Hijmans H, The 
European Union as Guardian of Internet Privacy: The Story of Art 16 TFEU (Springer Berlin, 
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305  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data (Data Protection Directive) OJ 1995 L 281, 31. 
306 Art 3 (1) Directive 95/46/EC (Data Protection Directive) (n 305). 
	 95	
of the scope of Community law such as public security or defence as well as 
processing by natural persons ‘...in the course of a purely personal or household 
activity’, the so called household exemption. The harmonization of national laws 
through the Directive has the purpose of ensuring a certain level of protection within 
the Community as well as codify and expand certain data protection principles already 
enshrined in the Council of Europe Framework. In that regard, with coherence in 
Member States of Council of Europe and EU, divergent data protection standards 
would not have been feasible. Other Directives that are part of the EU data protection 
framework include the ePrivacy Directive that shall ensure equal protection levels of 
privacy rights in the area of electronic communications307 and which lays out more 
specific provisions on information security, confidentiality of communications, traffic 
data as well as certain categories of data such as location data. Directive 2002/58/EC 
has since then been amended by several other EU legislations, including the repealed 
Directive 2006/24/EC (data retention) and Directive 2009/136/EC (cookies).308  
With the adoption of the General Data Protection Regulation in April 2016, the EU 
1995 Data Protection Directive will be replaced and the new data protection standards 
will come directly applicable within all member states on the 25th of May 2018. While 
the scope of the GDPR applies to public, as well as private data processing activities 
falling within the scope of EU law, the data protection reform process also resulted in 
the adoption of a new so-called ‘Police’-Directive, which applies to personal data 
processing for purposes of public security, prevention, investigation, detection or 
prosecution of criminal offences.309  
                                                
307 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning 
the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector 
(Directive on privacy and electronic communications), OJ L 201, 31/07/2002, 37-47. 
308 See Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the 
retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available 
electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 
2002/58/EC, (Data Retention Directive), Invalidated 8.4.2014, OJ L 105, 13.4.2006, 54-63; and 
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Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications 
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protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on 
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OJ L 337, 18.12.2009, 11–36. 
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An additional step in the modernization of European data protection rules will be the 
upcoming reform of the so called ‘ePrivacy’ Directive, which is going to be replaced 
by a new Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications.310 Foreseeably, this 
Regulation will set new standards for all sorts of electronic communications, including 
for example messenger- and social media services.  
 
2.3.2 Data	Protection	as	a	Fundamental	Right?		
An essential part of EU data protection today is the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union (EUCFR). The EUCFR entered into force with the Treaty of 
Lisbon on 1st of December 2009 and is meant to close the gap between Community 
Law and existing fundamental rights protection in Europe. The Charter also 
specifically aims to tackle fundamental right issues that relate to technological 
development in societies; it wants to ‘…strengthen the protection of fundamental 
rights in the light of changes in society, social progress and scientific and 
technological developments by making those rights more visible in a Charter.’ The 
EUCFR enshrines, as the first international document, not only privacy as a right in 
article 7, but also a fundamental right to personal data protection in article 8. Article 
8 ensures a right to personal data protection for everyone and at the same time lists 
several core principles of data protection, namely fair and lawful processing, purpose 
specification, consent of the data subject, access and rectification as well as the control 
of those principles by an independent authority.311 With the coming into force of the 
Charter, data protection was explicitly mentioned as a fundamental right within the 
EU legal framework. Consequently, data protection in Europe is a standard that is 
more and more articulated as a rights-issue, affecting the public and private sectors in 
similar ways. Evidence of this can also be found in the recent case law of the CJEU, 
employing rights based arguments in order to address data protection problems arising 
from the public and private sectors.  
                                                
310 See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the respect 
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On the 8th of April 2014, the CJEU issued a judgment on the compatibility of the 
European Data Retention Directive (2006/25/EC) with fundamental rights in the 
European Union. The 2006 Directive was a result of widespread and longstanding 
discussions on the necessity of Europe-wide retention of communication meta-data 
for purposed of criminal investigations.312 The Directive required member states of 
the EU to implement national law obliging Telecommunication Service Providers 
(TSP) to store meta-data of citizens’ communication from 6-24 months and allow law 
enforcement access to these data. Meta-data in this context meant all data related to a 
person’s communications including internet usage hence ‘…traffic and location data 
on both legal entities and natural persons and to the related data necessary to identify 
the subscriber or registered user’313 but not the actual content of communications. 
From the beginning, the Directive has been subject to heavy criticism and several 
national constitutional Courts have issued judgments partly halting the 
implementation process.314 
In April 2014, the CJEU annulled the Directive. In Digital Rights Ireland, the Court 
was specifically asked to examine the Data Retention Directive in light of the 
fundamental rights to private and family life, data protection and freedom of 
expression and information (arts 7,8, and 11) of the EUCFR.315 The Court established 
a rights interference on the bases that such meta- data would allow for  
…very precise conclusions to be drawn concerning the private lives of the 
persons (…), such as the habits of everyday life, permanent or temporary places 
of residence, daily or other movements, the activities carried out, the social 
relationships of those persons and the social environments frequented by 
them.316  
                                                
312 See Boehm, F and Cole DM: Data Retention after the Judgement of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, Study funded by the Greens/EFA Group in the European Parliament, 
Münster/Luxembourg, 30.06.2014, 
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313 Art 1(2) Directive 2006/24/EC (n 308). 
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The Court regarded this as a severe interference with the right to private life and data 
protection (it did not further examine article 11) and due to the comprehensiveness of 
the data, lack of safeguards against the risk of abuse, un-proportionality of the 
interference and controllability of the data ruled the Directive invalid.317 With this, the 
court employed a very strong fundamental rights argument and at the same time set 
standards determining the employment of fundamental rights arguments in the field 
of data protection.318 It is clear that the CJEU understands state surveillance as a 
fundamental rights issue, requiring strong mechanisms and safeguards on the 
European level. Surveillance, privacy and data protection were seen as an issue of 
constitutional relevance to the European Union.  
The second CJEU case employing a particularly strong fundamental rights argument 
is Google Spain. In this case, the Court ruled that the internet search engine Google 
has to remove links to sites containing personal information of individuals from their 
search results if this data outlives the necessity to be processed for the specific purpose 
at times of collection. 319  This sparked widespread discussions on a right to be 
forgotten and the general effects on search engine providers that shall not be discussed 
here,320 however what is interesting in that context is the fundamental rights rhetoric 
the Court used. Citing the preamble of the Data Protection Directive (Directive 
95/46/EC), the Court stressed that it ‘…seeks to ensure a high level of protection of 
the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, in particular their right to 
privacy, with respect to the processing of personal data.’321  
With this, the Court clearly laid out a partly hierarchical fundamental right based 
system as it reads the regulatory regime of data protection in the EU strictly in 
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connection with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and especially articles 7 and 
8 therein. The Court explicitly stated that when provisions within the data protection 
regime touched upon fundamental rights issues such as the right to privacy, they 
‘…must necessarily be interpreted in the light of fundamental rights, which, (…), form 
an integral part of the general principles of law whose observance the Court ensures… 
.’322 Due to those fundamental rights, the status of data protection, the principles of 
fair and lawful processing, access to information as well a right to rectification need 
to be implemented by a search engine provider, whose task it would be to assess 
carefully upon request if the referral to personal information stored somewhere on the 
internet are still in compliance with those principles after a certain time span. 
Furthermore, the Court interestingly employed the Data Protection Directive in the 
Case as a source for laying out mechanisms for permissible limitations into the rights 
enshrined in art 7 and 8 of the EUCFR.323  
Without going too much into the detail of the case here, the Court’s fundamental rights 
rhetoric was similar to Digital Rights Ireland, where the violation of article 7 and 8 
was essentially based on a failed proportionality test. Here now, the Court basically 
imposed the standard of a fundamental rights balancing test onto a private corporate 
entity and established the possibility of appealing to a public procedure if that test is 
not solved to the satisfaction of the complainant.324  
The third landmark judgment which employed a fundamental rights based argument 
in assessing privacy issues was the Schrems case.325 The case originated in a request 
for preliminary ruling on the adequacy of the fundamental rights protection of the so 
called safe harbour privacy principles deriving from a Commission Decision 
(2000/520/EC) of 26.07.2000.326 Essentially, the underlying problematic arose from 
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NSA data collection and surveillance practices leaked by Edward Snowden during 
summer 2013, and the social media corporation Facebook transferring data of 
European citizens to the US which was then legally based on the Commission’s safe 
harbour agreement. The question which arose from Facebook’s US data transfers, was 
how far there really existed an ‘adequate level of protection’ of personal data in the 
US and which authority had the competence to evaluate the protection level. 
Already in 2013, Maximilian Schrems filed a complaint against Facebook Ireland for 
those practices with the Irish Data Protection Authority on the bases that the  
…law and practice in force in [the US], did not ensure adequate protection of 
the personal data held in its territory against the surveillance activities that were 
engaged in there by the public authorities.327  
The DPA rejected the compliant and stated that the Commission’s Decision 2000/520 
already determined the existence of adequate data protection practices in the US. The 
Court rejected this opinion.  
Again, the CJEU emphasized that  
…the provisions of Directive 95/46, inasmuch as they govern the processing of 
personal data liable to infringe fundamental freedoms, in particular the right to 
respect for private life, must necessarily be interpreted in the light of the 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter.328  
Furthermore, ‘adequate level of protection’ can only mean, in the words of the Court, 
the requirement for the US as a third country  
…to ensure, by reason of its domestic law or its international commitments, a 
level of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms that is essentially 
equivalent to that guaranteed within the European Union by virtue of Directive 
95/46 read in the light of the Charter.329  
US legislation, permitting state authorities vast access to personal data and electronic 
communications, consequently ‘…must be regarded as compromising the essence of 
the fundamental right to respect for private life, as guaranteed by Article 7 of the 
Charter’ as well with the right to effective judicial protection enshrined in article 47 
of the Charter due to the lack of a legal recourse. 330  Such fundamental rights 
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interferences need to be strictly necessary in order to be justified and the Court did not 
see the strict necessity in this case and consequently declared the Commission’s safe 
harbour Decision 2000/520 invalid.331  
In all three cases, the CJEU has employed strong fundamental rights arguments and it 
has established specific mechanisms of privacy and data protection norms that apply 
within the European context.  
Firstly, it emphasized the important of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union as a document with constitutional relevance. Especially when an 
issue regulated by EU law has the potential of interfering with fundamental rights 
enshrined in the Charter, all regulatory regimes related to that issue will need to, in 
one or another way, be interpreted in light of relevant fundamental rights. This is 
especially the case when the issue concerns the right to private life and the right to 
data protection.332 Furthermore, the Court has also applied this argument to other 
regulatory regimes of the European Union, especially the data protection regime 
consisting of Directive 95/46/EC and its related Directives, Decisions and Opinions. 
This indicates the existence of a fundamental rights regime within the European Union 
which is particularly relevant for surveillance, data protection and privacy. It is also a 
system of protection which exists parallel to the human rights instrument of the 
European Convention of Human Rights. What is remarkable, though, is that 
particularly the Google Spain case showed that EU fundamental rights have a strong 
impact on the private sectors and therewith on private individuals as well as private 
companies. This means that in cases where EU regulatory instruments regulate 
conduct in the private sector, the actors in the private sector are bound by EU 
fundamental rights in the EUCFR, especially in cases concerning privacy and data 
protection. This shows that EU fundamental rights are directly applicability in the 
private sector, and therewith appear to unfold a certain ‘Drittwirkung’; especially 
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private entities such as companies may be bound by the rights enshrined in the 
EUCFR.333  
2.3.3 Conclusion		
Privacy and Data Protection are important concepts in Europe and have an important 
regulatory consequences and constitutional importance. Both are constructed by 
employing a fundamental rights language and European Courts, as discussed above, 
have given them further jurisprudential relevance.  
Consequently, while Data Protection is often understood as a new legal field, it has 
had significant practical relevance all over the world since computer technologies 
came to play a significant role in everyday life. In that sense, the relation of privacy 
and data protection can be seen as reciprocal: on the one hand the legal concept of 
privacy, especially when understood as a fundamental right, gained significant 
importance in the 60s and 70s due to states’ data collection (census) and retention 
activities (data banks). On the other hand, data protection regulation derived their legal 
arguments from the early discourses and debates about privacy as a right. In other 
words, it seems that privacy and data protection are concepts that mutually benefitted 
from each other in many ways and in that sense a strict separation between privacy 
and data protection appears somehow artificial. Yet, data protection appears to play a 
particularly separated role in the framework of the European Union.  
Today, technological developments and data processing capabilities have reached a 
new level. On the one hand, data protection is perceived as a right supposedly 
countering the enormous collection of information on individuals. On the other hand, 
data has become a tradeable good, even a currency, that is essential for economic 
growth and development. Even further, the protection of data today is a regulatory 
instrument that seems to oppose corporate developments and is often seen as an 
obstacle to all kinds of economic activities, from start-up founding to global trade.  
In fact, the question has to be asked how much data protection has transformed into 
something more than the protection of specific information about individuals. Data 
today also functions as a currency, as code, as a decision-making tool, as exercising 
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control and even as a predictor of the future. In fact, the functionality of our world is 
built around data and data protection plays an integral element in that world. Data 
protection as a fundamental right has to be seen as an integral element in such a world 
even more than ever before.  
Data protection, as well as privacy, therefore are essential for an analysis of public 
surveillance in an urban setting. In many ways, both privacy arguments, as well as 
data processing questions are the most important issues when addressing the question 
of surveillance. This is particularly the case when it comes to surveillance of actual 
physical public places. The analyses below will address some of the questions around 
the relationship between privacy and data protection as joint or separate legal 
arguments addressing public surveillance. Before, however, another topic demands a 




‘Security’ is the primary and most predominant reason for building surveillance in 
public places.334 In fact, 
…in an age when security is as much about monitoring and interdicting flows 
of capital, people and information as it is about defending borders with 
conventional military forces, cities are increasingly seen as key sites for security 
policies and interventions, giving rise to new policing technologies of risk, 
surveillance and profiling.335 
Security, however, as a concept is as complex as it is ambivalent. In fact, it can be 
understood in many ways by different disciplines. On the meta-level, security is a term 
that has been grasped in different ways in many fields of science. Most prominently, 
security has appeared as the subject of studies in political sciences, international 
relations and even forms its own distinct discipline in the social sciences: international 
security studies.336 In this context, security can be understood in different ways: for 
example as traditional and military security, focusing on national security, states and 
war.337 Security, however, can also include less state-centric perspectives and the 
expansions of reference objects: the economy, the environment or international crime 
and terrorism are a threat to security in a similar way as warmongering states, 
especially since the end of the Cold War and the shift of perspective from purely 
external threats to global threats.338 Further, more thorough and complex approaches 
to security include amongst others the concept of human security as deriving from the 
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1994 UN Human Development Report which criticized state-centric security 
conceptions and demanded a focus on individuals, their needs, rights and dignity.339  
Another, extremely complex but interesting conception is the concept of 
‘securitization’ developed by the so-called Copenhagen School, which constructed 
security as the subjective speech act of securitization, by which an issue becomes a 
subject of security when actors articulate it as a security problem, with the intention 
to claim and justify exceptional measures that would counter the existential threat.340 
Therewith, security problems are not naturally given objective threats, but subjective 
constructions which ultimately should be handled with care, in other words, should be 
‘de-securitized’.341 Such a conception allows for a more distant, in fact, a more critical 
perspective on security arguments. In that sense, the Copenhagen school presented a 
critique on traditional realist as well as liberal conceptions of security, in which 
security is always perceived as something positive and something that needs to be 
built and achieved.  
The Copenhagen School, however, has been debated and criticized extensively. 
Burgess, for example, recognized the originality of the Copenhagen School approach 
in its systematization of security as a system of reference and therewith as 
‘…pragmatic function, as the transitive act, of “securitization”.’342 This, however, 
would fall short of reflexivity in that it took for granted the securitizing actor as the 
creator of the securitizing speech act: ‘Securitization theory thus identifies the locus 
of the ethical subject of security in the logic of the speech act. And yet this approach 
is ultimately too narrow, precisely because “organizational logic”, like the subject 
itself, is not neutral, not objectively given.’343 There is, however, nothing self-evident 
and nothing neutral in the construction of a securitizing actor and therewith ‘[b]y 
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taking the individual embedded in an organizational logic as a given, we miss the 
ethical nature of the subject.’344  
Another issue that the Copenhagen School falls short on is a clarification of their 
understanding of the role of law in the securitization process. For some Copenhagen 
scholars, ‘[s]ecurity is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the 
game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics.’345 
From a legal perspective, emergency measures enacted with the purpose to combat 
existential threats suggests that there are elements in the thinking of the Copenhagen 
school which are close to a Schmittian understanding of state of emergency and 
exception.346 The state of exception stands therewith beyond the law and beyond all 
institutionalized forms of political governance and therewith draws a clear line 
between ‘normal’ and exceptional times347 and it is questionable whether such clear 
demarcations can retain validity in times of permanent emergency measures and the 
de facto permanence of legal and constitutional changes. 348  Despite justified 
criticisms, however, the Copenhagen School retains theoretical viability, especially 
when employed as a methodological concepts in order to criticize security arguments 
as trumps. Constructivist argumentation, of course, is not the only critical approach to 
traditional perceptions. Security has also been discussed in forms with more critical 
perspectives: Galtung and the idea of negative and positive peace, and its relations to 
the concept of structural violence which prevents the liberation of individuals, is one 
example.349 Security as a concept of emancipation and therewith ultimately not only 
the freedom from fear and want, but also the absence of structural violence enable 
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individual to strive for liberation and overcome existing constraining and determining 
power relations.350  
2.4.1 Security	and	the	Law	
The relationship between security and the law adds another layer of complexity. For 
law, security is more than just a certain theoretical conception or an approach. In fact, 
security is often interwoven with concrete legal arguments.  
On the one side, in law, security is often used as ‘certainty’, e.g. as legal certainty, 
stability and the rule of law as cementing and underlying complex social systems. In 
that sense, legal certainty is in fact bringing order to chaos, and without legal certainty 
no constitution or system of fundamental rights protection could thrive. Security, from 
this perspective, can bring and demand order and can even be conceptualized as a 
right.  
On the other side, ‘security’ is used in a legal argument as a justification mechanism 
for certain limitations and exceptions. Here, security can meet law in different ways: 
Firstly, as limitation and justification within the law, secondly, as amendment to the 
law, and thirdly, as the ultimate reason for suspension of the law as such. In that sense, 
security can be understood as functioning within the law and above the law.351 Within 
the law, security arguments can work in order to limit certain rights or as a mechanism 
of justification. This is because most fundamental rights are not absolute in nature and 
can be interfered with. The right to privacy in article 8 ECHR, for example, grants 
everyone ‘…the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.’352 Interferences with rights enshrined in article 8, however, can be 
permitted provided they are ‘…in accordance with the law’, ‘necessary in a democratic 
society’ and serve a legitimate interest such as ‘public safety’ or ‘national security’, 
as is explicitly listed in art 8 (2) ECHR. While this appears banal, it illustrates the first 
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relation between law and security: safety and security can be reasons for limiting 
certain fundamental rights.  
The second possible use of security within the law would be an in-build mechanism 
for possible derogations in case of threats or emergencies. The ECHR, again, as an 
example, contains a specific mechanism for derogations in times of emergency in 
article 15. Member states can derogate from certain Convention right ‘[i]n time of war 
or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation…’ provided this follows 
a specific procedure. 353  In a similar way, many legal sources, especially of an 
international or constitutional nature, contain or have established mechanisms for 
limitations and derogations, and the justification for the activation of such mechanisms 
often uses functional security arguments. Understanding that such arguments are not 
innocent, de-politicized or objective acts is important when critically engaging with 
security and law. This is where the methodological framework of the Copenhagen 
School comes in handy.  
The other frequent appearance of security in the context of law happens in areas that 
could be called ‘beyond’ the law. Security is used beyond the law when its effect leads 
to the amendment of law in general, or to permanent changes of legal sources, because 
of an alleged security problem. In that sense, urgent security problems can modify 
existing legal systems and mechanisms in many ways, one of them can be seen in the 
expansion of investigatory powers and repressive security actions after large-scale 
terror attacks. The global change of counter-terrorism laws after 9/11 354  can be 
regarded as one example of ‘global security law’ in which existing legal systems of 
rights protection have been systematically weakened.355 While a state of emergency 
within the law is by definition of a temporary and exceptional nature,356 an emergency 
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beyond the law leads to the amendment of existing laws, drafting of new laws or to 
the dismissal of laws entirely, for example in times of war, crises or revolutions. A 
more detailed discussion on states of emergencies and security however, has to be 
made elsewhere. The following section focuses on the implications of security on 
public surveillance.  
2.4.2 Public	Surveillance	and	Security		
While the terminology of security in law can function as a tool for certainty as well as 
a mechanism for the justification of limitations, exceptions and even suspensions of 
laws, the relationship between security and the public space are more concrete. What 
is remarkable, though, is that wide varieties of discourses on public spaces address 
security issues. Essentially, security and public spaces revolve around three terms: 
public order, public safety and public security. While public safety and order are 
essentially terms addressing the functionality of public places, the more general and 
more abstract public security addresses aspect of threats and the survival of the public 
space as such.  
What makes security a fascinating theoretical concept is that within a public place, it 
is essentially a mind-game. Making a public place safe requires the capabilities to 
control the space to some degree. In this context, ‘controlling’ means to be able to 
alter and steer events and activities in a particular frame. The degree of necessary and 
adequate control, however, is determined by the security mindset of the actors, 
institutions and logics which perceive it as their task to control that particular space. 
 
2.4.3 The	Right	to	Security		
The discussions on the concept of security above focus on the relationship between 
security and the law above looks at security as a political issue and as a tool that works 
as a justification for certain limitations or even exceptions. In this sense, security 
presents one side of a balancing argument: in order to legitimately interfere with rights 
and freedoms. Security and its perceived necessities need to be balanced and weighted 
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against losses, values, rights and general freedoms as such.357 Therewith, security is 
discussed in terms of oppositions such as security v liberty358 or liberty v control.359  
Law, however, can address security in another way: security in fact can be perceived 
as a ‘right’. This way of approaching the topic somehow represents a turn in 
perspective: while the starting point in the discussion of the relationship between 
security and law above is ‘security’, another perspective is to prima facie start from 
‘the law’. Law, includes security also in a way that goes beyond a mere reason for 
legitimating certain interferences; and that is in the conceptualization of security as an 
individual right. But is there really a unique and distinguishable right to security, as 
there is a right to privacy? Can the right to security therefore be balanced against the 
right to privacy? And is there a right to security in certain circumstances, such as in a 
public space and are there certain obligations for states and their security authorities 
to secure a public area, for example with surveillance means?  
2.4.3.1 The	ECHR	and	a	Right	to	Security		
Looking at legal sources, the right to security is indeed included in the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Article 5 (1) reads: ‘Everyone has the right to liberty 
and security of person.’ While this as such is rather indeterminate, article 5 continues 
with a list of reasons justifying the deprivation of liberty making clear that article 5 in 
fact is about detention, imprisonment and arrests and therewith addressing 
fundamental principles regarding the deprivation of liberty rather than granting 
individuals an overarching right to security. It might still be argued, however, that a 
general right to security would be valid in areas, where special rights do not apply. A 
general human right to security would hence be related to the change of the security 
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object from states and entities to individuals, such as in the UN human security 
conceptualization. There is, however, reason for caution.  
That is because it is important to distinguish between the argument that security per 
se would be a pre-condition for the enjoyments of rights, for example, when a certain 
amount of security in a public space would be required in order to guarantee freedom 
of expression, and actually basing fundamental rights on an overarching right of 
security. Lazarus, in this context, warned that there was a principle ‘…difference 
between securing rights and “securitizing” rights’.360 Indeed,  
[t]here is a danger when the right to security slips into becoming the meta-
principle grounding other rights, it can also displace the non-instrumental values 
upon which it properly ought to rest. In this way the right to security can 
inadvertently legitimise security measures that encroach upon those values it has 
now displaced.361  
A right to security has to be therefore regarded as highly problematic. Apart from such 
criticism, a right to security is de-facto conceptualized in legal sources beyond the 
above mentioned article 6 ECHR: In the South-African constitutional bill of rights, 
for example, a ‘right to freedom and security of person’ is defined beyond the 
deprivation of liberty in Section 12. It also includes a right ‘to be free from all forms 
of violence from either public or private sources’, as well as all aspects of torture and 
cruel, inhuman or degrading punishments.362 Section 12 also includes the right to 
‘bodily and psychological integrity’ which enshrines aspects of reproduction and self-
determination. This is interesting, as many of the aspects in Section 12 could, from a 
European perspective, be subsumed under the right to ‘private life’ in article 8 ECHR. 
In Europe, a certain ‘right to security of the person’ could therefore also be derived 
from personal integrity and self-determination rights surrounding a right to privacy.  
More generally, however, the right to security has more and more been distinguished 
from the right to liberty and, as a more general trend, has been established as a lone-
standing right in different contexts.  
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From a constitutional law perspective, this trend appears to follow three steps: Firstly, 
the right to security is detached from liberty and articulated as a separate right, 
secondly the applicability and scope of security is expanded from a purely vertical 
public-private relationship to multi-dimensional application including public and 
private actors (as the horizontal effect or so called ‘Drittwirkung’), and thirdly, it is 
emphasized that states have positive obligations to actively protect individuals from 
rights violations, even in horizontal relations, meaning through other individuals.363 
This, paired with the general ambiguity and political sensitivity of the concept of 
security can lead to the absurd situation in which security aspects which heavily 
interfere with a fundamental right are masked as a fundamental right in order to be 
balanced against other rights. The true nature of security arguments, for example the 
securitization of a political interest, can easily be hidden inside an alleged fundamental 
rights discourse, which masks the real effect of a security measure, namely the 
justification of permanent changes to legal systems and power balancing mechanisms 
of protection.  
Within the framework of the ECHR, the right to liberty and security has foremost been 
interpreted as the right to liberty, including safeguards against unjustified 
interferences.364 The term ‘security’ in this context has traditionally been interpreted 
as relating to the strict condemnation of ‘arbitrary detention’.365 In the Kurt judgment, 
the ECtHR stated:  
What is at stake is both the protection of the physical liberty of individuals as 
well as their personal security in a context which, in the absence of safeguards, 
could result in a subversion of the rule of law and place detainees beyond the 
reach of the most rudimentary forms of legal protection.366 
While article 5 is regarded primarily as addressing the deprivation of liberty, the 
ECtHR has been employing the security of persons in cases of disappearances, e.g. in 
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the Kurt-case cited above. Naturally so, as it is then unclear if a person’s liberty or 
their life is at stake.367  
It can be concluded that security in the jurisprudence of the ECHR works in fact as 
articulation of a protective mechanism, and as a concept that functions jointly with the 
right to liberty. Other scholars have confirmed the reading that security and liberty are 
one joint right and not distinct:  
…[T]he European Court of Human Rights has developed the concept of security 
in an auxiliary way, that is, the right to security of person is about securing 
liberty and has no independent content of its own. In doing so, in the context of 
Article 5 it has limited the context in which the security of person applies to 
physical liberty. It is suggested that the concept of security of person which the 
European Court of Human Rights develops is not a substantive concept with 
independent meaning but rather an auxiliary concept which attaches to other 
values or interests in order to protect or ensure them.368 
It would therefore not be without difficulties to interpret a distinct individual ‘right to 
security’ into the ECHR. There is, however, another reason for this: Article 5 and the 
‘right to liberty and security of person’ is not the only way in which the concept of 
security is used in the ECHR. Far more prominently and more widely discussed is the 
use of ‘national security’ in the Convention, namely as a legitimate aim for states to 
interfere with certain rights. ‘National security’ is listed as such a specific legitimate 
aim in the common limitation clauses in arts 8-11.  
It is because of this reason that the construction of security as a distinct right in the 
Convention would be problematic: when assessing the legitimacy of interferences the 
ECtHR examines national security as specific aim, as a general interest, not as an 
individual right balanced against other individual rights. 369  Security as a distinct 
individual right could therefore radically change the legal reasoning of the ECtHR – 
and embed the obligation to protect individuals through the state (Schutzpflicht) 
directly in the test of permissible limitations on other rights. While ‘national security’ 
certainly needs to be distinguished from a right to security, such general and all-
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encompassing interpretations of security run the risk of turning the concept into a carte 
blanche for legitimating wide-reaching interferences with fundamental rights in the 
ECHR.  
2.4.3.2 The	EU	and	a	Right	to	Security		
Within the EU fundamental rights framework, the EUCFR contains a right to liberty 
and security, in article 6, without mentioning a focus on deprivation of liberty as 
such.370 Once again, taking into account common interpretations on the general right 
to not be deprived of one’s liberty, the mentioning of ‘security’ in this context could 
have been seen merely as an addition to the primary purpose of article 6, namely to 
establish the ‘right to freedom’. Security in a narrow sense here had to be interpreted 
as ‘legal certainty’; and as an indication that the right to freedom shall not be arbitrarily 
and without proper procedure and safeguards be interfered with.  
Surprisingly, however, in Digital Rights Ireland, the Court added an interesting, and 
somehow awkward side-note: After confirming that both combatting serious crime as 
well as international terrorism are objectives of general interest, it added: 
‘Furthermore, it should be noted, in this respect, that Article 6 of the Charter lays down 
the right of any person not only to liberty, but also to security.’371 This means that the 
Court read article 6 EUCFR in a new way: it seems that it now includes a right to 
security next to a right to liberty, although the Court did neither explicitly specify this 
nor clarified the relation of such a right to security with other rights in the Charter, 
particularly not with articles 7 and 8, the right to private life and data protection.372  
In a more recent case, the CJEU referred to Digital Rights Ireland, when it stressed for 
a second time that there exists a right to security next to a right to liberty: in J. N. v 
Staatssecretaris voor Veiligheid en Justitie, the detention of the applicant, ordered for 
reasons of national security and public order were seen as objectives of general 
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interest.373 In this case, the Court repeated that ‘…everyone has the right not only to 
liberty but also to security of person (…),’374 after which it moved on assessing the 
proportionality of the detention of asylum seekers. Following a more detailed analysis, 
it appears that there are two distinguishable concepts of security involved in the 
judgment. The first ‘security’ is the concept of protecting ‘national security or public 
order’ as a ground for the detention of asylum applicants pursuant to the Directive 
2013/33/EU. 375  The second type of ‘security’ is an explicitly distinguished and 
generally construed ‘right to security of person’. The pressing question in the context 
of the case is therefore how the general objective of protecting national security and 
an alleged right to security derived from article 6 of the EUCFR are related?  
Unfortunately, the reasoning of the judgment does not give clear answers to this 
question. The Court discussed the concepts of ‘public order’ as entailing,  
…the existence — in addition to the disturbance of the social order which any 
infringement of the law involves — of a genuine, present and sufficiently serious 
threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society (...)376  
and ‘public security’ as covering  
…both the internal security of a Member State and its external security and that, 
consequently, a threat to the functioning of institutions and essential public 
services and the survival of the population, as well as the risk of a serious 
disturbance to foreign relations or to peaceful coexistence of nations, or a risk 
to military interests, may affect public security (…).377 
However, it did not return to specify the details of a special individual right to security 
of persons. Consequently, it can only be assumed that the CJEU here did not mitigate 
a right to liberty against a ‘right to security of person’ but that it in fact attempted to 
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balance the individual right to liberty of the applicant against a general societal 
interest.  
Read differently, and assuming the CJEU did indeed develop a right to security in 
article 6 of the Charter, this right would essentially entail two rather weird elements: 
Firstly, the individual right not to be disturbed by threats in one’s own social order, 
and secondly, the individual right of the absence of threats to the functioning of 
institutions, essential public services and survival of the population. This obviously 
does not work and it is unlikely that the CJEU had the intention to develop such a 
right.  
This shows that developing and specifying a right to security is not only problematic, 
but also highly dysfunctional. The right to security therefore has to be regarded as a 
political or theoretical argument and it comes with the similar problems of ambiguity 
and indeterminacy as the concept of security per se.  
2.4.4 Conclusion		
Deriving the obligation for states to protect individuals from a general right to security 
is highly problematic. While interferences with fundamental and human rights can 
very well be justified by using a security argument, turning this argument into an 
individual right does not make much sense, especially when considering the ambiguity 
of security as a concept as such. Guaranteeing security in public places by reference 
to an individual right to security is fundamentally flawed, simply because the exact 
content of such a right is of very abstract and indeterminate nature. It highly depends 
on the employed concept of security and there is a high risk that the core of security 
is determined by very specific political interests.  
The Copenhagen School and critical security scholars have shown that security is not 
only an ambiguous but also a very problematic concept as it is prone to favour state 
interests over individual interests. Furthermore, it has been shown that also more 
human-centric conceptualizations of security run the risk of employing repressive 
tools for reasons of existential threats and therefore justify the use of repressive means 
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and methods.378 It can be expected that legal arguments around a general right to 
security would have similar effects.  
Both, the ECHR as well as EU case law have employed a right to security more or less 
carefully. Furthermore, it can be asserted that an individual ‘right to security’ simply 
does not exist within Europe. While a certain type of ‘security’ can, and probably 
should, limit certain rights in freedoms in specific ways, those limitations need to be 
carefully assessed.  
Balancing security and freedom in public spaces is a difficult task. In order to balance 
those alleged two poles, however, the content and concept of security needs to be 
outlined. In a public context, security often actually contains a strong element of 
‘control’ – in order to guarantee the security of public spaces, they need to be 
surveilled and controlled. In public places, it is therefore often not the dichotomy of 
security v liberty, but that of liberty v control which is at stake.379 Only the total 
control of public spaces, however, guarantees total security. Taking this argument 
further, the only way to completely secure public places is when they lose their public 
character: everything happening in a public place needs to be regulated and controlled, 
including access and behaviour. Strong surveillance therefore tends to have a 
repressive character: by enabling control, in its extreme form, over the past 
(investigation), present (analytics), and future (prediction), surveillance has the 
potential to swap total control for liberty. History, however, as well as the logics of 
fundamental rights show that the complete elimination of liberty for the sake of 
security achieved by control is not only societally undesirable but also in breach of 
basic fundamental rights.  
Before turning towards more detailed fundamental rights analyses of specific 
surveillance issues, the following section discusses another essential element for 
grasping the relation between security, surveillance and fundamental rights, and that 
is the importance of limitations to fundamental rights.  
	 	
                                                
378 See e.g. Chandler D, ‘Review Essay: Human Security: The Dog That Didn't Bark’ (2008) 39 
Security Dialogue 427.  
379 See Schneier B, ‘What our top spy doesn’t get: Security and Privacy aren’t opposites.’ Wired.com, 
24 January 2008 http://www.wired.com/2008/01/securitymatters-0124/ accessed 23 March 2016. 
	 118	
2.5 Limiting	Mechanisms	to	Fundamental	Rights		
The fundamental right to privacy, as well as a possible right to the protection of one’s 
own data, are not absolute rights. It goes without saying that such rights can be subject 
to limitations, provided that these limitations remain within the boundaries of the legal 
protection mechanisms. This applies to many fundamental rights, including privacy 
and data protection in the context of public area surveillance.  
There are three mechanisms with particular relevance to this study: Limiting 
mechanisms derived from international human rights law, the permissible limitations 
test in the ECHR and a similar test enshrined in the EUCFR. This section describes 
and compares these three distinct mechanisms establishing permissible interferences 
with privacy and data protection in Europe.  
It should be noted that there are of course mechanisms that may allow the restriction 
or abandonment of some human and fundamental rights, such as reservations or 
emergency derogations both on the European, as well as on the international level. 
Furthermore, legal amendments, legal change or withdrawal of Member States from 
human rights regimes can significantly impact fundamental rights protection. As this 
study primarily focuses on the fundamental rights issues of surveillance technologies 
in everyday-stations, those will not be discussed here. 
2.5.1 Limitations	of	the	International	Human	Right	to	Privacy	and	Data	
Protection	
The right to privacy and data protection is widely recognized as an international 
human right. It is included either explicitly or implicitly in international, regional as 
well as constitutional legal sources such as article 12 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR), article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), or in article 16 of the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child.380 It might be worth mentioning in this context that universal international 
human rights instruments appear to express privacy as a negative right, prohibiting 
bearers of human rights obligations from intruding into the realm of protection without 
adequate justification. Particularly the wording in the UDHR and ICCPR prohibit 
                                                
380 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (n 255); International Covenant on Civil and 
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‘arbitrary or unlawful interference with [a person’s] privacy, family, home or 
correspondence (…).’381  
On the other hand, privacy appears to be articulated more as a positive right in some 
other regional or national constitutional human rights sources: The ECHR, for 
example, emphasizes a right to respect for private and family life, home and 
correspondence.382  
The negative and positive rights distinction is an essential element for the perception 
of privacy protection in public places. From a US constitutional law perspective, for 
example, freedoms of individuals might not necessarily entail the positive obligation 
to protect individuals from privacy intrusions, while a European approach emphasizes 
positive obligations for states.383  
Regardless of privacy being established as a more positive or more negative right, 
privacy is not an absolute right and can therefore be interfered with, provided 
interferences can be justified by following specific requirements. On the international 
level, the wording of article 17 of the ICCPR indicates that interferences with privacy, 
family, home or correspondence shall not be ‘arbitrary’ or ‘unlawful’, implying that 
limitations to art 17 require a legal basis or legal safeguards. It does not, however, 
contain expressed limitation but implies that permissible limitations need to be lawful 
and proportional: ‘[M]ost ICCPR rights may be limited by proportionate laws 
designed to protect a countervailing community benefit, such as public order, or to 
protect the conflicting right of another person.’384 The Human Rights Committee 
(HRC) has made clear that authorized interferences require to be provided by national 
law and cannot be of an arbitrary nature:  
The introduction of the concept of arbitrariness is intended to guarantee that 
even interference provided for by law should be in accordance with the 
                                                
381 ICCPR, Art 17. A right to privacy is articulated as a negative right also in Art 16 of the Convention 
of the right of the Child (n 380), Art 14 of the International Convention on the Protection of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families. See UN General Assembly, International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, 18 December 
1990, A/RES/45/158. 
382 Art 8 ECHR. 
383 See Currie DP, ‘Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights’ (1986) 53 University of Chicago Law 
Review 864 for an early discussion on the negative focus of US constitutional rights.  
384 Joseph S and Castan M, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials, 
and Commentary, (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2013), 31. 
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provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant and should be, in any event, 
reasonable in the particular circumstances.385 
In the view of some, despite the lack of an expressed permissible limitation test in art 
17 ICCPR, forbidding arbitrary interference implies an even further reaching 
justification mechanism. In 2009, the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, 
Martin Scheinin, published his report on the right to privacy.386 According to the 
Special Rapporteur, a general interpretation of the ICCPR and the HRC General 
Comment No 27, which establishes an expressed limitations test for interferences with 
the ICCPR art 12 freedom of movement,387 implies that a similar test applies as well 
to article 17.388 In that sense, Scheinin argued that it ‘…codifies the position of the 
Human Rights Committee in the matter of permissible limitations to the rights 
provided under the Covenant.’389 Consequently, a similar test could also be required 
in order to justify interferences with article 17 ICCPR, a test which is constructed from 
a common reading of limitations to several rights in the ICCPR390 and elements 
contained in the HRC Comment No 27. Most of ICCPR articles containing expressed 
limitations include common elements: generally, restrictions require lawfulness, must 
be necessary in a democratic society and serve a legitimate aim. Scheinin, however, 
distils a more sophisticated permissible limitations test from the Comment:  
The permissible limitations test, as expressed in the general comment, includes, 
inter alia, the following elements: 
                                                
385 Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy), 
The Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and 
Reputation, 8 April 1988 paras 3-4.  
386 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Martin Scheinin (n 15). 
387 See UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 27: Article 12 (Freedom 
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(a) Any restrictions must be provided by the law (paras. 11–12);  
(b) The essence of a human right is not subject to restrictions (para. 13);  
(c) Restrictions must be necessary in a democratic society (para. 11);  
(d) Any discretion exercised when implementing the restrictions must not be 
unfettered (para. 13);  
(e) For a restriction to be permissible, it is not enough that it serves one of the 
enumerated legitimate aims; it must be necessary for reaching the legitimate aim 
(para. 14);  
(f) Restrictive measures must conform to the principle of proportionality; they 
must be appropriate to achieve their protective function; they must be the least 
intrusive instrument amongst those which might achieve the desired result; and 
they must be proportionate to the interest to be protected (paras. 14–15);  
(g) Any restrictions must be consistent with the other rights guaranteed in the 
Covenant (para. 18).391 
Such a permissible limitations test, according to the Special Rapporteur’s argument, 
would also apply to article 17, as implied by the prohibition of arbitrary and unlawful 
interference with the right to privacy.392  
What follows from this is that privacy can be seen as constituting a fundamental right 
on the international level which is not only enshrined in binding human rights treaties, 
but which also comes with strict requirements in order to establish permissible 
limitations.  
One could, of course, argue that Scheinin’s construction of a detailed limitations test 
is not in line with a literal interpretation of the ICCPR: if the notions ‘arbitrary’ and 
‘unlawful’ in the Covenant really implied all the above-mentioned elements, why did 
the drafters not include at least specific legitimate aims into the human rights treaty? 
Does not the fact that more detailed permissible limitations were included in other 
articles of the ICCPR indicate that a right to privacy as protected by the Covenant 
should explicitly not contain a strict limitation clause?  
Looking at the drafting procedures in fact reveals that there had been discussions and 
concrete suggestions to amend article 17 with a more concrete limitation clause, 
                                                
391 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Martin Scheinin (n 386), para 
17.  
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including a list of possible legitimate aims.393 Those proposals were rejected for two 
reasons: some drafters felt that an explicit limitation clause would limit the scope of 
the article to public interferences while it was supposed to protect both against 
intrusions by public authorities and private actors, including organizations; and others 
regarded detailed limitation clauses as a collision with Member States’ domestic 
jurisdictions and their freedom to decide on the practical application of the principles 
promulgated in article 17.394 In that sense, article 17 was not drafted to establish 
concrete human rights with detailed limitations, but rather as a principle, leaving 
Member States some freedom in how they implemented it within their jurisdictions.  
On the other side, of course, it is well established that a purely literal interpretation 
with references to the travaux préparatoires particularly of human rights treaties is 
highly problematic. Human rights treaties have to be interpreted, in line with the 
customary principles of treaty interpretation codified in the 1969 Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),395 considering the elements of ‘good faith’, ‘ordinary 
meaning’ and in light of the ‘object and purpose’ of the treaty. 396  Furthermore, 
interpretation can take into account preparatory documents as ‘supplementary means 
of interpretation’ for clarifications.397  
Particularly, a teleological interpretation of a fundamental rights treaty in light of its 
object and purpose raises the question about the distinct nature of the protection of 
human rights through international treaties and the special nature of human rights 
treaty interpretation has been recognized in international law as early as in the 
1950s.398 Human rights treaties therefore require interpretations not only in light of its 
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original meaning, and the interests of Member States, but also in light of their nature 
as instruments for protecting individuals.  
Regarding the interpretation of privacy and its limitations in article 17, this does allow 
for a more systematic and teleological interpretation. Particularly societal and 
technological changes, led by digitization and networking of information and 
communication technologies, appear to require new interpretations of article 17 
ICCPR. It is also for that reason that civil rights groups as well as the former UN 
Special Rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism have argued for the urgent 
need of a new HRC General Comment to article 17 ICCPR, including new guidelines 
on permissible limitations to the right to privacy in international human rights law.399  
In light of both technological development and the increased importance of 
information flows and data processing, it appears to make sense to adopt a strict 
permissible limitation test as described. With regards to a public surveillance scenario, 
limitations to a right to privacy, including personal data protection, require adequate 
justification already from the perspective of international human right law. This goes 
in line with principles and guidelines for limiting rights enshrined in the ICCPR 
deriving from a variety of sources and authorities400 allowing for a conclusion that 
‘…overarching principles of legality, necessity and proportionality…’ apply when 
determining the legality of limitations.401 
This means that there exists a globally (ICCPR member states) valid test establishing 
the permissibility of surveillance in public places containing the seven cumulative 
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elements, namely ‘provided by law’, ‘essence’, ‘necessary in a democratic society’ 
‘limited discretion’, ‘legitimate aims’, ‘proportionality’ and ‘consistent with other 
rights’.402  
It is rather clear that restrictions to a right to privacy in public places must be based 
on national laws of sufficient accessibility, clarity and precision. A sophisticated 
camera surveillance system processing vast amounts of citizens’ data, for example, 
can only be operated once there is adequate regulation in place. Furthermore, the 
surveillance system needs to be proportional regarding its functioning, the least 
intrusive instrument and necessary for reaching a specific legitimate aim. 
Additionally, the surveillance in question must be regarded as necessary in a 
democratic society and any discretion in applying restrictions on citizen’s rights 
cannot be unfettered, requiring the presence of oversight and adequate remedies.  
The exact meaning of what constitutes an interference ‘necessary in a democratic 
society’ in an international setting remains vague, however, guidance can be found in 
ECtHR case law, where the term has been interpreted excessively.403 Generally, in 
order to establish a necessity in democratic societies, there needs to be a ‘pressing 
social need’ for public space surveillance as well as a discussion of how far a possible 
margin of appreciation –doctrine could be applied in international human rights law.404 
After all, particularly the Human Rights Committee appears to have rejected the 
application of the margin of appreciation doctrine on the international level. 405 
Nevertheless, despite the lack of a clear application of a margin of appreciation 
doctrine, what is necessary in a democratic society can very well be determined with 
references to proportionality assessments and specific, albeit flexible, interpretations 
of democratic necessities in the respective countries. Both proportionality as well as 
that limitations must not be unfettered are, however, separate elements in the special 
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rapporteur’s proposed permissible limitations tests. 406  Large scale surveillance 
capabilities would therefore require an assessment of whether they are limited enough, 
proportional and correspond to a democratic necessity.  
Additionally, in order for the human rights interferences to be permissible, they need 
to serve a specific legitimate aim or interest to which they need to be suitable and 
proportionate for. Restrictions through surveillance, naturally, require to be consistent 
with other rights in the Covenant as well.  
Finally, and perhaps the most challenging element in the proposed permissible 
limitation test on privacy enshrined in the ICCPR is the reference to an inviolable core 
or an ‘essence’ of the fundamental right to privacy. Guidelines of an interpretation of 
a fundamental rights essence can be found in General Comment No. 27 stating that 
‘…States should always be guided by the principle that the restrictions must not impair 
the essence of the right (…)’407 while referring to Article 5 ICCPR, which limits 
limitations fundamentally contradicting the very substance of the Covenant.408 The 
core of the essence formulation in international human rights law henceforth limits 
limitation to rights, how exactly however this could apply to an international human 
right to privacy remains to be interpreted.  
It can be concluded that states have the obligation to respect a right to privacy in 
international human rights law. Interferences with the right to privacy through 
surveillance, data collection, and processing require compliance with the limitation 
principles outlined above. This requires taking into account especially legal 
authorization of sufficient clarity, precision and accessibility for particular 
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surveillance practices, clearly defined specific legitimate aims, as well as 
proportionality and necessity of the operation. Furthermore, the operation cannot be 
unlimited in scope and time and needs adequate safeguards to counter abuse and 
enable remedy.409 Additionally, legitimate surveillance operations require to take into 
account possible negative effects on other rights and also they cannot contradict the 
essential core of fundamental rights protected by the ICCPR.  
While the details of an overall framework of limiting an international human right to 
privacy may be debatable, it appears clear that there are certain core requirements 
which will need to be taken seriously when surveillance and control interfere with 
individuals’ right to privacy and data protection.  
The international human rights framework protecting privacy is of course not the only 
one protecting –and limiting the limitations of– privacy. Both the ECHR, as well as 
the EU frameworks come with more detailed norms and a body of jurisprudence on 
permissible limitations to privacy. Both will be briefly examined in the following two 
sections.  
2.5.2 Permissible	Limitations	in	the	ECHR		
The European Convention on Human Rights and its article 8 have been protecting 
individual rights against state interferences ever since it entered into force in 1953 and 
come with an immense body of case law. Article 8 protects individual from unjustified 
interferences and give states a positive obligation to respect their citizens’ ‘private and 
family life’, ‘home’ and ‘correspondence’.410  
Unlike the ICCPR, the ECHR contains a distinct limitation clause in article 8 (2), 
which provides for detailed guidance as to when interferences with the rights 
enshrined in article 8 are permissible:  
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-
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being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection 
of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.411 
Consequently, after determining if an issue in question falls into the scope of article 8 
and constitutes an interference with a protected interest, the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) applies a standardized test deriving from the limitation clause as well 
as its case law.  
In the context of this study, this means that once targeted surveillance of a person in 
public places falls into the scope of article 8 (1) ECHR and constitutes an interference, 
there are three special requirements that need to be fulfilled in order to be permissible: 
the surveillance action of a citizen in Helberg explicitly requires legality, a legitimate 
aim and a democratic necessity.  
In order to perform the limitation test, the ECtHR has developed a standardized 
approach in its case law and it usually builds the permissible limitation test in the 
subsequent manner: any limitation requires legality, a legitimate aim and the 
previously mentioned necessity in democratic societies. This means that when the 
legality criterion of a measure fails, the ECtHR will find a violation without 
considering remaining criteria.  
To comply with the first requirement, the measure needs to be in accordance with the 
law. This usually means that the measures have to be based on national law and that 
this law must be of a certain quality, and fulfil the criteria of accessibility, 
foreseeability, and clarity.412  
In the Sunday Times judgement, the ECtHR specified accessibility and preciseness as 
key criteria for determining lawfulness of norms allowing for interferences: ‘…the 
citizen must be able to have an indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the 
legal rules applicable to a given case…’ and the norm needs to be ‘…formulated with 
sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct...’. 413  In its 
interpretation, however, the ECtHR also stressed that sufficient precision comes with 
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412 See Kopp v Switzerland, App no. 23224/94, Judgment (Court), 25 March 1998, Reports 1998‑II, 
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an element of reasonability: A person affected by the law ‘…must be able - if need be 
with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, 
the consequences which a given action may entail.’414  
Any targeted visual surveillance in a public place – provided that this surveillance 
amounts to an interference - hence needs a legal basis in domestic law which must be 
accessible to the subject of surveillance who should be able to foresee the legal 
consequences of the law.415 In addition, the domestic law should be ‘compatible with 
the rule of law’, implying  
…inter alia, that domestic law must be sufficiently foreseeable in its terms to 
give individuals an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which and the 
conditions on which the authorities are entitled to resort to measures affecting 
their rights under the Convention.416 
Furthermore, the ECtHR has stressed the importance of the rule of law and 
independence of judicial review enshrined in legally provided review mechanisms: 
Especially 
…the values of a democratic society must be followed as faithfully as possible 
in the supervisory procedures if the bounds of necessity, within the meaning of 
Article 8 § 2, are not to be exceeded. In a field where abuse is potentially so easy 
in individual cases and could have such harmful consequences for democratic 
society as a whole, it is in principle desirable to entrust supervisory control to a 
judge, judicial control offering the best guarantees of independence, impartiality 
and a proper procedure.417  
Furthermore, domestic law regulating targeted surveillance in a public place needs to 
ensure certain safeguards against abuse and against uncontrolled powers in the hands 
of the authorities.418  
This has been stressed in cases where the ECtHR examined laws authorizing secret 
surveillance measures: particularly because it is against the nature of secret 
surveillance measures to be subject to immediate scrutiny by affected individuals and 
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it would not be compatible with the rule of law to grant unfettered powers to the 
authorities.419 Therefore, specific minimum safeguards that need to be laid down in 
the national laws include inter alia the nature of offences that warrant surveillance, 
specification of categories of people or groups potentially subject to surveillance, 
duration limitation, data processing procedures, data transfer precautions, and deletion 
of surveillance data.420 While many of those requirements derive from wiretapping 
cases, laws authorizing targeted sophisticated surveillance in the public space require 
similar criteria. The main question arising from this is in how those requirements could 
work with the complex surveillance systems described in the scenario; after all such 
surveillance systems can be operated as very effective targeted surveillance systems 
for tracking and surveilling suspects in a vast area, depending on the design and 
prevalence of video cameras and other location sensors. This is problematic, because 
on the one hand the system is a public mass surveillance system, which on the other 
hand has the capability to be employed as a targeted surveillance system if necessary. 
While the ECtHR has explicitly found that simple camera surveillance systems 
installed in public spaces do not require a legal basis since they do not constitute an 
interference with rights protected in the ECHR,421 it has on the other hand developed 
very detailed requirements for the lawfulness of targeted secret surveillance measures, 
including wiretapping. In order to be used as a targeted surveillance system, there 
needs to be a law specifically authorizing the employment of sophisticated public 
surveillance systems with both mass- and targeted surveillance capabilities.  
The second criteria for determining the permissibility of an interference into the rights 
enshrined in article 8 ECHR is that the measures in question require specific legitimate 
aims.  
Art 8(2) ECHR provides an exhaustive list of such aims:  
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…interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.422 
It is important to note that those interests will not justify an interference per se, but 
need to be suitable and proportionate in order to reach the particular aim.  
Sophisticated surveillance of urban public spaces serves certain aims of security. 
Naturally, targeted surveillance of individuals in a public context most likely will have 
either a security or a law enforcement context. While surveillance of public places in 
general could serve abstract aims of upholding a certain concept of public safety, in 
the context of targeted surveillance however, national security or crime prevention 
might be more likely to be relevant.  
As discussed earlier, ‘national security’ is a difficult concept as such but targeted 
surveillance might very well serve such aim if the person under surveillance is 
involved in activities labelled as terrorism. In the Klass case, the ECtHR accepted that 
a law granting surveillance powers to German state authorities was serving the 
legitimate aims of ‘national security’ and the ‘prevention of disorder or crime’.423 
Therewith the ECtHR confirmed the authorizing law’s purpose to protect  
…against “imminent dangers” threatening “the free democratic constitutional 
order”, “the existence or security of the Federation or of a Land”, “the security 
of the (allied) armed forces” stationed on the territory of the Republic or the 
security of “the troops of one of the Three Powers stationed in the Land of 
Berlin”…424  
as constituting the legitimate aims of safeguarding ‘national security’ and ‘to prevent 
disorder or crime’.425  
In the Uzun case, the ECtHR confirmed that both visual surveillance as well as GPS 
tracking of a person served the ‘…interests of national security and public safety, the 
prevention of crime and the protection of the rights of the victims’426 because the 
suspect was investigated for attempted murder, the case had a terrorist background 
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and because the authorities attempted to prevent future bomb attacks.427 Hence, the 
acceptance of national security as a legitimate aim for systematic targeted visual 
surveillance of an individual’s action in a public area depends on the detailed 
circumstances and the reasons for the surveillance of the individual.  
Another likely aim for targeted public visual surveillance is ‘prevention of disorder or 
crime’. Targeted visual surveillance is naturally very often of an investigative nature 
or perceived as a penal measure which is why the prevention of disorder or crime is 
one of the most often accepted aims by the ECtHR.428  
Other legitimate aims, such as the economic wellbeing of the country, health or 
morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others may play a more 
marginal role in targeted surveillance cases.  
The third element included in the legitimacy test in art 8(2) ECHR states that apart 
from being in accordance with the law and serve a legitimate aim is that the 
interference has to be ‘necessary in a democratic society’ in order to be legitimate. 
This means that targeted visual surveillance as a restriction into individual rights needs 
to be ‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’ and ‘correspond to a “pressing 
social need”’. 429  In addition, states have a ‘certain but not unlimited margin of 
appreciation’430 in deciding applying restrictions, however, that process will be under 
the review of the ECtHR.431 In the Handyside Case, the ECtHR stated that principally 
national judges are ‘…in a better position than the international judge to give an 
opinion on the exact content of the requirements as well as in the “necessity” of a 
“restriction” or “penalty” intended to meet them.’432 There is an excessive body of 
case law and debates on the application of such legal arguments and the ECtHR has 
                                                
427 Ibid.  
428 See White R, Ovey C and Jacobs FG (n 364), 320.  
429 See Silver and Others v The United Kingdom, Apps no. 5947/72; 6205/73; 7052/75; 7061/75; 
7107/75; 7113/75; 7136/75, Judgment (Court), 25.03.1983 para 97.  
430 Ibid. 
431 Ibid, see also Handyside v The United Kingdom, App no. 5493/72, Judgment (Court), 07.12.1976, 
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applied the argument differently, some say indeterminately and in a manner that is 
difficult to predict.433  
So, what could this concept mean in the context of targeted visual surveillance? On 
the one hand, the proportionality test is of a certain importance. Is the measure 
interfering with an individual’s right proportionate to the pursued aim? If the targeted 
measure affects a suspected drug dealer, is limited in time, and targeted towards a 
criminal investigation and evidence gathering, the Court might find that the measure 
was proportionate or that the state possessed a wide margin of appreciation on the 
issue. If the police use the surveillance system in order to follow and monitor the 
action of e.g. the political opposition for years, the ECtHR might decide differently.  
In cases involving terrorism, public threats and national security, the ECtHR seems to 
have favoured a wider margin of appreciation, such as for example in the Leander 
case, where the ECtHR granted a wide margin to the respondent state to collect and 
retain secret databases in order to assess if a person is suitable to be employed in 
security sensitive areas.434 Also in the Klass judgment, when assessing the existence 
of a secret system of surveillance, the ECtHR granted a wide –although not unlimited- 
margin of appreciation to the authorities.435 Taking into account both the technological 
improvements of surveillance capabilities and development of terrorism in Europe, 
the Court found that:  
Democratic societies nowadays find themselves threatened by highly 
sophisticated forms of espionage and by terrorism, with the result that the State 
must be able, in order effectively to counter such threats, to undertake the secret 
surveillance of subversive elements operating within its jurisdiction. The Court 
has therefore to accept that the existence of some legislation granting powers of 
secret surveillance over the mail, post and telecommunications is, under 
exceptional conditions, necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security and/or for the prevention of disorder or crime.436  
                                                
433 See, White R, Ovey C and Jacobs FG (n 364), 326. For a more detailed discussion see Cameron I, 
National security and the European Convention on human rights (Iustus 2000), 27-36. 
434 See Leander v Sweden, App no. 9248/81, Judgment (Court) 26.03.1987, para 59. 
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Another important factor in deciding if targeted surveillance is ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’ is the ECtHR’s conception of democracy. Despite granting a wide 
margin in the Klass case, the ECtHR also explicitly noted that:  
…this does not mean that the Contracting States enjoy an unlimited discretion 
to subject persons within their jurisdiction to secret surveillance. The Court, 
being aware of the danger such a law poses of undermining or even destroying 
democracy on the ground of defending it, affirms that the Contracting States 
may not, in the name of the struggle against espionage and terrorism, adopt 
whatever measures they deem appropriate.437  
The ECtHR hence explicitly recognizes surveillance as a threat to democratic societies 
that need to be carefully balanced and assessed – making it necessary to take into 
account the ECtHR understanding of a democratic society in the individual cases.438  
It can be concluded that for targeted visual surveillance and monitoring of an 
individual to be in line with the legitimacy criteria of being ‘necessary in a democratic 
society’, the overall situation, implementation, design and authority’s application of 
balancing exercises will need to be reviewed by the ECtHR. It appears, though, that 
the more targeted, limited and reviewed such a surveillance procedure is designed to 
be, the more likely it will be deemed legitimate.  
 
2.5.3 Permissible	Limitations	in	the	EUCFR	
After discussing possible systems of permissible limitations both in international as 
well as European (Council of Europe) human rights mechanisms, what remains is to 
take a brief look at limitations enshrined in EU fundamental rights and therewith in 
article 52 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The EU Charter lays down two 
distinct articles on the protection of privacy and data protection (arts 7 and 8), 
however, unlike the ECHR with its similar limitation clauses in arts 8-11, most of the 
EUCFR articles do not contain explicit limiting elements. Instead, title VII of the 
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Charter provides a separate article containing a general provision for the justification 
of interferences with the rights protected therein439. 
Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this 
Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and 
freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made 
only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest 
recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of 
others.440  
The wording of this provision is explicitly based on established CJEU case law on 
limiting EU fundamental rights which in turn references the ECHR and its limiting 
mechanisms.441  
Additionally, article 52 (3) provides that the EUCFR requires at least an equal level 
of protection when it comes to scope an interpretation of rights enshrined in the ECHR. 
With this, limiting elements in the ECHR become part of a EUCFR assessment, if not 
a distinct requirement in the EUCFR permissible limitations test.442  
The content of the article 52(1) permissible limitation test is therefore similar to the 
mechanism in the ECHR. Any limitation to the rights protected requires to be 
‘provided by law’, and it must have a legitimate aim that corresponds to genuine Union 
interests and/or rights and freedoms of others. Furthermore, limitations must be 
necessary for reaching that aim and they must generally be proportionate. In addition, 
article 52(1) EUCFR contains a requirement that a limitation must ‘…respect the 
essence of (…) rights and freedoms’, an element which is not as such contained in the 
wording of the ECHR limitation clauses.  
The applicability of the permissible limitation need to be, of course, approached with 
care, especially with regards to the problem of their scope. Foremost, the Charter 
                                                
439 Absolute rights, of course, cannot be subject to limitations provided by Art 52 (1) EUCFR. See 
Lenaerts K, ‘Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2012) 8 European 
Constitutional Law Review 375, 388. 
440 Art 52 (1) EUCFR. 
441 See Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ C 303, 14.12.2007, 17–35. See 
also Case C-5/88 Wachauf, Judgment (Third Chamber), 13 July 1989, ECLI:EU:C:1989:321, para 18; 
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ECLI:EU:C:2000:202, para 45. 
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applies primarily to the area of Union law, and therewith to issues with direct EU law 
relevance. Article 6(1) TEU in particular, while lifting the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights onto the level of the EU Treaties, at the same time states that ‘…the Charter 
shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties.’443 
In accordance with the principles of conferral and subsidiarity, article 51 (1) and (1) 
EUCFR only apply when the EU Member States implement EU law and should not 
establish new powers of tasks.444 This means that a permissible limitations test on an 
interference with a right guaranteed in the Charter is only required in case the issues 
at stake falls into the scope of the application and implementation of Union law and 
therewith imposes obligations on Member States.445 In addition to the problem of 
applicability and scope, it is remarkable that the CJEU does not consistently refer to 
the permissible limitation test in article 52(1) EUCFR when assessing permissible 
limitation to Charter Rights.446 
In case the issue at stake falls under the scope of Union law and constitutes an 
interference into rights protected by the Charter, the potential interference must be 
provided for by law. There is extensive jurisprudence on the interpretation and details 
of this requirement in ECHR case law, and it is clear that similar criteria apply also in 
the case of the EUCFR. It is important to note, though, that legal provisions qualifying 
for the legality criteria in an EU-context self-evidently include EU legislative acts.447 
Once, however, an issue falls within the scope of Union law, it is most likely that there 
exists an EU legislative act which requires compliance with the legality criteria.  
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The next step in the EUCFR’s permissible limitation test is the provision for the 
existence of a legitimate aim and the proportionality of the measure to reach that aim. 
While the ECHR and the common limitation clauses in arts 8-11 provide for an 
exhaustive list of specific aims, the Charter remains silent. Article 52(2) EUCFR 
merely names two distinct categories: firstly, ‘objectives of general interest recognised 
by the Union’ and secondly, ‘the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others’. In 
fact, the objectives of general interest appear to be interpreted rather widely in CJEU 
case law: Lenaerts, for example, distils a list of aims such as for example 
‘establishment of a common organisation of the market’, ‘protection of public health’, 
‘public security’, ‘international security’ and ‘transparency’.448 This indicates that 
legitimate aims for restricting Charter rights go further than the enumerated list of 
legitimate aims in the ECHR.  
Secondly, article 52(1) EUCFR additionally mentions the protection of ‘rights and 
freedoms of others’ as an aim for permissible limitations, which in its application, 
requires a balancing test between the rights limited and the rights and freedoms of 
others affected by the possible non-limitation. It goes without saying, that all 
legitimate aims are part of a necessity and a proportionality test.  
The remaining criterion for the application of a permissible limitations test in light of 
article 52(1) of the EUCFR is that any limitation must respect ‘the essence’ of rights 
and freedoms protected in the Charter. The formulation the EUCFR’s limitation clause 
is interesting for two reasons. Firstly, the formulation to respect the ‘essence’ of rights 
and freedoms is somehow unique in its directness in limitation clauses in international 
human rights law. It is not explicitly mentioned in the ICCPR, neither in the ECHR, 
although, as discussed above, it is mentioned in HRC General Comments No 27 as 
‘…States should always be guided by the principle that the restrictions must not impair 
the essence of the right (…)’449, and an essence argument has been put forward in 
some ECtHR cases.450  
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Secondly, it is fascinating because it points to an interpretative approach of human 
rights limitations which could be described as a ‘categorical determination’451 to the 
application and interpretation of human rights, opposing a general pull towards a 
balancing test.452  
Balancing when assessing the justifiability of restriction and limitations with rights is 
an ever-present court practice, particularly in the context of security relevant cases and 
especially when employing proportionality-based tests. Indeed, the balancing of rights 
against rights, of rights against interests and of interest against interest has been 
debated extensively in legal theories.  
While for some, such balancing is fundamentally based on political power 
decisions,453 for others balancing is a matter of the complex quantifiably of conflicting 
individual and communal interests.454 It is important to note, though, that judicial 
balancing, particularly when it concerns an alleged conflict between (individual) 
liberty and (collective) security, has another dimension, and that is one of 
comparability.  
One of the core assumptions in favour of judicial balancing is that of the possibility of 
quantifiably of the two conflicting interests or social goods. At the same time, the 
criticism of judicial balancing is based on pointing out the arbitrariness, and the social 
and political dimensions of weighting those interests. What is missing from such 
criticism, however, is that often the alleged balancing involves comparing apples to 
oranges: that is because collective social goods or collective interests appear to be 
                                                
that ‘…the right of access to the courts is not absolute and may be subject to limitations that do not 
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compared and balanced against constitutionally or internationally protected human 
rights.455  
In that regard, specific ‘interests’, when enshrined as fundamental rights may have to 
be taken out of the equation of balancing: because they either are inviolable, such as 
for example the absolute prohibition of torture or the prohibition of slavery, or because 
they contain a core, an inviolable substance, an ‘essence’ which cannot be subject to 
limitations and balancing. In that sense, this is what makes the EUCFR art 52(1) 
limitation clause so remarkable: it establishes the existence of an ‘essence’ of 
fundamental rights, which cannot be limited.  
Such a reading of the Charter reminds of Robert Alexy’s distinction between rules and 
principles.456 Scheinin argued, that Alexy’s distinction leads to the conclusion that 
‘…most, if not all, human rights include an inviolable core with the character of a rule, 
surrounded by a much broader principle that is valid at the level of the legal order as 
a whole.’457 In Scheinin’s interpretation of Alexy, it is this strict rule which forms the 
core of a right, whereas the surrounding broader principle is the one that can be 
weighted and balanced. 458  Limitation tests therefore can only be conducted on 
principles, whereas the core or essence of rights form a rule that either applies 
categorically or does not. What matters in the application of a rule is the scope, not 
the balancing. But does the reference to ‘essence’ in the EUCFR really favour an 
Alexyan perspective in assessing permissible limitation to rights enshrined in the 
Charter?  
Indeed, this argument can be made. Already in the 1970s, the European Court of 
Justice took the stance that rights in the Community should only be limited provided 
that their very substance remains untouched.459 Today the EUCFR therefore appears 
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to contain limitation criteria based on an essence argument: fundamental rights in the 
Charter can therefore not be subject to limitations when the limitation touches upon 
the very essence and therewith the core of a right.  
Interestingly, two recent cases concerning privacy and data protection, strengthen this 
reading: In Digital Rights Ireland, the CJEU discussed limitations to articles 7 and 8 
of the EUCFR in light of the 2006/24/EC Data Retention Directive.460 While applying 
the art 52(1) limitation test of the Charter, the Court held that because the Data 
Retention Directive did not allow for the collection of communication content, and 
because it, in the view of the Court, respected certain data protection safeguards, 
neither the essence of the right to privacy in article 7, nor the essence of data protection 
in article 8 EUCFR were impeded.461  
In the Schrems judgment, however, the Court regarded general access to the content 
of communications as well a lack of safeguards and recourse as impeding the very 
essence of privacy and data protection rights guaranteed by the EUCFR.462 The Court 
reasoned: 
…legislation permitting the public authorities to have access on a generalised 
basis to the content of electronic communications must be regarded as 
compromising the essence of the fundamental right to respect for private life, as 
guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter (…).463  
Furthermore,  
…legislation not providing for any possibility for an individual to pursue legal 
remedies in order to have access to personal data relating to him, or to obtain 
the rectification or erasure of such data, does not respect the essence of the 
fundamental right to effective judicial protection, as enshrined in Article 47 of 
the Charter.464  
This means that the extend of possible content surveillance paired with a lack of 
recourse was reason enough for the Court to find an unjustifiable intrusion into the 
                                                
a provision protecting the essence of right to be limited by national laws (so called 
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core of the rights (privacy and judicial remedy) protected by the Charter. The Schrems 
judgment can therefore been interpreted as a more recent turn to take privacy as a right 
seriously and for clarifying the understanding of the role of rights-essences in limiting 
fundamental rights in Europe.465 In light of these findings, essence arguments may 
grow in importance, particularly in upcoming cases on the limits of privacy and data 
protection in Europe.466  
One further issue deserves to be mentioned in the context of limitations to the rights 
enshrined in the Charter concerning the separation of privacy rights and data 
protection in the Charter. While there are is no specific limitation clause in the right 
to respect for private life, home and communications, the right to the protection of 
personal data comes with more specific provisions. In that sense, article 8(1) EUCFR 
articulates the right as: ‘1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data 
concerning him or her.’ 
Article 8(2) and (3) EUCFR then continue:  
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of 
the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by 
law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected 
concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified.  
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent 
authority. 
Following the logic of article 52 EUCFR, it should be clear that this permissible 
limitation test applies as well to the right to personal data protection. Article 8, 
however, has a somehow unique standing in the rights of the Charter.  
Firstly, the EUCFR contains therewith a right to personal data protection formulated 
separately, next to the right to privacy enshrined in article 7. This means that when 
considering limitations, article 8 does not have a direct correspondence with the 
ECHR, which leaves a question mark behind the comparability of the meaning and 
scope of data protection deriving from article 8 ECHR and the protection of personal 
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data in the EUCFR.467 Although it is highly unlikely that a fundamental right to data 
protection would be narrower in scope than the protection in the ECHR, the 
application of article 52(3) EUCFR to limitations regarding data protection rights 
might be debatable.  
Article 8 EUCFR, however, has to be regarded as a product of existing data protection 
sources such as the 1981 Council of Europe Data Protection Convention and the 
95/46/EC Directive, as well as Art 8 ECHR jurisprudence.468 Interestingly, though, 
here the Data Protection Directive (now replaced by the new General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR)469, as well as the Regulation on data processing by Community 
Institutions (EC) No 45/2001 470  are explicitly mentioned as setting limitation 
conditions for the right to data protection.471 This means that the limiting conditions 
for the right to data protection are being additionally constituted through lex specialis 
provisions in the form of EU legislation.  
Secondly, another reason for its separate standing is that article 8 EUCFR itself 
contains specific conditions in article 8 (2) and (3) EUCFR, which could be read as 
intrinsic limitations. Article 8(1) could therefore be read as establishing a right to data 
protection as a general ban on the processing of data. Paragraph 2 and 3 would then 
lay out the permissible limitations to the general ban of personal data processing, 
namely that such processing is only justified when data is processed fairly, for a 
specified purpose, with consent or otherwise lawfully and that a permissible limitation 
would include individual access rights as well as the possibility for rectification. 
González-Fuster and Gutwirth call this reading, which is similar to the binary structure 
of article 8 ECHR, a ‘prohibitive’ approach.472 In that sense, para 1 of article 8 EUCFR 
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468 Ibid, Section: ‘Explanation on Article 8 — Protection of personal data’. 
469 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, (GDPR), (n 303). 
470 Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies 
and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 8, 12.1.2001, 1–22. 
471 See Section ‘Explanation on Article 8’ in Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
OJ C 303, 14.12.2007, 17–35. 
472 González Fuster G and Gutwirth S, ‘Opening up personal data protection: A conceptual controversy’ 
(2013) 29 Computer Law & Security Review 531, 532. 
	 142	
would establish the general rule, whereas paras 2 and 3 would establish the conditions 
for limitations.  
Another possible reading of article 8 EUCFR, according to González-Fuster and 
Gutwirth, could be a ‘permissive’ conception,473 in which the right to the protection 
of personal data does not entail a general prohibition of personal data processing, but 
the right to have personal data processing safeguarded and conditioned upon the 
substantive criteria laid out in article 8 (2+3) EUCFR. Article 52 EUCFR would then 
further establish permissible limitations for interferences into the core conditions of 
data processing, rather than the justification of interference with a ban on data 
processing per se.474  
This is an important distinction, because the reading of limitations to data protection 
either as a prohibitive or permissive conception can determine the standing of personal 
data protection as a right next to privacy. A general prohibition of personal data 
processing comes with the necessity to justify any processing in light of the 
mechanism available, while a permissive approach grants a right, not to not have one’s 
data processed, but to have adequate safeguards and protection mechanisms in place.   
As a consequence, the fundamental core (the essence) of a fundamental right to data 
protection would be significantly different in each case: in the former prohibitive 
approach, data protection has its own standing as a right next to privacy, while in the 
permissive approach, the core of data protection lies in the protection of individuals 
from harm through unsafeguarded data processing. From a permissive perspective, the 
individual protection needs to rely on the definition of a potential harm as such, and 
this definition need to derive from the concept of privacy. From a permissive 
perspective, data protection cannot develop an independent protective effect, without 
reference to the fundamental right to privacy.   
Be it as it may, it becomes clear that permissible limitations of a right to personal data 
protection in the EUCFR consists of several layers which need to be taken into 
account: Firstly, EU legislative instruments e.g. nowadays the GDPR as well as the 
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‘Police’-Directive475  may be read as setting legitimate conditions for limitations. 
Secondly, article 8 (2) and (3) contain conditions or principles that play a role, and 
thirdly, the EUCFR contains its separate mechanisms for the conditions for 
limitations, including a reference to the inviolability of the essence of the fundamental 
rights.  
*** 
This section discussed systems for permissible limitations of privacy and data 
protection in international and European human rights law. Providing that certain 
aspects of surveillance in the scenario above fall into the scope of those rights and 
constitute an interference, such interferences are required to pass all applicable 
limitations test in order to not constitute human and fundamental rights violations. 
Naturally, this will have to be assessed on a case-by-case bases.  
This study will now move towards a more scenario based analyses of specific issues 
that arise in connection with public surveillance and data collection.  
  
                                                
475 Directive (EU) 2016/680 (n 303). 
At the core of this study lies a discussion addressing the regulation of surveillance and 
complex surveillance technologies in the context of urban public space surveillance. 
Part one of this study therefore discussed various aspects of the problem of the 
application of privacy in public. Part one especially focused on the foundations of 
fundamental rights analyses of the rights of privacy and data protection and the various 
problems of the concept of security. While it concludes that both the right to privacy, 
and a right to data protection are intertwined fundamental rights, security functions 
differently, namely as a limiting mechanism. Part one of this study also showed that 
there are a variety of limiting mechanisms to individual rights when applied in the 
European public space, deriving from the international human rights framework as 
well as both the CoE and the EU rights protection systems.  
What is essential for a discussion of the function of fundamental rights in addressing 
surveillance in public places, however, are the theoretical underpinnings behind such 
rights. When privacy is conceptualized employing individual freedom, the articulation 
of the substance of such a right is fundamentally different then when it is deriving 
from dignity and personality. One of the reasons is that dignity appears to allow a 
broader focus on societal and communal understandings of privacy, which appears as 
a surprise, considering the rather liberal theoretical background of the concept of 
human dignity. In that sense, the first part attempted to show the importance of a 
differentiation between different understandings of privacy and their effects on rights 
application in public places.  
The second part of this study will now turn towards a more concrete analysis of 
European case law in connection with the surveillance scenario described in the 
introduction. The analysis will mainly focus on the scope of application of privacy 
and data protection in the context of the scenario, simply because a further detailed 
discussion of permissible limitations would go beyond the limits of this study.  
The analyses of the scenario furthermore limit themselves to four distinct issues of 
particular relevance and interest. Firstly, this study analyses targeted public 
surveillance. This is important because it is probably the most common surveillance 
scenario: a person in a public space is for one or the other reason a subject of 
surveillance targeting specifically her or him. The second issue analysed with 
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reference to the surveillance scenario of Helberg, is mass surveillance. This describes 
the indiscriminate surveillance of everybody within the reach of the respective 
surveillance system. Of course, one of the crucial issues of this is that both targeted 
and mass surveillance questions depend on the sophistication and capabilities of the 
surveillance technologies employed. The core in both analyses will therefore be based 
on understanding the function of surveillance technologies described at the outset of 
this study, especially when it comes to visual analytics and prediction. For this reason, 
a third issue analysed in this context is a brief discussion of future surveillance 
capabilities and their legal consequences: the issue of complex analytic and incident 
prediction. Before turning to the future, however, this study discusses privacy in public 
places in light of a further distinction of the private and public spheres: namely the 
relevance of private and public actors in modern urban surveillance scenarios.  
 
3.1 Targeted	Public	Surveillance	
As a first concrete legal assessment of the surveillance scenario, this study analyses 
targeted surveillance in a public space. Targeted surveillance in the context of this 
work means that a surveillance operation targets one or a group of suspects in order to 
gather information or evidence about them. This comes closest to a ‘conventional’ 
surveillance operation, where an individual is subject to surveillance for specific 
reasons. An array of technical means and personnel on the ground might accompany 
such surveillance. Targeted surveillance in the context of the urban surveillance 
scenario means that observers have the option to target an individual by different 
means, for example by tailing and observing a suspect, but also by targeting someone 
with surveillance technologies such as video cameras or movement trackers.  
For this purpose, existing public surveillance systems can be used in aiding targeted 
observations. For example, video surveillance systems can monitor a single person 
and video content analyses (VCA) or biometric identifications systems can be used to 
pick out the target person from a crowd. The more sophisticated the system, the less 
extra means will be necessary to conduct a surveillance operation on the ground.  
There are several components and capabilities of targeted surveillance that have 
special relevance for a legal assessment of the scenario:  
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A public surveillance system can be used to identify and locate a target. The moment 
the police in the Helberg scenario becomes aware that person A might be involved in 
the selling of drugs, police officers could obtain biometric data of A (image, facial 
profile, movement profile etc.) in order to feed them into the computer programs of 
the surveillance system. Once A is picked out by the system, the police know the exact 
whereabouts of A and can monitor her further actions and movements.  
Of course, when the surveillance system is capable of VCA, behavioural analyses, or 
incident prediction, the software might be able to automatically single out and identify 
actual suspects form a group of people, leading to a further targeted surveillance 
operation.  
Targeted surveillance of an individual hence includes the following components: 
Firstly, the person’s location will be tracked. Location data might as well be retained 
and processed in order to establish connections at a later stage as well as for forensics 
and legal proceedings. Secondly, the individual’s actions can be visually monitored. 
Thirdly, targeted surveillance also monitors social interactions and communications, 
up to the point where targeted sound sensors might record all the communications of 
the individual. Fourthly, in order to function, systems need to process and possibly 
retain significant amounts of personal data.  
The following analyses will assess, whether and how a fundamental right to privacy 
addresses and affects targeted surveillance in the European public space.  
3.1.1 The	Scope	of	a	Right	to	Privacy	in	Public		
Many of the above-described components of target surveillance in public spaces might 
interfere with the right to private life enshrined in article 17 ICCPR, art 8 ECHR and 
art 7 EUCFR. Furthermore, as personal data is an essential component of the described 
surveillance, the right to the protection of personal data in art 8 EUCFR needs to be 
taken into consideration as well. As location data is used, targeted public surveillance 
might as well fall into the scope of the right to liberty of movement, enshrined in art 
12 ICCPR, art 2 Protocol 4 to ECHR and art 45 EUCFR. Furthermore, targeted 
surveillance in public might also touch on certain aspects of right to freedom of 
opinion and expression guaranteed under art 19 ICCPR, art 10 ECHR and art 11 
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EUCFR as well as right to assembly of art 21 ICCPR, art 12 ECHR and art 12 
EUCFR.476  
From a fundamental rights perspective there are hence a variety of rights affected 
when individuals are subject to surveillance in public places. The scope of a right to 
privacy is one core issue when legally assessing targeted surveillance in public. The 
following sections therefore examine some key aspects of targeted surveillance, 
particularly targeted public surveillance and personal data processing. The following 
analyses will also employ the dichotomy of privacy conceptions between a liberal 
approach and a dignity/personality- based approach in targeted surveillance cases in 
the ECtHR.  
Foremost, modern sophisticated surveillance systems in the scenario are heavily based 
on video surveillance. Visual surveillance alone can be used for a variety of purposes 
such as object surveillance and monitoring of a person’s activities, their location as 
well as their behaviour. With the help of analytics technologies and data processing 
the capabilities of surveillance can be extended dramatically: facial recognition, 
automated tracking or behavioural analytics, just to name a few, are capabilities that 
have not much in common with a closed system allowing an observer to technically 
extend her views. This raises the question if visual surveillance in public places in 
Helberg creates fundamental rights issues.  
It is often stated that video cameras in public places would not fall into the scope of 
protection of private life in the ECHR, because of their low level of intrusion, and due 
to the fact that an individual in public is in principle also publicly visible and therefore 
enjoys a lesser expectation and degree of privacy.477 This view will be analysed in 
more detail in the next sections.  
The ECtHR’s case law on images in public spaces started rather early. Already in 
1973, the Commission addressed an application concerning the taking of photographs 
                                                
476 This study limits itself to privacy and data protection and will not discuss further other affected 
rights. For a discussion on the relationship between freedom of expression and opinion and surveillance 
see e.g. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of 
the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue, A/HRC/23/40, 17 April 2013. For a 
sociological analysis of surveillance and the right to assembly see Starr A and others, ‘The Impacts of 
State Surveillance on Political Assembly and Association: A Socio-Legal Analysis’ (2008) 31 
Qualitative Sociology 251. 
477 Herbecq and the Association Ligue des droits de l 'homme v Belgium, (n 421),  94. 
	 148	
during a political demonstration: The applicant took part in an anti-apartheid 
demonstration during which she was restrained by the police, photographed against 
her will and asked for her identity. The applicant also claimed that the police created 
a file containing her picture in order to ‘deter [her] from participating in similar 
demonstrations again’.478 The Commission found that this could not be viewed as an 
interference with her private life, because a) her home was not entered for the purpose 
of taking photographs, b) she voluntarily took part in a public event, and c) because 
the photographs ‘…were taken solely for the purpose of her future identification on 
similar public occasions and there is no suggestion that they have been made available 
to the general public or used for any other purpose.’479  
Similar findings were made in another case concerning the use of photographs for 
identification purposes in criminal investigations against people allegedly involved in 
squatting. The fact that the police used photographs from the applicant’s driving 
license application and from pictures taken during previous arrests for the 
investigation did not amount to an interference of art 8. 480  The Commission 
emphasized that the way in which the photos were taken was not intrusive and that the 
photographs were kept in police archives, only used for the criminal investigation, and 
not disseminated.481 
In 1995 when the Commission adopted its report in the Friedl Case, it elaborated but 
upheld its previous argumentation regarding the intrusiveness of images taken in 
public places. The case concerned political protests organized by a working group at 
Vienna University as a weeklong ‘sit in’ in an underground pedestrian passage in order 
to raise awareness about problems of homeless persons.482  Due to obstruction of 
pedestrian traffic and security concerns, the manifestation was dissolved by the police 
and the participants were ordered to leave the passage. During this sit-in, police 
authorities took pictures and videos of the manifestation, in order ‘…to record the 
                                                
478  X. v the United Kingdom, App no. 5877/72, Decision (Commission) 12.10.1973, applicant’s 
submission, para 1.  
479 Ibid, Commission’s examination, para 2.  
480 Lupker and Others v the Netherlands, App no. 18395/91, Decision (Commission), 07.12.1992, 
Commission’s findings, para 5.  
481 Ibid.  
482 Friedl v Austria, App no. 15225/89, Report (Commission) 19.05.1994, para 15. 
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conduct of the participants in the manifestation for the purposes of ensuing 
investigation proceedings for offences against the Road Traffic Regulations.’483 The 
applicant in the case complained about the taking of images and the recording of his 
personal data by the police.484  
While the Commission was of the opinion that the recording of the applicant’s data 
constituted and interference with art 8 ECHR, capturing and retaining images would 
not fall into its scope.485 The Commission based this opinion on the facts that the 
police took the photographic material in a public place and not in the applicant’s home, 
that the photos were taken in the course of a public event in which the applicant took 
part voluntarily, and that the recordings were  
…taken for the purposes, (…), of recording the character of the manifestation 
and the actual situation at the place in question, e.g. the sanitary conditions, and, 
(…), of recording the conduct of the participants in the manifestation in view of 
ensuing investigation proceedings for offences against the Road Traffic 
Regulations.486  
This seems to suggest that pictures taken in public places fall outside the scope of art 
8 ECHR once their nature is related to public incidents. The fact that personal data is 
processed, however, might change the nature of the images as such as they fall into 
the area of protection of art 8(1) ECHR but the mere taking and retention of 
photographs of the applicant in a public place without processing the imagery e.g. in 
order to identify the individuals in the pictures did not constitute an interference of art 
8.487  
Also, the mere existence of clearly visible surveillance technology did not amount to 
interference into art 8 ECHR. In 1993 in the Hutcheon Case, police authorities erected 
a surveillance tower facing the home of the applicant in Northern Ireland. While the 
applicant believed that her movements were watched and her conversations recorded, 
the Commission did not see sufficient evidence for such allegations and consequently 
                                                
483 Ibid, para 24.  
484 Ibid, para 43. 
485 Ibid, paras 51-53.  
486 Ibid, para 49.  
487 See Friedl v Austria, (n 482). The case was struck from the list and settled between the applicant 
and defendant, see Friedl v Austria, App no. 15225/89, Judgment (Court), (Struck out of the List), 
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regarded those claims as unsubstantiated. The Commission consequently did not find 
any interference of the surveillance tower with the applicant’s home, communications 
or private life – and noted that even if there was an interference, those would be 
justified under art 8(2) ECHR.488  
The view that visual surveillance technology in public spaces would not per se 
interfere with a right to privacy was reconfirmed in a decision on the absence of legal 
regulation of unrecorded public video surveillance in Belgium. In Herbecq and the 
association “Ligue des droits de l'homme” v Belgium, the applicants claimed that the 
lack of legal regulation of public video surveillance in Belgium constitutes a violation 
of the right to private life in art 8 ECHR, because  
…it is impossible for people subject to such surveillance to know when it is 
occurring what means of challenging it they have, and to whom to address 
themselves where they suspect that they have been subjected to such 
surveillance.489  
Due to this uncertainty, individuals might change their behaviour in public places. 
Additionally, the applicants claimed that such surveillance might even be suitable to 
capture personal information or certain personal behaviour, which the individual 
might not have wanted to disclose to anybody.490 
The Commission did not follow this argument and decided that there has not been any 
interference into the scope of article 8, since unrecorded video surveillance is not 
suitable for obtaining permanent information about individuals. The Commission 
argued that ‘…the data available to a person looking at monitors is identical to that 
which he or she could have obtained by being on the spot in person’ and that 
‘[t]herefore all that can be observed is essentially, public behavior.’491  
The argument that the mere presence of public visual surveillance systems which do 
not retain images or process personal data does not constitute an interference with art 
8 (1) ECHR was again brought up in Peck v UK: The case concerned the applicant’s 
attempted suicide in public, which was prevented by the police. Later, after the 
                                                
488 See Hutcheon v the United Kingdom, App no. 28122/95, Decision (Commission), 27.11.1996, ‘the 
law’ para 1.  
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490 Ibid, para 94. 
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incident, the video images immediately following the suicide attempt, which were 
captured by a surveillance camera, were broadcast on a TV channel.492 Although the 
applicant challenged the publication of the video material, but not the video 
surveillance as such, the Court restated its criteria developed in the findings in Friedl 
and Herbecq. Essentially three questions were important for the findings: Firstly, how 
far do visual images taken in a public space interfere with a person’s privacy? 
Secondly, do the visual images have a public or private nature? And thirdly, was the 
material obtained ‘…envisaged for a limited use or was likely to be made available to 
the general public’?493 While there was no interference in Friedl and Herbecq due to 
the lack of intrusion into the private sphere and the lack of personal data retention, in 
Peck v UK the publication of the visual material amounted to a serious interference 
into the private life of the applicant.494  
Read the cases together, the ECtHR has developed a distinction that separates ‘normal’ 
visual surveillance from a certain form of sophisticated public surveillance which 
processes personal data. Furthermore, the purpose, nature and circumstances of the 
visual surveillance play a decisive role in determining a possible interference. In the 
Peck-case, for example, the Court explicitly noted that although the suicide attempt 
was conducted on a public road, the applicant could not foresee the surveillance or the 
publication of the material, and neither was he participating in a public event, let alone 
could he be considered a public figure.495 
Consequently, interference of visual surveillance of an individual in public places into 
the ECHR’s scope of private life was determined considering the following specific 
elements: Firstly, the individual’s expectation of being subject to surveillance and how 
far the individual can foresee possible consequences of the surveillance,496 secondly, 
the nature and role of the subject of surveillance: was the applicant for example a 
public figure? Thirdly, the nature of events under which the public surveillance takes 
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495 Ibid, para 62. 
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place and if the applicant was e.g. taking part in a public event e.g. a demonstration.497 
Fourthly, the retention of personal information and processing of such data and if data 
was retained and used for identification of persons,498 and fifthly, considering the 
design, purpose and intention of the visual surveillance, e.g. purely monitoring objects 
for security purposes.499  
Additionally, the Court and the Commission have developed another element 
addressing the expansion of the scope of art 8 ECHR into the public sphere: the right 
to personal identity and to develop relationships with other human beings – also in a 
public context.500 The Court held that ‘[t]here is therefore a zone of interaction of a 
person with others, even in a public context, which may fall within the scope of 
“private life”.’501 Targeted surveillance in a public place, once this has an effect on 
persons developing their identities, might therefore constitute an interference. This 
argument boils down to the question if the intensity of surveillance has any effect on 
the ability of a person to form relationships or develop an identity and has therefore a 
direct connection with mass surveillance. The right to develop relationships with the 
outside world will be discussed later in this study. 
The ECtHR in its case law developed a twofold opinion on visual public place 
surveillance. On the one hand, it distinguishes between an inner circle (home, private 
life and secluded spaces) and takes into account different individual expectations 
depending on the space in which an individual is situated. On the other hand, the Court 
constructs the right to form personal relationships in order to expand the right to 
private life into the public sphere. 
This applies however, only with respect to the taking of imagery from a public place. 
The retention of personal data, permanent surveillance records or data processing have 
always been considered to fall into the scope of article 8 ECHR. In Leander v Sweden, 
which addressed a secret police register containing security relevant information about 
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individuals, both the retention and the release of such information interfered with art 
8 ECHR.502 Also, the creation of records through wiretapping and storing of phone 
calls from and to private homes and business premises constituted interferences.503 
Consequently, all kinds of records and personal data, even when obtained from public 
areas or held and processed by public authorities fall into the scope of private life in 
article 8.  
Article 8 ECHR additionally covers location tracking and the subsequent creation of 
location databases. This includes GPS surveillance504 as well as data bases retaining 
travel activities within a member state. 505  Subsequently, all elements including 
targeted visual surveillance, location tracking, monitoring of social interactions and 
communications, and data collection, retention and processing fall into the scope of 
art 8(1) ECHR.  
With this, targeted surveillance of individuals in public spaces interferes with 
fundamental rights. However, it is interesting that the focus in finding interferences 
with a person’s privacy in public appears to rely on information collection and 
therewith conceptually on informational privacy. At least in its early case law, the 
ECHR system seemed to support a perspective in which the amount of privacy granted 
to individuals is less in the public context, particularly when they voluntarily and 
actively participate in public life. This hints towards an understanding of privacy 
which is based on individual choice and individual freedom – and therewith on an 
individual’s privacy expectations. The following section will address this argument in 
more detail.  
 
3.1.1.1 Reasonable	Expectations	of	Privacy	in	Public	and	the	ECHR	
Some concepts which grasp privacy in public rely on the idea of ‘reasonable 
expectations of privacy’. This means that the grade of protection for individual privacy 
in the public sphere somehow depends on an individual’s perception of privacy. 
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According to that view, an individual can expect less privacy when sojourning on a 
public road than sitting in one’s own bathtub at home. As discussed in section 2.2.7 
above, this is based on very specific theoretical conceptions of privacy. But in how far 
do such conceptions influence the ECtHR’s understandings of a fundamental right to 
privacy in public places?  
When addressing such issues, the ECtHR frequently resorted to a formulation of a 
legitimate expectation of privacy test in public. In the P.G. and J.H. v UK, the ECtHR 
stated that  
[t]here are a number of elements relevant to a consideration of whether a 
person’s private life is concerned by measures effected outside a person’s home 
or private premises. Since there are occasions when people knowingly or 
intentionally involve themselves in activities which are or may be recorded or 
reported in a public manner, a person’s reasonable expectations as to privacy 
may be a significant, although not necessarily conclusive, factor. A person who 
walks down the street will, inevitably, be visible to any member of the public 
who is also present. Monitoring by technological means of the same public scene 
(for example, a security guard viewing through closed-circuit television) is of a 
similar character. Private-life considerations may arise, however, once any 
systematic or permanent record comes into existence of such material from the 
public domain.506 
Some scholars argue that the first appearance of an individual expectation reasoning 
influencing fundamental rights protection in Europe was the Lüdi Case decided in 
1992.507 Mr. Lüdi, who allegedly tried to sell 2kg of cocaine to an undercover police 
officer, was unsuccessful in his complaint of a breach of art 8 ECHR. The applicant 
particularly challenged, firstly, the employment of an undercover officer who engaged 
in a personal relationship with him and secondly, that the undercover officer had used 
technical devices in order to record conversations and intrude into the applicant’s 
home.  
The Court regarded the fact that the applicant engaged in such criminal activity as 
reason enough to not find a violation:  
Mr Lüdi must therefore have been aware from then on that he was engaged in a 
criminal act punishable under Article 19 of the Drugs Law and that consequently 
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he was running the risk of encountering an undercover police officer whose task 
would in fact be to expose him.508  
This can be interpreted that the applicant enjoyed a lesser expectation of privacy 
because he engaged in criminal activity.  
In wording, the ECtHR used the ‘reasonable expectation’ – formula for the first time 
in the Halford-case.509 The background of the case were the repeatedly unsuccessful 
applications for a higher-ranking position by the applicant, who was the most senior 
female police officer in the UK at that time. Ms. Halford hence started a complaints 
procedure against several superiors as she suspected gender discriminatory reasons for 
the repeated rejections of her applications.510 During the investigation, the applicant’s 
workplace phone was intercepted in order to allegedly obtain information about Ms. 
Halford to be used against her in the discrimination proceedings.511 The Government 
argued that Ms. Halford would not have had a reasonable expectation of privacy at her 
workplace and that employers should be able to monitor calls made on work-phones 
by their employees and that henceforth the interception would fall outside the scope 
of protection of art 8 ECHR.512  
The Court disagreed with that view and stated that both private but also business 
premises as well as correspondence can fall into the scope of art 8 ECHR and that Ms. 
Halford very well ‘…had a reasonable expectation of privacy for such calls…’ 
especially considering the fact that she was additionally told she could use her work-
phone for private purposes and for purposes of working on her discrimination case.513 
The Court furthermore found a violation of art 8 ECHR because the interception of 
her office phone was not in line with the legality requirement of art 8 (2) ECHR.514  
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This means, however, that the court at least partly based its assessment of whether Ms. 
Halford had such a reasonable expectation on the possibilities she had to subjectively 
expect an interception of her phone. Gómez-Arostegui rightly wonders if the Court’s 
assessment would have been different if Ms. Halford had been informed about the 
possibility of workplace communication interception beforehand. 515  In any case, 
albeit responding to the Government’s argument of reasonable expectation, the case 
gives little detailed guidance as to how exactly a reasonable expectation test for art 8 
ECHR would look like. It also should be noted that it would have not been necessary 
for the Court to actually engage in that argument, as it did establish the interference 
without actually resorting to Ms. Halford’s expectations.516  
A similar argument was brought forward in a more recent case concerning the 
surveillance of communication at the workplace: in Copland v UK, the Court found a 
violation of art 8 ECHR as the monitoring of the applicant’s phone and e-mail 
communications as well as internet activity fell under the scope of article 8 and were 
not in accordance with domestic law.517 While the Court, for the first time, included 
e-mail communications and internet usage into the scope of article 8, it also stated that 
the applicant had a ‘reasonable expectation as to privacy’ as she was not warned that 
her office calls, internet usage and e-mails might be monitored.518 
The Court, however, specified its view on ‘reasonable expectation’ in 2001 in P.G. 
and J.H. v UK.519 The Court stated that ‘…a person’s reasonable expectations as to 
privacy may be a significant, although not necessarily conclusive, factor’ and 
connected the individual’s expectation to the public place:  
A person who walks down the street will, inevitably, be visible to any member 
of the public who is also present. Monitoring by technological means of the same 
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public scene (for example, a security guard viewing through closed-circuit 
television) is of a similar character.520  
The background of the case concerned police investigations into a planned robbery of 
a money transport during which the police secretly recorded the applicants’ voices in 
a police station in order to compare them to audio recordings obtained from a listening 
device installed in an apartment – which was considered to be an interference into the 
right to private live and a violation of art 8 as it was not in accordance with the law.521 
It is remarkable that the Court summarized its jurisprudence mentioning the 
reasonable expectation test in this judgment – especially as it based the interference 
foremost not on a reasonable expectation test, but on the fact that the secret voice 
recordings at the police station established permanent records of personal data.522 
Gomez-Arostegui rightly asks how the two different arguments - the legitimate 
expectation of privacy by the applicant and the processing of the applicant’s personal 
data – relate to each other.523 If joint together, this would mean that the processing of 
personal data such as video or audio recordings in a public place becomes an 
interference only in relation to the individual’s expectation that her data was being 
processed, retained and used. One could, however also argue the contrary, namely that 
personal data protection works independently from one’s personal expectation and 
that legitimate expectation in public places are only a part of the Court’s general 
assessment of interferences per se.  
Reading between the lines of P.G. and J.H. v UK, it appears that the Court was rather 
careful with the introduction of a general legitimate expectation test for privacy cases. 
In fact, in the 2003 Perry case, the Court referred to P.G. and J.H. noting that ‘[a] 
person's reasonable expectations as to privacy is a significant though not necessarily 
conclusive factor.’524 The Perry case, as discussed above, concerned the manipulation 
of a video camera in a police station in order to obtain better images from a suspect. 
While the Court again emphasized that the manipulation of a normal surveillance 
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camera and use of records in an identification procedure could not been expected or 
foreseen by the applicant, it based the finding of an interference on the facts that such 
manipulation created permanent records and constituted the processing of personal 
data.525  
Also, shortly before Perry, in the Peck judgment, the Court partly used what could be 
considered a reasonable expectation of privacy test. As described above, the Peck case 
concerned the publication of video recordings relating to the applicant’s suicide 
attempt in a public space. The Court, after quoting the above mentioned core 
formulation in P.G. and J.H. v UK and therewith once again that ‘…a person's 
reasonable expectations as to privacy may be a significant, although not necessarily 
conclusive, factor’526, established that the disclosure of the video footage amounted to 
an interference with the applicant’s private life.527 The case is somehow special as the 
applicant did neither complain about the video surveillance per se, nor about the 
processed personal data, but merely about the disclosure of the material for media 
broadcasts in which he was clearly identifiable.528 The Court assessed the facts in light 
of the tests established in Lupker and Friedl529, in which the Court weighted an 
intrusion into the inner circle of the applicant’s life, and in that sense if the material 
obtained related to public or private activities or events, if the person concerned was 
a public figure, and if the material was published or disseminated.530  The Court 
concluded that ‘[a]s a result, the relevant moment was viewed to an extent which far 
exceeded any exposure to a passer-by or to security observation (…) and to a degree 
surpassing that which the applicant could possibly have foreseen…’.531 This goes in 
line with the Court’s assessment, that certain individual expectations – expressed 
through the criteria of foreseeability- are part of the Court’s assessment of 
interferences into private life in public places. The Court does however not seem to 
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give too much weight on individual’s expectations or personal choice arguments as it 
regards them as a part of, but not as a fully-fledged argument in the ECtHR’s case 
law.532  
Recent judgments of the ECHR confirm such a reading: in Uzun v Germany, a case 
concerning GPS tracking, the Court, although citing the formulation that a person’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy might be somehow significant, but not necessarily 
conclusive from Perry v UK,533 quickly moved on and established the interference 
merely on the fact that GPS data was collected, processed and retained.534 The Court 
hence did not engage in an argument about the applicant’s reasonable expectation of 
being tracked by a GPS transmitter in public places, but concluded that ‘…the 
applicant's observation via GPS, (…) , and the processing and use of the data obtained 
thereby (…) amounted to an interference with his private life…’.535  
Another significant contribution of the reasonable-expectation argument to the 
Court’s case law, concerns the very classic issues of alleged intrusion into the privacy 
of persons of public interest through the media. In the 2012 von Hannover 2 case, a 
case adressing the publication of images of celebrities in tabloid newspapers, the 
ECtHR recognized the importance of a right to personality. 536  
…[T]he concept of private life extends to aspects relating to personal identity, 
such as a person’s name, photo, or physical and moral integrity; the guarantee 
afforded by Article 8 of the Convention is primarily intended to ensure the 
development, without outside interference, of the personality of each individual 
in his relations with other human beings.537  
Consequently, interactions with others, and the development of one’s own personality 
fell into the protected sphere of private life. Here, also photographs fell into the 
protective scope, although they were taken in public places and concerned a person of 
                                                
532 Gomez-Arostegui, however, established an argument about how the Court could use a reasonable 
expectation of privacy test as a future benchmark for its case law. See Gomez-Arostegui HT, ‘Defining 
Private Life Under the European Convention on Human Rights by Referring to Reasonable 
Expectations’ (2004-2005) 35 California Western International Law Journal 153.  
533 Uzun v Germany, (n 426), para 44, Perry v the United Kingdom, (n 524), para 37.  
534 Ibid, paras 49-53.  
535 Ibid, para 52.  
536 Von Hannover v Germany, App no. 59320/00, Judgment (Court) 24.06.2004; Von Hannover v 
Germany (no. 2), App nos. 40660/08, 60641/08, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 07.02.2012.  
537 Von Hannover v Germany (no. 2), ibid, para 95.  
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public interest.538 The Court gave significant weight to the importance of images 
because they were 
…one of the chief attributes of his or her personality, as it reveals the person’s 
unique characteristics and distinguishes the person from his or her peers. The 
right to the protection of one’s image is thus one of the essential components of 
personal development. It mainly presupposes the individual’s right to control 
the use of that image, including the right to refuse publication thereof.539  
In case of questions addressing the publication of images, the ECtHR regarded it as 
important to emphasize that persons might have a certain legitimate expectation of 
privacy protection although they were persons of public interest.540  
In cases concerning the publication of information on persons of public interest, a 
legitimate expectation of privacy therefore plays a role in ECHR case law when 
assessing whether a lack of protection from the publication of personal information 
constitutes a violation. Here, legitimate expectation is employed in order to balance 
the interest of the individual against a public interest and the freedom of expression. 
Nevertheless, in the von Hannover cases the ECtHR has also stressed individual 
personality rights as constituting the essence of a right to private life, and therewith 
appears to apply a privacy conception based on personality and dignity. At the same 
time, however, it employed the individual expectation of public figures, an argument 
that can be associated more with a liberal individual-centric conception of privacy.   
This is not surprising considering the closely related natures of the von Hannover cases 
and other cases relating to the dissemination of information on public figures, and the 
conception of privacy as a right to be let alone by Warren and Brandeis. In fact, on a 
closer look, Warren and Brandeis derive the right to privacy partly also from the 
construction of an individual’s inviolate personality.541  
It is interesting to note that the ECtHR here uses the term ‘legitimate expectation’ 
when assessing an individual interest in public figures when challenging image 
publication, however, it has otherwise mostly used the term ‘reasonable expectation’ 
                                                
538 Ibid; see also Petrina v Romania, App no. 78060/01, Judgment (Court), 14.10.2008, para 27.  
539 Von Hannover v Germany (no. 2), (n 536), para 96; Reklos and Davourlis v Greece, App no. 
1234/05, Judgment (Court), 15.01.2009, para 40.  
540 Von Hannover v Germany (no. 2), (n 536), para 95; Von Hannover v Germany (no. 3), App no. 
8772/10, Judgment (Court), 19.09.2013, para 41.  
541 See Warren SD and Brandeis LD, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1890) 4 Harvard Law Review 194.  
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when addressing public surveillance systems. While it is not entirely clear if and how 
the Court distinguishes those two formulations, one possible explanation might be that 
‘legitimate’ expectation might have a closer judicial connection, e.g., whereas 
‘reasonable’ might have closer societal component.  
It can hence be concluded that, although the reasonable expectation of privacy can be 
considered a part of the Court’s analyses of privacy intrusions in the public sphere, it 
does not appear to function as a predominant argument in the Court’s case law 
addressing public surveillance. Particularly regarding targeted public visual 
surveillance, the Court has recently put more weight on the assessment of the 
collection, retention and processing of personal data rather than on individual’s 
expectations when it comes to privacy in public places.  
The legitimate expectation test within the ECHR framework for public place 
surveillance is problematic, which is reflected in the cautious approach taken by the 
Court. It plays a role up to a certain extend and with relevance to a certain type of 
cases, but it has not become a standard test, regularly applied by the ECtHR. 
Hence, while one can argue that the expectation of a person in a public space matters 
for the assessment of whether there has been an interference or not, the expectation as 
such has not played such an important role and it remains unclear as to how exactly a 
legitimate or reasonable expectation test functions coherently in ECHR cases.  
Reasonable, or legitimate expectations of privacy by individuals might however, be 
taken into account in concrete cases as part of a larger assessment scheme. This means 
that when assessing targeted visual surveillance through highly sophisticated 
surveillance systems as in the Helberg scenario, the Court would most likely find an 
interference taking into account the following factors:  
Firstly, the discussion above suggests that the ECtHR would consider the design and 
purpose of the surveillance system in question. Why was it installed, and what is its 
general purpose? Is it a ‘normal’ security system that merely monitors places for a 
specific purpose? Or does it enable indiscriminate surveillance? Here, the technical 
sophistication of the visual targeting capabilities will play a role as well as the purpose 
restriction. It is however, not clear how the Court would value technical sophistication 
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as such. It might certainly lay weight on the system’s capabilities to process personal 
data.  
Secondly, as outlined above, the ECtHR might take into account the foreseeability and 
transparency of the visual surveillance system and its capabilities. This might reach 
from an assessment of the design of the system to questions of visibility, labelling, 
public warnings or even general knowledge about the system. This might also include 
the question of how far an individual could foresee and expect a certain kind of 
surveillance, including its consequences and hence take into account the reasonable 
expectation of individuals.  
Thirdly, the Court might consider the nature of the events and the nature of 
surveillance in the individual case, for example, was the person under surveillance 
participating in a public event or alone at night in a parking lot. At least in the past, 
the Court has made such distinctions. 
Fourthly, the nature and situation of the applicant as a person might also play a certain 
role, although this is does not appear too relevant concerning police surveillance.  
Fifthly, as already indicated, and as will be discussed in the following section, it may 
play a decisive role how personal data of surveillance subjects are processed and 
retained.  
Sixth and finally, the accessibly to surveillance data, their possible disclosure or 
publication may also be important factors for the Court when assessing whether an 
interference into art 8 (1) ECHR is established through targeted visual surveillance in 
a possible Helberg case. 
3.1.1.2 Covert	and	Overt	Public	Surveillance		
As mentioned above, targeted surveillance of individuals is often conducted directly 
by police authorities within criminal investigations. Public surveillance systems with 
a certain degree of sophistication might hence be very useful within a targeted police 
operation. One further question when assessing visual surveillance in public places is 
the question about a distinction between two design features of surveillance systems: 
secret and hidden systems on the one hand, and visible and open surveillance systems 
on the other.  
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Usually, covert surveillance is distinguishable from overt surveillance simply through 
knowledge of an individual about being subject to surveillance. Consequently, some 
police operations which target a specific suspect might, by their nature, be covert 
operations. How far does such hidden, or unforeseeable surveillance give rise to 
interferences with the right to privacy enshrined in the ECHR?  
The ECtHR dealt with questions of targeted secret surveillance in a variety of contexts. 
Perry v UK, for example, concerned targeted secret visual surveillance of individuals. 
The case originated in criminal investigations into several counts of robbery against 
the applicant during which he was brought to a police station. While passing through 
the custody suite at the stations, the applicant’s images were captured by a surveillance 
camera, which was previously manipulated to obtain better and clearer images so that 
those images could be shown to witnesses to identify the suspect.542 Unlike  
…the normal use of security cameras per se whether in the public street or on 
premises, such as shopping centres or police stations where they serve a 
legitimate and foreseeable purpose…543  
the surveillance images in the Perry case constituted an interference with art 8 ECHR. 
The Court reasoned, firstly, that the manipulation of the camera, together with the 
compilation of images and the subsequent use of the material in criminal investigation 
and proceedings, constitutes the collection and processing of personal data and 
therewith an interference with art 8 ECHR.544 Secondly, the Court emphasized that 
while the camera as such was visible to the applicant, he could not have known of the 
technical alterations and subsequent use of the material obtained.  
Whether or not he was aware of the security cameras running in the custody 
suite, there is no indication that the applicant had any expectation that footage 
was being taken of him within the police station for use in a video identification 
procedure and, potentially, as evidence prejudicial to his defence at trial. This 
(…) went beyond the normal or expected use of this type of camera, as indeed 
is demonstrated by the fact that the police were required to obtain permission 
and an engineer had to adjust the camera.545  
                                                
542 See Perry v the United Kingdom, (n 524), paras 39-41.  
543 Ibid, para 40.  
544 Ibid, para 41.  
545 Ibid.  
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This can be seen as an indication of the Court’s critical view towards targeted secret 
surveillance. It appears that a ‘normal’ security camera as such, with a ‘legitimate and 
foreseeable purpose’ would not raise concerns within the ECHR. However, the 
moment that footage is somehow altered, targeted or directed towards an individual 
without the individual having any expectations of being targeted, fundamental rights 
issues arise. The Court here used two parallel arguments: Firstly, it used the argument 
of legitimate expectation as discussed above. Secondly, it conditioned the question 
when visual surveillance becomes an interference with rights in the Convention on the 
processing of personal data.  
Legitimate expectation hence plays a decisive role in distinguishing covert and overt 
surveillance in public places. Taking into account the efficiency, technical 
functionality and sophistication of surveillance systems today, it will be difficult for 
the Court to not find an interference with Convention rights. In that connection, it 
might be wise to view modern video surveillance systems per se as an interference – 
especially considering the fact that modern surveillance systems rarely work without 
certain forms of personal data processing.  
Another important problem arising from the distinction between covert and overt 
surveillance is the question of legal safeguards and public scrutiny. The ECtHR has 
pointed out on several occasions, that secret surveillance comes with a high risk of a 
lack of control, judicial review and safeguards. Such a risk of power abuse hence 
required that ‘…domestic law provides adequate protection against arbitrary 
interference with Article 8 rights.’ 546  Any police action conducted in secrecy 
consequently demands for a sufficiently clear legal base, adequate authorization and  
…must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give individuals an adequate 
indication of the circumstances and conditions in which public authorities are 
entitled to resort to such covert measures.547  
Consequently, targeted secret surveillance in public places can be regarded as 
interference into art 8 ECHR and therefore requires being in line with the legitimacy 
                                                
546 See Uzun v Germany, (n 426), para 63, see also, Amann v Switzerland, (n 503), paras 76-77; Bykov 
v Russia, App no. 4378/02, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 10.03.2009, para 76; see also Weber and 
Saravia v Germany, (n 419), para 94; Liberty and Others v the United Kingdom, App no. 58243/00, 
Judgment (Court) 01.07.2008, para 62. 
547  See Khan v the United Kingdom, App no. 35394/97, Judgment (Court), 12.05.2000, para 26; 
Taraneks v Latvia, App no. 3082/06, Judgment (Court), 02.12.2014, para 87.  
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mechanisms provided in the Convention.548 Nevertheless, it is not entirely clear how 
the Court would assess visual surveillance per se – as it has in the past relied more on 
either the processing of data, or monitoring of communications in order to establish 
interference in complex targeted surveillance cases.  
If such standards were to be applied to a targeted covert police operations, it is clear 
that such operations would require a clear legal basis. There would therefore need to 
be a sufficiently clear and accessible law regulating targeted covert operations, 
including the use of surveillance technologies. The problem here is that there appears 
to be a significant difference in the requirements for techniques of targeted 
surveillance on the one hand, and mass surveillance technologies used for targeted 
surveillance on the other. While traditional targeted surveillance techniques appear 
limited in their effect, mass-surveillance technologies, although they are used for 
targeting a single person at a particular moment, have in principle unlimited 
surveillance capabilities. Mass-surveillance technologies therefore tend to have a 
greater effect on fundamental rights protection of communities, while purely targeted 
technologies have such effects on a more limited number of persons. This will be 
discussed in more detail further below.  
In order to fulfil the legality requirement, the law regulating such operations needs to 
be ‘…sufficiently clear in its terms to give individuals an adequate indication of the 
circumstances and conditions in which public authorities are entitled to resort to such 
covert measures’549  
It is difficult to see how these quality and clarity requirements can be fulfilled when, 
for example, the general capabilities for surveillance are kept secret, or the law does 
not specifically deal with the targeting capabilities of surveillance systems. While 
naturally covert and overt surveillance operations require some distinction regarding 
fundamental rights assessments, due to the technological nature of surveillance 
systems and surveillance techniques, it becomes increasingly difficult to legally 
separate targeted and mass surveillance operations. In this context, setting a lower 
fundamental rights threshold for visible surveillance systems than for targeted covert 
                                                
548 Klass and Others v Germany, (n 423), para 41. 
549 Khan v the United Kingdom, (n 547), para 26; Taraneks v Latvia, (n 547), para 87. 
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surveillance operations would not take into account the evolving surveillance 
technological capabilities of security systems.  
 
3.1.2 Personal	Information	and	Surveillance	
Personal data plays a more and more important role in everyday life and has therewith 
an enormous effect on surveillance and security applications. In fact, all information 
about individuals in digital form qualify as personal data. Personal data has been 
defined as information relating to an identified or identifiable individual, essentially 
since the beginnings of data protection regulation.550  It goes without saying that 
modern surveillance systems, especially when they are applying certain analytics 
software, will inevitably create and process personal data. In that regard, public 
surveillance as pictured in the Helberg surveillance scenario will create personal data 
in many forms, and modern surveillance systems have capabilities to create a holistic 
and real time digital information profile about a person. While the regulation of data 
processing is not a new phenomenon, data protection has recently gained prominence 
as being understood increasingly as an essential fundamental right.551 A fundamental 
rights analysis of targeted surveillance systems therefore requires a closer look at data 
protection as a fundamental right in Europe.  
There are several aspects in the scenario of particular relevance for data protection. 
Firstly, mostly all computer technology and all types of sensors produce data, for 
example the digital visual images from a video surveillance camera which are stored 
on a hard drive.  
Secondly, data production is often an unintended by-product of computer 
technology. 552  Card payments, mobile phone usage, and social media activities 
amongst many others, produce a vast amount of information. The primary purpose of 
such data collection and retention is not surveillance, but to enable the technology or 
                                                
550 See e.g. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Guidelines Governing 
the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flow of Personal Data, 23 September 1980, 
https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofper
sonaldata.htm#recommendation accessed 20 February 2017, 1. a); CoE Data Protection Convention, (n 
299), Art 2 (a); Directive 95/46/EC (Data Protection Directive) (n 305), Art 2 (a). 
551 See Section 2.3 above.  
552 See Schneier B, Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect your Data and Control your World 
(W.W. Norton 2015).  
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service to function. Similarly, a smart meter measuring the precise consumption of 
electricity does not only record electricity consumption for the energy company, but 
it allows also for extensive individual profiling and the analysis of life-patterns. Data 
that was created as a by-product to a certain service can be used as surveillance data. 
Thirdly, data is always of different qualities and types. There is, for example a clear 
difference between personal data relating to an individual, a large data base or ‘big 
data’. While big data bases are useful for large scale analytics, e.g. information on 
rush hour traffic flows, individual or personal data contains very specific information 
on single individuals.  
In that regard, public surveillance would be unthinkable without the use of 
sophisticated data collection, data retention, and the employment of analytical tools. 
Modern surveillance accumulates and integrates data through a large variety of sensors 
and tools in order to search, sort, and filter information useful for particular 
surveillance purposes. Data from a large variety of sources can be employed for 
surveillance practices. For example, camera surveillance can be connected with 
mobile phone location data or information gathered from social media. German police 
forces have used surveillance technologies to collect mobile phone meta data around 
a political demonstration for the purpose of the identification of suspects - leading to 
debates about the possible repressive effects of such surveillance measures.553 Data 
collected from mobile phones allowed the collection of location and communication 
data of all individuals present within a certain radio cell at a given time.  
Social media data can as well play an important role in public place surveillance. 
During and after the so called ‘2011 London Riots’, a series of protests leading to 
violent riots and looting after the police shot a Tottenham resident in August 2011, 
security authorities used social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter in order to 
identify participants in the riots, both by analysing visual data found on social media 
and by publishing images of perpetrators. Social media data intelligence consequently 
                                                
553 See SPIEGEL Online, Demo in Dresden: Polizei wertete Tausende Handy-Daten aus, 19.06.2011, 
http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/web/demo-in-dresden-polizei-wertete-tausende-handy-daten-aus-a-
769275.html accessed 2 November 2015; Meister A, Funkzellenabfrage: Die millionenfache 
Handyüberwachung Unschuldiger. Netzpolitik.org, 21 December 2012, 
https://netzpolitik.org/2012/funkzellenabfrage-die-millionenfache-handyuberwachung-unschuldiger/ 
accessed 2 November 2015.  
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can play an important role in all kinds of criminal investigations as well as it can be 
used for political repression.554 In both examples, data produced in non-surveillance 
contexts played decisive roles in public place surveillance techniques.  
There are many other examples in which data from a variety of different sources could 
be used and integrated into complex surveillance operations and in comprehensive 
surveillance systems. The analyses of data streams in order to predict criminal activity 
and even terror attacks, for example, have been debated in 2011 after WikiLeaks 
released hacked e-mails from the private security company Stratfor, indicating that 
software called TrapWire was employed in two US cities.555 Although the capabilities 
and operational methods of the system are not publicly know, the leaked sources 
indicated that the system employed data from video surveillance streams in order to 
pick out preparation operations for possible terror attacks employing video 
analytics.556  
While large data collection intuitively appears better suited for mass-, and untargeted 
surveillance, targeted individual surveillance requires the detailed analyses of 
information relating to individuals. Targeted data surveillance consequently means 
that information about individuals is collected, retained and analysed. A video 
surveillance system, for example captures visual data from a public place. Once a 
person is clearly visible in the captured video, the video becomes personal data. Once 
that data is stored on a hard drive or analysed somehow, that personal data is stored 
and processed.  
The question which will be addressed in the following sections is how data protection 
can function as a legal argument against mass surveillance practices. It should be noted 
that data protection has a somewhat strange role in surveillance operations: it bridges 
the gap between individual and mass surveillance and it can serve as a separate right 
                                                
554 See Omand D, Bartlett J and Miller C, ‘Introducing Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT)’ (2012) 
27 Intelligence and National Security 801; for a critical analysis and the roles of social media in public 
protest situations, see also Fuchs C, ‘Social media, riots, and revolutions’ (2012) 36 Capital & Class 
383.  
555 See Eijkman Q and Weggemans D, ‘Open source intelligence and privacy dilemmas: Is it time to 
reassess state accountability?’ (2012) Security and Human Rights 285, 295. 
556 See Stanley, J, ‘What to Make of the TrapWire Story?’ ACLU Speech, Privacy & Technology 
Project, ACLU, 14 August 2012, https://www.aclu.org/blog/what-make-trapwire-
story?redirect=blog/technology-and-liberty-free-speech-national-security/what-make-trapwire-story 
accessed 3 November 2015.  
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in Europe in order to cover cases which are problematic to be addressed with an 
argument based on a right to privacy. Of particular importance is the nature of the 
European legal space regarding the protection of personal data as it combines two 
fundamental rights protection regimes that have jointly, but also independently 
developed data protection as a fundamental right: the ECHR and the EUCFR.  
3.1.2.1 The	Definition	of	Personal	Data		
Personal data protection concerns the regulation of information on individuals. The 
definition appears rather clear and is defined in the basic legal sources on data 
protection in Europe.557 Article 2 a) of the 1981 CoE Data Protection Convention, for 
example defines personal data as ‘any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable individual ("data subject")’.558 The EU Data Protection Directive defined 
personal data as ‘…information relating to an identified or identifiable natural 
person,’559 with the addition that  
…an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in 
particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors 
specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social 
identity.  
In the GDPR (as well as in the new Police Directive), personal data is defined in the 
same way but with a slightly modified explanation of an identifiable person:  
“personal data” means any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be 
identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such 
as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one 
or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, 
economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person;560 
In the context of public mass surveillance, this distinction is of great relevance because 
not all data collect from a public environment fall into the category of ‘personal’ data. 
At first sight, non-personal data appears not relevant for the purpose of surveillance. 
Data on the temperature on a square, for example, will hardly be controversial from a 
                                                
557 It should be noted that the scope of application of the EU data protection sources in particular is 
limited to the scope of EU law, excluding especially national security and policing issues. This is 
discussed in more detail in Section 3.2.3.4 below.  
558 Art 2(a) CoE Data Protection Convention, (n 299). 
559 Direct Directive 95/46/EC (Data Protection Directive) (n 305), Art 2 (a).  
560 Art 4 (1), Regulation (EU) 2016/679, (GDPR), (n 303); Art 3(1) Directive (EU) 2016/680 (n 303). 
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fundamental rights perspective. Similarly, information about how many cars are lining 
up at which point in what direction, or the number of persons in a specific space at a 
certain time might not qualify as personal data in the respective definitions as personal 
data requires a connection or a relation to a natural person. Yet, such data might gain 
some relevance once it can either be related to a single natural persona, or if the overall 
data collection has an effect on individuals or groups of persons. The question in 
context of public surveillance is, of course, what data would qualify as personal data 
in the surveillance scenario and would therewith fall into the material scope of data 
protection in Europe.  
What qualifies as ‘information’ in the context of data protection regulation has been 
extensively discussed561 and guidance can be found in the opinions562 of the Article 
29 Data Protection Working Party’, a EU advisory body on data protection issues 
established through article 29 of the 1995 EU Data Protection Directive. According 
its opinion on the concept of personal data, the nature of information relates to both 
objective information, such as ‘person A is now walking on street X’, but also 
subjective information on persons such as opinions or abilities, e.g. ‘person B is really 
good at skateboarding’.563 The Art 29 Working Party explicitly assumed that visual 
and audio data can contain personal information and therewith qualify as ‘personal’ 
data.564 Also, the 1995 EU Data Protection Directive contains a direct reference to the 
processing of audio and visual data:  
 …given the importance of the developments under way, in the framework of 
the information society, of the techniques used to capture, transmit, manipulate, 
record, store or communicate sound and image data relating to natural persons, 
this Directive should be applicable to processing involving such data.565 
                                                
561 See e.g. Lloyd IJ, Information Technology Law (6th edn, Oxford University Press 2011), 39-60, 
Bainbridge D, Introduction to Information Technology Law (6th edn, Longman 2008), 505, 506.  
562 Especially Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (Art 29 WP), Opinion 4/2007 on the concept 
of personal data, 20 June 2007, 01248/07/EN WP 136, 
 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wp136_en.pdf accessed 10 October 
2016.  
563 Ibid, 6-8.  
564 Ibid, 7-8.  
565 Recital 14, Directive 95/46/EC (Data Protection Directive) (n 305). See also Article 33 thereof.  
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It is therewith clear that surveillance data cannot be excluded from the scope of 
protection of EU data protection law simply because the processed information comes 
from public spaces or is available freely to anybody.  
Additionally, certain types of analytics require the use of information that qualify as 
personal data: biometric data, for example, has a special character. A facial profile 
constitutes personal data as such, but also enables linking certain other types of 
information to an individual for example the whereabouts of person A. In a similar 
way to fingerprints or DNA profiles, personal information is used to create links 
between persons and objects.  
The Art 29 WP Opinion on the concept of personal data distinguishes here between 
extracting information from individual tissues and the samples as such: human tissue 
samples as such are not considered personal data, however, the extraction of 
information and storage in profiles, is.566 Therewith, the use of personal information 
from public individual surveillance falls into the category of personal information, 
both for the Council of Europe and for the EU framework.  
The second question important to the definition of personal data is the meaning of the 
relational element in the definition. Information ‘relating’ to individuals evidently 
requires some connection between the information processed for public surveillance 
and a natural person. The relation between individual and information can be of a 
direct nature such as ‘person A on camera 1 has dark hair’ or of an indirect nature, e.g. 
‘the car causing the accident at place x had the number plate XYZ-123, and XYZ-123 
belongs to person A’. In some cases, the indirect relation is not that obvious and can 
be problematic, as for example traffic flow data could be understood as somehow 
relating to each single individual participating in the respective traffic. For 
clarification, the Art 29 Working Party issued a document on data protection and RFID 
tags in 2005 in which it proposed the following definition:  
                                                
566 See Art 29 WP, Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data, (n 562), 9. On tissue samples, see 
also Council of Europe, Recommendation No. Rec (2006) 4 of the Committee of Ministers to Member 
States on research on biological materials of human origin, of 15 March 2006; and Recommendation, 
CM/Rec(2016)6 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on research on biological materials 
of human origin, 11 May 2016.  
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Data relates to an individual if it refers to the identity, characteristics or 
behaviour of an individual or if such information is used to determine or 
influence the way in which that person is treated or evaluated.567  
In its further elaboration, the Art 29 WP suggested a ‘three alternative elements’- test 
in order to determine if data relates to an individual. According to this test, the relation 
should be established with reference to ‘content’, when the information is directly 
about someone, with reference to ‘purpose’, when the information contains the 
purpose to somehow evaluate or influence a person, or with reference to ‘result’, when 
information is likely to have a certain impact on a person’s rights and interests.568  
Consequently, data in a public surveillance scenario generally can be considered to be 
related to persons when they contain information about somebody (Person A is 
carrying a pink bag), when the information is used to influence or evaluate a person 
(collection of arrival times of employees via facial recognition), or if the result of data 
processing has an impact on a specific person (collection of mass traffic data impacts 
traffic flow regulation with the result that person A at location X has to wait longer).  
A third important term in the definition of personal data, both in the EU as well as the 
CoE frameworks, are the criteria of ‘identification’ and ‘identifiability’. Identification 
can be described as distinguishing a person from another using specific criteria or 
characteristics unique to that person. Information about a person therefore either 
clearly identifies an individual (e.g. a name, birthdate etc.) or enables the identification 
of an individual by using further means.569  
Discussions around the issue of identification of individuals are strongly 
interconnected with technological progress and the actual capabilities to identify 
somebody using data processing. The 1981 Explanatory Report on the CoE Data 
Protection Convention stated that ‘“[i]dentifiable persons” means a person who can 
be easily identified: it does not cover identification of persons by means of very 
                                                
567Art 29 WP Working document on data protection issues related to RFID technology, 19 January 
2005, 10107/05/EN WP 105,  
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2005/wp105_en.pdf accessed 13 October 2016, 8.  
568 Ibid 8-11.  
569  See e.g. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Council of Europe, Handbook on 
European Data Protection Law (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 39; 
Bygrave LA, Data protection Law: Approaching its Rationale, Logic and Limits (Kluwer Law 
International 2002), 43.  
	 173	
sophisticated methods.’570 This conception stems from an understanding that the more 
complex processing is, the harder it will be to identify a person. With increasing 
processing power this reading can only be seen as a misconception:571 More recent 
data protection documents contain different definitions: According to the 1995 EU 
Data Protection Directive, ‘…account should be taken of all the means likely 
reasonably to be used either by the controller or by any other person to identify the 
said person’572 when interpreting identifiability. The GDPR states:  
…account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as 
singling out, either by the controller or by any other person to identify the 
individual directly or indirectly. To ascertain whether means are reasonable 
likely to be used to identify the individual, account should be taken of all 
objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time required for 
identification, taking into consideration both available technology at the time of 
the processing and technological development.573  
This means that both direct information about an individual (name), as well as indirect 
information about individuals, where a unique combination of information or 
indicators can lead to identification, qualify as personal data. It is worth pointing out 
that ‘reasonable likelihood’ is a determining factor for identifiability in both the 1995 
Directive and the 2016 Regulation and that technological capabilities play an 
important role in the EU data protection framework. Such definitions also consider 
the facts of technological progress and advancing capabilities through which today’s 
unidentifiable data may be made identifiable tomorrow.  
This is of high relevance for public surveillance practices. Data such as, for example, 
video stream of a public place captured from a distant perspective might fall outside 
the scope of data protection laws because low image quality defies individual 
identification. There is however no guarantee that future technologies will not make 
it possible to extract and process further information from such material than what can 
be done today.  
                                                
570  CoE Explanatory Report to the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Strasbourg, 28.1.1981, para 28  
571 This argument is made by Bygrave LA, Data protection Law: Approaching its Rationale, Logic and 
Limits (Kluwer Law International 2002), 43 
572 Recital 26 Directive 95/46/EC (Data Protection Directive) (n 305). 
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Following such a conception of identifiability, data obtained through surveillance 
technology is highly likely to qualify as personal data, therewith triggering the 
respective protective mechanisms. This includes direct information about persons but 
as well a variety of data that relate to persons and theoretically allow their 
identification. In determining identifiability, however, probability, capability and 
necessary efforts should be taken into consideration. Consequently, a wide variety of 
data which falls into that category can be taken from a public space: physical features, 
behaviour, personal profiles, location data, communications data and generally 
indicators that can be linked in order to target and distinguish individual person in 
public environments.  
The following section will now move on towards a brief discussion of general data 
protection principles and their relation to urban public place surveillance.  
3.1.2.2 The	General	Principles	of	Data	Protection	
Data protection is a complex legal field and attempts have been made to distil and 
distinguish several core principles of data protection which are more or less contained 
in legal documents regulating data protection. 574  Principles in that sense can be 
understood as abstract legal rules which exercise a certain form of normative force, 
both as ‘guiding standards’ as well as actual rules found in data protection 
regulations.575  
The assumption behind such principles is that personal data processing in principle 
interferes with certain rights and freedoms of individuals. A central element in data 
protection is therefore the general principle of limited collection, retention and 
processing.576 This follows a common understanding that information on individuals 
is problematic per se and should therefore be limited.  
                                                
574 See for example Bygrave LA, Data protection Law: Approaching its Rationale, Logic and Limits 
(Kluwer Law International 2002), 57, see also European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 
Council of Europe, Handbook on European Data Protection Law (Luxembourg: Publications Office of 
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(Duncker & Humblot 2006), 49 and for a more general discussion on the function of data protection 
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(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2002), 85-112. 
575 See Bygrave LA, Data privacy law: An International Perspective (Oxford University Press 2014), 
145 
576 See Gutwirth S, Privacy and the Information Age (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2002), 85. 
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Bygrave established a nuanced catalogue of principles addressing the obligations of 
controllers and data subjects, such as ‘fair and lawful processing’, ‘minimality’, 
‘purpose specification’, ‘information quality’, ‘data subject participation and control’, 
‘disclosure limitation’, ‘information security’ and ‘sensitivity’. 577  The CoE/EU 
handbook on data protection lists similar key principles of European Data Protection 
law which derive both from the Council of Europe and the EU data protection 
frameworks.578 This includes the principle of lawful processing, purpose specification 
and limitation, data quality (relevancy and accuracy), limited retention, fair processing 
and accountability.  
Most of those principles are also enshrined in the legal data protection documents: The 
CoE Data Protection Convention enshrines several principles in its second chapter, 
especially art 5 relating to the quality of data, art 6, which addresses special data 
categories and, art 7, focusing on data security. 579  Also the EU Data Protection 
Directive states that data should be ‘processed fairly and lawfully’, ‘collected for 
specified, explicit and legitimate purposes’, proportionate, accurate and timely 
limited.580 The GDPR explicitly lists ‘lawfulness, fairness and transparency’, ‘purpose 
limitation’, ‘data minimization’, ‘accuracy’, ‘storage limitation’ and ‘integrity and 
confidentiality’ as core ‘principles relating to personal data processing’ in its art 5.581  
Taken together, this means that the processing of personal data comes with strict 
limitations as it is as such an interference with personal freedom and privacy. It could 
be added that some of those principles reflect certain rights of individuals which have 
been expressed and developed in other contexts: the ‘right to informational self-
determination’, the ‘right to be forgotten’ or the ‘right to integrity of information 
technological systems’ are examples of individual rights being reflected by such 
principles. As such, data protection rights and principles are similar in most legal 
documents. Additionally, a variety of them are explicitly articulated as rights: it stands 
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to reason that at least some may compose the very core of a right to data protection in 
the age of information technologies. Several principles appear to be broad and 
indeterminate, while others are rather specific. Within the context of targeted 
surveillance in public places, however, they can contain useful hints establishing the 
requirements for the design and character of such surveillance.  
One, if not the key requirement for processing data in the context of public 
surveillance is lawfulness. It is one of the basic requirements for the legitimation of 
interferences with individual rights in Europe. Within the ECHR, lawfulness is an 
essential component of a permissible limitation test, in which any interference with 
the right to private life is required to be ‘in accordance with the law’.582 Consequently, 
as the processing of personal data has clearly been recognized as an interference with 
Convention rights, processing requires a precise, accessible and foreseeable basis in 
domestic law.583  
Also, the EU Charter of Fundamental rights requires lawfulness as one of the main 
criteria. According to general limitation clause in art 51(1), limitations to the right to 
private life and data protection are only admissible if such limitations are ‘…provided 
for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms.’584 Consequently, the 
Council of Europe Data Protection Convention as well as the EU Data Protection 
Directive and the General Data Protection Regulation contain clauses on lawful 
processing. Both the CoE Convention as well as the EU Directive state that data must 
be ‘processed fairly and lawfully’585, whereas within the scope of the GDPR, personal 
data must be ‘processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to the 
data subject’ (art 5 1) (a)). The GDPR furthermore provides a list of legal bases for 
processing, inter alia by individual consent, contractual necessities or legal 
compliance.586 
                                                
582 ECHR, Art 8 (2).  
583 See e.g. Leander v Sweden, (n 434), paras 49-57, Rotaru v Romania, (n 418), paras 47-63.  
584 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 18.12.2000, OJ 2000/C 364/1, Art 52(1).  
585  CoE Data Protection Convention, (n 299), Art 6, 1) a); Directive 95/46/EC (Data Protection 
Directive) (n 305), Art 5 a). 
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This essentially means that when data is processed within the European legal space, 
this processing requires a legal basis. The way in which such legal basis is established 
and evaluated depends on the processing actor: within a security and surveillance 
context, an adequate legal basis is established by clear and accessible laws, foreseeable 
for the individual and containing adequate safeguards. For private sector data 
processing, lawfulness requires consent or at least certain contractual or legitimate 
interest.587  
It needs to be mentioned that targeted surveillance through police authorities is 
covered by a different data protection framework, especially regarding the EU. While 
all data processing for surveillance purposes of police authorities fall within the scope 
of the ECHR and the CoE Convention 108, such data processing falls within the scope 
of the EUCFR only when EU law is regulating aspects of such actions. This means 
that although police surveillance may fall outside the scope of, for example, the 
GDPR, there may be aspects that are still covered by the EUCFR, as for example seen 
in Digital Rights Ireland, where the CJEU declared the EU Directive obliging Member 
States to ensure the retention of telecommunications meta-data through the TSPs 
between 6-24 month invalid.588 Even more so, as the Lisbon Treaty enabled the EU to 
act within the ordinary legislative procedure also in the area of criminal justice. 
Further EU documents that may be applicable to data protection within a policing 
context are specialized agreements for inter- European police cooperation as well as 
border protection: The Council Framework Decision on the protection of personal data 
in the areas of police and judicial cooperation or the Prüm Convention, but also the 
Schengen Information System II Decision, or the Europol Decisions to name just a 
few.589 Additionally, the EU data protection reforms added the 2016 Directive on data 
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processing by law enforcement authorities, which will replace the Framework 
Decision in 2018.590 
In addition to the applicability of ECHR and Convention 108, the Council of Europe 
also adopted a Police Recommendation that applies to collection, retention and 
dissemination of personal data for police purpose. The preamble of the 
Recommendation advises the implementation of the principles in the convention in 
national legal frameworks.  
Lawfulness therewith can be listed as one of the core principles of data protection, just 
as any other action or measure interfering with fundamental rights in Europe. Public 
surveillance and data processing for surveillance purposes requires an adequate legal 
basis, and surveillance conducted through security and police organizations cannot be 
unlimited and without control.  
Very recently, the EU data protection reform adopted the new GDPR, but also a 
Directive applicable to police and criminal procedures data processing. From the 6th 
of May 2018 onwards, EU Member States will be required to have implemented a new 
Directive regulating data processing in the context of police and security data 
processing.591 This Directive, while very similar to the wording of the GDPR, requires 
compliance with the data protection principles, particularly lawful and fair processing, 
purpose specification, adequacy, and secure amongst some others. 592  The new 
Directive applies to all data processing by authorities for the purposes of ‘…the 
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the 
execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention 
of threats to public security,’593 provided the processing does not fall outside of the 
scope of Union Law.594  
Therefore, it can be assumed that the certain general principles of data protecting apply 
to public sector surveillance, if not as clear cut rules than as interpretative guidance in 
                                                
590 Directive (EU) 2016/680 (n 303). 
591 See Directive (EU) 2016/680 (n 303).  
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fundamental rights cases. The following section takes a closer look at the ECHR and 
the ECtHR’s use of data protection in targeted surveillance cases.  
3.1.2.3 Data	Protection	in	the	Scope	of	the	ECHR	
One of the first ECHR article 8 cases on privacy already dealt with the collection and 
retention of personal data. X v UK, as already discussed above, dealt with the taking 
of images of a participant at a political demonstration.595 According to the applicant’s 
statement, pictures of her were taken against her will by the Hampshire police. 
Additionally, the police allegedly added the applicant’s personal information to the 
image, including name and birthdate in order to keep a file for future reference.596 The 
Commission, at that time, did not discuss the issue of data collection, but focused on 
the taking of an image of the applicant and found that this did not fall into the scope 
of art 8 because the photographs were related to a public incident.597  
Later, in 1979, the Commission decided on the admissibility of an application 
regarding the continuous surveillance and supervision of an applicant by the Vienna 
Security Police Department. The surveillance came to light in the course of criminal 
trials following an anti-fascist demonstration at the University of Vienna in which the 
applicant was acquitted of all charges. The collected data used in the proceedings, 
however, listed several whereabouts and participation in youth camps and political 
activities in which the applicant had been involved since he was seven years of age.598 
The applicant therefore claimed that this close supervision through the Vienna 
Security Police department interfered with his private life, freedom of movement and 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion as well as right to peaceful assembly.599  
The Government responded that the data collected was purely ‘…administrative data 
… that might admit of a conclusion as to a political motivation...’ of the applicant.600 
The Commission addressed the question whether the information collection by the 
police and their submission to the court in the criminal proceedings could be seen as 
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an interference with private life in article 8(1) ECHR, however, left the question 
unanswered as it regarded it justified within article 8(2) ECHR.601 The Commission 
found the interference with the applicant’s private life justified as being in accordance 
with the law, necessary in a democratic society for the prevention of crime, although 
it left open the question if that particular issue of data collection really fell into the 
scope of article 8.  
Later on, however, it became clear that data protection would become included in the 
scope of private life in article 8 (1) ECHR.  
In X v Germany, the Commission found that personal data held and recorded by the 
police and subsequently used in criminal proceedings constituted an issue of data 
protection, ‘…which comes within the broad scope of Article 8…’.602 The case again 
concerned a police report used in proceedings which consisted of files containing the 
applicant’s name as well as copies of personal documents. Furthermore, the file was 
retained for several years by the police. While the Court considered the use of such 
files in the court proceedings to be justified, it concluded that the existence of such 
files was a data protection issue and that data protection as such fell within the scope 
of article 8.603  
As discussed in Section 2.3 above, states started to use data more and more efficiently 
for administrative purposes in the early days of information technology and it didn’t 
take long until the ECtHR had to decide on cases regarding the scope of the ECHR 
and the practices of collection and retention of information about citizens.  
In a complaint against a public census in the UK in 1981, the Commission regarded 
the fact that individuals were obliged to answer questions including personal 
information such as gender, marital status and birthplace amounted to a prima facie 
interference with article 8(1).604 However, the Commission considered the application 
as manifestly ill-founded as interferences through such censuses were considered to 
be necessary in a democratic society for the purpose of economic well-being, due to a 
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common practice in the Member States and due to need for such information for state 
administrative purposes, provided that the information is kept secured and 
confidential.605  
Although censuses as well as data bases for administrative purposes therefore fall into 
the scope of protection of article 8(1) ECHR and have been regarded as interfering 
with respective rights, such limitations are often found permissible pursuant to the 
requirements of legal basis, legitimate aim and necessity in a democratic society.  
Police registers, investigations, government registries and censuses were therewith the 
first issues through which data protection entered European Convention of Human 
Rights case law. Furthermore, the ECtHR held already very early on that what is today 
often referred to as communications ‘meta-data’ clearly falls into the scope of article 
8 and constitutes an interference into the right to private life:  
In the 1984 Malone case, one of the two questions relating to audio and 
communications surveillance by the police in the course of criminal investigations 
against Mr Malone, a former antique dealer suspected of handling stolen goods, was 
that the police obtained such data from the telecommunication provider, the Post 
Office at that time.606 The so called ‘metering’ of a phone involved a ‘meter check 
printer’, a device which registered all dialled numbers, as well as call time and 
duration, on a landline phone.607 The Government in the Malone case made the claim, 
that because it had not directly monitored the content of communications but only 
communications meta-data, the retention of such data would not be an interference 
with private life pursuant to article 8 ECHR.  
While the Court accepted a distinction between the direct interception of 
communication and the collection of meta-data, it did not follow the Government’s 
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view.608 Such meta-data, according to the Court, ‘…contain information, in particular 
the numbers dialled, which is an integral element in the communications made by 
telephone.’609 Therewith, meta-data collection clearly constituted an interference with 
article 8 and because of insufficient legal bases for that practice, the Court found that 
the metering constituted a violation.610  
The Malone case is remarkable in the sense that although the Court directly dealt with 
the collection and retention of personal communications data, it did not yet emphasize 
the data protection aspects of the case. Communications interception was therefore 
not seen as an issue of data protection, but an issue of interference with private life 
and correspondence. Nevertheless, it shows that data protection goes hand in hand 
with other issues in the ECHR and that the ECtHR already early on interpreted the 
scope of private life and correspondence rather wide.  
Another remarkable aspect in the case was the concurring opinion of Judge Pettiti, 
who took a very strong argument in favour of a different, more data-protection centred 
perspective on the case. He especially emphasized the threats deriving from states and 
governments and their temptations to analyse and process the lives of European 
citizens and build profiles of individuals by employing more sophisticated 
technologies. Especially with a reference to computer processing Judge Pettiti 
emphasized with remarkable foresight the need to establish and ensure strong judicial 
review procedures addressing issues of over intrusive data collection, retention and 
processing.611  
One of the most important early cases paving the way for the inclusion of data 
protection as a separate issue into the scope of protection of private life in article 8 
was the 1987 Leander judgment. 612  The case concerned a carpenter who was 
employed as a naval museum technician in Sweden, however, later, his employment 
was revoked as he had not passed a required personnel security check. The naval 
museum was attached to a military base and parts of the museum were located in 
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access sensitive areas. Therefore, employment at the museum required passing a 
security clearance procedure.613  
For this purpose, the National Police Board’s Security Department held a secret police 
register containing information about the private lives of individuals. The applicant in 
the case could not obtain any detailed information about the information retained 
about him and contested the fact that he was classified as a ‘security risk’ and 
therewith excluded from being employed in the museum.614  
The Court concluded without much elaboration that a secret police register containing 
personal data of individuals held by a government authority falls into the scope of 
article 8 and had to be regarded as an interference into Leander’s private live.615 
Retention and release of personal information and the refusal to allow the applicant to 
review such data amounted to an interference with article 8.616 The safeguards built 
into the Swedish personnel control system were, however, found to be sufficient to 
satisfy the requirement of article 8 (2) ECHR in the case.617 Additionally, the ECtHR 
also held that it did not matter how or even if the collected and retained data was used: 
the mere retention already qualified as an interference.618  
A core element of targeted public surveillance through technological systems is the 
existence of reference data bases. Reference data bases are important, because they 
enable the identification of individuals out of a pool of a vast variety of other 
individuals in public. For example, the employment of facial recognition technology 
in order to identify a suspect after a crime recorded on CCTV on a public place 
requires the existence of a reference data base containing facial profiles together with 
the name of a person, her residence, birthdate etc.  
Data bases are therefore crucial to targeted public surveillance, and lie at the very core 
of operating targeted surveillance in a public place. Consequently, state authorities 
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often operate data bases containing information going far beyond the mere registration 
of citizens for administrative purposes.  
One of the more recent cases addressing fundamental rights compatibility of such an 
extensive surveillance data base was Shimovolos v Russia. The case addressed the 
retention of personal information about travel movements of the applicant in a so-
called ‘surveillance database’ under the category of ‘human rights activists’ in the 
context of the May 2007 EU-Russia Summit in Samara.619 The applicant’s personal 
data was entered into the data base and he was detained by Russian authorities in order 
to prevent him from participating in political activities around that event. 
Consequently, the applicant complained that his registration in such a database merely 
for alleged public and political activities, leading to the detailed monitoring of his 
travel movements by the police, interfered with his rights guaranteed by article 8.620 
This interference, so the applicant, had not fulfilled the requirement of legality because 
the creation of the database was based on unpublished ministerial orders.621  
The Court followed this argumentation and held that there has been a violation of 
article 8. Firstly, the creation of a government database containing movements of the 
applicant clearly fell into the scope of article 8(1) and constituted an interference.622 
Secondly, particularly the fact that the legal foundations of establishing the database 
were secret and that there was a lack of public scrutiny and adequate safeguards led 
the Court to conclude that the interference was not justified and failed the requirement 
of legality.623  
Similarly, the ECtHR also found a violation of article 8 in a 2014 case concerning the 
registration of offenders in a database.624 From the beginning, it was not contested in 
that case that the French system for processing recorded offences (‘système de 
traitement des infractions constatées’, STIC)625 constituted an interference into private 
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life.626 Furthermore, it was considered clear that this interference served a legitimate 
aim and that the legal basis was sufficient for the Court to see the legality criteria 
fulfilled.627 However, particularly the lack of possibilities for the applicant to get the 
data deleted, paired with the long retention of the data for 20 years or more, led the 
Court to find that the state did overstep its margin of appreciation as the measure was 
not proportionate.628 
Consequently, data bases and records about persons in the hand of security authorities 
require clear and strict compliance with the European fundamental rights systems, and 
particularly the ECtHR has exercised close scrutiny over government data collection 
and retention practices.  
The collection and retention of personal data by state authorities therefore clearly falls 
into the scope of private life in article 8. However, do then all the pieces of information 
collected and processed by state authorities trigger article 8 ECHR?  
It is clear today that databases containing personal information about individuals fall 
into the scope of article 8, however the ECtHR has also stressed the fact that this data 
should be of a certain quality in order to produce effects on privacy. In its early cases, 
especially Friedl and Peck addressing visual surveillance629 the Commission and the 
Court took into account the specific backgrounds of the retention, its context and 
specific implication and especially the way that the data was obtained.  
What is remarkable in that context, is the move towards data protection arguments 
rather than establishing the interference into private life through public surveillance 
per se in the Peck case. While referring to Lupker, Friedl and Herbecq630, all cases in 
which the court did not find that visual public surveillance constituted an interference 
into the rights established in art 8, the ECtHR stressed that the fact that the applicant’s 
image data in Peck v UK were recorded and disseminated constituted a serious 
interference with private life.631 This finding relied heavily in the fact that personal 
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data was disclosed and the court also stressed that the retention of personal data, even 
from a public context, in that case went beyond the mere ‘…exposure to a passer-by 
or to security observation … and to a degree surpassing that which the applicant could 
possibly have foreseen…’632  and therewith has to be regarded as establishing an 
interference.  
A similar line, but even a much stronger data protection perspective was taken up by 
the Court in Amann v Switzerland and in P.G and J.H. v UK: in the latter recording of 
audio data in a police cell and subsequent processing of such data was considered an 
interference with article 8 because it constituted a permanent record. In the former, 
phone line tapping led to the creation and retention of data in a file, which was 
subsequently considered to be an interference. 633  Similarly, the collection and 
retention of data in repositories by security and intelligence services constituted 
interference with private life in article 8, even without employing covert data 
gathering.634 In Amann v Switzerland the ECtHR also invoked the 1981 Council of 
Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data and particularly its definition of personal data as ‘…any 
information relating to an identified or identifiable individual’ in article 2.  
Another essential case in which the Court addressed issues resulting from surveillance 
and data-collection is the 2000 Rotaru v Romania Judgment. 635  The applicant 
proceeded against the Romanian state authorities in order to get certain rights fulfilled 
which he was seeking as a person persecuted by the former communist regime in 
Romania.636 During those proceeding, the state employed (false) information about 
the applicant as evidence which were obtained by the Securitate, communist 
Romania’s former Department of State Security and which were transferred into the 
possession of the Romanian Intelligence Service (RIS). The fact that the RIS was 
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holding information about the applicant which were partially false was considered a 
violation of article 8 ECHR as such practices did not fulfil the legality requirement.637  
The Court referred to Leander v Sweden when finding that secret government registers 
as well as the transfer of personal information fell within the scope of article 8 ECHR 
and cited Amann v Switzerland to re-emphasize the relevance of the 1981 Council of 
Europe Data Protection Convention.638 While the Government claimed that certain 
information about the applicant, which related to the applicant’s engagement in 
political activities and publications, would not fall within the scope of private life of 
article 8 as they would relate to the applicant’s public life and therefore per se did 
constitute public information,639 the Court explicitly rejected that view. In fact, so the 
Court  
…public information can fall within the scope of private life where it is 
systematically collected and stored in files held by the authorities. That is all the 
truer where such information concerns a person's distant past.640 
The ECtHR followed up on such interpretations in its P.G. and J.H. v UK Judgment 
in which it, as discussed above, stated that privacy rights can very well be applicable 
within a public sphere.641 This is essential for the analyses of data collection and 
retention of data from public areas: once data collection, retention and processing 
becomes systematic, it will be difficult to exclude such data from the scope of 
protection of private life in article 8 ECHR.  
Subsequently, data protection plays an increasingly important role as a legal argument 
in the Court’s findings. The right to private live and subsequently a right to data 
protection as included in the scope of article 8(1) ECHR, however, are not absolute 
rights. Their interference can be justified by applying the Convention’s permissible 
limitations tests.  
Data protection within the ECHR framework also addresses several further aspects 
relating to the nature and way of data collection and processing, some of which are of 
                                                
637 Ibid, paras 62, 63.  
638 Ibid, para 43; Leander v Sweden, (n 434), para 48, Amann v Switzerland, (n 503), para 65.  
639 See Rotaru v Romania, (n 418), para 42.  
640 Ibid, para 43.  
641 See P.G. and J.H. v the United Kingdom, (n 500), para 56. 
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particular importance when it comes to sophisticated surveillance systems controlling 
public spaces.  
Before discussing some of the legal issues arising from data of a certain quality and 
type with special relevance for public surveillance, such as for example biometrical 
data, this section concludes by discussing another landmark judgment on data 
protection within the Council of Europe framework: the 2008 S and Marper v UK 
judgment.642  
The Grand Chamber judgment in 2008 addressed the practice of unlimited retention 
of fingerprints, DNA profiles and cell samples of offenders and suspects in the UK. 
Those records were taken from suspects and retained even if the suspects were not 
convicted. The applicants, which were both arrested but later acquitted, submitted that 
the unlimited retention of DNA profiles, fingerprints and cellular samples violated 
their right to private life.643 The Grand Chamber re-emphasized the importance of data 
protection as an inherent element in article 8 of the ECHR:  
The mere storing of data relating to the private life of an individual amounts to 
an interference within the meaning of Article 8 (…). The subsequent use of the 
stored information has no bearing on that finding (…). However, in determining 
whether the personal information retained by the authorities involves any of the 
private-life aspects mentioned above, the Court will have due regard to the 
specific context in which the information at issue has been recorded and 
retained, the nature of the records, the way in which these records are used and 
processed and the results that may be obtained (…).644 
Subsequently, the Grand Chamber held that both finger prints as well as DNA profiles 
and cellular samples raised issues under article 8 ECHR.645 The unlimited retention of 
this personal data, including the retention of data from people never convicted of any 
crime, clearly overstepped the margin of appreciation the state enjoyed and was 
therefore an un-proportionate interference with the applicants’ private lives and a 
violation of article 8 ECHR.646 This view was reconfirmed in M.K. v France, where 
                                                
642 See S and Marper v the United Kingdom, App nos. 30562/04, 30566/04, Judgment (Grand Chamber) 
04.12.2008. 
643 Ibid, paras 60, 87. 
644 Ibid, para 67. 
645 Ibid, paras 77, 86.  
646 Ibid, paras 125,126.  
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the retention of fingerprints of later acquitted suspects in a computerized police 
database was also seen as a violation.647 
While S and Marper concerned personal data of a certain form, namely fingerprints, 
DNA profiles and cell samples, the argumentation of the case outlines a specific set 
of issues which are of special concern for the ECtHR regarding personal data.  
Firstly, as mentioned above, the mere retention of personal data raises issues of private 
life, however, the Court takes into consideration how and why this information was 
obtained and retained, and what the information as such looks like.648 Furthermore, 
the Court also emphasized the importance of the nature and way of processing such 
data and what consequences such processing may have on an individual. This means 
that the Court recognizes several core principles of data protection as a fundamental 
right that is triggered once any kind of personal information is stored, which the 
ECtHR explicitly derived from legal instruments of the Council of Europe as well as 
the ‘law and practice of the other Contracting States.’649  Core principles of data 
protection hence can be derived also from the Council of Europe Data Protection 
Convention, which lays out particular basic principles regarding the quality of data 
(article 5) special categories of data such as health or origin (article 6), data security 
and additional safeguards (arts 7,8).650 In the S and Marper judgment, the ECtHR 
applied those principles in a consistent way and therewith interprets the Council of 
Europe data protection framework as an important source of European fundamental 
rights.  
Following the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, fundamental right will need to be 
interpreted in connection with existing data protection frameworks when testing a 
possible fundamental rights and data protection compliance of public surveillance 
systems. The following section will now address a couple of specific issues in 
connection with data protection mechanisms in Europe, with special focus on the 
ECtHR. The analysis with references to the surveillance scenario particularly 
                                                
647 M.K. v France, App no. 19522/09, Judgment (Court), 18.04.2013.  
648 See S and Marper v the United Kingdom, (n 642), para 67.  
649 Ibid, paras 106, 107.  
650 CoE Data Protection Convention, (n 299). 
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addresses issues of the systematic collection of data, the quality of urban surveillance 
data as well as the retention of data.  
 
3.1.2.4 Data	Protection	Issues	in	the	Scenario		
Public surveillance, as seen within the scenario, is essentially about the collection of 
information on individuals. Such information can take many shapes. Visual data, for 
example, in the form of a photograph, can be regarded as personal data, although the 
ECtHR addressed the use of photographs in police records long before data-protection 
became an issue within the ECHR. Data protection aspects are therefore difficult to 
distinguish from surveillance issues brought up under the Convention. Visual 
surveillance of a public place can both be an issue falling under the scope of protection 
of private life, or an issue of data protection, once, as argued in Peck, a ‘systematic 
record comes into existence’.651  
With digitization and advancement of technology, everything digital becomes data 
that will be processed in more or less sophisticated ways. It is therefore difficult today 
to draw a clear distinction between data protection and privacy as separate issues 
deriving from article 8 ECHR. Especially regarding government administered 
databanks, repositories and records, data protection is a necessary element in analysing 
fundamental rights issues in that area. This section addresses specific requirements for 
public surveillance deriving from data protection and the analyses of case law of the 
ECtHR above.  
Targeted surveillance in a public context employing electronic surveillance 
mechanisms has become unthinkable without personal data collection. When police 
officers follow a suspect via a video surveillance system, they will watch screens on 
which the suspect is visible to them and as they know the location and direction of that 
camera, they know where the suspect is.  
As discussed above, the mere watching of an individual via electronic means does not 
prima facie raise issues under the Convention, in the same way that police following 
a suspect by foot would not per se be regarded as an interference.652 After all, the 
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collected information appears as part of the public domain and therefore in principle 
visible to all. Additionally, such information does not directly concern the individual’s 
private activities and the individual has a different expectation of privacy. This view, 
however, relies on an understanding of privacy deriving from liberal individualism, in 
which the exercise and enjoyment of rights becomes connected with individual 
expectations and choices. Ultimately, it appears as a choice to enter into the public 
sphere.  
Contrary to such a perspective appear two other arguments which play a crucial role 
in this study: on the one hand, Courts can rely on data protection to find fundamental 
rights problems. On the other hand, Courts can employ dignity and personality to build 
up an argument that understands privacy as an essential element in a free and 
democratic society and in that sense as a communal element of societies. Both are 
especially prone to address issues of systematic surveillance and systematic data 
collection.  
In P.G. and J.H., as cited several times above, the Court stated that privacy life 
considerations rise at the moment ‘…once any systematic or permanent record comes 
into existence of such material from the public domain.’653 This means that if the 
surveilling police officers wrote the name of the abovementioned suspect on a sheet 
of paper, together with the time and place of the whereabouts of the person, private 
life considerations would arise.  
The first conclusion which can be drawn form this is that data protection is a powerful 
argument within the ECHR, one that is more likely to establish an interference than 
the surveillance action as such. Data collection practices therefore can be 
distinguished into several important elements addressed by the ECtHR: systematic 
collection, quality of data and the retention of data.  
3.1.2.4.1 Systematic	Collection	
Systematic collection as such has two distinct features in the context of the 
surveillance scenario. Firstly, targeted surveillance employs and relies on information 
which has been collected and retained previously. Secondly, the targeted surveillance 
operation produces information which will most likely be retained. For example, 
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employing facial recognition technology in Helberg in order to follow a suspect via 
video surveillance requires the existence of a facial profile database. In that sense, 
once an individual is targeted, the reason for targeting that particular person possibly 
derive already from the combination of a series of previously collected information 
sets stored in some database. The existence of such databases containing information 
of individuals has been found to fall within the scope of private life and constitute and 
interference regardless of the use or sensitivity of the information,654 when collected 
from a public context,655 or regardless if the gathering method is covert or overt.656  
It is important to emphasize, that the ECtHR has particularly stated in P.G. and J.H. 
and in the Rotaru judgment that public information as well as information gathered 
from a public domain can very well constitute an interference with private life.657. 
Consequently, databases used for public surveillance purposes, or created from public 
surveillance, need adequate justifications in order to comply with fundamental rights 
set out in the ECHR.  
One of the most relevant issues in relation to sophisticated targeted surveillance in 
public places is the practice of profiling – a consequence of systematic collection and 
processing. Profiled data in itself then can be re-used for more data collection. For 
example, a facial profile reference database can be used for locating a suspect within 
a wide public area employing facial recognition technology.  
The slippery slopes of systematic data collection are obvious and are one of the 
reasons, why the ECtHR laid special emphasis on the problem of the creation of 
systematic data gathering and storing from public places. After all, while for example 
only one piece of information about a person gathered from a public place might not 
be considered to be heavily intrusive - for example that a person bought a can of beer 
at a supermarket – the same information gathered over time – the same person buying 
a can of beer at the same supermarket 8 times a day – will have to be considered more 
                                                
654 See Amann v Switzerland, (n 503), paras 65-67.  
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intrusive as the connection of information becomes data with health relevance. In fact, 
not only does systematic data collection play a crucial role in targeted surveillance 
compliance with fundamental rights, but also the nature and categories of data, 
elements that can be summarized as data quality.  
3.1.2.4.2 Data	Quality	
For the data collected within a public surveillance system to fall within the scope of 
protection of article 8 ECHR, it needs to be personal data as defined in the CoE Data 
Protection Convention.658  
The Court has however considered various types of data and the level of intrusiveness 
which comes with them. In S and Marper v UK, for example, the Court distinguished 
between fingerprints on the one side and DNA profiles and cell samples on the others, 
whereas the latter were considered more intrusive than the former, although the 
collection of both forms of data was considered an interference due to the fact that 
records were created.659 Fingerprints had to be regarded as external features enabling 
individual identification and were therefore considered personal data within the 
context of the ECHR.660 Earlier, though, the Commission found that the taking of 
fingerprints and photos of a criminal suspect after arrest did not amount to an 
interference with the applicant’s right to private life, because the  
…information retained (…) was not of such a character that it could have 
adversely affected the applicant any more significantly than the publicly known 
fact that he had been charged with, but acquitted of, certain charges.661  
This view was refuted in S and Marper, when the Court lifted fingerprints onto the 
same level of protection as visual data and audio recordings. The government argued 
that fingerprints were ‘…constituted neutral, objective and irrefutable material and, 
unlike photographs, were unintelligible to the untutored eye and without a comparator 
fingerprint.’662 The Court, although principally confirming this argument, found an 
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interference with private life because fingerprints can be used to identify individuals 
in many ways, and therefore essentially constitute personal data.663  
Furthermore, data quality also had a significant influence on the ECtHR’s assessment 
as to whether the interference can be justified. Special categories of data, as defined 
in article 6 of the 1981 Data Protection Convention, require strict legal protection 
mechanisms in order to be processed. This applies to data concerning origin, political 
opinion, religion, health, sexual life and criminal convictions and the ECtHR has 
included DNA information and profiles into such sensitive data.664  
Consequently, apart from systematic collection mechanisms, the specific nature of 
data can play a role in the fundamental rights assessment, and particularly 
bioidentifiers such as DNA and biometric data were clear concerns for the Court in 
the S and Marper case. 
Urban surveillance potentially produces a variety of different data. Most relevant in 
that context is location data, communication meta-data, data about an individual’s 
appearance, and biometric data that can be used for identification purposes. Generally, 
the systematic collection of information from individuals in public spaces might allow 
the linking wide varieties of information in order to gather additional data about a 
person’s whereabouts, behaviour or other relevant information. Data analytics can 
allow for individual profiling in an advanced way, and can create specifically sensitive 
information even without the direct collection of such information. For example, 
communication data analytics might reveal sensitive health information, when 
suspects frequently call or visit certain medical specialists, or religious beliefs when 
they frequently visit places of worship. Systematic profiling from data gathered from 
urban surveillance might therefore fall into distinct categories that enjoy special 
protection.  
In that sense, data quality or the nature of data can also change once a temporal aspect 
is added: Data from the past and data gathered over a longer period of time are more 
likely to raise issues under the ECHR, especially when a systematic element is added. 
This was also emphasized by the Grand Chamber in Rotaru v Romania:  
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…public information can fall within the scope of private life where it is 
systematically collected and stored in files held by the authorities. That is all the 
truer where such information concerns a person's distant past.665  
Questions of the nature, scope and especially duration of data retention are therefore 
another relevant element when assessing the compliance of surveillance systems. 
 
3.1.2.4.3 Data	Retention		
A core purpose of targeted surveillance operations is the gathering of information 
about a specific individual. Police authorities keep and preserve specific information 
for a certain purpose, which can reach from retaining very isolated and specific 
information about an individual for the purpose of a criminal procedure to the retention 
of complete personal profiles including for example biometrical data, whereabouts, 
contacts with other individuals, political activities or communications to name just a 
view.  
The ECtHR has been rather sceptical about excessive practices of data retention, 
especially when the information stored is of a high quality and the retention period 
extends beyond a certain threshold. The Court has given special weight to elements 
such as the possible future use and effects of such retained data on individuals. In S 
and Marper, for example, the Court emphasized that it  
…cannot discount the possibility that in the future the private-life interests 
bound up with genetic information may be adversely affected in novel ways or 
in a manner which cannot be anticipated with precision today.666  
Underlying to such an argument is the concern that temporally unlimited retention 
could have serious negative effects on individuals in the future, for example due to 
technological advancements or possible further use and analytics for exiting datasets.  
This aspect is especially relevant when it comes to public surveillance practices. For 
example, a digital photo about a person stored in an administrative register could be 
used to create a digital facial profile with which that person’s location could be found 
employing an automated facial recognition system. Retaining vast facial profile 
databases indefinitely would hence enable a theoretically unlimited automated 
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surveillance of large areas such as whole cities, depending on the infrastructure of 
sensors.  
While it is clear that data retention as such does interfere with the rights guaranteed 
by article 8 ECHR, unlimited storage is even more difficult to justify. Already the 
1981 CoE Data Protection Convention clearly states in article 5 (e):  
Personal data undergoing automatic processing shall be… preserved in a form 
which permits identification of the data subjects for no longer than is required 
for the purpose for which those data are stored.667  
Consequently, the ECtHR recognized that ‘[t]he core principles of data protection 
require the retention of data to be proportionate in relation to the purpose of collection 
and insist on limited periods of storage (…).’668 In Brunet v France, the Court stressed 
that while the duration of retaining information in an offender database of 20 years 
was limited, there was not a factual possibility to request his data to be deleted, leading 
to the conclusion that the state overstepped its boundaries.669 Similarly, in a case 
concerning the registration of fingerprints for 25 years as a consequence of a minor 
offence (book theft) and no factual possibilities for the applicant to request deletion 
was also found to be a violation of article 8 because France overstepped its margin of 
appreciation.670 
With this, the ECtHR clearly recognizes one of the core principles of data protection: 
namely that data retention should in principle be temporarily limited and purpose 
specific, especially once the data is of a certain quality. On the other hand, there are 
ways in which the retention period of data can be very lengthy. In other cases 
concerning registration of persons in a sex offender data base in France, a data 
retention of 30 years was not considered disproportionate to the pursued aim of 
preventing crime, combating repetition of sexual crimes and enabling a better 
identification of sexual offenders.671 This was especially the case because there were 
adequate mechanisms in place to legally challenge the retention of data as well as the 
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given opportunity to apply for earlier deletion of personal information from the sex 
offender database.672 
It can be concluded that personal data, including biometric information or 
bioidentifiers can legitimately be stored for a very long period of time, provided that 
such retention passes the legitimacy test of legality, proportionality and legitimate 
aim. This has been repeatedly confirmed regarding DNA profiles as well as cell 
samples in the cases of convicts, 673  but has been found to cross the line of 
proportionality once of a too general nature. In case of sexual offenders, the Court 
confirmed even the permissibility of a preventive nature of the measures. 
Nevertheless, once the retention becomes too broad, too long, too unspecified and 
once it lacks adequate safeguard mechanisms, large-scale data retention will be 
difficult to justify from the fundamental rights perspective of the ECHR.  
 
3.1.3 Conclusion	
This section discussed individually focused and therewith targeted surveillance in 
public places. This was approached from two different perspectives: on the one hand 
through legal arguments deriving from a right to privacy, and on the other hand 
through the lenses of data protection. Both, data protection, as well as privacy, derive 
from fundamental rights frameworks protecting a right to private life, the inviolability 
of the home and the privacy of communications.  
Generally, targeted individual surveillance does not appear as a new problem. In fact, 
the surveillance of individuals in both a private and a public context, as well as the 
interception of communications form a rather classic body of fundamental rights case 
law in the ECHR.  
The right to privacy and its application in public spaces appear in two lines of 
arguments. Firstly, privacy in public was understood in relation to the background and 
setting of the individual: in a public place, or as a participant in a public event, it 
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appears that privacy was mostly evaluated by the ECtHR in connection with an 
individual’s expectation, at least in its early case law. Pure observation, the taking of 
images or police surveillance were either not placed within the scope of protection of 
privacy of the ECHR or the interferences were easily justifiable. In that sense, the 
early case law of the ECtHR addressing visual surveillance appear to have a strong 
connection with the legitimate expectation arguments: it was within the realm of free 
individuals to expect and therewith adjust their behaviour in surveilled public 
contexts.  
The second line of argument discussed in this section, was the reasons when public 
surveillance was regarded as a strong interference with individual privacy, namely 
when it could not be expected from the individual to expect surveillance. Cases 
addressing secret surveillance or an unknown manipulation or sophistication of 
surveillance technologies appear to have a stronger interference with individual 
privacy than if surveillance occurs in overt, known and expectable situations. Again, 
a legitimate expectation argument appeared at least to some extend in the egal 
assessments.  
With the emergence of data protection, a different approach to address surveillance 
issues emerges. It is not the surveillance practice as such which is seen as a clear 
interference with individual rights, but the collection of information about individuals. 
With this, the understanding of individual privacy in public places shifts from a 
legitimate expectation approach towards informational privacy. The collection of 
information in itself raises fundamental rights issues.  
The second part of this section therefore discussed data protection as a legal argument 
addressing public surveillance in the scenario.  
Taken together, it becomes clear that the sophisticated surveillance systems in Helberg 
have to be considered as a serious interference with individual fundamental rights. 
This is due to their unforeseeable capabilities on the one hand, and their massive and 
systematic data processing on the other. Those capabilities pose serious threats to an 
individual’s right to privacy and data protection in Europe. Furthermore, the 
technology enables targeting individuals in a systematic way, placing surveillance 
between individually targeted surveillance and mass surveillance. This has a strong 
effect on the assessment of permissible limitations.  
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Articulating data protection as a decisive factor for establishing rights interferences, 
yet has another effect: the processing of personal data somehow bridges the gap 
between individual surveillance and systematic mass surveillance.  
Privacy based on legitimate expectation is applied more easily on individual 
surveillance than on mass surveillance. Data protection, on the other hand, can 
function as an argument without focusing on a single individual’s expectations and 
therewith might be a better legal argument for addressing mass- and systematic 
surveillance.  
Consequently, the next section will turn from targeted individual surveillance towards 





Mass surveillance is a term that has recently gained significant importance in legal 
debates around the world. One of the reasons for this were a series of ‘revelations’ 
about secret US intelligence programmes, showing the existence of a variety of tools 
and surveillance capabilities which were previously only speculated about.674 Those 
large-scale surveillance practices showed the attempt by security and intelligence 
agencies to gain access, retain and analyse massive amounts of communications data 
in order to process and filter information about individuals. 
The existence of ‘big data’ and the availability of large ‘treasure troves’ of data that 
can be used for many purposes is nothing new in the digital age. Technical 
developments have led to the fact that everyday life is accompanied by vast streams 
of information transferred through expanding and highly integrated networks. 
Phenomena like this have been described as the rise of ubiquitous computing and as 
the ‘internet of things’. 675  Networks, data and integrated sensors, have become 
functional elements in modern societies. Today, businesses, administrations and 
governments alike operate with collection, retention, and analytics of vast amounts of 
data. 
In a similar way, modern urban environments have become important sources for such 
information. Traffic, pollution, or customer locations are only a few examples of data 
flows that can play an important role in improving business profit or operating the 
complexities of modern urban spaces and they play an important role in urban public 
mass surveillance.  
Mass surveillance in urban public spaces comes with many promises but also threats. 
On the one hand, the surveillance of public places promises to make them safer, fight 
petty crime, unwanted behaviours and also serious crimes or terrorism. Prevention and 
protection, but also repressive action and investigation allegedly become easier once 
public spaces are monitored. On the other hand, fears of a total control of public 
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spaces, the loss of freedom, the chilling-effects and a forced change of behaviour in 
public can deliver valid arguments against wide scale public space surveillance.  
Mass surveillance, for the purpose of this study shall mean ‘the subjection of a 
population or significant component of a group to indiscriminate monitoring,’676 a 
definition adapted from Privacy International. Consequently, ‘[a]ny system that 
generates and collects data on individuals without attempting to limit the dataset to 
well-defined targeted individuals is a form of mass surveillance.’677 In that sense, this 
study employs a definition of ‘mass surveillance’ on a rather low threshold. The line 
between mass surveillance and targeted surveillance could very well be drawn on a 
higher level, for example where potentially legitimate surveillance of certain groups 
or populations becomes illegitimate due to the mere expansion of scale. Bigo and 
others, for example, rightly argue that while surveillance of categorized groups has 
always been part of liberal societies, it is precisely the scale and the purposes of group 
surveillance which distinguishes police states from democratic ones.678 This study, 
however, sets the threshold for mass surveillance lower: In accordance with the 
definition above, surveillance can be regarded as mass surveillance once it reaches 
beyond the targeted surveillance of single individual or very small group for a 
narrowly defined purpose. 
Once mass surveillance is defined in this way, it is evident that public surveillance 
systems and capabilities in the scenario are mass surveillance systems. Already a 
simple video surveillance system qualifies as a mass surveillance system for the 
purpose of this study because it monitors indiscriminately and without pre-defined 
target.  
This section analyses a couple of distinct legal issues of different categories that come 
with wide scale and systematic public mass-surveillance. Naturally, some of those 
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issues fall into the realm of data protection law and some are better grasped from a 
privacy perspective.  
 
3.2.1 Distinguishing	Mass	Surveillance	from	Targeted	Surveillance	
This study approaches mass-surveillance and targeted surveillance as distinct issues 
deriving from the scenario. This distinction is chosen, because there are separate issues 
from the perspective of a fundamental rights analyses. Mass surveillance is, by its very 
nature, different than targeted individual surveillance. The distinction is clear on first 
sight: While targeted surveillance operates on the basis of a known individual and a 
specific reason for the surveillance, mass-surveillance operates on the bases of 
collecting and analysing vast amounts of information on many individuals. Mass 
surveillance naturally will have similar components as targeted surveillance, however 
it comes with a wider scope.  
Addressing the urban public surveillance scenario as a mass-surveillance issue appears 
more natural than as a targeted surveillance problem. It goes without saying that public 
surveillance systems are usually designed as mass surveillance systems, simply 
because they will inevitably be directed at every person sojourning in the respective 
area. The more proliferated and the more capable surveillance systems become, the 
more they become mass-surveillance systems.  
In order to legally grasp urban surveillance beyond the individual perspective, this 
section tackles some legal issues particularly related to mass surveillance questions, 
although, of course, they are directly related to individual surveillance as such. After 
all, one of the central abilities of sophisticated mass surveillance in urban spaces is 
that a system build for general public surveillance can easily be transformed into a 
highly efficient targeted surveillance system. 
The theft of a purse on the main square of Helberg can serve as a good example of a 
petty crime within an urban public space surveillance context. The surveillance system 
in Helberg might be able to automatically identify pickpocketing by recognizing 
certain specific patterns on a video stream. For this, video analytical software would 
continuously analyse all video material and once as pattern is recognized, the system 
could automatically target the alleged perpetrator.  
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Once the security system targets the perpetrator, other mechanisms can locate the 
place of theft, track the location and movement of the perpetrator and identify the 
perpetrator through facial recognition software. Theoretically some, or even all, of 
those processes might happen fully automatically before a human operator of the 
security system is notified. Later on, after the perpetrator has been identified and 
arrested, the surveillance material can be used as evidence in a criminal trial.  
This example shows, that mass surveillance of public places becomes a targeted 
surveillance issue the moment an identifiable individual is targeted at which time the 
borders between untargeted mass surveillance and targeted individual surveillance 
become blurred.  
Such public surveillance, however, starts off as general surveillance rather than as 
targeted surveillance. This means, that in the first place, every individual in the public 
space is automatically and indiscriminately a subject of surveillance. A video camera 
captures everybody passing by in its field of direction in the same way that other 
surveillance sensors capture data indiscriminately.  
At first sight, the relationship between mass-surveillance and fundamental rights 
appears rather unspectacular. In fact, it is in many ways undisputed that targeted 
surveillance in the same way as mass surveillance falls within the scope of a right to 
privacy in international fundamental rights protection. Yet, there are some issues at 
stake which make it important to distinguish fundamental rights protection of 
surveillance from similar protection from mass-surveillance.  
Firstly, as discussed in the previous section, individual and targeted surveillance 
clearly interferes with a single person’s fundamental right. A citizen in Helberg, for 
example, as a natural person, enjoys respective fundamental rights, including access 
to legal remedies. In mass-surveillance cases, however, accessibility to remedies tends 
to be more complex. Groups of natural persons, organizations or institutions and even 
societies as a whole have a more complicated standing from a fundamental rights 
perspective. Additionally, it might be more difficult for individuals to claim a violation 
of their right to privacy because of a lack of evidence or legal standing of having been 
concretely subject to rights interferences especially when mass-surveillance practices 
are secret.  
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Secondly, the legal claim challenging mass surveillance requires a different and more 
abstract legal argumentation than a claim against individual surveillance. This section 
shows that while individual claims can easily be based on individual freedom and 
liberty, mass-surveillance claims require the construction of a common good or a 
collective end. Judicial decisions in individual surveillance claims require balancing 
individual rights against collective interests, in mass surveillance cases, this balancing 
much more requires the choice of an important good or end for society as a whole. 
This is, once again, heavily dependent on the actual conceptualization of privacy. A 
dignity-based or communal privacy approach conceptually enables the articulation of 
common goods and ends, while an individual liberty centred approach comes with a 
stronger focus on the individual. This section, which employs European fundamental 
rights case law, shows some of the problems that fundamental rights arguments face 
when mass-surveillance is at stake.  
 
3.2.2 Mass	Surveillance	and	Privacy	
Within recent years, the ECHR has addressed a variety of cases concerning 
surveillance, both targeted individual as well as systematic mass surveillance. While 
targeted surveillance has been analysed in Section 3.1, this part shall now look in more 
detail at possible responses to mass surveillance in public places from the perspective 
of the ECtHR.  
There are a number of classificatory problems when analysing the European 
Convention on Human Rights in terms of targeted individual and mass surveillance.  
The first is that the ECtHR has dealt with a variety of surveillance technologies, some 
of which can be categorized as technologies for individual surveillance, some of which 
as more generally mass surveillance systems. While for example a sophisticated 
camera surveillance system is more a mass surveillance instrument than an instrument 
of individual surveillance, a wiretapping system which is only directed at a specific 
person is more suitable to be classified as a tool for individual surveillance. The 
technology employed for surveillance and its specific features and capabilities 
consequently play a significant role in the legal assessment of surveillance. On top of 
the technology as such, the Court has been using data protection arguments in order 
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to address surveillance, posing a specific form of fundamental rights argumentation.679 
The protection of individual rights relating to the collection of personal information 
therewith functions as a bridging mechanism between targeted individual surveillance 
and mass surveillance.  
The second core issues in addressing fundamental rights protection in mass-
surveillance cases is the accessibility of, and legal standing before a fundamental 
rights Court. Admission of a mass surveillance case and establishing an interference 
into a right to privacy require different legal argumentation than in a case addressing 
targeted surveillance.  
 
3.2.2.1 Admissibility	and	Victim	Status	in	ECHR	Mass	Surveillance	Cases	
The legal issue that arises from the classification of surveillance into targeted 
individual and mass surveillance is related to the nature and construction of 
fundamental rights protection in the ECHR per se. After all, the ECHR requires an 
individual or an organization to be a direct victim of a rights violation in article 34 
ECHR in order for the case to be admissible.680 This may be less straightforward when 
considering complaints against mass surveillance systems, particularly where the 
systems as such are kept at least partly secret and where the complainant belongs to a 
group of person only potentially affected by a surveillance regime. The massive 
interception of telephone calls or the bulk collection and retention of personal data 
could create a situation where it might be difficult to determine if a complainant is a 
direct victim.  
The Court, however, has interpreted this admissibility criterion rather broadly. 
Already in the 1978 Klass case, the Court accepted that individuals can claim to be 
the victim of a violation ‘…by the mere existence of secret measures or of legislation 
                                                
679 As discussed in the previous section, the simple fact that personal information is recorded in a 
systematic way raises issued under the ECHR. See Leander v Sweden, (n 434), and S and Marper v the 
United Kingdom, (n 642), para 67.  
680 Article 37 ECHR states that application can be submitted ‘…from any person, nongovernmental 
organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High 
Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto.’ This has been 
interpreted rather broadly and includes international organizations, churches, trade unions and NGOs 
amongst others. See Cameron I, An Introduction to the European Convention on Human Rights (5th ed, 
Iustus 2006), 56.  
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permitting secret measures, without having to allege that such measures were in fact 
applied to him.’681 The Court considered that the existence of a systematic surveillance 
mechanism, allowing for interception of telecommunications and the mail of citizens 
in Germany in itself allowed for the applicants to claim to be victims without having 
to be directly subject to such surveillance themselves.682  
Similarly in Malone, where the Commission and the Court confirmed that the mere 
existence of a law and practice of surveillance and the fact that the applicant belonged 
to a group of person potentially affected by communication interception were 
sufficient for the applicant to be regarded as a victim and to establish an 
interference.683 With this, the Court as well as the Commission addressed potential 
admissibility problems for applicants in case they cannot directly prove having being 
individually targeted and affected by state surveillance. The admissibility of mass 
surveillance cases as such therefore does not necessarily require direct proof of the 
applicant being subject to targeted surveillance, because the mere  
…menace of surveillance can be claimed in itself to restrict free communication 
through the postal and telecommunication services, thereby constituting for all 
users or potential users a direct interference with the right guaranteed by Article 
8.684  
On the one hand, the Convention Organs have therewith addressed mass surveillance 
systems as per se problematic for fundamental rights and given applicants a rather 
easy way to be accepted as victims. On the other hand, however, the ECtHR has also 
sometimes held that the establishment of a status as victim requires at least a certain 
likelihood of being affected by surveillance measures. In this regard, the burden of 
proof can also be with the applicant in some cases, in order to establish what the 
Commission called a ‘reasonable likelihood’ to be subject to surveillance measures.685 
According to this interpretation, the applicant is required to show that she or he was 
affected by surveillance or information collection with a ‘reasonable likelihood’. 
                                                
681 Klass and Others v Germany, (n 423), para 34.  
682 Ibid, paras 37, 38.  
683 Ibid, para 64.  
684 Ibid, para 37. 
685 See Hilton v The United Kingdom, App no. 12015/86 (Commission Decision), 06.07.1988, ‘the 
Law’ 1.2.B. 
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Commission and Court employed this test in a variety of cases that were 
distinguishable from Klass v Germany.  
For example, in Hilton v UK, a case addressing security checks for employment 
reasons, the Commission found no interference with the applicant’s rights enshrined 
in article 8 ECHR because the applicant failed to show that there was ‘…at least a 
reasonable likelihood that the Secret Service has compiled and continues to retain 
personal information about her.’686 On closer reading, the Commission particularly 
interpreted the plausibility of the applicant being subject to secret surveillance and 
data collection due to the fact that she did not belong to a ‘category of persons’ of 
possible interest.687 Such categories have been found to include for example persons 
with political and party activities.688  
In Esbester v UK, a case concerning security checks for employment reasons – the 
applicant was refused a position in the Central Office of Information. The applicant 
claimed that information concerning his private life were collected, retained and 
disclosed by state security organs, however, neither did the Government confirm such 
an allegation nor did the applicant have any detailed insights into how the security 
assessment leading to the employment refusal was carried out and what information 
had been used.689  The Commission, albeit declaring the application inadmissible, 
found that the fact of such a security check being conducted showed with reasonable 
likelihood that some security service compiled some personal information concerning 
the applicant’s private life. 690  Similarly in the case Christie v UK, in which the 
applicant complained against alleged GCHQ interception of Telex communication 
with East European trade unions, the Commission confirmed there was a reasonable 
likelihood that such communication was intercepted. 691  It is remarkable that the 
Government in the case, albeit neither confirming nor denying a possible interception, 
                                                
686 Ibid.  
687 Ibid. 
688 See Redgrave v the United Kingdom, App no. 20271/92, Decision (Commission), 01.09.1993. For a 
further discussion on the case law on that matter see Cameron I, National security and the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Iustus 2000), 98-99.  
689 Esbester v the United Kingdom, App no. 18601/91, Decision (Commission), 02/04/1993.  
690 Ibid.  
691 Christie v the United Kingdom, App no. 21482/93, Decision (Commission), 27.06.1994. 
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did accept that it may have been reasonably likely that communications were in fact 
monitored.  
The ECtHR has also employed the ‘reasonable likelihood’-test to visual surveillance. 
In Hutcheon v UK, the applicant contested the erection of a police surveillance tower 
and complained that her home was subject to visual surveillance as well as that her 
telecommunications were intercepted because her house and garden were in the direct 
vicinity of the tower.692 Here the Commission did not find that Ms. Hutcheon could 
produce enough evidence for it to be reasonably likely for her home and family to 
having been subject to surveillance through the tower.693 Hence, while the ECtHR 
generally has addressed mass surveillance as a general issue, in some cases the 
requirement and burden of proof on the applicant to establish a reasonable likelihood 
can render an application inadmissible.  
In several more recent cases, however, the ECtHR has taken a more critical stand 
regarding the admissibility of cases addressing the existence of mass surveillance 
mechanisms. Weber and Saravia v Germany, for example, addressed surveillance 
competences given to the German Federal Intelligence Agency (BND), the Federal 
Office (and ‘Länder’-Offices) for the Protection of the Constitution, and the Military 
Counterintelligence Service (MAD)694 by the Act on Restrictions on the Secrecy of 
Mail, Post and Telecommunications. This so called ‘G10 Act’ imposed restrictions on 
the secrecy of mail and telecommunication guaranteed by article 10 of the German 
Constitution. 695  The applicants, a German free-lance journalist and a Uruguayan 
National, both living in Uruguay, claimed that the powers given to the Federal 
Intelligence Agency (BND) to monitor communications violated their rights 
guaranteed by article 8 ECHR.696 The applicant contested five measures relating to 
strategic mass monitoring: the use and transmission of data, the transfer and use of 
                                                
692See Hutcheon v the United Kingdom, (n 488). 
693 Ibid, ‘the Law’, 1.  
694  The German names of the intelligence organisations are: ‘Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND)’, 
‘Verfassungsschutzbehörden des Bundes und der Länder’, and ‘Militärischer Abschirmdienst (MAD)’.  
695 Gesetz zur Beschränkung des Brief-, Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnisses, (Artikel 10-Gesetz), 26 
June 2001, BGBl. I S. 1254, 2298; 2007 I S. 154.  
696 See Weber and Saravia v Germany, (n 419).  
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personal data by other security agencies, the destruction of data as well as restriction 
on notification of surveillance measures.697 
The Court took a similar stand as in Klass and Malone and stated that the  
…mere existence of legislation which allows a system for the secret monitoring 
of communications entails a threat of surveillance for all those to whom the 
legislation may be applied. This threat necessarily strikes at freedom of 
communication between users of the telecommunications services and thereby 
amounts in itself to an interference with the exercise of the applicants’ rights 
under Article 8, irrespective of any measures actually taken against them (…).698  
Consequently, the broad authorization for surveillance through the G 10 law was 
considered a clear interference with article 8 of the Convention, however, it was found 
to be justified under article 8(2) in the case. The same formula was used by the Court 
in Liberty and others v UK, a case addressing warrants for mass surveillance of 
international communications from the UK. Here again, the UK government remained 
silent on the matter but accepted that the applicant could be regarded as a victim of an 
interference due to the potential effect of surveillance measures on them.699  
In another claim challenging the compliance of a national surveillance act, the 
Bulgarian Special Surveillance Means Act of 1997, with the ECHR, a human rights 
NGO and a lawyer succeeded with their claim that under the existing laws, they may 
at any time become subject to surveillance measures – without claiming to have been 
directly or indirectly affected by surveillance measures.700 The Court emphasized that 
both an individual as well as a legal person can be threatened by surveillance measures 
and enjoy article 8 protection. Because the applicants did not claim that they had been 
de facto directly subjected to surveillance measures, there was no need to prove a 
‘reasonable likelihood’.701 The existence of legislation enabling secret surveillance 
per se therefore constitutes an interference with article 8 ECHR and the Court did not 
see that this interference was justified in the case.702 
                                                
697 Ibid, para 74.  
698 Ibid, 78 see also Klass and Others v Germany, (n 423), para 41, and Malone v The United Kingdom, 
(n 418), para 64.  
699 Liberty and Others v the United Kingdom, (n 546), paras 56, 57.  
700 Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev v Bulgaria, (n 420). 
701 Ibid, paras 58-63.  
702 Ibid, paras 69-94.  
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3.2.2.1.1 Challenging	Mass	Surveillance	in	abstracto		
Despite of the rather broad approach of upholding potential effects of secret 
surveillance on applicants, the ECtHR also frequently emphasized its general principle 
of denying individuals the right to complain against an existing law in abstracto.703 In 
Kennedy v UK, the Forth Section Court elaborated extensively on its two earlier 
approaches. On the one hand it had allowed for general complaints against 
surveillance regimes in cases where the secret nature of surveillance would bar the 
applicant from proving to be directly affected by surveillance. If applicants were 
barred from challenging secret surveillance regimes, the protected rights in article 8 
(1) ECHR would de facto be nullified.704  
On the other hand, it re-emphasized that in case the actual surveillance of 
communication is merely assumed, there should at least be a ‘reasonable likelihood’ 
of applied surveillance measures to the applicant.705  
Generally, however, ‘…[t]he Court will make its assessment in light of all the 
circumstances of the case and will not limit its review to the existence of direct proof 
that surveillance has taken place given that such proof is generally difficult or 
impossible to obtain.’706  
This created some tension within the Court’s arguments. On the one hand, an applicant 
formally needs to be a victim of a concrete interference and the Court does not see its 
role in examining Member State’s legislation in abstracto. On the other hand, the 
Court has clearly permitted and reviewed complaints in which the applicants did not 
claim to be directly victims of surveillance but merely potentially might have been 
affected.  
The reason for this appears to be the special nature of secret surveillance practices. 
Simply because people don’t know and can’t prove that their rights are being violated 
cannot mean that they don’t have access to the Convention’s complaint mechanism. 
In the words of the Court ‘…where a State institutes secret surveillance the existence 
                                                
703 Kennedy v the United Kingdom, App no. 26839/05, Judgment (Court), 18.05.2010, para 124.  
704 See Klass and Others v Germany, (n 423), para 36.  
705 See Kennedy v the United Kingdom, (n 703), para 123. See also Halford v the United Kingdom, (n 
510), paras 56, 57. 
706 Kennedy v the United Kingdom, (n 703), para 123. 
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of which remains unknown to the persons being controlled, with the effect that the 
surveillance remains unchallengeable, Article 8 (...) could to a large extent be reduced 
to a nullity.’707 
As a consequence, the Court has recently extensively addressed that issue and 
attempted to create a general harmonization of its earlier approaches. In the 2015 
Roman Zakharov v Russia case, the applicant complained that the Russian system and 
practices of mobile phone communication interception would not comply with the 
rights standard of article 8 ECHR.708 Roman Zakharov, an editor in chief in a Russian 
publishing company, complained that the legislation allowing for covert interception 
of mobile phone communications put him at risk of being subjected to such 
surveillance. Hence, Zakharov challenged legislation on the bases of a possibility of 
being subject to the measures rather than as a result of actually being a subject to 
concrete surveillance actions.709 The Court emphasized the article 34 requirement for 
a complainant to be directly affected and be a victim of the challenged measures, 
however, extensively cited the Klass- judgement for justifying that in some situations 
such general challenges of a legislative framework could be permissible.710  
The Court acknowledged that it had developed two approaches for accepting the 
victim status of the applicant. While in some cases the Court found an interference 
because  
…the mere existence of laws and practices which permitted and established a 
system for effecting secret surveillance of communications entailed a threat of 
surveillance for all those to whom the legislation might be applied,  
in other cases, either a ‘reasonably likelihood’ to be affected by concrete measure was 
required, or that  
…the test in Klass and Others could not be interpreted so broadly as to 
encompass every person in the respondent State who feared that the security 
services might have compiled information about him or her.711  
 
                                                
707 Klass and Others v Germany, (n 423), para 36.  
708 See Roman Zakharov v Russia, (n 417).  
709 Ibid, para 163.  
710 Ibid, paras 164, 165.  
711 Ibid, paras 166-169. 
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3.2.2.1.2 The	Victim-Status	Test	
Consequently, in the Zakharov Case, the Court attempted to create a synthesis between 
those different approaches. In fact, the Court referred to Kennedy v UK, where it had 
already partly established a certain harmonization and a general test for admissibility 
and victim status of an applicant in secret surveillance cases.712 In Zakharov, the Court 
re-established a test starting with the scope of the legislation permitting surveillance 
measures:  
Firstly, the Court generally examines the possibility for the applicant to be affected by 
surveillance permitted through legislation either by being a member of a targeted 
group or because the legislation permits indiscriminate mass surveillance.713  The 
victim’s status can therefore be established by plausibility and the possibility of being 
affected.  
Secondly, the Court assesses accessibility and the structure of a possible remedy 
system in the Member State and adjusts ‘…the degree of scrutiny depending on the 
effectiveness of such remedies.’ 714  If such a remedy system is found not to be 
accessible and effective, the applicant is not required to show a risk of being personally 
affected by surveillance.715 This means on the other hand, that if the remedies on the 
national level are found to work effectively, the applicant needs to show at least a 
certain risk of being personally subjected to concrete surveillance measures in order 
to be considered a victim in the case. The reason for this is that the Court regards the 
unavailability of the possibility to challenge surveillance, paired with the secrecy of 
such measures, as suitable to have a strong impact on populations as a whole. Already 
in Kennedy v UK, the Court explicitly noted that  
[w]here there is no possibility of challenging the alleged application of secret 
surveillance measures at domestic level, widespread suspicion and concern 
among the general public that secret surveillance powers are being abused 
cannot be said to be unjustified.716  
                                                
712 See Kennedy v the United Kingdom, (n 703).  
713 Roman Zakharov v Russia, (n 417) para 171.  
714 Ibid, para 171.  
715 Ibid, para 171.  
716 Kennedy v the United Kingdom, (n 703), para 124.  
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Due to establishing a test of admissibility based on the assessment of remedies, the 
Court in the Zakharov case spent much effort testing the structure, availability and 
effectiveness of the Russian remedy system on mobile phone communication 
interceptions.717 In the end it concluded that there had not been an effective remedy 
available to the applicant and that there had been a violation of article 8 ECHR due to 
the ‘…existence of arbitrary and abusive surveillance practices, which appear to be 
due to the inadequate safeguards provided by law (…).’ The Russian law authorizing 
mobile phone interceptions does therefore ‘…not meet the “quality of law” 
requirement and is incapable of keeping the “interference” to what is “necessary in a 




The arguments regarding the victim status test put forward in the Zakharov judgment 
are interesting because they show how the ECtHR attempts to balance its own 
argumentation and forms a coherent test applicable to admissibility and interference 
assessment when cases concerning secret mass surveillance reach the Strasbourg 
Court. Although they are not particularly new, the arguments in the Zakharov case 
sum up, clarify and unite previous case law regarding secret surveillance.  
Article 34 ECHR defines criteria regarding admissibility of individual complaints, one 
of which requires the applicant to be able to claim to be a victim of a violation of rights 
in the ECHR System. Yet, the victim-test set out by the Court in surveillance cases 
connects this victim status not only to an established interference, but also to an 
assessment of the justification of an interference set out in article 8(2), particularly the 
requirement of legality. Following the victim test, the Court needs to take into account 
the possibility of the applicant being subjected to surveillance and the remedies 
available. In line with the Convention’s systematics, however, the existence of 
adequate safeguard and remedies are assessed as part of the legality requirement when 
testing a possible justification of an already established interference in article 8(2) 
                                                
717 Roman Zakharov v Russia, (n 417), paras 286-300.  
718 Ibid, paras 303, 304.  
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ECHR. This means, that admissibility, interference and justification of an interference 
are heavily interdependent in mass surveillance cases. Consequently, in the Zakharov 
judgment, the Court justified the applicant’s claim to challenge the legislative system 
of surveillance authorization as it potentially affects all users of mobile 
communication. Additionally, however, the Court referred to its own following 
assessment of the legality requirement in the case when it found that there is a lack of 
effective remedies in the Russian system. 719 Due to this, challenging the surveillance 
system in abstracto can be justified as an exception to the general principle of 
requiring the applicant to be a direct victim of an interference. Whether the strict 
interdependencies between justification of interference, establishing an interference, 
and admissibility requirements will cause problems for the Court’s argumentation in 
the future remains to be seen. With Zakharov, however, it becomes clear that the Court 
is very well willing to extensively engage with mass-surveillance cases. The most 
challenging ones are yet to be heard.720 Admissibility and interference into rights 
enshrined in the Convention play a crucial role also in case of mass urban surveillance.  
It additionally becomes clear that the Court referred to the abstract threats of mass-
surveillance in order to justify admissibly. Potential fears of population, surveillance 
as a ‘menace’ for society and similar arguments in the cases show that mass-
surveillance requires abstract arguments. It shows, however, that abstract challenges 
of mass-surveillance systems are not barred from being successful.  
The discussion on admissibility and victim status tests showed a general problem with 
challenging mass surveillance cases before Courts: admissibility often depends on a 
burden of proof and a personal affectedness, and both can be challenging arguments 
to make, especially when the capabilities of mass surveillance systems are not 
transparent. The example of the ECtHR arguments in those cases, however, show that 
                                                
719 The ECtHR stated: ‘Furthermore, for the reasons set out below (see paragraphs 286 to 300), Russian 
law does not provide for effective remedies for a person who suspects that he or she was subjected to 
secret surveillance.’ Roman Zakharov v Russia, (n 417), para 176.  
720 See e.g. the pending cases: Centrum För Rättvisa v Sweden, App no. 35252/08, Communicated Case, 
14.10.2014; Big Brother Watch and Others v the United Kingdom, App no. 58170/13, Communicated 
Case, 07.01.2014, Bureau of Investigative Journalism and Alice Ross v the United Kingdom, App no. 
62322/14, Communicated Case, 05.01.2015; 10 Human Rights Organisations and Others v the United 
Kingdom, App no. 24960/15, Communicated Case, 24.11.2015.  
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the Court found ways to not make admissibility become an insuperable barrier for 
challenging mass surveillance.  
	
3.2.2.2 Fundamental	Rights	Arguments	against	Mass	Surveillance	
As has been shown in the analyses of targeted and individual surveillance in section 
3.1 above, many surveillance technologies fall within the scope of the ECHR per se. 
Audio surveillance and communication interception, location data, the collection of 
personal information and also, as shown from the discussion on victim status and 
admissibility above, mass surveillance regimes as such can trigger article 8 issues. The 
remaining question to be discussed is how far highly integrated mass surveillance 
system operating in public spaces as described in the Helberg scenario can give rise 
to article 8 issues.  
 
3.2.2.2.1 Mass	Surveillance	and	the	Scope	of	Privacy	
Mass surveillance systems in public places employ a variety of different types of 
technologies, for example video camera surveillance, tracking technologies or 
analytics software. As discussed above, the ECtHR held repeatedly that, for example, 
camera surveillance used merely for security purposes and observations does not 
constitute an interference with article 8, however, with the caveat that once such a 
surveillance system records and retains personal data, the fact that systematic records 
are used, is enough to amount to an interference with private life in article 8.  
In Herbecq and the Association Ligue des Droits de L’Homme, both a natural person 
and an association challenged the lack of legislation regulating the use of unrecorded 
public video surveillance in Belgium.721 The applicants in the case claimed that the 
absence of legislation would have made it de facto impossible for individuals to 
challenge the use and spread of video surveillance.  
The applicants, however, also challenged unrecorded video surveillance by pointing 
to a potentially negative societal impact. In fact, the applicants employed a chilling-
effect argument in the case:  
                                                
721 Herbecq and the Association Ligue des droits de l 'homme v Belgium, (n 421), 93.  
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Since no one has this information everyone may feel obliged to censor their own 
behavior so as to avoid doing anything or behaving in any way which could be 
interpreted by potential observers using such surveillance equipment.722  
The Commission did not follow this argumentation and held that the application was 
manifestly ill-founded. Firstly, it rejected the view that an association can complain 
against the lack of legal bases permitting public video surveillance in the case. Only 
the first applicant or identified specific victims, but not associations could be subject 
to visual surveillance. Secondly, the Commission re-emphasized earlier case law on 
the use of photographic equipment in finding that visual imagery from public areas as 
such do not amount to an interference with the scope of protection of article 8.723 
Provided that no systematic or permanent record is created, visual surveillance of 
public areas therefore falls outside the scope of protection, although depending on the 
assessment and nature of such images.  
It would most likely however be difficult for the Court to come to the same conclusion 
regarding sophisticated surveillance systems in the scenario.  
Much of the technology employed in Helberg is based on data collection, retention 
and especially analytics. A video surveillance system, for example, which allows 
personal data to be analysed, however, clearly falls within the scope of protection of 
the ECHR. After all, sophisticated technological surveillance capabilities such as 
tracking an individual’s movements, the identification of behavioural patterns, or 
predictive analytics touch the essence of privacy as a right enshrined in its various 
forms. 724  Furthermore, sophisticated capabilities in Helberg include extensive 
monitoring and surveillance of individuals and groups and allow for the efficient 
control of vast spaces.  
Already potential mass surveillance capabilities of such sophisticated surveillance, 
might lead the ECtHR to the conclusion that such surveillance per se constitutes 
                                                
722 Ibid, 94.  
723 See discussion on Friedl v Austria, (n 482), and Herbecq and the Association Ligue des droits de l 
'homme v Belgium, (n 421) above. 
724 For a more detailed discussion on prediction see Section 3.4 Automation and Prediction.  
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interference with a right to private life in article 8 ECHR even if a possible applicant 
could not directly prove to be subject to concrete targeted surveillance.725  
In that case, a person walking on a public place might very well argue that the 
existence of such sophisticated surveillance capabilities per se interferes with several 
of her rights enshrined in the Convention. After all technology is way more advanced 
than what a simple security guard present at that place might be able to discern.  
The Court employed the Kennedy and Zakharov cases admissibility test also in a 
recent judgment. In the early 2016 judgment Szabó and Vissy v Hungary, the Court 
found that Hungary’s secret anti-terrorism surveillance legislation was in breach of 
article 8 ECHR because the measures were broad and there were no adequate 
safeguards in place preventing abuse of the surveillance system.726 The applicants 
were staff members of a politically active NGO and due to that, claimed to be more 
likely affected by article 8 interferences through broad surveillance competencies 
given to anti-terrorism policing.727 The Court however, stated that while it may have 
been important to consider certain special issues relating to politically active NGOs, 
the particular anti-terrorism surveillance measures potentially targeted all ‘users of 
communication systems and all homes’.728 Paired with the fact that there was no 
possibility for individuals to complain before an independent body against assumed 
and potential surveillance, the Court confirmed the victim status of the applicants and 
declared the application admissible.729  
In Szabó and Vissy, the ECtHR clarified the relationship between a legal analysis of 
judicial safeguards and a proportionality test: In its evaluation of possible 
justifications of interferences in the case, the Court clarified, that when the applicant’s 
complaint is directed against a specific system of surveillance and not against concrete 
or targeted surveillance, it would focus on an analysis of legislation and safeguards 
rather than on the proportionality of measures directed towards an individual.730 This 
                                                
725 See Roman Zakharov v Russia, (n 417); and Section 3.2.2.1.1.  
726 See Szabó and Vissy v Hungary, App no. 37138/14, Judgment (Court), 12.01.2016. 
727 Ibid, para 37.  
728 Ibid, para 38.  
729 Ibid, para 39.  
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means that once an application is admissible but challenges legislation in abstracto, 
the Court will assess the legislation and the adequacy and efficiency of inbuilt 
safeguards. Once, on the other hand, concrete surveillance measures against an 
applicant are challenged, the Court will analyse the specific surveillance measures as 
to their proportionality in respect to the circumstances and situation of the applicant.  
This sheds some light onto the question of how an interference in cases concerning a 
sophisticated public surveillance system in a public area could be found. For this, a 
claim could either focus on the legal source establishing the possibility of installing 
and operating surveillance systems, or on the potential collective or individual effects 
of a concrete surveillance system. The result might then depend on the very nature of 
the system. It appears, though, that the more hidden a system is and the higher its 
capabilities to operate in the background are, the more it makes sense to analyse 
interference on the bases of legal safeguards and the collective or societal effect of the 
surveillance system.  
Additionally, data collection as such can also play a decisive role. As already 
discussed above, the collection and processing of personal data as such falls into the 
scope of article 8 ECHR, giving rise to another factor for arguing an interference with 
privacy rights. 
The notions of ‘private life’, ‘home’ and ‘correspondence’ in article 8(1) ECHR 
clearly cover: ‘to search and keep under surveillance the applicants’ homes secretly, 
to check their postal mail and parcels, to monitor their electronic communications and 
computer data transmissions and to make recordings of any data acquired through 
these methods.’731 As much as individual surveillance matters for the Court, in mass 
surveillance cases it has often emphasized the finding that surveillance, especially 
when conducted without proper legal bases and safeguards, can become a ‘menace’ to 
democratic societies and therewith an interference per se.732  
It is apparent from the discussion above, that the ECHR rights protection system is 
fundamentally targeted towards individual complaints. The requirement of a victim 
                                                
731 Ibid, para 52.  
732 Klass and Others v Germany, (n 423), para 37, Halford v the United Kingdom, (n 510), paras 53, 
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status for admissibility and the general principle of the ECtHR to not examine legal 
regimes in abstracto show that the ECHR system is originally not designed for 
addressing abstract and general questions regarding fundamental rights. It is indeed a 
control mechanisms focusing on the possibility of individuals complaining against 
alleged violations of their fundamental rights. Yet, as can be seen above, the ECtHR 
sometimes makes exceptions to that rule, and cases involving mass surveillance are 
treated as such an exception simply because of the nature of surveillance, especially 
when the extend of surveillance practices remain secret. While the section above 
discussed the admissibility and rights interferences of mass surveillance, the following 
section will now return to a discussion of mass surveillance in public places.  
 
3.2.2.2.2 Mass	Surveillance	as	a	‘Menace	to	Society’	
The ECtHR adapted its own argument of a reasonable expectation for individuals to 
be surveilled in public as analysed in Section 3.1.1.1 above. In P.G. and J.H. v UK, 
the Court has coined the formula:  
A person who walks down the street will, inevitably, be visible to any member 
of the public who is also present. Monitoring by technological means of the same 
public scene (for example, a security guard viewing through closed-circuit 
television) is of a similar character.733  
Consequently, the ECtHR came up with an argument that suggest that individuals once 
placed on a public street enjoy a lesser amount of privacy than in secluded places as 
in public they enjoy a lesser ‘expectation of privacy’. On the other hand, it is also clear 
from previous findings that the right to privacy protects individuals in all places and 
in all situations, especially when the person’s social interactions, honour or dignity are 
affected.734  
In that sense, the ECtHR has indicated that it distinguishes between levels of 
intrusiveness of surveillance in public spaces. As discussed already above, in Herbecq 
the applicant complained against a lack of legal regulation on video surveillance 
cameras in public places in Belgium. The applicants particularly challenged public 
                                                
733 P.G. and J.H. v the United Kingdom, (n 500), para 57. 
734 See Council of Europe, Venice Commission), Opinion on Video Surveillance, (n 101), para 32 for 
a similar conclusion.  
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unrecorded video surveillance by employing a ‘chilling-effect’ argument. The lack of 
adequate regulation would make video surveillance directly unchallengeable for 
individuals which may have the effect that people in public places change their 
behaviour due to the ever-present threat of being watched with a video camera. 
Furthermore, for the applicants in the case, such visual surveillance could reveal 
‘…information, consisting in certain modes of behaviour or physical attitudes, which 
the individual in question may not have wished to divulge.’735 The argument, hence, 
was based on the general perception that people who are being surveilled or who think 
they are being surveilled change, restrict or adopt their behaviour and therefore restrict 
their freedom within a public context. This should be seen as an interference with the 
right to private life protected by article 8 ECHR as such. The ‘chilling-effect’ of a 
surveillance camera would then per se constitute an interference.  
The commission did not follow this argument. It emphasized that the applicant 
challenged merely unrecorded video surveillance in public places by public and 
private actors and referred to its earlier case law on the use of photographic equipment 
in public spaces.736 The video surveillance system also did not collect any personal 
data which could be stored analysed and disseminated.  
[T]he data available to a person looking at monitors is identical to that which he 
or she could have obtained by being on the spot in person (…). Therefore, all 
that can be observed is essentially, public behavior.737  
The Commission declared the application manifestly ill-founded. Unrecorded video 
surveillance therefore seemed not intrusive enough to constitute an interference with 
private life protected by the ECHR. Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that the ECtHR 
would uphold such a finding when it is confronted with a case challenging a 
sophisticated surveillance system as exemplified in the urban surveillance scenario. 
Firstly, the mere scale and systematic surveillance capabilities might already raise 
issues in relation to article 8 ECHR. Secondly, the collection, processing and retention 
of personal data would constitute an interference738 and thirdly, seen as a holistic tool 
for mass surveillance, challenging wide-scale surveillance might even be permissible 
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in abstracto, depending on the outcome of a successful test in line with the Kennedy 
and Zakharov requirements. Furthermore, the ECtHR has clearly described mass 
surveillance as a ‘menace’ to society and therewith operated on a collective, rather 
than an individual-centred perspective.  
The ECtHR, however, has constructed another argument in earlier cases which might 
be suitable to be employed in surveillance cases. Not only does an individual enjoy a 
right to her own secluded circle, but also enjoys the ‘right to form relationships’. This 
reasoning has particular relevance for mass-surveillance: Could mass-surveillance in 
public interfere with the right to form relationships?  
 
3.2.2.2.3 The	Right	to	Establish	Relationships	with	the	Outside	World.		
This aspect has been frequently reasoned by the ECtHR in article 8 and in surveillance 
cases. In fact, the ‘right to establish and develop relationships with other human 
beings’ was coined in the 1992 Niemitz v Germany judgment:  
[I]t would be too restrictive to limit the notion [of private life] to an “inner circle” 
in which the individual may live his own personal life as he chooses and to 
exclude therefrom entirely the outside world not encompassed within that circle. 
Respect for private life must also comprise to a certain degree the right to 
establish and develop relationships with other human beings.739  
This formula contains two elements: Firstly, article 8 protects at least in some ways 
the forming of personal relationships with other individuals and secondly, the notion 
of private life expands to the outside world, beyond a narrow application of privacy 
rights in strictly secluded spaces. For this reason, the ECtHR has found that aspects of 
private life expand in spheres such as business life or other public contexts.740  
Additionally, it is important to note that the Court explicitly grants a right to form 
relationships with other persons as part of the creation of personal identity and the 
development of one’s own personality.741 In Fernández Martínez v Spain, the Court 
additionally emphasized a right to ‘self-fulfillment’ through personal development or 
the ‘…right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the 
                                                
739 Niemietz v Germany, App no. 13710/88, Judgment (Court), 16.12.1992, para 29.  
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outside world.’ The Court furthermore regarded ‘personal autonomy’ as a crucial 
principle enshrined in article 8 ECHR.742 This reading of privacy goes beyond the 
limited understanding of privacy as an individual expectation. Here, privacy is 
connected with self-determination and a personality right.743 In that sense, because 
article 8 also protects personal autonomy, it entails a level of privacy which goes 
beyond individual expectations: In the well-known Pretty case, the ECtHR stated that  
[a]lthough no previous case has established as such any right to self-
determination as being contained in Article 8 of the Convention, the Court 
considers that the notion of personal autonomy is an important principle 
underlying the interpretation of its guarantees.744  
The right to private life, article 8 ECHR and questions relating to personal autonomy 
and self-determination have been extensively discussed in case-law and the literature, 
for example in connection with sexual orientation, gender identity or the right to end 
one’s own life.745 It is however important to note that the ECtHR has limited the 
application of private life and the right to form relationships in spheres with others 
that go beyond a narrow interpretation of the private sphere. In the Botta case, the 
applicant, a person with disabilities, complained that the lack of accessibility features 
in a private bathing establishment restricted his private life and personality 
development because  
…he was unable to enjoy a normal social life which would enable him to 
participate in the life of the community and to exercise essential rights, such as 
his non-pecuniary personal rights (…).746  
The Court did not follow this argument because it saw such interpersonal relations as 
being too broad in order to be protected by article 8. Similarly, in Friend and Others 
the Court found that hunting bans did not interfere with article 8 ECHR because 
personal enjoyment and personal relationships gained from such practices would fall 
                                                
742 Fernández Martínez v Spain, (n 416), para 126; Pretty v The United Kingdom, (n 258), para 61.  
743 See Section 2.2.7 Privacy in Public. 
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outside the scope for similar reasons.747 Recently the Court repeated that private life 
in article 8 does not protect  
(…) every activity a person might seek to engage in with other human beings in 
order to establish and develop such relationships. It will not, for example, protect 
interpersonal relations of such broad and indeterminate scope that there can be 
no conceivable direct link between the action or inaction of a State and a 
person’s private life.748 
Therefore, challenging mass-surveillance in public spaces on the basis of a right to 
form relationships in a public sphere would need constructing a clear connection 
between an individual’s right to private life and a negative impact of mass-surveillance 
on the forming of relationships. It is in a way possible that sophisticated public 
surveillance and the control of space through state security authorities could in an 
indirect way interfere with a person’s private life and their abilities to form 
relationships and enjoy participation in social life. For example, if a person lives in an 
area subject to heavy surveillance, friends might avoid visiting because they do not 
want to subject themselves to surveillance in the public space or on the way there. Or, 
in a more concrete example, when a person is visible for surveillance organs once she 
steps outside her own doorstep, that person might limit leaving the home to what is 
absolutely necessary and therefore self-restrict her participation in public social life.  
While many examples could be constructed in which surveillance in one or the other 
way interferes with forming personal relationships and other personal freedoms in a 
public surveillance scenario, the most likely and most clear establishment of an 
interference stems from the fact that systematic surveillance collects, processes and 
retains personal information. The right to personal data protection therefore appears 
to be stronger than a right to develop interpersonal relationships deriving from article 
8 ECHR.  
	
3.2.3 Mass	Surveillance	and	Data	Protection		
Data protection and mass-surveillance have a complex relationship. On the one hand, 
the processing of personal information is a crucial part of mass-surveillance practices 
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today, on the other hand, the legal discussions on mass surveillance in the ECtHR 
jurisprudence appear to distinguish between data-protection issues and mass 
surveillance.  
Personal data collection, retention and processing, however, clearly falls within the 
scope of protection of article 8 ECHR. Additionally, the EUCFR and regulatory 
instruments in the EU as well as CJEU jurisprudence made data protection an essential 
element of European fundamental rights law. 
The distinction between targeted and untargeted surveillance in the analyses of the 
scenario above, however reaches its limits with regards to data protection. That is 
because the legal protection mechanisms of data protection in mass- as well as in 
targeted surveillance depend on the classification of data as ‘personal’ data.  
Because personal data is defined as ‘…any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable individual ("data subject")’,749 any mass-surveillance data processing can 
be seen to have a very specific individual focus.  
Generally, however, data protection and fundamental rights implications have played 
an important role in the definition of the scope and interpretation of the right to private 
life in the ECHR, especially relating to new technologies. Public surveillance via 
technologically advanced surveillance systems as described in the technological part 
as well as the public surveillance scenario heavily relies on the collection of massive 
amounts of personal data. A CCTV image of a person, the GPS coordinates of a 
person’s mobile phone, their communications and respective meta-data all constitute 
personal data.  
Mass-surveillance of public places, however, is not always only concerned with data 
relating to an individual. Often, mass surveillance also collects a bulk of data that is 
processed for other purposes than targeted surveillance. As discussed in the outline of 
this section, surveillance is not solely about individuals and their information, but also 
about managing, governing and controlling large amounts of people and large 
systems, as well as administering risk.750 What follows from this is the question if the 
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mass data-collection and therewith the exercise of such administration and control 
could be seen as an interference with fundamental rights in the ECHR system.  
This is a somewhat tricky question, as it defies the essential basics of the ECHR 
fundamental rights system. Human Rights in the ECHR and especially the right to 
private life and the interpretations on personal data protection are conceptualized as 
individual rights that depend on the relation to an individual. Data falling into the 
scope of protection of the ECHR as well as the CoE Data Protection Convention 108 
is always ‘personal’ data, not just data. Furthermore, the object and purpose of 
Convention 108 is tackling data protection as ‘…automatic processing of personal 
data relating to him.’751 Some data collected by mass surveillance systems might 
however, not prima facie qualify as personal data.  
What remains to be discussed especially in connection of mass surveillance are 
therefore two issues. Firstly, surveillance data that falls completely outside the scope 
of data protection frameworks, and secondly, data that falls outside of the scope today, 
but due to expanding technological capabilities, could fall into the category of personal 
data in the future. 
 
3.2.3.1 The	Scope	of	Data	Protection		
Public surveillance, employing technology described in the scenario, naturally is 
primarily concerned with the identification of individuals. Advanced technologies 
such as facial recognition or video content analyses attempt nothing more but to single 
out individuals, either because they pose a threat, or because they are the subject of 
surveillance. One core issue relating to modern technological mass surveillance is that 
it blurs the border of targeted and non-targeted surveillance. Additionally, such 
technologies, for example facial recognition, operate in the invisible background 
therewith blurring the border between covert and overt surveillance. Modern 
surveillance, especially in the sense of the scenario, is targeted and non-targeted as 
well as covert and overt at the same time and hence creating an omnipresent web of 
data processing operating in the background behind visible sensors.  
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For classical data protection and the definition of personal data, this might mean that 
originally non-personal data in which individuals are not identified or identifiable, 
become data points leading to the identification, or at least, identifiability of persons 
in the future. For example, low resolution video images unsuitable for identification 
of persons could be processed and analysed using powerful software which can 
identify specific individual movement patterns leading to the identifiability of 
individuals. With this, data protection standards would start to apply for data which 
originally fell outside of such scope. This could create a prima facie loophole in 
fundamental rights protection from public surveillance.  
 
3.2.3.2 Big	Data		
The other category with significant relevance to mass surveillance and data protection 
regulation is the massive collection of vast quantities of data and the subsequent 
analytics. The buzzword for this phenomenon is ‘Big Data’, describing the collection 
and analytics of vast amounts of information. For Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, Big 
Data is about ‘…seeing and understanding the relations within and among pieces of 
information that, until very recently, we struggled to fully grasp.’ 752  Boyd and 
Crawford define Big Data as a ‘…cultural, technological, and scholarly phenomenon’ 
which is founded on the interplay of three interrelated aspects namely ‘technology’, 
‘analyses’, and ‘mythology’.753 What they mean is that Big Data essentially describes 
a phenomenon deriving from technological progress and the vastly increasing 
collection and retention of data, improved capabilities for analytics and a common 
rhetoric around the phenomenon that it would somehow objectively improve insights 
into aspects of the real world. In that sense, Big Data is indeed ‘…less about data that 
is big than it is about a capacity to search, aggregate, and cross-reference large data 
sets.’754 Following such an understanding of Big Data, it becomes clear that it can 
describe different types of data analytics, from global data on climate change to the 
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analytics of all Facebook posts. Lyon therefore rightly pointed out that possible 
applications of Big Data analytics vary so much that a legal analysis would have to 
take into account different aspects of each field – after all Big Data analytics in the 
field of terrorism prevention has more impact on individual rights than climate data 
on the melting of the polar ice caps.755  
Beyond such rather critical views, Big Data is often understood to have enormous 
promise for technological process, economic growth and innovation and any 
regulation in this area is perceived as impeding progress and a positive future.756 
While those debates have to be held elsewhere, one important question arises in 
connection with mass surveillance in a public context: Does Big Data analytics 
interfere with fundamental rights and how is it regulated in that context? 
Public data collection and analytics which are large enough come with two essential 
legal questions: Firstly, does Big Data interfere with a right to privacy and data 
protection. For this the essential question at this point seems to be how far the actual 
data in Big Data analytics can be categorized as personal data or not.  
Secondly, as Big Data is collected, retained, and analysed by private corporations or 
non-governmental organizations rather than governments and security authorities, 
how does the private sector big data processing and subsequent law enforcement 
access affect the protection through fundamental rights regimes?  
Regarding the latter, it has become clear since Edward Snowden leaked classified 
intelligence files in 2013, that while the US security authorities collect and retain 
larger amounts of data and communications than anticipated, there also existed a 
system of coercion and cooperation for government access to data held by 
corporations and private sector entities. Additionally, a large private security industry 
today collects and retains data with the specific purpose of selling data to intelligence 
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services and governments. 757  This has enormous implications, both for practical 
protection as well as theoretical analyses of human rights.  
What this section argues is that using the analyses of vast quantities of data and Big 
Data processing for the purpose of surveillance will constitute an interference with 
human rights in the European legal space.  
The starting and most essential question is, if Big Data analytics falls within the scope 
of data protection rights. At first sight, the answer is rather simple: once Big Data 
qualifies as personal information, data protection standards apply because it then falls 
within the scope of article 8 ECHR and the Council of Europe Data Protection 
Convention, or, provided the processing happens within the scope of EU law, also in 
the EU data protection framework. Secondly, once data processing falls into those 
areas of law, the information processed would need to fulfil the criteria of personal 
data as information relating to an identified or identifiable individual. Considering the 
rather wide legal interpretations, it is difficult to imagine any surveillance related data 
that would not fall into this category, however, it is crucial to understand how far it is 
technically feasible to attribute information to an individual and how likely such a 
process would be. In the end, it would depend on the actual nature, purpose and 
technical analytics of such data.  
What is remarkable in this regard is that the nature of data as well as the nature of 
surveillance has radically changed. Data is collected, retained, and analysed in a very 
different way today than ten years ago, naturally questioning the conceptual 
relationship between individual and information. Surveillance understood as targeted 
operation on single individuals has changed to what could be called ‘dataveillance’ 
and the sources of data gathering have changed from targeted collection to accessing 
the large data pools created through information and communication technologies.758 
With this, however, is the current classification into personal and non-personal data 
still useful?  
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Within the European context, both the Council of Europe Data Protection Convention 
and the definition on the European Union framework, namely in the 95/46 Data 
Protection Directive and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), understand 
personal data as ‘information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person.’759 
While all of the definitions are essentially similar, their interpretations vary between 
CoE and EU framework, especially with regards to the interpretation of what 
essentially determines ‘identifiability’. Here, the interpretations of the two sources 
appear manifestly different: where the CoE Explanary Report on Convention 108 
finds that identifiability requires an easy identification possibility (excluding 
‘sophisticated methods’)760 , the GDPR interpretation focusses on the criterion of 
‘reasonable likelihood’. In fact, Recital 26 of the GDPR states that in interpreting 
identifiability in article 4 (1), ‘…account should be taken of all the means reasonably 
likely to be used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by any other person 
to identify the individual directly or indirectly.’761  Such reasonable likelihood is 
established by taking into consideration ‘…all objective factors, such as the costs of 
and the amount of time required for identification, taking into consideration both 
available technology at the time of the processing and technological development.’762 
Consequently, all information that can be attributed to a natural person (including 
pseudonymization) constitute personal data and only completely anonymous 
information which cannot be traced back to a person is excluded from the scope of the 
GDPR (this also applies to research statistics).763  
What consequences would the CoE interpretation of identifiability have for 
sophisticated public surveillance? Would, for example information on persons 
gathered by facial recognition systems in public spaces fall outside the scope of the 
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CoE Data Protection Convention because it does not include the ‘…identification of 
persons by means of very sophisticated methods’?764  
In order to answer this question, it needs to be discussed what could be considered a 
‘sophisticated method’ in the sense of the commentary. Taking into account that the 
Convention as well as the commentary date back to 1981, it becomes clear that a 
crucial factor is technological progress. While the identification of a person on a video 
tape on a public place 35 years ago would have required watching hours of recorded 
video, it could be possible to achieve identification today within seconds. It seems 
obvious that the sophistication of method relates to the actual effort which needs to be 
expended to connect a piece of information with a real person. With advancing 
technologies, and the sophistication of methods in that sense, connecting such dots 
becomes easier. Taking into consideration the object and purpose of the Data 
Protection Convention, namely the protection and strengthening of fundamental 
rights,765 it is unlikely that the sophisticated processing and analytics of information 
would result in the personal information falling outside the scope of the treaty.  
In that sense, technological sophistication should not be confused with the 
‘identification of persons by means of a very sophisticated method’ in the CoE 
Explanatory report. What remains, would be a classification of personal data along the 
lines of ease and effort to actually achieve identification of an individual or 
information attribution – the easier it is and the less effort it takes, the more likely it 
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is that the information will be considered personal data. With Big Data, however, most 
of the information that is processed, especially in a surveillance context, would fall 
into the category of personal data and therewith within the scope of the CoE Data 
Protection Convention. Therewith, much of mass surveillance Big Data should be 
considered as processing of personal data - unless the information is absolutely 
unrelated to individual human beings. Much therewith also depends on the actual 
detailed technological processes in the surveillance system. For example, assuming it 
is of importance for a public transport authority to know how many people use the 
transportation system at what time, to adjust transportation capacities. One way of 
getting such information is to install a video camera and run specific software which 
counts individuals on the video stream. As it is in principle easy to identify people on 
video camera images, this would qualify as processing of personal data in the meaning 
of the CoE Convention 108. The only option to design the system in a way that it 
might fall outside the scope of the Convention would be if the system actually did not 
at any moment retain any real video images; e.g. the system takes the video stream, 
counts the individuals and immediately and un-recoverably deletes the video stream.  
Therefore, such video analytics processes non-personal data only when the data are 
either not retained or immediately anonymized. However, even then it could be argued 
that because the system actually takes and processes real images of people, it could 
still be classified as processing personal data.  
In that sense, only the non-existence of senor data guarantees the non-personality of 
such information. The distinction between personal data and non-personal data in Big 
Data processing therewith is very difficult to grasp and to delineate.  
A slightly different formulation on the interpretation of personal data and non-personal 
data can be found in the EU framework and the new GDPR. The GDPR requires a 
certain ‘reasonable likelihood’ for the data to be used for identification. The 
identifiability of an individual therefore requires an assessment test: identifiable 
information is attributable to a person, and this attribution requires to be firstly, 
possible, and secondly, reasonably likely. Consequently, the available means as well 
as the objective factors involved, e.g. effort, time, or costs, need to be part of the 
assessment. In that sense, an assessment of a person counting system in the example 
above would need to focus on the technological capabilities to extract information 
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attributable to a specific individual, and how likely is it that a controller or operator 
could extract such information with a reasonable effort.  
Additionally, however, the GDPR is not intended to apply to anonymized data:  
The principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous 
information, that is information which does not relate to an identified or 
identifiable natural person or to data rendered anonymous in such a way that the 
data subject is not or no longer identifiable.766  
The definition of anonymization, however, depends again on the test outlined above. 
Anonymized Big Data, provided that such information is not reasonably likely to be 
re-attributed to an individual would therefore fall outside of the EU data protection 
framework. Surveillance Big Data, however, is difficult to place outside of data 
protection frameworks, simply because surveillance data, by definition, is likely to 
single out individuals. 
 
3.2.3.3 Big	Data,	Societal	data	and	Data	Protection	Principles	
Data protection in general can be understood in terms of specific principles that are 
more or less contained in all data protection laws and regulations. Furthermore, 
especially recently, data protection principles increasingly found their voices in 
European Courts, spearheaded by the CJEU and its recent landmark judgments on the 
right to privacy and the right to data protection. 767  Data protection principles 
furthermore have developed rapidly and became an important factor for case law and 
jurisprudence in Europe. In line with such interpretations, the crucial question relating 
to Big Data and public surveillance is in how far public surveillance systems collide 
with particular principles of data protection. Mass surveillance is of particular 
importance in this regard because the core of such types of surveillance is the bulk 
collection of information, as opposed to the targeted gathering of data on a specific 
suspect. Big Data surveillance therewith marks a shift from targeted and purpose 
specific data collections to the pre-emptive and causeless collection of information 
processed in order to identify persons, patterns or anomalies.  
                                                
766 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, (GDPR), (n 303), Recital 23. 
767 See Section 2.3.2 above 
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With Big Data used as surveillance information, ordinary and on first sight seemingly 
meaningless and unrelated information is collected and retained, leading to 
classification, quantification and real-time tracking and monitoring of individual and 
societal information. Societal information in this regard is the mix of environmental 
information, meta-information, operational data as well as information on groups as 
well as on individuals. While targeted surveillance is collected and stored for a specific 
purpose, mass surveillance by gathering societal data in a public context is collected 
pre-emptively and without a specific purpose, and often even without any current 
capabilities to process all this data. One of the characteristics of bulk collection, for 
example, is the collection, aggregation and retention of all sorts of information, with 
a future perspective that it might be a possibility that this data would become relevant 
for future processes. In that sense, data today is often collected ‘…before determining 
the full range of their actual and potential uses and mobilizing algorithms and analytics 
not only to understand a past sequence of events but also to predict and intervene 
before behaviours, events, and processes are set in train.’768  
Within the context of Big Data and public surveillance, and therewith the gathering of 
societal data from a public environment, how do such practices interfere with specific 
data protection principles? Taking into account the data protection principles in 
European fundamental rights law, it becomes clear that many of such collections might 
contradict the prohibitions of limitless and uncontrolled collection of all sorts of 
personal information. Convention 108 but also both the GDPR as well as the new 
Police Directive769 contain similar general principles of data processing: personal data 
shall only be collected for ‘specified, explicit and legitimate purposes’, limited to the 
purpose and not kept longer than necessary for that purpose.770 Provided that Big Data 
qualifies as personal data, such surveillance data collection would collide with at least 
some of the data protection principles.  
On a general level, the collection and processing of large amounts of data in public 
places might have an overall negative societal effect, and chilling effects- 
                                                
768 Lyon D, ‘Surveillance, Snowden, and Big Data: Capacities, consequences, critique’ (2014) Big Data 
& Society 1, 4.  
769 Directive (EU) 2016/680 (n 303). 
770 See Art 4 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, (GDPR), (n 303), Art 4 Directive (EU) 2016/680 (n 303), Art 
5 CoE Data Protection Convention, (n 299).  
	 234	
argumentation can be connected with data collection and processing. The collection 
and processing of societal data might as well qualify as secret surveillance practices 
towards which particularly the ECtHR has taken a rather critical stand against.771  
 
3.2.3.4 Applicability	of	EU	Data	Protection	to	Mass	Surveillance	
As can be clearly seen from the analyses on data protection above, responses to mass 
surveillance within a European legal context are not limited to the framework of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. In recent years, the EU has strengthened its 
Fundamental Rights framework not at last with the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 and the 
binding legal status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. This 
means that surveillance issues are not only subject to fundamental rights 
considerations at the ECHR/Council of Europe level, but also at the level of the 
European Union. There is, however, a caveat: The EU Charter’s scope extends to 
‘…the institutions and bodies of the Union with due regard for the principle of 
subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law.’772 
Personal data protection is furthermore contained in art 16 TFEU773 and art 39 TEU.774 
Generally, as discussed already in Section 2.3 above, there is a wide body of EU 
regulation on data protection. 
In this context, the question arises of how far mass surveillance and surveillance of 
public places fall within the scope of Union Law, provided it concerns actions that can 
be related to EU law. Security and law enforcement have traditionally been placed 
outside of the scope of Community Law. How far can mass surveillance and public 
surveillance therewith be addressed by the EU Fundamental Rights framework? This 
is a somehow tricky issue, because it is often unclear how far the scope of fundamental 
rights extends to issues only indirectly related to EU regulation and because it can be 
very difficult to determine which actions fall within the scope of Union Law. 
                                                
771 See e.g Roman Zakharov v Russia, (n 417), para 169 
772 Article 51 EUCFR 
773 See Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), OJ C 
326, 26.10.2012, 47–390. 
774 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, 13–390. 
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In that regard, fundamental rights within the EU context theoretically apply to 
measures that are in one or another way related to Union Law. An issue regulated by 
National Law will therefore not directly be subject to EU fundamental rights review 
unless it can be related to the scope of Union Law.775 Once member states act within 
the scope or implement EU law, they should be bound by the principles of that 
framework, including its fundamental rights protection.776 The obligation to comply 
with EU fundamental rights, however, once within the scope, cannot be limited. In 
Åkerberg Fransson, the Court clearly stated that  
…situations cannot exist which are covered in that way by European Union law 
without those fundamental rights being applicable. The applicability of 
European Union law entails applicability of the fundamental rights guaranteed 
by the Charter.777  
This applies to all forms of direct, indirect and even partly regulations.778 The essential 
question in that regard, is how far the actual ‘implementation’ of Union Law in article 
51 of the Fundamental Rights Charter can be extended to affect surveillance issues.  
The answer to this question depends heavily on the purpose and field of law in which 
certain surveillance measures take place. That is also why there is no easy answer to 
that question and the applicability of the EU Fundamental rights framework is subject 
to debate.779  
What is important to note, though, is that article 4 (2) of the TEU establishes a clear 
exemption for national security issues. Certain core state functions shall be respected, 
including ‘…the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and 
                                                
775 See Rosas A and Armati L, EU Constitutional Law: An Introduction (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2012), 
167.  
776 See Spaventa, E, ‘Fundamental Rights in the European Union’ in Barnard C and Peers S (eds), 
European Union Law (Oxford University Press 2014), 232. 
777  Case C‑617/10 Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson, (Grand Chamber), 26 February 2013 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, para 21.  
778 For a more detailed discussion see Spaventa E, ‘Fundamental Rights in the European Union’ (n 
776), 240-241.  
779 Ibid, 232 -234, see also Schütze R, European Union Law (Cambridge University Press 2015), 430-
438. For general discussion on the horizontal effect of fundamental rights in the EU see Walkila S, 
Horizontal effect of fundamental rights contributing to the 'primacy, unity and effectiveness of 
European Union law' (Diss, University of Helsinki, 2015), 85-91.   
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safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the sole 
responsibility of each Member State.’780  
There are, however, certain aspects to mass surveillance that can fall within the scope 
of EU law. Data protection, in particular, is an area of the law that falls within the 
scope and which has been heavily regulated by employing a number of instruments. 
ever since the beginning of the information age. The EU Data Protection Directive, 
for example, applies to personal data issues, unless outside its scope of application, 
e.g. when data processing falls within the so called ‘household-exemption’ and in 
cases of ‘…public security, defence, State security (including the economic well-being 
of the State when the processing operation relates to State security matters) and the 
activities of the State in areas of criminal law.’781 Similarly, the 2008 EU Framework 
Decision on the protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters782 contains an exclusion of national security 
and security interest. Problematic in this regard, of course, is the principal 
indeterminacy of the term ‘national security’.783 Its interpretation can vary drastically 
in dependence to the circumstances of application.  
In April 2016, the Data Protection Directive as well as the Framework Decision were 
replaced by the General Data Protection Regulation and a new Directive applying to 
data processing for law enforcement and public sector processing.784 While the GDPR 
has a similar limited scope as the former Directive 95/46, the new ‘law enforcement’-
Directive applies to all data processing ‘…by competent authorities for the purposes 
of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the 
execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention 
of threats to public security.’785 At the same time, however, article 2 3) (a) of the 
2016/680 Directive excludes data processing ‘in the course of an activity which falls 
                                                
780 Art 4 (2) TEU. 
781 See Art 3 (2) Directive 95/46/EC (Data Protection Directive) (n 305). 
782 EU Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA (n 589). 
783 See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (Art 29 WP), Working Document on surveillance of 
electronic communications for intelligence and national security purposes, 5 December 2014, 14/EN 
WP 228, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2014/wp228_en.pdf accessed 10 January 2016, 22-23.  
784 See Regulation (EU) 2016/679, (GDPR), (n 303); Directive (EU) 2016/680 (n 303). 
785 Art 2(1) and 1 (1) Directive (EU) 2016/680 (n 303). 
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outside the scope of Union law’. The purpose and scope of the Directive appears 
therefore either expansive or contradictory, as ‘public security’ and the prevention of 
threats thereto could intuitively be seen to fall outside the scope of Union Law.  
Additionally, while the replaced Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA was 
limited to the transfer of personal data between member states, it appears the new 
Directive takes a more inclusive stand. This is interesting, because it raises the 
question in how far data processing in public surveillance systems would fall under 
the new 2016/680 Directive and therewith become subject to additional EU 
fundamental rights safeguards of the EUCFR.786  
General surveillance and wide scale data collection can ntrigger the applicability of 
EU fundamental rights. For example, when private entities collect data such as, e.g., 
when the owner of a grocery store installs video surveillance in her premises. In that 
case, the private owner or company has to be regarded as a data controller in light of 
the EU data protection framework – and corresponding EU rules are applicable.  
Consequently, although ‘national security’ in general excludes the application of EU 
data protection frameworks, once EU companies and private entities collect, retain 
and process personal data and transfer these data to security authorities including 
intelligence agencies, this transfer can be seen as falling within the scope of EU law.  
This applicability has been emphasized by the CJEU in several cases addressing data 
protection as a fundamental right issue in the EU: In Digital Rights Ireland, the CJEU 
made clear that a Directive obliging States to implement laws that force 
telecommunication companies to retain communication meta-data has to be tested for 
validity in light of EU fundamental rights, especially the right to private life and data 
protection in arts 7 & 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.787  
A similar approach was taken by the CJEU in the Schrems judgment: the transfer of 
personal data to a third country requires the same levels of fundamental rights 
                                                
786 See De Hert P and Papakonstantinou V, ‘The New Police and Criminal Justice Data Protection 
Directive. A First Analysis’ (2016) New Journal of European Criminal Law 7, 10. 
787 See Cases C‑293/12 and C‑594/12 Digital Rights Ireland, (n 324) paras 23-31. 
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protection as in the EU, especially when such data might be transferred to law 
enforcement or security authorities.788  
In particular, legislation permitting the public authorities to have access on a 
generalised basis to the content of electronic communications must be regarded 
as compromising the essence of the fundamental right to respect for private life, 
as guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter (…).789  
It has to be concluded in this context, that once surveillance data are collected, retained 
or processed by private actors and such data are accessed by security authorities, the 
assessments of the legality of such actions have to be based on the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and the relevant EU data protection and privacy regulatory 
frameworks. EU data protection law then applies to all forms of corporate, private as 
well as private security operations in public places. This causes a controversial 
situation in terms of public surveillance: While a surveillance camera which is 
installed and operated by a police force might not fall into the scope of EU law and 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights, a surveillance camera installed and operated by a 
private actor might very well do so. This would mean that private actors are directly 
bound by EU fundamental rights, while public actors are, in principal excluded, at 
least from a direct application of the EUCFR. Systematic mass surveillance by states, 
however, would still be likely to fall into the scope of protection because such 
practices often require derogations from relevant EU directives in the respective field, 
provided that such derogations fall within the scope of application of the EUCFR.790 
It is clear, however, that the CJEU has significantly strengthened the rights to private 
life and data protection during recent years. Government mass-surveillance has been 
seen especially critical when there appears to be a lack of oversight and remedy. 
Ironically, the CJEU has addressed here especially the US system of mass-surveillance 
which came into the focus after the Snowden revelations. The Schrems judgment, in 
which the CJEU declared the EU/US safe-harbour framework as essentially 
                                                
788 Case C-362/14 Schrems, (n 325).  
789 Ibid, para 94, see also Cases C‑293/12 and C‑594/12 Digital Rights Ireland, (n 324), para 39.  
790 In how far derogations from EU legal instruments constitute ‘implementation’ of EU law pursuant 
to Art 51 of the EUCFR is disputed. This discussion is left out from this work. For a rather 
straightforward approach see FRA, Surveillance by Intelligence Services, 
http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2016-surveillance-intelligence-services_en.pdf 
accessed 6 Mai 2015, 11  
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incompatible with EU fundamental rights norms reflects such a turn. Due to the above-
mentioned restriction of the scope of EU law however, it is questionable how far the 
CJEU would be able to directly address government surveillance frameworks. 
However, Digital Rights Ireland and Schrems, as well as to a certain extent also 
Google Spain have shown that EU fundamental rights ought to be taken seriously in 
the EU and that governments and security authorities do not enjoy a carte blanche 
from a EU law perspective when operating systems of mass surveillance. In any case, 
even if the EU right to privacy and data protection framework were left out of the 
consideration, both the ECHR as well as the Council of Europe Convention 108 and 





Mass surveillance of public places triggers a variety of fundamental rights arguments. 
There is enough case law to confirm that mass surveillance in public places will trigger 
issues in relation to private life and article 8 ECHR, especially when individuals can 
claim a specific personal effect. Even if that cannot be proven, mass surveillance cases 
can still be admissible within the ECHR framework, provided they pass the above 
discussed test in Kennedy and Zakharov. 791  Vast technological security systems 
enabling surveillance and control of public spaces therefore trigger individual rights 
issues which can be challenged by affected individuals employing fundamental rights 
frameworks. This applies both to the ECHR and the EU rights frameworks. There is 
however another aspect of mass surveillance which deserves deeper discussion at this 
point.  
Throughout this study, two fundamentally different approaches towards privacy and 
surveillance became visible. Those became clear already in the section on the 
philosophical foundations of privacy in the beginning of this study. Simplified, those 
arguments go as follows: on the one hand, privacy in public is legally protected in a 
narrow way. It has to be interpreted in connection with the individual’s expectation to 
                                                
791 See Section 3.2.2 above.  
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be visible to others. Once in a public place, an individual enjoys less privacy protection 
than in the secluded private sphere of the home. On the other side, privacy extends 
beyond the pure private sphere. Individual self-determination, the right to form 
relationships with others, personal autonomy, identity and freedom of decision making 
and choice are as well in a certain way an inherent part of the concept of privacy. The 
chilling effect, in which an individual alters her behaviour as a response to real or 
alleged surveillance is part of such an argument. Such argumentation may be derived 
from concepts such as a right to personality or dignity. 
The question arising from this in the context of urban mass surveillance at this stage 
is therefore, if there is legal evidence that a sophistication of surveillance and security 
technology in public spaces require a reformulation of such concepts. After all, simply 
the massively improved capabilities and sophistication of surveillance might lead to 
the necessity of articulating a clear and precise fundamental rights argument 
challenging mass surveillance beyond individual rights and its common arguments. In 
that sense, there could be a need for the formulation of a collective right to be free 
from surveillance and control also in public unless there are adequate justifications 
and safeguards. How can a mass surveillance scenario be legally challenged from a 
more collective perspective?  
 
3.2.4.1 Personal	Autonomy	and	Self-Determination	
This study has previously discussed the use of a legitimate expectation test in the 
ECHR system. The Court held in the already excessively discussed P.G. and J.H case 
that  
(…) there are occasions when people knowingly or intentionally involve 
themselves in activities which are or may be recorded or reported in a public 
manner, a person’s reasonable expectations as to privacy may be a significant, 
although not necessarily conclusive, factor. A person who walks down the street 
will, inevitably, be visible to any member of the public who is also present. 
Monitoring by technological means of the same public scene (for example, a 
security guard viewing through closed-circuit television) is of a similar 
character. Private-life considerations may arise, however, once any systematic 
or permanent record comes into existence of such material from the public 
domain.792  
                                                
792 P.G. and J.H. v the United Kingdom, (n 500), para 57.  
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This means basically that individuals have a lesser expectation of privacy in public 
spaces as compared to their secluded private spaces. Furthermore, this only applies 
once the system does not collect personal data – because personal data per se interferes 
with the right to private life in article 8 ECHR. Additionally, however, the ECHR 
system also protects ‘(…) a right to identity and personal development, and the right 
to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside 
world.’793 Private life therefore cannot only include a clearly secluded real or virtual 
space, but there are areas of public life and publicity that are important if not crucial 
for a person’s life. This seems to be also in mind of the ECtHR when not limiting its 
interpretations of private life to a secluded inner sphere of an individual.  
In that sense, it can be argued that using legitimate expectation of individuals to 
determine the scope of their privacy has severe shortfalls. One problem with the 
expectation of privacy argument is that it bases the assessment of intrusiveness of 
individual surveillance on the subjective perception of the surveillance through that 
individual. Ultimately, this would mean that simply making people aware of 
surveillance (ensuring they expect to be surveilled) and therewith lowering their 
‘expectation’ means that surveillance is more justified.794 In this sense it would be 
questionable if notifying people about surveillance as such can be sufficient for its 
justification especially in light of the enormous sophistication and capabilities of 
surveillance means and methods.  
Within the ECHR framework, several notions appear to counter the legitimate 
expectation argument: the ‘right to identity’, ‘personal development’ and the ‘right to 
establish relationships with other human beings and the outside world’ have been 
explicitly mentioned by the ECtHR on several occasions.795 In connection with this, 
the ECtHR has also used the notion of self-determination and personal autonomy as a 
fundamental rights principle. ‘Although no previous case has established as such any 
right to self-determination as being contained in Article 8 of the Convention, the Court 
considers that the notion of personal autonomy is an important principle underlying 
                                                
793 Ibid, para 56, see also Niemietz v Germany, (n 739), para 29, and Halford v the United Kingdom, (n 
510), para 44.  
794 See Rouvroy A and Poullet Y, ‘The Right to Informational Self-Determination and the Value of 
Self-Development: Reassessing the Importance of Privacy for Democracy’ (n 162), 48.  
795 P.G. and J.H. v the United Kingdom, (n 500), para 56.  
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the interpretation of its guarantees.’796 Self-determination, personal autonomy and 
personal freedom can therefore be interpreted to lie at the core of article 8 ECHR, yet, 
when it comes to surveillance cases, this notion has hardly been employed by the 
Court. Personal autonomy and the right to self-determination, however, were 
frequently discussed in cases concerning identity, transgender and discussions around 
the ‘right to die’ in the Pretty case.797 Yet, the relationships and nature of such notions 
in the ECHR are far from clear.  
In this regard, Nelleke Koffeman sketches two interpretations of the relationship of 
human dignity, personal autonomy and freedom. The first line of interpretation 
understands ‘…personal autonomy as a general principle of law on equal footing with 
human dignity and personal freedom’, 798  while the second interpretation sees, 
‘…personal autonomy as a right in itself with a specific content and with human 
dignity as its underlying value.’ 799  Personal autonomy and the right to self-
determination can be interpreted either as a notion deriving from the general concept 
of dignity and freedom - after all, the ECtHR has found that ‘[t]he very essence of the 
Convention is respect for human dignity and human freedom’800, or as a separate right 
in itself.  
Whichever interpretation is favoured, it is in a way conceivable that massive 
surveillance of public spaces can restrict personal autonomy, freedom and self-
determination and is therefore essentially an interference with human dignity. In that 
sense, thought even further, private life, backed up by the notions of dignity and self-
determination, is an essential prerequisite for keeping up societal forms of 
organization. Rouvroy and Poullet advocate for the right to privacy to be understood 
as ‘…an instrument for fostering the specific yet changing autonomic capabilities of 
individuals that are, in a given society at a given time, necessary for sustaining a vivid 
                                                
796 Pretty v The United Kingdom, (n 258), para 61.  
797 Ibid.  
798 Koffeman NR, (The right to) personal autonomy in the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights (n 745), 5. 
799 Ibid, 7. 
800 Pretty v The United Kingdom, (n 258), para. 65. For the first time this formulation was used in C.R. 
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democracy.’ 801  Based on freedom, autonomy and dignity, privacy becomes a 
vanguard to counter interferences and restrictions into individual lives and freedoms 
through coercion and manipulation by states.  
 
3.2.4.2 Dignity	and	State	Surveillance		
In fact, a very sophisticated and early legal argument deriving a specific privacy 
related right from dignity is found in the case law of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court already in the 80s. In 1983, the Federal Constitutional Court 
developed a ‘right to informational self-determination’ from a combination of the right 
to freely develop one’s own personality (art 2(1) German Constitution), and the 
general inviolability of human dignity in article 1(1) of the German Constitution.802 
This general personality right in the Constitution explicitly protects the dignity of 
persons as free members of a free society.803 In this regard, every individual has the 
ability and competence to decide for herself in what way her personal information is 
distributed and shared, but this ability is threatened through new technological means 
of data processing.804 The FCC interestingly emphasized that technological means of 
data gathering and processing as well as the combination of information from a variety 
of sources and the use of integrated information technological systems inherently 
come with the threat that an individual loses control over personal information.805 The 
core of the argument, however, lies in the threat of behavioural coercion and the 
possible loss of freedom that comes with uncontrolled and intransparent data 
collection of individuals:  
The right to informational self-determination would not be compatible with a 
societal order and a corresponding legal order in which citizens can no longer 
ascertain who knows what about them, when and in which occasion. Who is 
uncertain as to whether deviant behaviour is taken note of at all times and whose 
                                                
801 Rouvroy A and Poullet Y, ‘The Right to Informational Self-Determination and the Value of Self-
Development: Reassessing the Importance of Privacy for Democracy’ (n 162), 46.  
802 [Germany] FCC, BVerfG, 15. Dezember 1983 (Volkszählungsurteil), (n 145). 
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information is the permanently stored, used or transferred, will attempt to avoid 
standing out through such behaviour.806  
This might go so far as the exercise of fundamental rights are avoided, for example 
participation in political protest. The FCC emphasized especially that this could 
heavily interfere with personal development and the common good: ‘…self-
determination is an elementary prerequisite for a free and democratic community 
based on its citizens’ abilities to act and participate in it.’807 
With this judgment, the FCC not only created a powerful dignity and personal 
autonomy- based argument against uncontrolled information collection from citizens, 
it also formed the new right to informational self-determination in the German 
constitutional legal framework. This right was a direct response to technological 
development of massive data collection and derives from a general personality right 
in combination with human dignity. It should probably be noted that the German Basic 
Law does neither include a separately formulated right to privacy, nor a data protection 
clause.  
What makes such an argument interesting and relevant for surveillance analyses in the 
context of European fundamental rights protection, is that the German FCC has 
formulated a dignity based criticism of mass surveillance: It applied its interpretation 
on a right to informational self-determination to a case contesting public video 
surveillance in the city of Regensburg in 2007.808  
The city planned to install four video surveillance cameras including a video recording 
function in a public place. The purpose for the video surveillance was to monitor a 
street art project that the city had installed on that place, in which the relief of a 
medieval synagogue was made partially visible to the public. The FCC found that 
recorded video surveillance in public places per se constituted an interference with the 
right to informational self-determination. It argued, firstly, that the surveillance was 
indiscriminate and affected all individuals moving in the public place. However, as a 
matter of proportionality, interfering measures should foremost be directed at the 
                                                
806 Ibid, para 172 (own translation). 
807 Ibid, para 172 (own translation).  
808 See [Germany] FCC, BVerfG, Beschluss der 1. Kammer des Ersten Senats (Decision, 1st Chamber, 
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perpetrators of criminal offences.809 Secondly, the video recording enabled intensive 
processing of picture materials and the comparison and connection with other personal 
data. Thirdly, and probably most importantly, the surveillance at stake aimed at 
manipulating the behaviour of individuals in the public sphere.810 As such, the video 
surveillance was found unconstitutional as it lacked adequate safeguards.811  
This FCC judgment employed an argumentation based on the construction of a right 
to informational self-determination deriving from a personality right in combination 
with human dignity. The legal argumentation focused on the ‘chilling-effect’ of 
surveillance technologies on people in public places. Self-restriction and loss of 
freedom could result in a major damage for democratic activities. In a German 
constitutional context, such public place surveillance is only permissible when it has 
a strict and narrow purpose and when it is strictly regulated and safeguarded by 
adequate legal frameworks. What is interesting about the focus on manipulating 
behaviour is that it does not challenge the surveillance and its practices as such, but 
the attempt to target and manipulate individual behaviour in a public space. This 
means that the FCC made an argument explicitly challenging the intention to control 
public spaces.812 
The construction of a right to informational self-determination as the ‘constitutional 
anchor’ of data protection in the German system813 has not lost its actualities. In fact, 
it can serve as a powerful argument against unfettered data collection from public 
places. Connecting data protection to a personality right allows the addressing of a 
variety of problems stemming from surveillance technologies, and furthermore allows 
a response to technological developments severely affecting individuals in public 
spaces. A pure focus in individual expectations in public places, on the other hand, 
will not be able to address the technological sophistication of surveillance. The limits 
                                                
809 Ibid, para 51. 
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of an individual expectation approach are directly proportional to technological 
sophistication: The more complex and capable a technology becomes the more 
difficult it will be for an individual to grasp the whole complexity. Additionally, 
technological sophistication lowers the level of privacy expectation as such. If it is 
generally known that there exist the potential for a wide array of partly hidden sensors 
in public spaces, privacy expectations would essentially drop to zero, in turn, 
legitimating the use of surveillance technologies as such. A ‘effect on personality’- 
approach, on the other hand, does address the possible effects of such public 
surveillance capabilities on a person’s identity, personality and freedom.  
3.2.4.3 EU,	Dignity	and	Surveillance		
Challenging privacy by employing perspectives deriving from dignity did not remain 
a German exclusivity. Some scholar argue that privacy is conceptualized in different 
ways between Europe and the US. While it is based essentially in individual 
expectations and liberty in the US, in Europe, conceptions of privacy are deeply rooted 
in the concept of human dignity. 814  In Europe, the right to informational self-
determination, when it is understood as an essential capability for individuals to 
control the collection and sharing of personal information, is seen as essentially based 
on the perceived dignity of an individual in public, while in the US, legal 
interpretations of privacy are based on a freedom from interference through the 
State.815 While this can certainly be interpreted in many ways, ‘dignity’, as a concept, 
plays a significant role in the fundamental rights framework of the European Union. 
The EU was founded, according to the preamble of its Charter of Fundamental Rights 
‘…on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and 
solidarity’ and ‘…is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law’816 and 
Article 1 of the same Charter reads: ‘Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected 
and protected.’817 With this, dignity has to be seen as a central element to European 
fundamental rights interpretations.  
                                                
814 See for example Whitman JQ, ‘The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty’ 
(2004) 113 The Yale Law Journal 1151.  
815 Ibid, 1161.  
816 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 18.12.2000, OJ 2000/C 364/1, Preamble 
817 Ibid, Art 1.  
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The right to informational self-determination based on human dignity, however, has 
not found a direct way into the CJEU case law. The reason for this may be that in the 
EU context, privacy as well as data protection find more specific formulations and 
therefore making a lex generalis articulation less necessary. The EU legal framework 
has established very detailed regulations for privacy, and especially data protection, 
making it possible to address surveillance issues without taking a detour in 
establishing a fundamental right through dignity. Privacy and data protection are 
clearly defined as fundamental rights in the European Union and therewith mass 




This section discussed mass surveillance as a separate issue in the surveillance 
scenario. Starting with the problems of admissibility and scope, it analysed three 
different legal arguments addressing mass surveillance in urban public contexts.  
Firstly, a right to privacy as enshrined in European human rights regimes, and 
especially in the ECHR, can tackle mass surveillance in different ways, for example 
as individual expectation, as a more collective ‘menace to society’ and as an 
interfering with a right to establish relationships. Within the ECHR, it is important to 
note that the more difficult it is to focus on individuals being the direct subject of 
surveillance, the more a legal argument focuses on general analyses of the abstract 
features of surveillance systems and their communal effect. The argument that mass 
surveillance somehow would impede the right to form relationships appears 
constructed and not very convincing in the context of ECHR mass surveillance case 
law.  
Secondly, this section discussed data protection as a legal argument addressing mass 
surveillance. It can be concluded that data protection appears, as already discussed 
above, as a bridging argument between individual and mass surveillance, because 
systematic data processing on a massive scale enables not only the addressing of 
interferences with an individual’s rights, but also possible overall negative effects of 
data processing as a whole. Big data and massive data collection come with a variety 
of risks, provided it concerns data processing of at least somehow identifiable 
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individuals. Data protection has an additional relevance as it is very likely that mass 
surveillance data processing falls within the scope of the protection of the EU 
fundamental rights regime.  
Thirdly, this section addressed the argument of privacy as a derivate of dignity. This 
offers a new perspective on addressing mass surveillance, namely through its societal 
effects. This argument derives from arguments on dignity made by the German FCC, 
because it is the one Court in Europe which has taken a strong stand in addressing the 
problem of mass surveillance through dignity and self-determination. This enables the 
construction of a privacy perspective based on communal interests, societal interest, 
and the exercise of control. Too much control in public spaces through mass 
surveillance appears as a constraining element which can be challenged with reference 
to societal values rather than individual liberty. In fact, the ‘menace to society’ 
argument appears as a similar argument that is less explicitly formulated.  
There can therefore be three distinct approaches towards challenging the mass 
surveillance systems in Helberg. The first one, based on individual liberty and 
expectation, challenges the surveillance due to their technical sophistication. After all, 
the hidden and all-encompassing surveillance tools do not allow an individual to 
expect such a total surveillance.  
The second argument allows a citizen of Helberg to challenge the mass surveillance 
with an argument based on informational privacy: In this interpretation, a right to 
control and determine information about oneself delivers a strong foundation for the 
protection of personal data.  
Thirdly, an argument entirely based on dignity and personality allows for the 
articulation of a strong chilling-effect type of argument and therewith a focus on 
overall negative societal effects of mass surveillance.  
The following two sections will now move to a discussion of two further issues 
relevant for surveillance in the Helberg scenario: namely private actor surveillance 






Public security surveillance traditionally is understood as an issue for public security 
actors. Public surveillance, understood as targeted or mass-surveillance has in this 
study been described as an issue of public law, conducted by state authorities. 
Particularly fundamental rights assessments of public surveillance essentially rely on 
the classic separation between public authorities and private individuals, where public 
authorities are bound by fundamental rights. After all, states are bound by fundamental 
rights, whereas individual natural persons are entitled to fundamental rights.  
Within the context of public surveillance, however, much of these clear delineations 
have become blurred, for example because technologies capable of surveillance have 
proliferated in the private spheres. Video surveillance cameras, for example, are a 
standard security feature for private businesses. Private security companies operate 
vast public surveillance systems and sensors in mobile phones, small video cameras 
or drones are collecting large quantities of data from public spheres. Leaving aside a 
deep discussion on fundamental rights obligations in the private sphere and for non-
state actors, 818  this section examines the legal consequences of private actors as 
operators of surveillance systems or as sensor data controllers.  
The role of public and private actors in law in general lies at the core of modern 
theoretical conceptions of legal theory. The common story is, of course, well known 
and the lines of separation flow along a horizontal vs a vertical understanding of 
powers and regulation. This section analyses the applicability of European 
fundamental rights to private actors conducting certain surveillance operations. 
Hence, there are a couple of possible options that are relevant for an urban surveillance 
scenario: Private actor surveillance of public spaces, private actor surveillance of 
semi-public spaces and private actor surveillance of purely private spaces.  
The operation of surveillance through private actors is a well-known phenomenon in 
modern urban environments –and is of special relevance to large-scale surveillance 
                                                
818 See e.g. Clapham A, Human Rights in the Private Sphere (Clarendon Press 1993); Clapham A, 
Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford University Press 2006); see also Engle E, 
‘Third Party Effect of Fundamental Rights (Drittwirkung)’ (2009) 5 Hanse Law Review, 165-173, and 
Walkila S, Horizontal effect of fundamental rights contributing to the 'primacy, unity and effectiveness 
of European Union law' (Diss, University of Helsinki, 2015). 
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systems. 819  That is because highly sophisticated surveillance systems are often 
operated by private security companies, on private commission and in functionally 
closed privately owned spaces such as shopping malls. Again, here, jurisdiction as 
well as the applicability of law plays a decisive role in the legal assessment.  
This section examines the role of private individuals in surveillance operations in light 
of the scope of data protection in Europe. It particularly focusses on the so called 
‘household exemption’ in European data protection law and its role in balancing the 
use and gathering of personal information by private individuals from public spheres.  
 
3.3.2 Private	Surveillance	Operations	in	Public	Areas	
This section starts with an analysis of a small-scale surveillance operation: assuming 
a house-owner in Helberg would operate a video surveillance system primarily to 
monitor her own door entrance.  
The legal framework applying in this case is of course the national legal system and 
here it depends on the State’s regulation of privately owned and operated surveillance 
systems in private spaces. While human and fundamental rights protection 
mechanisms do not prima facie bind natural persons, the detailed regulation of video 
surveillance in public places derives from the relevant data protection regulations on 
the national level. National regulation, however require compliance with international 
fundamental rights obligations as well as EU law, particularly the EU Data Protection 
Directive and the directly applicable new General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR), as both explicitly apply in the private sphere.820 
Generally, video surveillance is a form of processing personal data. Video surveillance 
contains data that enables the identification of an individual through physical identity 
and collects information that relates to this identified individual. Private individuals 
or corporations filming public areas therefore might be considered data controllers 
                                                
819 See e.g. Jones, T and Newburn, T, Private Security and Public Policing. Clarendon Studies in 
Criminology (Clarendon Press Oxford 1998); Wakefield A, ‘The Public Surveillance Functions of 
Private Security’ (2004) 2 Surveillance & Society 529; Marquis G, ‘Private security and surveillance. 
From the “dossier society” to databanks networks.’ In Lyon D (ed), Surveillance as Social Sorting: 
Privacy, Risk, and Digital Discrimination (Routledge 2003), 226-248.  
820 See Directive 95/46/EC (Data Protection Directive) (n 305), Regulation (EU) 2016/679, (GDPR), 
(n 303), Art 2(1).  
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pursuant to the GDPR and the Directive. The material scope of the GDPR is limited 
when the issue falls outside of Community Law, when it falls within Chapter 2 Title 
V of the TEU and when authorities process personal data for criminal and judicial 
matters. 821  Article 2 (2) GDPR additionally contains a scope limitation for data 
processing by ‘natural person in the course of a purely personal or household 
activity’.822 Also, the EU Data Protection Directive contains this so called ‘household 
exemption’.823  
The intention behind the household exemption is clear: There are certain information 
collected and retained by private individuals which clearly qualify as personal data, 
for example personal address books or a calendar containing birth dates of family and 
friends. Such information, used for purely personal activities should probably not be 
strictly regulated by the European data protection frameworks. With technological 
advancement, however, new questions have emerged, for example how the household 
exception should be applied to the publication of information on the internet.824 Those 
questions are not particularly new and have been discussed previously: Article 29 
Working Party, for example, has posed this question with regards to social network 
services (SNS) already in 2009. The Working Party stated that despite users as data 
subjects are generally exempt from the Data Protection Directive, there may be 
instances where users ‘…may not be covered by the household exemption and the user 
might be considered to have taken on some of the responsibilities of a data 
controller.’825 Consequently, also the GDPR, albeit taking over the formulation of the 
household exemption from the Data Protection Directive, states in the recitals:  
This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data by a natural 
person in the course of a purely personal or household activity and thus with no 
                                                
821 See Art 2 (2) a), b), d) Regulation (EU) 2016/679, (GDPR), (n 303).  
822 Ibid, Art 2 (2) c). 
823 Art 3 (2) Directive 95/46/EC (Data Protection Directive) (n 305). 
824 For further discussions see e.g. Wong R, Savirimuthu J, All or Nothing: This is the Question? The 
Application of Art. 3(2) Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC to the Internet (2008) 25 John Marshall 
Journal of Computer & Information Law; and Warso Z, ‘There's more to it than data protection – 
Fundamental rights, privacy and the personal/household exemption in the digital age’ (2013) 29 
Computer Law & Security Review 491.  
825 See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (Art 29 WP), Opinion 5/2009 on online social 
networking, Adopted 12.06.2009, 01189/09/EN WP 163,  
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp163_en.pdf accessed 1 February 
2017, 5,6.  
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connection to a professional or commercial activity. Personal or household 
activities could include correspondence and the holding of addresses, or social 
networking and online activity undertaken within the context of such activities. 
However, this Regulation applies to controllers or processors which provide the 
means for processing personal data for such personal or household activities.826  
The GDPR recital appears in line with previous case law on the household exemption 
and the Data Protection Directive. In Lindquist, the Court referred to recital 12 of the 
1995 Directive’s Preamble in order to find that publications and dissemination of 
personal data through private individuals are not covered by the household exemption 
and do hence fall within the scope of the Directive.827 According to the Court, the 
exemption only covers activities ‘…which are carried out in the course of private or 
family life of individuals.’828 Consequently, also in Satamedia, the Court followed that 
view and excluded the collection, processing and publication of publicly available 
personal tax information from falling under the household exemption.829  
The rather strict application of the household exemption extends also explicitly to 
surveillance operations by private individuals.  
In Ryneš, a CJEU judgment from December 2014, the 4th Chamber had to address the 
question, if a video surveillance system installed by a private individual on private 
ground for the purpose of protecting property, health and life of the owners of the 
home would fall within the household exemption of Art 3(2) of Directive 95/46/EC, 
despite the fact that the camera also captured partly public areas.830  
František Ryneš, a Czech national, installed a fixed video camera in his family home 
which recorded the entrance of his home, a public footpath as well as the entrance of 
the opposite house after the windows of his family home were repeatedly broken by 
unknown perpetrators.831 After another attack on his home, the video surveillance data 
was handed over to the police and two suspects were identified and criminal 
                                                
826 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, (GDPR), (n 303), Recital 18.  
827 See Case C-101/01 Lindquist, Judgment (Court), 6 November 2003, ECLI:EU:C:2003:596, paras 
46-48.  
828 Ibid, para 47.  
829 See Case C-73/07 Satakunnan Markkinapörssi and Satamedia, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 16 
December 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:727, paras 43-45.  
830 See Case C-212/13 Ryneš, (n 107), para 18.  
831 Ibid, para 13.  
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proceedings initiated, in which the video surveillance material was used as evidence. 
Subsequently, one of the suspects challenged the lawfulness of the installed video 
surveillance system before national Courts. 
In answering the referred question, the CJEU concluded that such a system did not fall 
within the household exemption and hence fell into the scope of the Directive.832 The 
Court emphasized that in order to fall within the household exemption, the activity 
would need to lay ‘purely’ within a personal or household area, such as 
communications or address books.833 However, as the video surveillance equipment 
was partially filming and recording a public space, and hence it was  
…directed outwards from the private setting of the person processing the data 
in that manner, it cannot be regarded as an activity which is a purely ‘personal 
or household’ activity for the purposes of the second indent of Article 3(2) of 
Directive 95/46.834  
The Court, however, also stated that  
…Directive 95/46 makes it possible, where appropriate, to take into account (…) 
legitimate interests pursued by the controller, such as the protection of the 
property, health and life of his family and himself (…).835  
In reaching this conclusion, the Court also took a turn towards a fundamental rights 
approach to data protection. In its opinion, ‘…Directive 95/46 is intended to ensure a 
high level of protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, in 
particular their right to privacy, with respect to the processing of personal data…’836 
and referred to Case C-131/12 Google Spain when stating that  
…Directive 95/46, in so far as they govern the processing of personal data liable 
to infringe fundamental freedoms, in particular the right to privacy, must 
necessarily be interpreted in the light of the fundamental rights set out in the 
Charter….837  
It becomes clear that the household exemption needs to be narrowly construed and 
interpreted when determining the scope of the Data Protection Directive and the 
                                                
832 Ibid, para 35.  
833 Ibid, paras 31, 32.  
834 Ibid, para 33.  
835 Ibid, para 34.  
836 Ibid, para 27.  
837 Ibid, para 29 and Case C-131/12 Google Spain (n 315), paras 66, 68. 
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GDPR. Furthermore, the CJEU has more and more taken an approach in which it has 
made very clear that Directive 95/46/EC needs to be interpreted in light of the 
established fundamental rights standards in the European Union. In Ryneš, it appeared 
that the Court was very reluctant to leave data processing outside the scope of the 
European Data protection framework, the moment it touches upon spheres that reach 
outside of what can be considers to be within a private and household sphere. 
Therewith, the Court construed the sphere in which data protection frameworks do not 
apply to private individuals very narrowly. It can even be concluded that processing 
data as a private individual does not serve as a shield against responsibilities 
concerning data protection obligations. Any surveillance systems operated by private 
individuals hence falls within the scope of EU data protection frameworks once it 
affects persons outside a narrowly construed private sphere. Considering this narrow 
interpretation as well as the special emphasis of high fundamental rights standards 
when it comes to data protection, it can be concluded that surveillance systems 
operated by private entities will fall within the scope of European data protection law 
and its strong fundamental rights- based approach.  
Here, new technology is especially affected, due to three issues that have become 
especially relevant in the recent years and that seem to have played a decisive role in 
interpreting the scope of the Directive and therewith the scope of the EU data 
protection framework. Firstly, obtaining and retaining personal data from (at least 
partially) public or semi-public places as it happened in the Ryneš -case. Secondly, the 
retention and transferal of personal data to a third party –e.g. to a security authority 
such as the police, or an insurance company, and thirdly, the publication of the 
personal data either in publicly available media (such as online video platforms) or on 
social media/social network services, where the dissemination might be a little more 
limited. In the Ryneš-case, for example, the data has been transferred to the police and 
used as evidence.  
Those questions become even more pressing, once one considers the recent spread of 
data recording and data dissemination devices available to private individuals. 
Recently, debates on the legality and use of so called dash-cams have gained attention 
in some EU Member States.  
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Dash-cams, are small video and audio recorders that can be mounted on a windscreen 
of a car. Typically, those devices record images and sound for a certain time, until the 
storage capacities are full at which point the device starts recording over the oldest 
data. Those recording times vary according to the sophistication of the device, but they 
can have from one hour up to 24h recording times, depending on the drive-space in 
the device. Usually, dash-cams are installed for several purposes, from filming nice 
landscapes up to securing evidence and protection of legal interests in case of 
accidents. Similarly, small weather-proof and outdoor-safe recording devices, so 
called action-cams, can be mounted on people’s helmets, bikes, motorbikes, hats and 
cars, enabling editing and publication of all kinds of activities, from skate-boarding to 
motor-bike tours. This has the effect that in case of accidents or other incidents, those 
recordings can be handed over to the police or insurance companies as evidence and/or 
can be uploaded and published on social media and video platforms. Considering the 
overall proliferation of wearable devices such as, for example, smart watches or 
glasses, it goes without saying that those questions will become very relevant for 
modern data protection regulation and fundamental rights.  
Regarding the above-mentioned judgments as well as the turn towards and emphasis 
of fundamental rights elements in data protection law, it is difficult to argue that 
filming public space for the purpose of publication or transferal would not fall under 
the scope of the data protection directive. The regulation of dash-cams is far from 
unified in the European Union, being illegal in some States while legal in others.838 A 
legal argument often associated with States in which dash cams are considered 
unproblematic is that video recording in public places should not be banned unless it 
explicitly violates privacy where people can reasonable expect to have privacy.839 On 
the other side, arguments claim that video surveillance requires areal limitation and 
special permission.840 Unsurprisingly, a particularly strong legal argument against the 
use of dash-cams be found in Germany: The Düsseldorf-circle, a part of the conference 
of German DPAs on federal as well as the ‘Länder’- level dealing with data-protection 
                                                
838 See Štitilis D and Laurinaitis M, ‘Legal regulation of the use of dashboard cameras: Aspects of 
privacy protection’ (2016) 32 Computer Law & Security Review 316. 
839 Ibid, 323.  
840 Ibid.  
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on the non-public level, for example, regards the use of private video surveillance 
from vehicles on public roads as being not in accordance with data protection 
standards. 841  Their argument emphasized that the employment of dash-cams in 
vehicles is not permissible unless it clearly falls within the household-exemption. If 
the employment does not fall into the household exemption, the use has to be in line 
with German Data Protection Law according to which the processing needs a clear 
and legitimate purpose and the interests of the controller needs to outweigh the 
negative effects on the affected data subject.842 The car driver’s interest to operate 
dash-cams, recording video and audio for the primary purpose of providing evidence 
in case of accidents or traffic incidents, does not justify the mass violation of the right 
to informational self-determination of the subjects recorded on the video.843  The 
interest hence does not justify the interference into the right of individuals to move 
freely in public space, ‘…without having to be afraid to unwillingly and causelessly 
become subject to video surveillance.’844 This argument was even supported by a 
regional Administrative Court decision in 2014. In the case, the regional data 
protection authority ordered the removal of a dash-cam installed and operated by a 
lawyer in his personal vehicle and requested the deletion of all recorder material. The 
lawyer challenged the order in front of the administrative court.845 Although the order 
was not upheld due to some formal and procedural flaws it contained, the Court 
confirmed the view of the data protection authority that the installation and operation 
of a dash-cam constitutes a grave violation of data protection laws and that it does not 
fall within the household-exemption.846 The Court regarded surveillance of a public 
area using a dash-cam installed in a vehicle as a form of control that affects large 
                                                
841 See Düsseldorfer Kreis, Beschluss vom 26.02.2014 Unzulässigkeit von Videoüberwachung aus 
Fahrzeugen (sog. Dashcams),  
http://www.bfdi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Publikationen/Entschliessungssammlung/DuesseldorferKreis/2
6022014_UnzulaessigkeitDashcams.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1 accessed 15 March 2015.  
842 Ibid, 1; and §6b (1) 3., §6b (3), Bundesdatenschutzgesetzes (BDSG) [Germany], 14. Januar 2003, 
BGBl. I S. 66, das zuletzt geändert durch Artikel 1 des Gesetzes vom 25. Februar 2015 (BGBl. I S. 
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843 Düsseldorfer Kreis, Beschluss vom 26.02.2014, (n 841), 1.  
844 Ibid, 1 (own translation).  
845 See [Germany], Verwaltungsgericht (VG) Ansbach, Judgment, 12. August 2014, Az. AN 4 K 
13.01634. 
846 Ibid, paras 56, 66.  
	 257	
numbers of individuals who had no possibility to foresee the surveillance. Therewith, 
the personality rights and right to informational self-determination clearly outweigh 
the interests of the dash-cam operator.847  
In dash-cam cases, one additional problem is the weighting of interests. Naturally, in 
case of a serious accident involving for example bodily harm, the interest of the injured 
persons might outweigh data protection or personality rights of possible bystanders. 
In that sense, a necessity and proportionality assessment can help in balancing rights 
and interests. Nevertheless, as Balzer and Nugel rightly notice, while recording just 
before and during an accident might be qualified as necessary and proportional, the 
daily recordings that happen throughout time that are not connected to the incident are 
the real challenge to data protection.848 Furthermore, permanent recordings from cars 
might create a permanent surveillance-pressure (‘Überwachungsdruck’) for the 
affected public for ‘[a]s long as the traffic participant [the operator, own insertion] has 
the possibility to manually retain and view the recordings permanently’.849  
This is an interesting general argument against mass surveillance in public areas based 
on an understanding of data protection and privacy on dignity/personality rights. The 
mass data gathering with a variety of sensors from public areas could create a 
‘surveillance pressure’ which manipulates and suppresses all sorts of behaviours and 
expressions within a physical public place. The German arguments against dash-cams 
therefore offer a vivid legal explanation on a possible chilling effect of surveillance. 
But they also form a legitimate expectation argument, as the question arises if it could 
be presumed that individuals can expect a holistic and ever present surveillance in 
public spaces.  
It is ever more important to discuss the effects and possible responses to private data 
collection in public since many more cases that fall within this category will probably 
appear in the future. Wearable sensors and cameras, such as for example the famous, 
although for now discontinued Google’s ‘Glass’ project, which was basically a 
                                                
847 Ibid, paras 75-82. 
848 Balzer T and Nugel M, ‘Minikameras im Straßenverkehr - Datenschutzrechtliche Grenzen und 
zivilprozessuale Verwertbarkeit der Videoaufnahmen’ (2014) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1622, 
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smartphone shaped and worn as glasses, or other wearable sensors gathering data 
about individuals in public. Those devices would enable the permanent micro-
surveillance of public areas. Another example is the integration of cameras and sensors 
in driving assistance systems of cars and their increased automation, or the retention 
car sensor data in ‘black-boxes’.850  
Generally, what makes all those situations more complicated, is that in many of those 
cases, sensor data is transferred, retained and processed also by third-party service 
providers, may that be an insurance or the police in case of a traffic accident. 
Technological sophistication, networking and proliferation of sensor technologies will 
unavoidably here and there collect –even if involuntarily- personal data of people in 
public places. This may lead to serious interferences with privacy and data protection 
rights, requiring adequate legal responses  
***	
Another important technological trend that might play a decisive role in future 
surveillance is the tendency towards smart surveillance and the use of data from 
sensors implemented in the direct private environment of surveillance subjects. The 
so called ‘internet of things’ with its ever-expanding proliferation of small devices that 
collect and send data and that create networks might ultimately be used or even 
integrated into surveillance systems. While the internet of things can be used for data 
gathering in public spaces, it will ultimately expand the possibility of data gathering 
into the sphere of the home, and therewith into a closed private sphere originally 
anticipated as the very essence of private life.  
In February 2005, a EU FP6 Project called SWAMI: ‘Safeguards in a World of 
Ambient Intelligence’ started their project on the ‘Internet of Things’ which they 
described as a future  
…world of smart dust with networked sensors and actuators so small as to be 
virtually invisible, where the clothes you wear, the paint on your walls, the 
                                                
850 See Duri S and others, Framework for security and privacy in automotive telematics, in: (2002) 
Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Mobile Commerce, 25–32, 
 http://www.cc.gatech.edu/projects/disl/courses/8803/backup/readinglist_files/p25-duri.pdf accessed 7 
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carpets on your floor, and the paper money in your pocket have a computer 
communications capability.851  
The project analysed technological advancements and proliferation of computer and 
network technology into everyday environments and private households, focusing on 
threats and vulnerabilities852 as well as possible safeguards of these technologies.853 
The project mainly assessed the technological components of data gathering 
throughout public and private spheres, and the fact that all this data can be useful for 
surveillance purposes. Also, the EU ISTAG group had an expressed their vision on 
ambient intelligence in 2003:  
…humans will, in an Ambient Intelligent Environment, be surrounded by 
intelligent interfaces supported by computing and networking technology that is 
embedded in everyday objects such as furniture, clothes, vehicles, roads and 
smart materials - even particles of decorative substances like paint. AmI implies 
a seamless environment of computing, advanced networking technology and 
specific interfaces. This environment should be aware of the specific 
characteristics of human presence and personalities; adapt to the needs of users; 
be capable of responding intelligently to spoken or gestured indications of 
desire; and even result in systems that are capable of engaging in intelligent 
dialogue.854  
	
More than 12 years after the report, some of the visions have materialized: Although 
home-automatization, such as the ‘smart’ fridge, which communicates that there is a 
cucumber rotting away in the back of the fridge and automatically orders a fresh one 
on the internet, is still not an everyday household device, it is clear that devices will 
increasingly become networked and ‘smart’.  
What is interesting, at this point, is how far such developments amount to data 
collection activities through private individuals. For example, a home video 
surveillance system including facial recognition capabilities which connects to data 
from the ‘smart’ fridge could keep track of the consumption of alcohol in a household. 
Would the controller of the system then be a data controller pursuant to the GDPR? 
                                                
851 Wright D and others (eds), Safeguards in a World of Ambient Intelligence (Springer 2010), 1.  
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What if the system collected data of third parties e.g. party guests? Considering Ryneš, 
it might be highly likely that such operations would fall within the scope of data 
protection laws, especially when it concerns third parties outside of the closed private 
sphere. Taking into consideration the recent developments in European data protection 
laws and the turn to fundamental rights, it is clearly not a purely personal or household 
operation if a person creates a sophisticated surveillance system within their own 
private space if that surveillance affects third-party individuals Another interesting 
factor in the household exemption would be the intention to spy on other members of 
the household, e.g. the children without their explicit knowledge or consent. The 
outcome of such possible cases is far from clear, however, there is at least a clear 
fundamental rights and data protection problematic in the employment of 
sophisticated surveillance technologies even within private spaces. It remains to be 
noted, that, as mentioned above, third party platform and technology providers will 
not fall within the household exemption when they process such personal data. 
 
3.3.3 Conclusion	
This section examined the applicability of fundamental rights, particularly data 
protection, to the operation of surveillance systems through private individuals. While 
generally fundamental rights only indirectly apply to the private sphere, data 
protection both as a right and as a regulatory instrument apply to all sorts of data 
processing activities, especially when commercial interests are involved, when the 
personal data is gathered from public places, and when personal data is disseminated. 
The EU data protection framework appears to be based on a rather strict interpretation 
of possible exclusions from its scope. With this, particularly the CJEU has argued in 
favour of a clear inclusion of data gathered from public areas and from third party 
individuals into the data protection framework.  
A dignity based approach to privacy and data protection, although not directly visible 
in the CJEU jurisprudence, can clearly be seen in the discussion on dash-cams. The 
argument that widespread collection of sensor data in public spaces and the 
consequential availability of that data for law enforcement and other purposes could 
create a high ‘surveillance pressure’ in public places, is an attractive argument from a 
fundamental rights perspective, particularly because it lends strong reasons for 
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preferring the communal privacy approaches over individual interests. This shows 
once again some ambiguities of privacy, in which an individual interest to privacy 
collides with a collective right not to be subject to control. This ambiguity becomes 
very visible when discussing individual and private actor surveillance. Dignity based 
communal approaches and individual-centred approaches appear to take 
fundamentally different stands. It is clear, that particularly within European 
Fundamental Rights, the protection mechanisms appear to favour a strict interpretation 
of the applicability of data protection to private actor surveillance. Not only public 
actor surveillance, but also private actor surveillance interferes with the European 
rights to privacy and data protection and therefore require adequate regulation, which 
can reach deep into the activities of individuals. The upcoming years will show if 




The last issue which shall be discussed in this study is an outlook into the future. This 
section addresses certain legal issues arising from the scenario that relate to the 
automation of surveillance and the prediction of incidents. The scenario as such 
contains a variety of fundamental rights issues, foremost related to either direct 
targeted individual surveillance or untargeted mass surveillance. Furthermore, the 
analysis focusses on actors and space in the classical dichotomy between public and 
private, in its many meanings.  
This last issue focusses on two specific surveillance capabilities of the technology 
employed in the Helberg scenario: the automation of recognition of incidents and the 
automatic prediction of events. Both capabilities are a result of highly sophisticated 
analytics technologies operating within the surveilled space. In this sense, automation 
of recognition means that certain incidents can be automatically detected and reported 
via data processing in the system.  
Prediction means that security relevant incidents in public spaces can be detected 
before they happen. The basic idea is that massive data analytics could identify 
common characteristics of security relevant incidents, e.g., by using automated 
detection mechanisms and creating algorithms which are, with a high probability, able 
to predict what is likely to happen in the future.  
Both of the capabilities are playing an important role in making modern surveillance 
tools more efficiently especially in the area of public surveillance, where the amount 
of gathered data often overstrains the capacities for manual and visual analyses. 
Additionally, security organizations with the mission to prevent terrorism naturally 
strive for employment and development in this direction. In light of this research, this 
section addresses technological automation of control in public areas and its legal 
consequences.  
3.4.1 Automation	
Automated detection of incidents in public areas lies at the core of what is often 
referred to as ‘smart surveillance’. Research on so called ‘smart surveillance’ has been 
conducted for over a decade, ever since the shift from analogue to digital technologies 
paired with the increase in computing powers made mass data analytics possible, 
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feasible and more or less efficient. The most common story-line in such research starts 
off with the remarkable technological changes that lead to technology starting to be 
able to recognize things and identify people, for example through facial recognition 
technology. 855  In fact, much of the academic research focuses on smart visual 
surveillance and CCTV, as one of the first sensors capable of certain analytical 
processing.856 Möllers and Hälterlein also track a variety of terms describing the use 
of analytics in video surveillance, such as ‘algorithmic surveillance’, ‘semantic video 
surveillance’, ‘second generation CCTV’, and ‘smart CCTV’. 857 CCTV, however, is 
not the only sensor in public security systems. The future of such systems lies in their 
multiple integration: In systems where data from visual, audio, temperature, chemical 
and radiation sensors can be combined and processed in one system, enabling a 
multitude of uses and information extraction. With the expansion of surveilled space 
comes the expansion of multiple sensors and the integration of many data sources into 
one centrally connected surveillance system.858  
Furthermore, such surveillance systems could also integrate data collection from other 
digital sources, for example social networks, mobile phone networks or travel records 
of public transport systems. With this, data collected and retained from ‘physical’ 
public spaces could be combined with information gathered from the virtual net of 
information in a ‘virtual’ public space. The visual recognition of people on a square, 
for example, and the combination of such information with mobile phone location 
data, could give valuable information on the flow of commuters or the size and 
movement of political demonstrations. The integration of the various sources of sensor 
data is therefore essential in enabling automatic detection functions.  
                                                
855  See Introna LD and Wood D, ‘Picturing Algorithmic Surveillance: The Politics of Facial 
Recognition Systems’ (2004) 2 Surveillance & Society 177, 178. For an early analysis of the global 
growth of video surveillance see Norris C, McCahill M and Wood D, ‘Editorial. The Growth of CCTV: 
a global perspective on the international diffusion of video surveillance in publicly accessible space’ 
(2004) 2 Surveillance & Society 110 and Norris C, ‘Accounting for the global growth of CCTV’ in 
Lyon D, Haggerty KD and Ball K (eds), Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies (Routledge 2012).  
856 See Möllers N and Hälterlein J, ‘Privacy issues in public discourse: the case of “smart” CCTV in 
Germany’ (2012) 26 Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research 57, 59.  
857 Ibid, 59.  
858 See also Kremer J, ‘On the end of freedom in public spaces: legal challenges of wide-area and 
multiple-sensor surveillance systems’ in Davis FF, McGarrity N and Williams G (eds), Surveillance, 
counter-terrorism and comparative constitutionalism (Routledge 2014). 
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An early example demonstrating the technical aspiration in the development of such 
systems in Europe is INDECT, an EU funded former FP7 project which attempted to 
build a surveillance system enabling automatic threat detection by combining CCTV 
streams as well as computer network data analytics.859 The vision of the project was 
to create a functioning and efficient surveillance system which would automatically 
detect many sorts of incidents and threats in public urban areas. The INDECT project 
raised much critical public attention and the actual technical project results are far 
from presenting a successfully and effectively functioning total surveillance system.860 
The main visions and ideas of such technologies are, however, of strong interest for 
this study  
The growing importance of sensors and analytics for surveillance systems is also due 
to the ever-increasing masses of data gathering. Wide-area persistent surveillance 
systems can produce an amount of data that is impossible to analyse manually, for 
example when high resolution video data is gathered form tens of square kilometres 
of terrain from the sky, such as with the ARGUS IS system.861 The main question 
arising from the collection of vast amounts of sensor data is what effect the automation 
of the detection of certain pre-defined incidents have on legal analyses of the 
surveillance scenario.  
It is uncontested that surveillance sensor data mostly consists of personal data. 
Personal data as information about an identified or identifiable individual, clearly 
comes into existence once sensors gather visual data on individuals. Also, mass-
surveillance data can fall into the category of personal data, provided that information 
can somehow be related to an individual for example to her behavioural patterns. 
There are also a variety of problems relating to the principles of data protection when 
it comes to mass-data collection, retention and analyses in the sense that a general 
                                                
859 See INDECT Intelligent information system supporting observation, searching and detection for 
security of citizens in urban environment, FP7-2007-SEC-218086, http://www.indect-project.eu/ 
accessed 9 Mai 2016.  
860 The project, albeit a FP7 funded research project, caused public stir in some and political debates 
due to heavy privacy concerns, leading to a change in communication strategy and led to a debate in 
the European Parliament on the project. See Parliamentary questions, 24 September 2010 E-7521/2010, 
OJ C 243 E, 20.08.2011; and Johnston I, EU funding 'Orwellian' artificial intelligence plan to monitor 
public for "abnormal behaviour" (n 70).  
861  See description of Autonomous Real-Time Ground Ubiquitous Surveillance Imaging System 
(ARGUS-IS), (n 77). 
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prohibition of data processing and a strict purpose limitation manifestly contradict 
unfettered mass surveillance. Yet, even if mass surveillance in the form of mass data 
gathering generally contradicts certain principles of data protection, there might be 
permissible limitations of the right to privacy within Europe’s fundamental rights 
frameworks.862 In many ways, automated data processing for automated surveillance 
systems are not distinguishable from data processing for non-automated surveillance 
systems. They both constitute an interference with the fundamental rights to private 
life in the ECHR and an interference with the right to data protection in the EUCFR, 
provided the surveillance falls within the scope of EU law. Consequently, such 
interferences require adequate justification in order to be permissible.  
Yet, there is a certain element of uniqueness which comes with automation and 
fundamental rights assessments. What automation achieves, is that it has the potential 
to limit effects, and therewith interferences on individuals. From a fundamental rights 
perspective, it could be argued that automation, in fact, would reduce the graveness of 
interferences.  
That is because individuals in public are more being left alone when surveillance is 
conducted by a machine which makes automated decisions of behaviours or incidents. 
Automated security systems could therefore be seen as less intrusive than non-
automated systems. 863  In that sense, one could argue that automation of data 
processing can lead to privacy improvements. Body-scanners at airports, for example, 
were made more ‘privacy-friendly’ by separating analytics and searching procedures: 
if the person analysing the scanned images of passengers passing through airport 
security is placed separately from the officer communicating with the passenger, the 
passenger’s ‘naked’ images would not be exposed to the person in direct contact, and 
privacy intrusions would be minimized. In a similar way, it could be argued that 
automatic recognition of incidents intrudes to a lesser degree into privacy, because no 
actual imagery might ever be accessible by security authorities, unless the system 
identifies a relevant incident.  
                                                
862 See the discussion on permissible limitations above.   
863 See for example Vermeulen M and Bellanova R, ‘European ‘smart’ surveillance: What’s at stake 
for data protection, privacy and non-discrimination?’ (2012) Security and Human Rights 297, 310.  
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Automation, on the other hand, could also be seen as more problematic than non-
automated surveillance. In a 2004 Opinion, the Article 29 Working Party stressed the 
need to pay greater attention to additional safeguard and privacy compliance 
assessment of video surveillance that employs automation features such as individual 
identification, location tracking and automated decision making.864 Also the Venice 
Commission takes the stand that automation poses greater dangers for rights intrusions 
than manual surveillance. Firstly, because such sophistication makes technology more 
functional and efficient and secondly, because automation can significantly expand 
the scope of surveillance.865  
Additional legal authority for an argument in favour of a critical perspective on 
automation comes from the EU data protection framework, in which ‘automated 
individual decisions’ explicitly require additional safeguards. Article 15 of the 95/46 
Data Protection Directive and article 22 of the GDPR state a general rule that a data 
subject shall not be subjected to decisions which are solely based on automated 
processing and profiling.866 Additionally, similar principles are repeated in the area of 
police and judicial cooperation, particularly in article 7 of the 2008/977/JHA Council 
Framework Decision867 and article 11(1) of the new ‘Police’ Directive which states 
that  
Member States shall provide for a decision based solely on automated 
processing, including profiling, which produces an adverse legal effect 
concerning the data subject or significantly affects him or her, to be prohibited 
unless authorised by Union or Member State law to which the controller is 
subject and which provides appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms 
                                                
864 See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2004 on the Processing of Personal Data 
by means of Video Surveillance, 11 February 2004, 11750/02/EN, WP 89, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2004/wp89_en.pdf  accessed 1 February 2017, 24.  
865  European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) Opinion on Video 
Surveillance (n 101), paras 17, 18.  
866 Art 20(1) Regulation (EU) 2016/679, (GDPR), (n 303): ‘1. The data subject shall have the right not 
to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces 
legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.’, Art 15 Directive 
95/46/EC (Data Protection Directive) (n 305) states: ‘1. Member States shall grant the right to every 
person not to be subject to a decision which produces legal effects concerning him or significantly 
affects him and which is based solely on automated processing of data intended to evaluate certain 
personal aspects relating to him, such as his performance at work, creditworthiness, reliability, conduct, 
etc.’ 
867 EU Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA (n 589), 60–71.  
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of the data subject, at least the right to obtain human intervention on the part of 
the controller.868  
It is furthermore emphasized that automated decision making employing special 
categories of personal data requires strict necessity and appropriate safeguards.869  
In effect, this shows that the argument which regards automated systems as less 
intrusive than non-automated systems is fundamentally flawed. Data protection 
instruments appear to be built on the premise that automatic processing of personal 
data is more problematic than manual processing. Increased efficiency, widened scope 
and proliferation of automated surveillance in fact lead to an ever-present system of 
surveillance which, even if no person accesses surveillance data until a ‘real’ security 
incident happens. This can only be seen as a lesser degree of intrusion, if the 
understanding of privacy is purely based on the notion of ‘legitimate expectation’. If 
a person’s individual expectation of enjoying privacy are generally very low in public 
spaces, then automation could in some sense increase the individual’s perception of 
privacy intrusion. If the person’s actions do not trigger the system to recognize and 
report an anomaly to the security controller, there will not be any digital trace or 
records of that person, and the person’s rights would not be interfered with.  
Once the understanding of privacy is based on dignity, personality and self-
determination, however, a scenario in which an automated system monitors and 
controls large areas of public space will be seen as a privacy nightmare. That is 
because the focus of the argument lies on external control rather than on internal 
individual expectations and the controlling of space presses individuals into 
conforming to pre-defined norms of behaviour. 
Another aspect of automation of systems is that by eliminating the human decision 
making factor, at least in theory, discriminatory treatment could be eliminated. After 
all, machines base their decisions on allegedly neutral data and not on other potentially 
discriminating factors. There are however, two problems with such an assertion. 
                                                
868 Art 9 Directive (EU) 2016/680 (n 303). 
869 Those special categories are ‘…data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or 
philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, (…) genetic data, biometric data in order to uniquely 
identify a person or data concerning health or sex life and sexual orientation’. See Art 8 Directive (EU) 
2016/680 (n 303). 
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Firstly, while automation generally takes over the pre-selection of security relevant 
incidents, the final decision of action is still determined by a human being, so that the 
automated decision making process is verified by personnel on the ground. This, some 
argue, leaves an uncertainty in the overall process which should be replaced with 
proper oversight over machine decision making processes, maybe even by being based 
on statistical data.870  
Secondly, another important aspect which is often overlooked is that the programming 
of the algorithms determining what constitutes incidents, events and behaviours which 
trigger notifications or actions, could be problematic in themselves. The INDECT 
Project, for example attempted to define what constituted anomalies or noteworthy 
incidents, by asking end-users such as police officers about what could constitute an 
‘abnormal’ behaviour.871  
Ultimately, the decision on what is ‘abnormal’, and therewith security relevant 
behaviour, lies with the programmers of the algorithms. It goes without saying that 
this requires defining certain social norms in public places which is heavily 
problematic from a political and democratic perspective.  
Once again, the positive aspects of automation in combatting discrimination only 
stand when employing viewpoints that base the argument on an individual’s 
expectations rather than self-determination and communal interest. Automatic 
selection necessarily employs pre-defined criteria which are always somewhat 
exclusive. In this sense, automated selection is similar to profiling, unless the 
automatic selection is somehow completely randomized.872  
                                                
870  See Vermeulen M and Bellanova R, ‘European ‘smart’ surveillance: What’s at stake for data 
protection, privacy and non-discrimination?’ (2012) Security and Human Rights 297, 311.  
871 See INDECT Consortium 2012, D1.1 Report on the collection and analysis of user requirements, 
European Seventh Framework Programme FP7-218086-Collaborative Project, 24 January 2012, 
http://www.indect-
project.eu/files/deliverables/public/INDECT_Deliverable_D1.1_v20091029a.pv.pdf/view accessed 5 
December 2016.  
872 Bruce Schneier has argued that randomization in Airport security screening makes sense, because 
profiling produces discrimination, is biased and less efficient. See Schneier, B, ‘The Trouble with 
Airport Profiling’ in Forbes, 9 May 2012 and Schneier on Security, 
 https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2012/05/the_trouble_with_air.html accessed 7 April 2016. 
See also the discussion by Harris S and Schneier B, ‘To Profile or Not to Profile? A Debate between 
Sam Harris and Bruce Schneier’ in Schneier on Security, 
https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2012/05/to_profile_or_not_to.html accessed 7 April 2016.  
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It has to be concluded that automation in security systems requires closer scrutiny in 
its fundamental rights assessments and data protection compliance analyses. Both, the 
ECHR as well as the EU Fundamental Rights system have yet to respond to fully 
automated surveillance systems. It is likely, however, that essential answers can be 
given within the developed perspectives on a right to private life and particularly the 
right to data protection. In order to grasp automated surveillance systems conducted 
by law enforcement authorities, the Courts might have to look at current 
interpretations in data protection law, and transfer some of the core principles, for 
example from the General Data Protection Regulation into the European Fundamental 
Rights framework.  
 
3.4.2 Prediction		
Prediction in surveillance systems is a fairly new phenomenon. Prediction 
technologies use large quantities of data in connection with statistical and probability 
information in order to foresee the occurrence of security relevant incidents. 
Prediction of incidents is the logical continuation of surveillance data analytics and 
automatic recognition. Once surveillance data is big enough, it might be possible to 
identify certain patterns which, with a high probability, might lead to the occurrence 
of an event.  
An example of such technology is the Pre Crime Observation System (PRECOBS), 
developed by the German Institut für musterbasierte Prognosetechnik Verwaltungs-
GmbH (IfmPt). PRECOBS essentially analyses data through the mapping of occurred 
crimes and the near-repeat methods from criminology research in order to predict 
possible future crimes.873 Another example of the use of prediction and prevention 
technologies in surveillance is TrapWire, a system designed to forecast terror 
attacks.874 By gathering incident reports from multiple sources, TrapWire operates on 
the assumption that sophisticated crimes and attacks require preparations including 
                                                
873 See Brühl J, Fuchs F‚ Gesucht: Einbrecher der Zukunft‘ in Süddeutsche Zeitung, sueddeutsche.de, 
12 September 2014, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/digital/polizei-software-zur-vorhersage-von-
verbrechen-gesucht-einbrecher-der-zukunft-1.2115086 accessed 7 April 2016.  
874  See Botsch D and Maness MT, ‘Trapwire. Preventing Terrorism’ (2006) 22 Crime & Justice 
International 39, 41.  
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the gathering of intelligence by criminals or terrorist. Analysing surveillance data of 
previous incidents and detecting such preparatory behaviours might then reveal 
patterns which could be found in other occasions prior to an actual incident. Once 
sophisticated enough, the hope is to be able to predict and prevent crimes targeting 
certain areas or buildings.875  
Continuing this thought, vast surveillance systems gathering data through ubiquitous 
sensors might very well be able to detect patterns prior to certain incidents. Pattern 
recognition and predictive modelling might therefore develop technological 
capabilities that enable efficient detection of incidents before they happen, and 
therewith allow for the allocation of security resources in order to prevent them. Once 
data is collected and processed on a massive scale and over long period of times, it 
will be possible to detect anomalies within this data. What adds to the functionality of 
predictive analytics in surveillance systems are generally highly sophisticated 
algorithms with self-developing capabilities, developments in Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) and Machine Learning.876 Ultimately, drawing the surveillance scenario further, 
automation and predictive analyses could employ data from surveillance systems and 
their sensors, form social media, from mobile phone data, from public and private data 
bases and many more in order to detect anomalies and predict incidents that are 
deemed noteworthy by the controllers of such systems. While this is truly an extreme 
scenario, today mostly pictured in TV series and movies such as Steven Spielberg’s 
2002 ‘Minority Report’ and CBS’ crime TV Series ‘Person of Interest’, the question 
remains on how such developments could be addressed from a legal perspective.  
Much of the functions of such systems would naturally fall into the scope of privacy 
law and fundamental rights. It is precisely such scenarios against which data protection 
regulations and privacy as a fundamental right have been drafted. Such technologies 
are therefore likely to be found to be incompatible in its entirety. Yet, privacy and data 
protection are not absolute rights. There might be reasons yet to be determined that 
could lead to a discussion on the possible justifications of such fictional systems. At 
least it has been shown since the NSA documents were released by Edward Snowden 
                                                
875 Ibid.  
876  See van Otterlo M, ‘Automated experimentation in Walden 3.0: The next step in profiling, 
predicting, control and surveillance’ (2014) 12 Surveillance & Society 255.  
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that certain intelligence agencies are making enormous efforts to build sophisticated 
tools for communication surveillance. Predictive analytics are enormously attractive 
tools for security authorities that have the prevention of certain incidents as their core 
mission.  
Jessica Earle and Ian Kerr classify predictions into three categories: consequential 
predictions, preferential predictions and pre-emptive predictions.877 Consequential 
prediction describes essentially the use of anticipatory algorithms in order to enable 
choices which avoid unfavourable outcomes in the future – Kerr and Earle specifically 
point out the profitability of reliable consequential predictions for individual actor 
centred risk management.878  Preferential predictions, on the other hand, describe 
analytics which give a reliable estimation of an individual’s likely choices and 
preferences; the prediction here focuses on, e.g., potential consumer choices of 
individuals.  
As a third type of prediction, Kerr and Earle describe pre-emptive predictions as 
‘…intentionally used to diminish a person’s range of future options’ and therewith 
‘…assess the likely consequences of allowing or disallowing a person to act in a 
certain way.’879 Pre-emptive predictions are therewith made in order to influence the 
possibilities of choices and actions for others in the future, in order to avoid certain 
unwanted effects.  
While this distinction appears very much choice and actor–centred, it is useful in order 
to assess the types of predictions that are relevant for public surveillance, keeping an 
eye on the urban surveillance scenario. Predictions in security surveillance fall into 
the first and last category of predictions: consequential predictions in surveillance 
could foresee certain events, allowing the authorities to adjust certain measures in 
order to prevent incidents, and pre-emptive prediction naturally occurs in surveillance 
when surveillance has a coercive or restricting effect on individuals in public.  
From a fundamental rights perspective, both consequential prediction as well as pre-
emptive prediction raises serious legal problems. When some individuals use 
                                                
877 Kerr I and Earle J, ‘Prediction, preemption, presumption: How Big Data threatens big picture 
privacy.’ (2013) 66 Stanford Law Review Online 65, 67, 68.  
878 Ibid, 67.  
879 Ibid.  
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consequential predictions in order to avoid future risks, those with no access to such 
information might be subject to avoidable risk. In such a scenario, access to 
information on risks deriving from predictive systems is crucial for risk managing 
capabilities. This poses serious ethical as well as legal problems such as e.g. 
discrimination and protection obligations.  
Pre-emptive prediction is particularly problematic, when legal systems are based on 
repressive rather than preventive measures. The turn to prevention poses serious issues 
for understandings of justice particularly in democratic judicial systems.880 This poses 
a general problem for the classic balancing between repression and prevention. While 
preventive measures appear to be a less fundamental rights intrusive than repressive 
measures, with sophisticated pre-emptive prediction, this balance might be on the 
verge of shifting. While pre-emptive prediction might be disguised as preventive and 
a less intrusive measure, it might in fact qualify as a collective repressive mechanism, 
with significant impact on fundamental rights and freedoms.  
The detailed legal analyses of predictive analytics in urban surveillance system will 
have to be done by future research. What can certainly be predicted for now is that 
those analytical tools will pose a major challenge for law makers and privacy lawyers 
in the future.  
  
                                                
880 See e.g. Lyon D, ‘Surveillance, Snowden, and Big Data: Capacities, consequences, critique’ (2014) 
Big Data & Society 1, 5.   
This study analysed fundamental rights problems deriving from modern surveillance 
technologies. It asked, how the existing European fundamental rights to privacy and 
data protection address the increasing and unprecedented surveillance capabilities in 
public spaces in Europe.  
Privacy, as well as data protection, have become two essential fundamental rights in 
the construction of the European legal space. Three elements were of crucial 
importance for answering this question. Firstly, the question after the underlying 
conceptions of privacy (and data protection) as fundamental rights. Secondly, the 
assessment of surveillance technologies and their capabilities and therewith a short 
description of existing and future surveillance technologies. Thirdly, in order to assess 
the legal implications of surveillance technologies on the European public space, this 
study required fundamental rights analyses of specific issues deriving from public 
surveillance.  
Part one of this study has shown that while the theoretical birthplace of privacy is 
essentially based in liberal individualism, modern and particular European 
understanding of privacy is also based on a right to personality, dignity, individual 
autonomy, and an overall perspective of community, particularly with regards to the 
strengthening of European data protection law. This also goes in line with the analyses 
of a right to security in Europe: while a right to security does not seem to have been 
very successful in European fundamental rights jurisprudence, data protection, the 
protection of democracy and rule of law appear as clear focal point particularly in EU 
fundamental rights. In that regard, it also seems that privacy jurisprudence appears to 
favour a turn of legal analytics of privacy from a liberty-based approach to a ‘dignity’ 
based approach – an approach in which privacy is understood as a derivate of dignity 
and community. While the concepts of dignity and privacy naturally have their 
ambiguities, from a fundamental rights perspective the latter offers attractive tools to 
address complex legal problems deriving from surveillance technologies.  
This study was structured in two main parts. Part one discussed framework and 
conceptions, and part two analysed specific issues in the light of fundamental rights 
protection of the European public space. The first part analysed the theoretical 
background of the research question. It provided an insight into the legal theoretical 
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conceptualization of privacy, security and data protection. Within the analyses of a 
right to privacy, privacy was analysed as a legal concept, laying the foundation for the 
distinction between privacy as a concept of liberty and privacy as a concept of dignity. 
It furthermore addressed the concept of a European public space and the problem of 
privacy in public areas.  
Privacy as expression of liberty and privacy as a derivate of dignity produce two 
different answers to the many questions deriving from surveillance technologies. 
Understood as from a perspective of individual liberty, privacy protection depends on 
individual choices and expectations. Here, the legitimate expectation doctrine 
occasionally employed by the ECtHR can serve as a prime example for such a concept. 
Consent-based data protection regulation functions in a similar way. From such as 
perspective, individuals have less fundamental rights protection when they enter the 
public sphere.  
Privacy conceptualized as a personality right and as a derivate of dignity and 
autonomy, enables different answers to pressing questions of privacy in public. Here, 
the public space is essentially constructed as communal space, and a fundamental right 
to privacy has the task to protect such communitarian spaces. Privacy is then interfered 
with, once an entity, may it be public or even private manipulates or coerces 
individuals, groups, or behaviours in public spaces. The same applies to virtual public 
spaces as well as personal information: not losing control over one’s information in 
such a way that it leads to fear, a certain surveillance pressure or a change in behaviour 
is a fundamental rights problem, and can be addressed as such.  
Naturally, neither privacy rights based on dignity, nor privacy rights based on 
individual freedom are absolute rights and they can be subjected to permissible 
limitations. The acceptance of such limitation through the Courts, however, then 
depends on the employed privacy perspective.  
Data protection, in this study appears as connecting individual freedom rights with 
dignity approaches. On the one hand, individuals enjoy the freedom to not be the 
subjects of unconsented data processing and therewith should be in control of their 
information. On the other hand, an uncontrolled permanent processing of personal 
data can very well violate human dignity, autonomy and personality rights. In this 
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light, it is somehow remarkable that particularly the CJEU has begun to emphasize the 
importance of data protection as a fundamental right.  
Furthermore, this study gave a brief overview over specific surveillance technologies 
and their capabilities and gave a glimpse into potential near-future application of such 
surveillance technologies. Technologies have progressed to a point where it is and will 
be increasingly difficult for the Courts in Europe to assess all potential fundamental 
rights implications. It appears therefore more important than ever to clearly understand 
the function of a fundamental right to privacy in modern democratic societies, namely 
on the one hand to protect individual liberties, but on the other hand as a tool to address 
the potentially devastating effects of modern surveillance effects on democratic 
societies.  
This study has shown that privacy as a fundamental right in Europe is more than just 
about liberal freedoms. It is in fact about the way that communities and whole societies 
will be organized in the future, in a world which will be interwoven and controlled 
with all sorts of technologies capable of controlling human and societal life.  
*** 
The research question outlined in the introduction of this study asked about the scope 
and limitations to privacy in public places. The first result of this study is therefore 
that the definition of a scope of privacy in public depends on the conception of privacy. 
The ECHR, for example, especially in its early case law, has repeatedly applied a 
conception of privacy in public which, at least to a certain extent, considers individual 
legitimate expectations as determining the scope of privacy protection in public. 
Willingly participating in public events, for example, appeared to lower individual 
protection against being subject to surveillance. This, of course, makes some sense. 
To a certain extent, being in a public place means being subject to a different type of 
scrutiny, control and surveillance, then if one is inside an apartment. This 
understanding of privacy therefore rests on a conception of a right to be let alone when 
one choses seclusion and solitude, but one does not enjoy such a right to be let alone 
once sojourning in a place shared with other individuals.  
The underlying assumption of this conception also comes with a specific perception 
of individual control. The position of legitimate expectation therefore not only 
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contains an element of individual choice, but also an element of individual control. 
Privacy, conceptualized from such a perspective therefore is based in individual 
freedom, in the sense that it is the freedom of the individual to choose certain 
behaviours and to control certain circumstances. Basing fundamental right 
interferences on legitimate expectation and individual freedom, of course, opens 
privacy to critique. Understood in such a way, privacy naturally becomes an exclusive 
concept for the people who possess the material means to choose and control.  
The discussions in this study showed that there are other ways of approaching the 
problem of privacy in public. Again, ECtHR case law also indicates that interferences 
with privacy can be caused by public surveillance, once personal data about 
individuals has been processed. This argumentation then is based on the idea that 
privacy is also about controlling information about oneself, and therewith about a right 
to informational self-determination. In fact, the inclusion of data protection in the 
scope of privacy in the ECHR appears to argue along this line: once information about 
individuals is systematically processed, this has been regarded as a privacy issue. 
Including this argument in its case law enables the ECtHR to address surveillance in 
public spaces, and especially mass-surveillance, with an argument different from that 
of legitimate individual expectation. Control of personal data, but also the potential 
societal effect of a highly controlled environment can be used as counter arguments 
against large-scale surveillance and data processing. The focus on information 
processing enables the inclusion of the public space into the realm of privacy 
protection, and lead to a special role of data protection in Europe.  
Data protection is an important regulatory instrument in Europe and it may even be 
regarded as a separate fundamental right next to privacy, as discussed in this study. 
The core of data protection could therewith contain both an element of freedom 
(choice and control) and an element of community, dignity and self-determination. 
Therewith, data protection can deliver arguments that a right to privacy based on 
individual liberty lacks: it addresses surveillance in public with reference to the need 
for individual control of information paired with a communal concern that systematic 
information processing can have an enormous coercing and repressing effect on 
societies. Data protection as a fundamental right therewith comes with a core of 
societal values of freedom and dignity. This is also what appears to make data 
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protection a strong argument in Europe, not only within the ECHR, but also with the 
EUCFR, the EU data protection reform and the corresponding case law.  
The third line of argument which addresses privacy in public in this study, derives 
from the concept of dignity and right to personality. While those are concepts 
originally coming from classical individual liberalism, one of the core finding in this 
study is that they can be used as a legal argument addressing the surveillance in public 
places from yet another perspective: namely as a communal value. Interestingly, there 
are some legal arguments addressing surveillance in public places that focus on the 
negative societal and communal effects of control and coercion by referring to human 
dignity and a right to personality. In such a perspective, privacy becomes a societal 
value deriving from classical liberal dignity, and this enables the construction of a 
very strong fundamental rights argument against public surveillance. In such a 
perception, the negative societal and coercive effects of surveillance pose high risks 
and a strong interference with rights, particularly in public places. Security authorities’ 
attempts to manipulate behaviour in public places is as such a problem with human 
dignity and therewith interferes with individual rights. It appears that by challenging 
public surveillance with references to dignity and personal autonomy, and therewith 
labelling control and coercion as a societal problem, privacy arguments gain a 
communitarian perspective. In that sense, liberal individual rights have found a way 
to address the complex societal problems of surveillance. This is especially visible 
when it comes to mass surveillance issues: the reference to surveillance as a ‘menace 
to society’ and the overcoming of particular procedural hurdles allowed, for example, 
the ECtHR to address such issues in its fundamental rights interpretations.  
The last aspect of the conclusion in this study is related to the technological aspects of 
surveillance. The capabilities of surveillance and control of public spaces appear more 
and more limitless. This is not only due to the advancements of technologies but also 
to the increased political will to employ surveillance. Furthermore, with enhanced data 
processing in virtual (public) spaces, the opportunities for the intrusion of coercion 
and control in many spheres of modern life appear limitless. This is a problem for 
fundamental rights, because fundamental rights are also built as (utopian) mechanisms 
against control and coercion. The control of public, as well as private space, is 
therewith fundamentally at odds with liberal individual concepts, but also communal 
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conceptions of rights. The results of this study show that current fundamental right 
mechanisms in Europe have the tools to address mass surveillance as a substantive 
problem. Consequently, it is up to these mechanisms to define the limits of 
surveillance, the limits of control, and also the permissible limits to fundamental 
rights. It may be advisable, however, to keep in mind the societal and community 
perspective in the times of ever more present sophisticated mass surveillance systems. 
Otherwise, the European public space may lose its potential for fostering 
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